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Este i tinige’-hu para si Inina Concepcion Naputi Kuper yan si Matatnga Gregorio 
Naputi Kuper, i patgon-hu siha. Put siha na ni ngai’an na bai hu påra tumachu 


































 Gof magåhet na ti siña hu tuge’ este na tinige’ yanggen guåhu ha’ na maisa  chumocho’gue 
este. Meggai na taotao ni umayuda yu’ gi este na karera ya hu gof agradesi siha. I mas takhilo’ gi 
lina’lå’-hu, i dos patgon-hu as Inina Concepcion Naputi Kuper yan si Matatnga Gregorio Naputi 
Kuper. Gi minagåhet, annai hu taitai este na tinige’-hu, sesso tuho’ i lago’-hu sa’ nina’triste yu’ 
nu i tinige’-hu. Hu ripåra annai hu tuge’ este ta’lo na yanggen tåya’ tumulaika gi este na hinanao i 
mundo, siempre u gof makkat i lina’la’-ñiha mo’na. Ginen este i tinige’-hu, puedi mohon na u 
ayuda tumulaika ya u na’lamaolek fumå’tinas nuebo na tåno’ para siha. Hu gof guaiya hamyo na 
dos, yan un diha siña en taitai este yan siña en sangåni yu’ yanggen magof hamyo na gaige hamyo 
gi este na tåno’.  
 Para i asagua-hu, Francine Naputi, hu gof guaiya hao. Gof magåhet na ti siña hu cho’gue 
este sin hågu gi lina’lå’-hu. Meggai pupuengi na dumesbela hao sa’ un tataitai este na tinige’. Un 
sangåni yu’ todu i ya-hu yan i ti ya-hu yan un ayuda yu’ muna’lamaolek este siha. Hu tungo’ na 
gof makkat este na karera para hita yan despues di este, para un na’funhåyan, lao todu i tiempo, 
tungo’ na para hita na dos, matuge’ gi langhet yan i puti’on. Magof yu’ kada diha na un a’ayek yu’ 
para ta hita. Hu gof guaiya hao yan hu gof guaiya i familiå-ta. Makmåmata yu’ kada ogga’an ya 
hu gof agradesi na hågu gaige gi fi’on-hu. 
 Para i familiå-ku: i dos nanå-hu biha as Estella Meno Gofigan yan si Magdalena Chargualaf 
Kuper, si tatå-hu as Terry Kuper, si nanå-hu as Eileen Gofigan, si Lilli Perez, si Joanne Ige, si John 
Naputi, si Sister Concepta, si Paul Gofigan, si Thomas Kuper, yan i primu-hu yan prima-hu siha 
yan todu ni esta manggaige gi langhet (Gregorio Gofigan, Francis Kuper, yan si Concepcion San 
Nicolas Naputi). Hu gof guaiya hamyo yan si yu’os ma’åse’ nu i guinaiyan-miyu yan i ayudon-
miyu. En animu yu’ kada diha yan put todu i bidan-miyu nu guåhu na siña hu na’funhåyan este na 
kareran Ph.D.   
Saina Robert Underwood, si yu’os ma’åse’ na un chachalålani yu’ gi este na karera yan 
hinanao. Hu hasso i fine’nana na biåhi annai umakuentos hit. Despues di FITE Club protest, måtto 
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hao giya guåhu yan un kombida yu’ para ta amotsa. Gi sigiente diha, chumocho hit gi Shirley’s 
yan un faisen yu’ håfa malago’ bei cho’gue gi lina’lå’-hu, yan atan på’go. På’go, uma’asodda’ hit 
dos na biåhi gi mes para un chachalåni yu’ mo’na. Esta hu sångan este meggai na biåhi lao bei 
sångan ta’lo guini: si yu’os ma’åse’ nu un apåtte yu’ nu i tiningo’-mu, i minenhålom-mu, yan i 
estoriå-mu siha. Hu tungo’ na esta munhåyan yu’ gi este na karerån Ph.D., lao guaha otro na chålan 
på’go na bei tåttiyi ya hu gåggao hao para un chachalåni yu’ ta’lo. Gof takhilo’ hao para guåhu ya 
hu gof agradesi todu i bidå-mu nu guåhu. 
 Miget, munhåyan yu’ på’go låhi! Gi minagåhet, ti siña hu tuge’ este gi fino’ CHamoru 
yanggen ti un fa’nå’gue yu’. Annai interasao yu’ gi este na kinalåmten i magubetñå-ta, un totnge 
i guafi giya guåhu ya hu hassuyi hao kada hu hasso i lina’lå’-hu gi este na kinalåmten. Gof magåhet 
na meggai na potta siha na un babayi yu’. Gof magof yu’ na para ta konsigi mamå’tinas lepblo, 
inegga’, yan otro na kosas fino’ CHamoru. Giya hågu, hu tungo’ na mañodda’ yu ga’chong para 
todu i lina’lå’-hu. Gof annok enao gi tinige’ taotaotao-ta. Mumon Linahyan! Na’lå’la’ i Fino’-ta! 
To Noenoe, mahalo nui loa for all your guidance and help throughout the years. I remember 
emailing you when I first moved to O’ahu to ask you about language revitalization in Hawaiʻi. It 
was then that you took me under your wing, served on my Master’s committee, guided me through 
the Ph.D. process, served as my advisor and chair of my dissertation committee, and overall have 
been a huge mentor in my life. From the countless hours of reading and editing my work to calming 
my anxieties down to allowing me to help teach your undergraduate language revitalization class, 
a lot of my growth as a scholar and activist has come from your guidance. I am forever grateful to 
you! 
To Jairus, one of the most awesome experiences in graduate school has definitely been 
finding a professor who was also into black metal! I first walked into your office asking if you 
could give me the basics of International Relations theory, and from there an incredible mentorship 
began. I truly could not have written this dissertation without you, your suggestions, and deep 
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theoretical explanations. I also must thank you immensely for sparking my interest in a whole new 
realm of Political Science as it has helped me become a more well-rounded scholar and has 
subsequently led to new ideas I never would have thought of before. You were incredibly patient 
and generous with your time in helping me with this project, and I sincerely appreciate everything 
you have done for me. This is just the end of one chapter, and the beginning of another chapter, 
and I enthusiastically look forward to the amazing collaborations ahead! 
To Noelani, following your work, scholarship, activism, and pedagogy has been a gigantic 
step in my development and who I am today. From taking your seminar on indigenous theory to 
helping in various projects to co-authoring a book chapter, your friendship and mentorship means 
a lot to me. It seems as if at every point, you had 3 large projects going on at the same time, and 
you completed them masterfully all while serving as Chair of our department, keeping up with 
community involvement and activism, and teaching both graduate and undergraduate courses. You 
have given me a masterclass in getting things done, using your time wisely, and nation-building. I 
look forward to continuing learning from you in the fight to liberate our respective homelands.  
To Terence, I was a curious 21-year-old when we first met as I entered the M.A. in Pacific 
Islands Studies. I was hungry to learn more about Oceania and my role in this beautiful region of 
the world. The first course I took with you, PACS 601, had a profound impact in helping me to 
develop big dreams for the region, get comfortable in my skin as a Pacific Islander, and cement 
my commitment to this beautiful ocean and her people. You introduced us to passionate articles, 
allowed us to explore our thoughts, and guided our work in that class. From here, you served on 
my M.A. committee and now my dissertation committee. I highly respect your advice, 7 years 
later, and look forward to seeking you for guidance as I continue dreaming big for this region I 
call home. 
To Mary Cruz, a sincere thank you for putting up with me through this journey in finishing 
this Ph.D. You consoled me, and at times, toughened me up, to just get this done so I can truly 
 7 
begin an amazing career in our Political Science program at UOG. You read countless drafts, 
helped prepare me for my defense, and overall helped me succeed in this program. You have also 
been an excellent mentor in my new role as faculty at the University of Guam, advising me on my 
syllabi, pedagogical techiques, and helping me navigate the maze of academia. 
To Victoria-Lola Leon Guerrero, a true warrior and fighter for our island, thank you so 
much che’lu for holding down the fort of our Educational Development and Research Committee 
as I finished this degree and journey. You patiently took the lead in our monthly General 
Assemblies and I owe you so much for this. Biba Independent Guåhan! 
To Jonathan Guerrero, thank you so much che’lu for being an amazing writing and study 
partner. Those late nights at the 24-hour coffee shop were only possible with your company and 
the laughs in between working sessions. 
To Jesi Lujan Bennett, you are and always will be the sister I never had. Your life-long 
friendship is something I treasure always. Graduate school was less stressful because of you and 
your inherent ability to calm me down. I am glad Inina has you as her wonderful Nina! 
To Melvin Won-Pat Borja and Camarin Quitugua, my double påri and double måle’, we 
are stuck together for life and I am excited for the future of the island when I look at all of our kids 
and I can’t wait for 20 years from now while we watch Ka’i, Ma’ina, Malinao, Inina, and Matatnga 
lead our island forward. You are both my ride-or-dies! 
To Carlos Anderson and Eric Maravilla, for keeping me sane throughout and being the 
closest and best of friends I could ask for.  
To LeeAnna Acfalle, Jesse Libby, and Joe Mesngon, our weekly hangouts and funny 
conversations were a much-needed break from the writing process. Thank you so much! 
Para i mañaina-hu yan i mañe’lu-hu ni munå’i yu’ ånimu: Auntie Hope Cristobal, Anna 
Marie Arceo, Jimmy Såntos Teria, Anne Perez Hattori, B.J. Cruz, Lisa Natividad, Sabina Perez, 
Fernando Esteves, Kisha Borja Quichocho-Calvo, Vito Calvo, Julian Aguon, Cara Flores-Mays, 
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Leevin Camacho, Ursula Herrera, Monaeka Flores, Machålek Sindålu, Kerri-Ann Borja, Joseph 
Certeza, Kie Susuico, Charles Megino, Tanielle Terlaje Megino, Andrew Gumataotao, and many 
more! 
To my Hawaiʻi family, especially Oceania Rising, thank you for always reminding me the 
importance of the work that we do and the joy of solidarity: ʻIlima Long, Kyle Kajihiro, Carissa 
Nakamura, Lee Kava, Kahala Johnson, Mahealani Ahia, Sophie Kim, Kathy Jetnil-Kijiner, 
Mechelins Iechad, Joakim Peters, Noʻeau Peralto, Haley Kaliliehu, Aiko Yamashiro, Joy 
Enomoto, Kim Compoc, and Micah McClinton. 
To Laurie Onizuka, none of this would have been possible if it were not for you. You spent 
hours and hours helping me navigate the UH system, ensuring I turn things in on time so I could 
get paid, register for classes on time, graduate, have a successful dissertation defense, and so much 
more. I loved just hanging out in the front office to talk story with you and make multiple jokes. I 
owe you so so much and am forever thankful for all that you have done for me. However, just 
because I am graduating, do not think that my prank calls will stop. They have only begun.  
To anyone else who I have not named here, you are not forgotten, I appreciate you, and 














Guåhan, more commonly known as Guam, is an unincorporated territory of the United 
States where the U.S. military currently occupies 27% of the island. Despite such heavy occupation 
and political inferiority, the hegemonic discourse surrounding the military presence in the island 
is that they keep the island “secure.” In this dissertation, I critically investigate this claim and show 
that rather than keep the island secure, that the military through forced powerlessness and a 
continuum of slow, steady, and eventless violence, produces a condition of rampant insecurity in 
Guåhan. Furthermore, I articulate the phenomenon of sustainable insecurity, whereby this 
insecurity is made sustainable as opposed to being raised to the urgency of a crisis through 
mitigation, dependency, and discursive formations. Throughout, I demonstrate how Guåhan’s 
form-of-life is produced via the entanglement of Guåhan’s militarization and unincorporated 
territory status. Through archival research, interviews, discursive analysis, and historical detail, 
this dissertation traverses the political, land, economic, and environmental realms of Guåhan to 
excavate the genealogy of insecurity and the operationalization of violence in the island and argue 
heavily against the hegemonic belief that the U.S. military is the provider of Guåhan’s security.  
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I Tinituhon: Introduction 
“The military is a 12-foot giant in our house. He is bound to step on some of your children.”1 -Dr. 
Robert Underwood 
 
(NON?)FICTION, The Journals of a Shape-Shifter Hunter Entry #1: It’s been five long, humid 
nights since the fight against the giant began. I open my blood-caked eyelids, look out into the 
starless night sky into the void, and shiver with fear thinking about seeing it for the first time in 
that form. My mind is scarred with the image of the giant, standing 12 stories high, pillaging our 
village with its hatchet and poisonous, rabid saliva. Growing up, I never thought the giant would 
ever harm us. Mother always told us the giant was there to protect us, and that his stay in the 
village would always keep us safe. Nobody was prepared for this. Nobody knew the giant’s saliva 
was the origin of the poison in our waters, that his poisonous saliva was the killer of our crops, 
the malicious thief of our vitality. Nobody ever thought the giant would turn his back on us; his 
most ardent servants; his most obedient subjects. Yet, five days ago, the giant unleashed his fury 
and showed his true face. It was a mask this entire time. Beneath the beautiful anthropomorphic 
prosthetic he wore, laid the most horrific face. Or should I say faces. The giant’s face is a mere 
oscillation of forms, never settling on one. Who ever knew that the giant in our midst was also a 
shapeshifter? How does one ever fight against something that can change shape on command? 
Step One: Record the oscillation of faces and isolate them one by one. Step Two: Examine this 
anatomy. Learn its different faces. Step Three:Fight back.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 My home island of Guåhan’s2 anthem is entitled, “Fanohge Chamorro.” The song was 
originally written in English by the first CHamoru3 doctor, Ramon Manalisay Sablan, and was 
titled “Stand Ye Chamorros.” Llagrimas Untalan, one of the first women elected to the local 
legislature, translated the song into the indigenous CHamoru language, and titled it “Fanohge 
Chamorro.” Growing up in the island, school mornings always began with the Fanohge Chamorro 
being sung right after the Star-Spangled Banner, as Guåhan is an unincorporated territory of the 
United States and its inhabitants are American citizens as of 1950. One of the most infectiously 
catchy parts of the song is found in the chorus, “Kontra i Peligru, Na’fansåfo’ Ham, Yu’os Prutehi 
i Islan Guam,” which can be translated to “Against All Danger, Keep Us Safe, God Protect the 
                                               
1 Laurel Monnig, “Proving CHamoru: Indigenous Narratives of Race, Identity, and 
Decolonization on Guam” (PhD diss., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007), 345. 
2 The island is commonly known as “Guam.” However, in this dissertation, I use the indigenous Chamorro (who are 
the indigenous people of the island) name for the island, Guåhan, which roughly translates to “we have.” 
3 CHamoru is the official spelling of the word. I will use the spelling “Chamorro” only when quoting. This spelling 
is rather new and this explains the prevalence of “Chamorro” over “CHamoru” in many of the sources I utilize. 
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Island of Guam.” One night as I was putting my daughter to sleep, I thought about her future and 
her safety, and found myself thinking back to this particular line of the song. Something seemed 
off about it—rather, it felt incomplete.  
Returning to this thought the next day, I realized what was missing about this line: the 
American military. The people of Guåhan pray for security by kneeling on the altar of two separate 
gods: the Christian God and the American military. The famous chorus of “Fanohge Chamorro” 
is only half of the praisal hymn of Guåhan’s security and safety. The people rely on both to keep 
the island out of harm’s way, by either divine intervention or raw military power. To more 
accurately reflect Guåhan’s reality, the song should be edited to “Kontra i Peligru, Na’fansåfo’ 
Ham, Yu’os yan i Militat, Prutehi i Islan Guam,” or “Against All Danger, Keep Us Safe, God and 
the Military, Protect the Island of Guam.” Although not found yet in the actual song, one hears 
this revised chorus being sung in other ways.  
For example, in her 2017 Congressional Address, Guåhan’s former delegate to the United 
States House of Representative, Madeleine Bordallo, embodied this bent knee of reliance saying, 
“History cannot repeat itself, and I want to assure our people that we remain safe, and the United 
States will protect Guam from threats that may arise. We are an important part of the American 
family, and I continue to work with DoD and all our federal partners to keep our island secure.”4 
Echoing this hymn of praise, in response to a North Korea missile threat to the island in 2017, 
Guåhan resident, Virgie Matson, told the Associated Press, “I feel that the presence of the military 
on Guam will help us a lot. They are here to protect the island, just in case something happens.”5 
Regarding the same North Korea nuclear threat, Guåhan’s highest elected official at the time, 
                                               
4 Madeleine Bordallo, 2017 Congressional Address, April 19, 2017, accessed at 
http://www.kuam.com/story/35183680/2017/04/Wednesday/delegate-madeleine-bordallos-2017-congressional-
address  
5 Grace Garces Bordallo and Cathy Bussewitz, “Guam’s worries grow as tensions rise between U.S., North Korea,” 




Governor Eddie Baza Calvo, expressed full faith in the U.S. military once again, saying, “This 
isn’t the first time that we’ve had threats lobbed against our island, but this time, knowing that we 
have a president (referring to Trump), and a White House and a military that is watching out for 
us gives me a great deal of comfort.”6 The military has noticed this devotion and has responded 
quite positively. Upon visiting the island in 2017, Lt. Gen. L. Scott Rice, the director of the Air 
National Guard, exclaimed, “As Americans, if you really want to see where the muscle of what 
the word patriotism means, go no other place than Guam to say, ‘Wow this is real patriotism at its 
core, at its heart.’”7 From elected officials to the average citizen to U.S. military officers, the lyrics 
of “the American military keeps the island safe,” is rather ubiquitous. 
In this dissertation, I write a different song with different lyrics. Put another way, in this 
dissertation, I challenge this hegemonic thought of the military as a security provider for the island. 
Rather, I argue that the U.S. military creates conditions of insecurity for the island due to the 
creation and sustaining of a continuum of entangled manifestations of violence. In describing these 
various manifestations of violence, I use the trope of the shape-shifting giant, reflecting Glen 
Coulthard’s analysis of colonialism as a shape-shifter. Furthermore, I articulate how this 
continuum of insecurity and violence can sustain itself through the introduction of a “permanent 
state of mitigation,” in which actions taken by the military that may create resistance or pushback 
are consistently “mitigated” via unequal exchanges, dependency, or discursive formations. I dub 
this phenomenon “sustainable insecurity” and utilize each chapter as a thematic historical and 
contemporary analysis of how insecurity has been made sustainable here in Guåhan. The heavy 
emphasis on history throughout the chapters is vastly important to understanding sustainable 
security which I dub as the material and discursive process(es) in which insecurity is made 
                                               
6 Phil Helsel, “Guam Governor Says Trump Called, Assured Island Is Safe,” NBC News, August 12, 2017, 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/guam-governor-says-trump-called-assured-island-safe-n792011 





sustainable as opposed to becoming a crisis. Through the historical analysis of events and quasi-
events, I explore the conditions of possibility for this sustainable insecurity. Lastly, I argue that 
the condition of possibility for these insecurities and violences is our forced powerlessness due to 
our current form-of-life as a heavily militarized, unincorporated territory of the United States. In 
other words, I show how Guåhan is subject to a continuum of violence and insecurities as a result 
of our status as a militarized, unincorporated territory, and how this is made sustainable due to the 
military’s shape-shifting power and its creation of a permanent state of mitigation. Marion Levy 
once wrote, “In the science game, it is important to be prepared to define one’s concepts because 
the querulous answer to questions about definitions which one so often hears from social scientists, 
namely, ‘You know what I mean,’ is almost always precisely false.”8 Heeding this advice, I use a 
significant remainder of the introduction to clarify the conceptual and theoretical frameworks I am 
in conversation with or are operating through.  
UNINCORPORATED TERRITORY: THE DNA OF MILITARIZATION  
 In thinking about the 12-foot giant of militarization, I argue that its DNA, the possibility 
for its unique manifestation in the island lies in Guåhan’s ambiguous political status of being an 
organized, unincorporated territory of the United States. Here, I provide the history and definition 
of unincorporated territory status, and in Chapter Two detail the story of the entanglement of 
militarization and unincorporated territory status. In 1898, the United States waged war against 
Spain, in what is commonly known now as the Spanish-American War. This war was initiated 
when the U.S.S. Maine exploded on February 15, 1898 in Havana Harbor, Cuba with the 
Americans blaming the Spanish for its explosion. The conclusion of this short war resulted in the 
Treaty of Paris, which stipulated that control of the Spanish colonies of Puerto Rico, the 
Philippines, and Guam be turned over to the United States, while Cuba became a U.S. 
                                               
8 Marion Levy, “Does It Matter if He’s Naked? Bawled the Child,” in Contending Approaches to International 
Politics, eds. Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017), 99. 
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protectorate.9 The acquisition of these territories caused great debate in the United States; the 
primary question being “Does the Constitution follow the flag?” Americans were debating whether 
or not the Constitution applies to these new territories which are technically under American 
control. The culmination of these debates resulted in the controversial “Insular Cases.” 
 The “Insular Cases” are a series of legal cases ruled upon from 1901 to 1922 that developed 
and legitimized the idea of unincorporated territory status “in order to enable the United States to 
acquire and govern its new ‘possessions’ without promising them either statehood or 
independence.”10 The Insular Cases saw the development of the “doctrine of incorporation,” which 
holds “that the inhabitants of territory acquired by the United States are not entitled to the benefits, 
privileges and immunities of the Constitution until Congress sees fit to extend these rights.”11 This 
logic derives from Article 4, Section 3, Clause 2 of the Constitution, which says “Congress shall 
have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or 
other property belonging to the United States.”12 It is important to note that these rulings were 
heavily tinged with the colonial languages of race and civilization. In one of the core Insular Cases, 
Downes v. Bidwell, it was argued that these territories were inhabited by “alien races, differing 
from us in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought”13 and because of 
this, “the administration of government and justice according to Anglo-Saxon principles may for 
a time be impossible.”14  
                                               
9 Christina Duffy Burnett and Burke Marshall, Foreign in a Domestic Sense: Puerto Rico, American Expansion, and 
the Constitution (Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2001). 
10 Burnett and Marshall, Foreign in a Domestic Sense, 2. 
11 Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider, A Campaign for Political Rights on the Island of Guam 1899-1950 (Saipan: 
CNMI Division of Historic Preservation, 2001), 34.  
12 United States Congress, Providing a Civil Government for Guam, Senate Report No. 2109 to accompany H.R. 
7273, 81st Congress, 2nd Session, 1950, 13. 
13 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 1901, accessed at 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/182/244/case.html. 
14 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 1901, accessed at 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/182/244/case.html. 
 17 
 Another factor in these legal decisions was found in the Treaty of Paris, which ended the 
Spanish-American War. Article IX of the treaty reads “The civil rights and political status of the 
native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the 
Congress.”15 As a result of the Insular Cases, the court ruled that unincorporated territories would 
only receive “unspecified fundamental” constitutional protections such as individual and personal 
rights (court procedures for example), but were not considered members of the bodypolitic. To put 
it more clearly, the Insular Cases established that unincorporated territories were not an integral 
“part of” the United States, but rather belonged to the United States. In the clearest language 
possible, the Insular Cases designated these new territories as “foreign in a domestic sense” and 
“domestic in a foreign sense” leaving us perpetually stuck in a political limbo leveraged differently 
over the strategic history of the United States as it rose from regional to global power.16   
 The legacy of these Insular Cases more than one hundred years later in 2019 are deeply felt 
by those who live in the territories. In Guåhan, it is common to hear the sentiment that we are 
second-class citizens.17 As an unincorporated territory, we have no representation whatsoever in 
the U.S. Senate or Electoral College and only non-voting representation in the House of 
Representatives. Furthermore, as a result of the Territorial Clause, the territories are under the 
“plenary power” of the United States Congress. The hypocrisy of this predicament is that we, in 
Guåhan, have no voting rights in the one government body (the United States Congress) that has 
complete control or “plenary power” over our affairs, which seems very contradictory to the 
foundations of democracy that the United States preaches to the world. In the University of Hawai’i 
Law Review, Jon Van Dyke argues, 
 
                                               
15 Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898, accessed at 
http://www.homeofheroes.com/wallofhonor/spanish_am/18_treaty.html.  
16 Bartholomew H. Sparrow, The Insular Cases and the Emergence of American Empire (Lawrence: University Press 
of Kansas, 2006). 
17 It should be pointed out that many of us do not aspire to be citizens of the united states as we believe in independence 
or free association for Guåhan’s political status. 
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The United States has always governed its territories and possessions separately from its 
states. During the past two centuries, the legal regime applicable to the territories has 
evolved in a patchwork ad hoc fashion, with Congress responding to the unique and 
individual needs of each territory, sometimes with sensitivity and sometimes with 
indifference or insensitivity. Each of these island communities have demonstrated the 
ability to exercise local self-government. They each have a mature and lively political 
structure in which the basic values of fairness and full opportunities for participation are 
maintained at the local level. They each have unique cultures that should be allowed to 
develop in ways that are true to their traditions. In terms of their subservience to the 
Congress and the federal agencies, however, they are still colonies.18 
Former Director of Policy Development in Guåhan, Tyrone Taitano, illustrates this hypocrisy, 
writing, “The relationship of Guam to the States is very similar to the relationship of the 13 
colonies to King George. That’s very disturbing to us.”19 Reinforcing this sentiment of outrage at 
the anathema of the Insular Cases today, former governor of Guåhan, Joseph Ada, exclaims, 
“Guam is governed exclusively under rules designed at the height of imperial fever, at a time when 
some legal fiction was needed to justify the maintenance of war booty, to justify the rule of people 
in a condition similar to serfdom.”20  
Now that Guåhan’s disturbing political portrait has been painted on the canvas of this 
academic endeavor, the next question is “Why Guam? Why would the United States care so much 
to control this tiny island in the Pacific Ocean?” Our former governor, Eddie Baza Calvo, hits the 
nail right on the head of this question when he exclaims that Guåhan’s importance to the United 
States is all about “location, location, location!”21 Former historian at the University of Guam, 
Robert F. Rogers, titled his important work on the history of Guam, Destiny’s Landfall. In his 
introduction, Rogers writes, “If fate is preordained but destiny is not, then much of humankind’s 
loss of innocence on this island called earth is mirrored in the often tragic, but inspiring history of 
                                               
18 Jon M. Van Dyke, “The Evolving Legal Relationship Between the United States and Its Affiliated U.S.-Flag 
Islands,” University of Hawai’i Law Review, Vol. 14: 445, 1992. 
19 Nicholas D. Kristof, “Guam, a Spoil of War, Seeks More Autonomy,” The New York Times, November 10, 1996, 
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/10/us/guam-a-spoil-of-war-seeks-more-autonomy.html?pagewanted=all.  
20 Joseph Ada, Statement to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, December 11, 1989 in Honolulu, 
Hawaiʻi. 
21 Adam Ashton, “Quietly, Guam is slated to become massive in U.S. military base,” McClatchy DC, November 22, 
2015, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article45241053.html.  
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the island of Guam since Magellan’s landfall.”22 By this, he articulates that “Guam, in short, was 
destined after Magellan to be a pawn in the realpolitik of foreign powers.”23 In discussions of 
Guåhan’s usage as a pawn, all roads lead back to geographical location and the subsequent role of 
geopolitics. Guåhan lies in the expanse of the Western Pacific and is the largest island between 
Hawai‘i and the Philippines with a major harbor and the largest between Japan and Papua New 
Guinea with the capability for hosting major runways.  
The island, which is a mere 212 square miles, hosts two large American military bases. 
There is Andersen Air Force Base which occupies the northern-tip of the island and Naval Base 
Guam which sits on one of the former most populated villages on the island, Sumay.24 Regarding 
our proximity to Asia, we also have the 7/7 advantage over Hawai’i. We are seven hours closer by 
plane to Asia and 7 days closer by sea. From a strategic military perspective, Guåhan seems truly 
as Rogers describes, “Destiny’s Landfall.” The strategic importance of Guåhan has led to various 
nicknames for the island including “The Tip of the Spear,” “Fortress Guam,” and “America’s 
Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier in the Pacific.” 
 At this point, the reader may be wondering if Guåhan has actually ever been used to protect 
American security interests? The simple answer is yes. In Guåhan, the words, “the war,” is 
synonymous with none other than World War II. If you ask someone from the United States to 
describe the effects of the war on their homeland, they may ask you what war? In Guåhan, World 
War II is guaranteed to be the first answer to enter one’s mind. On December 8, 1941, the Japanese 
bombed Guåhan four hours after they bombed Pearl Harbor in Oʻahu.25 From 1941 to 1944, 
CHamorus were under brutal Japanese occupation that involved intense manual labor, rapes, 
                                               
22 Robert Rogers, Destiny’s Landfall: A History of Guam, Revised Edition (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 
1995), 5.  
23 Rogers, Destiny’s Landfall, 2. 
24 The former residents of Sumay were not allowed to return to their land and now live in the geologically inferior 
village of Santa Rita.  
25 To prevent any confusion, Guåhan is one day ahead of Hawai’i thus resulting in the differing date of bombing. 
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beheadings, concentration camps, and massacres.26 It is important to point out that the Japanese 
were only able to take over Guåhan because the Americans, suspecting possible hostility from the 
Japanese, removed most of their personnel and their dependents, leaving the CHamorus without 
any defense against the Japanese invasion.27 In 1944, three years into the Japanese occupation, the 
Americans returned with a massive reoccupation campaign for the island, eventually defeating the 
Japanese and re-establishing their colonial rule under the guise of “liberation.”  
This reoccupation campaign and its consequences helped complete the physical 
transformation of the island into our current status as a giant military base. It was after the war that 
Guåhan truly became militarized. Before the war, Guåhan was used as a naval coaling station, but 
was not heavily occupied by the military. The island was run as a naval ship with the highest-
ranking naval officer acting as the “naval governor” of the island. These naval governors usually 
served for two-year terms before being replaced. Regarding these naval governors, historian and 
now local senator Kelly Marsh Taitano, writes,  
These naval governors had virtually absolute rule (answering only to the Secretary of the 
Navy) and governed based on their personal philosophies and individual sets of skills and 
abilities rather than the consent of the governed and without full application of the US 
Constitution. Naval governors had no training in civil government nor much, if any, prior 
experience in this field before being assigned as governor to Guam.28 
This meant that CHamorus during this time were forced to follow the laws imposed by the naval 
governor even if the laws were outrageous and idiosyncratic. For example, the first naval 
Governor, Richard Leary, passed executive orders, which mandated that dog owners obtain a 
license, banned cockfighting, and demanded that the Carolinian residents of Guåhan wear 
clothes.29 In a similar vein, Governor William Gilmer who served in Guåhan from 1918 to 1920, 
                                               
26 Wakako Higuchi, The Japanese Administration of Guam, 1941-1944: A Study of Occupation and Integration 
Policies with Japanese Oral Histories (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 2013). 
27 Rodgers, Destiny’s Landfall, 161-162. 
28 Kelly Marsh, “US Naval Era Governors: Contributions and Controversies,” Guampedia, July 2014, accessed at 
http://www.guampedia.com/us-naval-era-governors-contributions-and-controversies/.  
29 “Richard P. Leary, General Order Nos. 1-21”, Guampedia, September 2015, accessed July 2018, 
http://www.guampedia.com/leary-general-orders/ 
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passed executive orders which banned dancing after 10 p.m., whistling, and interracial marriages, 
and also required males to turn in five dead rat heads a month to their district commissioner.30 It 
is important to remember that CHamorus at this time were not citizens, nor aliens, but rather the 
ambiguous step cousin of the American political family.   
 Currently, the U.S. military still occupies 27% of the island and our status as a forward 
operating base currently swings at full force. Guåhan has shifted from a coaling station for U.S. 
naval ships to lily pads used to fight against the Japanese during World War II, to housing 
Vietnamese refugees during the Vietnam War, to being used as a launching pad and aircraft storage 
location during the Korean and Vietnamese wars. Most recently, our use can be seen in the military 
buildup proposed for the island. In 2006, the governments of Japan and the United States discussed 
relocating 8,000 marines and their dependents from Okinawa to Guåhan. This move, in part, was 
made in response to heavy local, Okinawan resistance to the immense marine presence in their 
homeland, with grievances against the U.S. military that included rape of children, environmental 
pollution, and military aircraft accidents, to name a few. The U.S.’s plans were not only the 
relocation of marines to Guåhan but also included the dredging of acres of reef for an aircraft 
carrier berth, installing anti-missile defense systems in the northern part of the island, and taking 
an ancestral CHamoru village (Pågat) for a firing range. The environmental impacts included a 
45% population growth over a 4-year period, a 6.1 million gallon per day shortfall of water for the 
civilian community, and in accommodating the nuclear aircraft carrier, the destruction of over 70 
acres of coral reef.31 
 Many of Guåhan’s people actively opposed this effort. One of the main factors was a 
lawsuit filed by the National Trust for Historic Preservation, the Guam Preservation Trust, and We 
Are Guåhan, in which they argued that the Department of Defense failed to consider another 
                                               
30 Marsh, “Naval Era Governors.”  
31 Joint Guam Program Office. 2015. Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement: Guam and CNMI Military 
Relocation (2012 Roadmap Adjustments). Prepared by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command Pacific. Pearl 
Harbor, Hawaii.  
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alternative for building the firing range complex on existing DoD property.32 Yet, like a lizard 
growing a tail, the military backed off from taking Pågat and came back with a renewed plan to 
reduce the amount of marines to 5,000 and move the site of the firing range to their existing 
footprint in Northwest Field. However, this Live Fire Training Range Complex would have 
detrimental impacts on the adjacent ancient village of Litekyan (where some of the oldest 
CHamoru archaeological remains were found) and threaten the island’s only aquifer in the northern 
half of the island.33 With this understanding of unincorporated territory status and Guåhan’s use 
as a strategic location for the United States military, I now move to clarify my usage of the concepts 
of “militarization” and “militarism.”  
THE BLACK MAGIC OF MILITARIZATION, MILITARISM, AND WAR AS FORM-OF-LIFE 
In The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle against U.S. Military Posts, Catherine Lutz 
describes the global reach of the United States military, which encompasses more than 800 military 
facilities in 46 countries and territories. She then adds that, “the U.S. military owns or rents 
795,000 acres of land, and 26,000 buildings and structures valued at $146 billion.”34 In her 
analysis, bases are the most powerful symbol of America’s military presence in the world and “to 
understand where those bases are and how they are being used is essential for understanding the 
United States’ relationship with the rest of the world, the role of coercion in it, and its political 
economic complexion.”35 This expansive reach is the result of militarization.  
In this dissertation, I base my operational usage of “militarization” on Cynthia Enloe’s 
concept of militarization. In her article, “Making War at Home in the United States: Militarization 
                                               
32 Joseph Ax, “Republican Pennsylvania leaders submit plan for redrawing congressional map,” Reuters, February 
9, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politics-pennsylvania/republican-pennsylvania-leaders-submit-plan-
for-redrawing-congressional-map-idUSKBN1FT1FM.  
33 Clynt Ridgell, “Prutehi Litekyan continues to push to stop firing range above Ritidian Wildlife Refuge,” Pacific 
News Center, September 7, 2017, https://pacificnewscenter.com/prutehi-litekyan-continues-to-push-to-stop-firing-
range-above-ritidian-wildlife-refuge/.  
34 Catherine Lutz, “Introduction: Bases, Empire, and Global Response,” in The Bases of Empire: The Global Struggle 
Against U.S. Military Posts, ed. Catherine Lutz (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 1. 
35 Lutz, “Bases”, 6. 
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and the Current Crisis,” Enloe defines militarization as “the contradictory and tense social process 
in which civil society organizes itself for the production of violence.”36 Militarization, as a process, 
involves an intensification of labor and resources allocated to military purposes and involves a 
shift in general societal beliefs and values in ways necessary to legitimate the use of force.37 Enloe 
also discusses the concept of militarism, which she defines as the societal emphasis on martial 
values. Militarism is an ideology, while militarization is a both a discursive and material process, 
and in this dissertation, I demonstrate the current effectiveness of both concepts in Guåhan. 
Enloe writes that militarization is “intimately connected not only to the obvious increase 
in the size of armies . . . but also the less visible deformation of human potentials into the 
hierarchies of race, class, gender, and sexuality, and to the shaping of national histories in ways 
that glorify and legitimate military action.”38 Revealing the ubiquitous nature of militarization, 
Barbara Sutton and Julie Novkov write, “Militarization currently permeates mundane activities, 
shapes cultural values, and filters into paramount institutions such as the media and the education 
system.”39 To this extent, militarization acts a structuring force of society that produces the erasure 
and/or inferior positioning of populations like Pacific Islanders and places like islands. This 
societal structuring is necessary to the smooth functioning of militarization because at the core of 
militarization and militarism is the mobilization of various social forces. According to Martin 
Shaw, “Militarism depends, first, on the typical social forces mobilized in military power. Armed 
actors always mobilize social resources and social constituencies.”40  
                                               
36 Catherine Lutz, “Making War at Home in the United States: Militarization and the Current Crisis,” American 
Anthropologist, 104, no.3 (2002): 723. 
37 Lutz “Making War,” 723. 
38 Lutz, “Making War,” 723. 
39 Barbara Sutton and Julie Novkov, “Rethinking Security, Confronting Inequality: An Introduction, In Security 
Disarmed: Critical Perspectives on Gender, Race, and Militarization, eds. Barbara Sutton, Sandra Morgen, and 
Julie Novkov (New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2008), 20.  
40 Martin Shaw, “Twenty-first century militarism: A historical-sociological framework,” In Militarism and 
International Relations: Political economy, security, and theory, eds. Anna Stavrianakis and Jan Selby (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 23. 
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In understanding the social fabric in which militarization is produced and subsequently 
justified, it is important to understand the role of modern technology and the new face of justifying 
warfare. Shaw writes that, “Western militarism centres on the ideological nexus between 
governments and electorates/media audiences who are mobilized through a combination of 
patriotism lite and a nationalist emphasis on force-protection.”41 Militarization inherently relies on 
this nexus and partnership of government and media. Governments are the primary producers of 
this new militarism, according to Shaw, but can never produce it independently. This analysis of 
operationalization of militarization provides a theoretical background to understanding that 
militarization is not a monolith that can be solved simply, if at all. Rather, I relate this analysis to 
the Foucauldian concept of the “dispositif.”  
According to Foucault, the dispositif is a complex ensemble of discourses, agencies, and 
apparatuses of implementation. Michael Shapiro elaborates this concept in his book, The Global 
Justice Dispositif, describing the dispositif as “a thoroughly heterogenous ensemble consisting of 
discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, 
scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions...the said as much as the 
unsaid...the elements of the apparatus.”42 In another of his works, “What Does A Weapon See?,” 
Shapiro provides the example of the weapon dispositif. In his description of the development of a 
weapon, he describes how a weapon is not just part of the operation of a killing force, but in order 
to truly understand what goes into making that weapon, we need to understand the societal forces 
that collaborate in its production. Jairus Grove illuminates this well writing,  
 
Shifting our interests from events and acts to processes and habits directs our attention to 
how the outbreak of war may be subterranean in habitual activities that are not seemingly 
warlike. We should not be fooled by the common sense that because things are not 
always at the fever-pitch of war, war is not working behind the scenes in our imaginative, 
                                               
41 Shaw, “Twenty-First Century,” 29-30.  
42 Michael J. Shapiro, War Crimes, Atrocity and Justice (Malden: Polity Press, 2015), 14. 
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judging, and bodily faculties as well as our ports, freeways, internet connections, satellite 
feed, and toxic runoff, emotional and molecular.43 
Throughout this dissertation, I attempt to dissect the various entanglements and intertwining of 
militarization’s dispositif here in Guåhan and its tendency towards invisibility and normalcy. 
Kanaka Maoli activist, Kaleikoa Kaeo, uses the metaphor of the heʻe or octopus in ‘Ōlelo Hawaiʻi, 
in understanding the U.S. military’s reach in the Pacific. He metaphorizes the Pacific Command 
(which has recently been renamed to the Indo-Pacific Command) in Oʻahu as the core of an 
octopus which spreads its tentacles to places such as Guåhan, the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands (CNMI), and Okinawa. In a similar vein, I use the metaphor of the shape-shifting 
12-foot giant as a way to describe the militarized manifestations of colonial violence, insecurity, 
and power in the island. 
 Moving beyond militarization and militarism, I argue in this dissertation that it is the 
combination of militarization and our status as an unincorporated territory of the United States and 
our status as an island that creates this form-of-life which oozes of sustainable insecurity. My usage 
of form-of-life is taken from Giorgio Agamben who argued, “A life that cannot be separated from 
its form is a life for which what is at stake in its way of living is living itself. It defines a life–
human life– in which the single ways, acts, and processes of living are never simply facts but 
always and above all possibilities of life.”44 I aim to understand our lives here in Guåhan and the 
entire fabric of society as a creation with a genealogy in forced powerlessness and violence, 
resulting from the larger social fabric of war. Jairus Grove invites us to think about war on a deeper 
level, writing, “I want to consider the possibility of war and warlike relations as processes of 
making a form-of-life in which warfare is normal. And what I mean by normal is much more than 
what we mean when we use concepts like ideology or legitimacy of discipline. By normal, I mean 
the very fabric of relations that makes a form-of-life and a world: a war body, a war assemblage, 
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a war ecology.”45 Furthermore, Grove argues, “So to say that we live in a global state of war, and 
that the making of the Eurocene was that making of a global state or war is to say that war 
intensifies the field of relations that make the world what is it right now not that it exhausts the 
possibility of what the world can become.”46 Similarly, I aim to excavate the genealogy of 
militarization and unincorporated territory as the fabrics that have attempted to mold our current 
form-of-life, destroy old forms-of-life that we had, and argue, similarly to Grove, that there are 
other forms-of-life again possible for us here in Guåhan. I privilege the usage of form-of-life over 
ontology for this reason as well. Ontology is too static and totalizing, and it tends to depoliticize 
and dehistoricize, connoting perpetuity. In using form-of-life, I am arguing that our livelihoods are 
not static, and I draw attention to how CHamoru and Guåhan forms-of-life are not completely 
eradicated, and that it is not too late to resurge to a more genuine form-of-life not rooted in our 
dispossession and oppression.  
POWER IS EVERYWHERE 
 I argue that in order to understand Guåhan and its militarized form-of-life, it is necessary 
to understand geopolitics and the larger discipline of International Relations (IR), and thus my 
usages of the terms “power” and “security” come directly from theoretical developments in IR. 
Within the field of IR, there are three dominant schools of thought: realism, liberalism, and 
constructivism. Realism, traditionally, is the school most associated with the theorization of power, 
although, as I will show, each school of thought is ultimately rooted in understanding the role of 
power in international politics. Power is core to the discipline of politics. For example, Hans 
Morgenthau writes, “International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power … Whatever 
the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.”47 In this project, I 
demonstrate how the United States creates powerlessness for Guåhan, and that it is through this 
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exercise of power that powerlessness for the island is teleologically sought. To be stripped of 
power is an end in itself for the sustenance of military presence here.  
 Perhaps the most widely used definitions of power come in the form of a theoretical battle 
between the national power approach and the relational power approach. The national power 
approach is most commonly used by neorealists, who argue that the anarchy of the international 
system is the permissive cause of war. Since the world is composed of a multitude of sovereigns 
with no overarching world government or enforcer, states can never know the intentions of other 
states, and thus must always, as rational actors, maximize either their security or power.48 
According to the national power approach, the power of states is determined through a lump sum 
quantification of a country’s resources, particularly, the level of military expenditure, size of the 
armed forces, gross national product, territory, and population. Critics of the national power 
approach argue that a lump sum quantity of material resources does not accurately provide an 
indicator of the aggregate power of a state. Brian Schmidt argues, for example, “At the end of the 
day, it is not the mere possession of power resources that matters, but the ability to convert these 
into actual influence.”49 The second critique of the national power approach deals with the 
fungibility of resources and power. David Baldwin defines fungibility as “the ease with which 
power resources useful in one issue-area can be used in other issue-areas.”50 For example, does a 
state’s possession of nuclear weapons guarantee that these weapons can be used in areas such as 
trade? Critics argue that this is not the case and that a lump sum approach to power as resources 
assumes fungibility.  
                                               
48 I use “either security or power” because there is a dichotomy within Realism between offensive realists and 
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Contrasted to the national power approach is the relational power approach, which can be 
traced to famed political scientist Robert Dahl. Dahl explained power as the following: “A has 
power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do.”51 
Schmidt fleshes out this definition further, “Power is a process of interaction whereby a state is 
able to exercise influence over the actions of another state. Power as a set of resources is deemed 
to be less important than the actual ability of actor A to change the behavior of actor B.”52 Unlike 
the national power approach, the relational power approach does not need to take fungibility into 
account because it does see power as a lump sum. Rather, proponents of the national power 
approach disaggregate power into various components. What is more important than the 
possession of resources is the effect on another’s behavior. 
In this dissertation, I argue that this dichotomy, while theoretically engaging and informing, 
does not accurately account for the saturation of U.S. military power here in the island. Rather, I 
argue that power is a polymorphous character giving rise to the shape-shifting violences of the 
military. Further guiding my approach to the operation of power in Guåhan, I turn to Michael 
Barnett and Raymond Duvall’s article, “Power in International Politics.” Barnett and Duvall argue 
that the problem with International Relations is the discipline’s privileging of one particular form 
of power. Viewing this as theoretical myopia, they encourage scholars of IR to rather, “employ 
multiple conceptions of power and develop a conceptual framework that encourages rigorous 
attention to power in its different forms.”53 
From this, they theorize a taxonomy of power with four varieties: compulsory power, 
institutional power, structural power, and productive power. Compulsory power is characterized 
by relations of interaction of direct control by one actor over another. This power type is most 
closely related to Dahl’s definition and has an “emphasis on control by identifiable actors over the 
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objections of other actors through development (even if only symbolically) of resources.”54 With 
compulsory power, there is an identifiable actor and the exercise of direct control. An example 
found in this dissertation is the military’s land takings, in which a clear actor (the military), outright 
stole/continues to steal CHamoru land. Institutional power’s emphasis is on the “formal and 
informal institutions that mediate between A and B, as A, working through the rules and 
procedures that define those institutions, guides, steers, and constrains the actions (or nonactions) 
and conditions of existence of others.”55 With institutional power, A does not necessarily possess 
the institution which constrains and shapes B. Rather, because A has a particular relationship with 
relevant institutions, its actions exercise power over B. As Barnett and Duvall explain it, “Long-
standing institutions represent frozen configurations of privilege and bias that can continue to 
shape the future choices of actors.”56 The prime example I examine in this project is the treatment 
of Guåhan by the United Nations and on the world stage.  
The final two types of power, productive and structural power, are concerned with 
constitutive social processes. Debates on power include whether power is something that one 
possesses and then uses or whether power is created and constituted through interactions and 
various processes. Differentiating themselves from compulsory power, productive and structural 
power can exist even in situations where there is no visible existence of expressed conflict. 
Productive power is “the constitution of all social subjects with various social powers through 
systems of knowledge and discursive practices of broad and general social scope.”57 Productive 
power’s usage of discourse is Foucauldian, referring to the microfields that “define the 
(im)possible, the (im)probable, the natural, the normal, and what counts as a problem.”58 For 
example, the discursive processes and subjectivity created from classifications like “civilized,” 
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“rogue,” “Western,” or “democratic,” are all forms of the productive power of discourse. The last 
chapter regarding the liberation discourse and World War II commemoration demonstrates the 
power of imaginative violence and the CHamoru subjectivity produced in a particular postbellum 
ordering of their world.  
The fourth and final type of power is structural power, which I argue Guåhan, along with 
compulsory power, is saturated with to the greatest capacity. Structural power concerns the 
determination of social capacities and interests and can be seen as a constitutive process. Structural 
power is a core component of the mechanization of colonialism as the structural position of A is 
enabled via the structural position of B. Examples of structural constitutive processes include the 
master-slave dialectic or the capital-labor structure. In the most obvious way, our status as both an 
unincorporated territory and a military base is demonstrative of the sheer intensity of structural 
power exercised over the island. They are both rooted in colonialism, which is in itself a structure 
and structuring force, the metropole-periphery, or more relevantly, metropole-island constitutive 
process. 
This constitutive U.S.-Guåhan relationship and structural power is the theoretical lynchpin 
of Michael Lujan Bevacqua’s dissertation, “Chamorros, Ghosts, Non-voting Delegates: GUAM! 
Where the Production of America’s Sovereignty Begins.” Bevacqua argues that rather than accept 
that Guåhan is irrelevant or inherently powerless, one needs to look at Guåhan’s ambiguous 
political status as sitting at the center of constituting American power and empire. He writes, “The 
decolonizing of the space between Guam and the United States and sovereignty means showing 
the structure by which Guam potentially sits at the center of American power, and that there are a 
litany of ways in which its banality, its geography, its coloniality all intersect....to constitute the 
United States, its power, its authority, its might.”59  
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Bevacqua’s work helps to clarify an important point regarding my usage of power in this 
project. As mentioned, I treat power as a polymorphous character and argue that privileging one 
is insufficient to completely understand Guåhan’s situation. Barnett and Duvall utilize these 
multiple concepts of power to “capture the different and interrelated ways in which actors are 
enabled and constrained in determining their circumstances.”60 I analyze how the United States 
military and federal government exercises various forms of power over the island leading to a 
continuum of violences. However, I am not arguing that Guåhan is inherently powerless in any 
shape or form. Genealogically linking my work to Bevacqua’s, my purpose is to show how 
political, economic, land, or environmental issues or concerns are consistently subservient to U.S. 
national security concerns in the Asia-Pacific region, which I argue is a state of insecurity and 
violence. This is not a demonstration of Guåhan’s inherent powerlessness, but rather an 
examination of the methods by which Guåhan is forcefully made powerless because of its strategic 
importance. This powerlessness, as a result of our unincorporated territory status, allows the U.S. 
to decide what their role is in our nation here in Guåhan. To return to the giant metaphor, the 
military becomes a 12-foot giant where it would only be a 5-foot giant in other political entities 
such as states of the U.S. or other nation-states for example.  
SECURITY: DO WE HAVE IT OR NOT? 
 Directly related to power is the way that “security” is utilized here in Guåhan. The 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary’s definition of security is “the quality or state of being secure such 
as a. freedom from danger, b. freedom from fear or anxiety, and c. freedom from the prospect of 
being laid off.”61 In this dissertation, I invoke this rudimentary definition of security. However, to 
show how Guåhan is a political anomaly which International Relations as a field cannot accurately 
engage with, I also challenge the conventional IR definition of security. According to the security 
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studies canon, security is defined as “the identification of threats to a particular referent object and 
the formulation of policy responses to those threats.”62 David Mutimer continues this definition of 
security by establishing its traditional parameters: threats are military, referent object is the state, 
and the responses are strategic policies.” As will be further detailed and theorized in the following 
chapter, as an unincorporated territory, Guåhan is not part of the referent object of American 
national security concerns, but is rather used as a response to threats.  
Beyond this traditional IR definition of security as military, I also invoke the genealogy of 
critical security studies and expand the scope of security to include alternative securities such as 
political, environmental, human, and economic security to see if the military keeps Guåhan 
“secure” in these ways. It is for this reason that I intend this work be in conversation with critical 
security studies. It is important to note that there is no clear definition fixing the meaning of the 
word “critical” within critical security studies. In their introduction to the subject, Columba 
Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams, write, “we take the boundaries of critical security studies to 
be defined by those who frame their work using the label.”63 Similarly, Keith Krause and Michael 
C. Williams in their volume, Critical Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, help illuminate what 
is meant by “critical.” They write, “Our appending of the term critical to security studies is meant 
to imply more an orientation toward the discipline of security studies than a precise theoretical 
label.”64  
In attempting to provide a unifying theme for critical security studies, Richard Wyn Jones, 
writes that CSS is an approach that “eschews statism, recognizes that non-military issues have a 
place on the security agenda as well as military issues, and anchors the theory and practice of 
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security in a broader concern with human emancipation.”65 In his key text, Theory of World 
Security, Ken Booth reinforces this, arguing that unlike traditional security studies, critical security 
studies should be used for the purpose of emancipation. Emancipation as described by Booth is 
“freeing individuals from war, the threat of war, poverty, poor education, and political 
oppression.”66 Thus, for Booth and others in the Aberystwyth School, security and emancipation 
are two sides of the same coin. Booth writes that, “Emancipation is the only permanent hope of 
becoming. Security is required, and not just survival. In this sense, security is equivalent to 
survival-plus (the plus being some freedom from life determining threats and therefore space to 
make choices).”67  
In this dissertation, I demonstrate how the invocation of American “national security” in 
Guåhan and the island’s use in the defense of this national security has been quite contrary to forms 
of emancipation. Rather, using these definitions of security within CSS, I strongly argue that the 
United States has made the island and its people insecure. As this dissertation shows, the island 
and its people must feel insecure in order to ensure a need for someone to “secure” the island, thus 
enabling military presence and a situation of sustainable insecurity. Some of the key concepts of 
critical security studies include deepening and broadening. Deepening security means moving 
beyond the state as the referent object of security, and broadening security means to move beyond 
the military sector of analysis to include other sectors of a referent object such as the 
environment.68 I justify situating this dissertation within critical security studies as I move beyond 
and critique the traditional military-defined, state-centered approach to security and muddy the 
conceptual waters to allow an analysis of Guåhan security to take center-stage in various 
manifestations.  
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Barbara Sutton and Julie Novkov ask the question, “What are the gaps between dominant 
conceptions of security and the interests of ordinary citizens, especially those in marginalized 
positions?”69 In many ways, this dissertation attempts to answer this question in the uniquely 
colonial and hypermilitarized case of Guåhan. Theoretically taking from the security studies 
literature, I argue that in the application of all definitions of security, the United States makes us 
more insecure than they do secure, and furthermore, related to my power argument, that any side 
effect of security is a demonstration of forced powerlessness rather than an ontology. Sutton and 
Novkov argue that “The dominant conception of national security rests on the assumption that 
security, through the enforcement of militarized policies, surveillance, and state secrecy, will 
eventually trickle down to the majority of the population.”70 This dissertation is a direct challenge 
to this dominant conception and to use an industrial metaphor, if the production of American 
national security produces the electricity for the United States to continue running, what trickles 
down to Guåhan is unreliable electricity, shutting on and off frequently, so that we always know 
that their power is better and more reliable, which makes us more dependent. Similar to 
Bevacqua’s notion of Guåhan sitting at the center of American power, I argue similarly that 
Guåhan is where American security is produced specifically in Asia and Oceania, but to the 
expense of the genuine security of the people of the island. As representatives at the International 
Women’s Summit to Redefine Security argued in 2000, “National security policies have done little 
for women and children but instead have promoted increased global militarization and bred 
insecurity as economic and environmental vulnerability of local communities worsened.”71 
By genuine security, I invoke a long line of demilitarization, feminist activists, who have 
done some of the most important thinking about security and its implication for the marginalized, 
particularly, Women for Genuine Security. Women for Genuine Security is a group promoting 
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security based on justice and respect across national boundaries, a world free of militarism, 
violence, and all forms of sexual exploitation. In their advocacy of genuine security, they invoke 
the United Nations Development Program Report of 1994, which advocates for a human security 
paradigm, in which the bases of security are that: (1) The physical environment must be able to 
sustain human and natural life, (2) People’s basic needs for food, clothing, shelter, health care, and 
education must be guaranteed, (3) People’s fundamental human dignity should be honored and 
cultural identities respected, and (4) People and the natural environment should be protected from 
avoidable harm.72 Furthermore, their positive conception of security is related to Booth’s notion 
of security as emancipation. They assert that working for genuine security includes, “ending all 
forms of colonialism and occupation, valuing the complex ecological web that sustains human 
beings and of which we are all a part, eliminating oppressions based on gender, race, class, 
heterosexuality, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, able body-ism, and other significant differences, 
and redefining manhood.”73 I share an affinity with many of their goals, and in the conclusion, 
provide possibilities for genuine Guåhan security. However, a core component of this dissertation 
is that genuine Guåhan security cannot ever be actualized as long as our form-of-life as a 
militarized, unincorporated territory of the United States continues, with each chapter 
demonstrating a different component of insecurity and violence. It is also important to note that 
these goals of genuine security are normative, but as I argue in the conclusion, the real-life 
predators lurking in the international system still require an answer that may conflict with the goals 
of genuine security. However, I argue that these normative goals should still remain the goals of 
security policy. 
Thus, I am careful in my engagement with critical security studies to never forget Guåhan’s 
militarized reality. Within security studies, there is a debate regarding security and militarism with 
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the most recent turn in the field tending to erase militarism. As explained by Anna Stavrianakis 
and Maria Stern,  
Yet, as security seeps into spaces previously unfamiliar to international relations, we lost 
sight of its limits in relation to other critical concepts and practices that also lie at the 
heart of the discipline. In particular, militarism…has never received the widespread and 
sustained focus it warrants in either traditional variants of security studies. The prevalent 
emphasis on security has taken precedence over the study of the ways in which war and 
militarism continue to permeate societies the world over, in different forms and different 
degrees.74 
This turn away from militarism in security studies stems from the post-Cold War intellectual 
trajectory away from great power politics and the rise of liberalism as well as an emphasis on this 
new human security. This project critiques an intellectual diminution of the role of security 
problems and sees them as co-constitutive in the case of Guåhan. My normative analysis of what 
may be considered human security issues is not made with a conceptual turn away from militarism 
as an ideology or militarization as a process. Rather, I see the connection between the two concepts 
as Stavrianakis and Stern do, “War and militarism have generated insecurity in a variety of forms– 
physical, gendered, food and health insecurity–through direct physical violence and the attendant 
strategies thereof that have effects that are then labelled as security problems.”75 This project 
attempts to further emphasize the continuing importance of war, militarism, and militarization as 
the origin of many security problems around the world, particularly in regions such as Micronesia 
and in islands like Guåhan. 
VIOLENCE IN GUÅHAN: SLOW, EVENTLESS, AND STEADY  
 Forging the previous sections together, I argue that because of the exercise of 
polymorphous American military power and Guåhan’s political status as an unincorporated 
territory, our consequent exclusion from American security concerns has led to multiple forms of 
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violence committed against the island and its people. Because the trend in security studies turns 
away from militarization and militarism, framing this dissertation simply as human security 
problems hurts my emphasis on the 12-foot giant’s effect on my homeland. Furthermore, using 
security alone as my conceptual framework would not be sufficient to critique the actions taken in 
the name of national security that have harmed Guåhan and its people.  
To assist in understanding this argument, it is important to theorize my notion of violence. 
For this dissertation, I argue that the violence committed against Guåhan and its people is slow, 
eventless, and steady, thus challenging dominant notions of what violence is supposed to do or 
what shape it is supposed to have. Keeping with the shape-shifting giant metaphor, I compare the 
seeming invisibility of violence as slow, steady, and eventless as one of the giant’s most excellent 
camouflages amongst its arsenal of control. I argue that these shapes form a “continuum of 
violence” as described by many feminists.  
Feminists have long been noting and interrogating the continuum of violence and the 
inadequacy of the categories that distinguish between different forms of violence, thus 
problematizing the lines of distinction between war and peace, the public and private, 
domestic and political violence, and so on. Feminist insight has shown us that for people 
living in war zones, war is relational and systemic, a continuum in which it is not quite so 
easy to set aside ordinary aggression, force or violence as not war.76 
I similarly argue that the bombing during World War II, post-war land taking, and economic 
limiting due to obscure policy in the interest of national security are not ontologically different 
categories, but rather all lie in the continuum of violence produced via our militarized, 
unincorporated territory status. In Guåhan, neatly delineating between violences during World War 
II and violences after World War II conducted by the military produces an unnecessary 
differentiation that does not accurately reflect the structural nature of militarization, insecurity, 
power, and violence in Guåhan. The military acts as the take-it-for-granted giant. It doesn’t 
necessarily need to bite or blatantly exercise power, so it seems like a non-actor or non-event. 
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 To begin, I challenge the temporality of conventional violence. For most, violence is a 
quick and highly visible act (if not the act itself, then its aftermath). Slovenian philosopher and 
critical theorist, Slavoj Zizek, describes this as subjective violence, which is the type most people 
are describing when they use the word. With subjective violence, there is a clearly identifiable 
agent performing the act. Everyday examples include rape, murder, robberies, assault, and other 
forms of violent “crime” one sees on the nightly news. While I agree that these acts are violent, 
what I attempt to show in this dissertation is that the violences of the U.S. military in Guåhan have 
not traditionally taken this stereotypical form. Rather, the more accurate description in Guåhan is 
slow violence as theorized by Rob Nixon. Nixon, in Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of 
the Poor, writes, 
By slow violence, I mean a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of 
delayed destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is 
typically not viewed as violence at all. Violence is customarily conceived as an event or 
action that is immediate in time, explosive and spectacular in space, and as erupting into 
instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage a different kind of violence, a 
violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather incremental and 
accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal scales.77 
In providing an example of slow violence, Nixon invites the reader to a thought experiment. He 
asks what is more violent? The bombing of a country in Africa or using that country as a dump 
site for toxic waste? For most, the former would clearly be the winner of this thought experiment 
as it fits the stereotypical conditions for violence: immediate in time, explosive, spectacular in 
space, and erupting into sensational visibility. Using a country as a dump site, however, does not 
fit these characteristics and thus for many, may not be seen as an act of violence. One may view it 
as unjust or wrong, but not necessarily violent.  
 Nixon argues, however, “We need to account for how the temporal dispersion of slow 
violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social afflictions–from domestic 
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abuse to post-traumatic stress and in particular environmental calamities.”78 He then asks the 
reader, “How can we turn the long emergencies of slow violence into stories dramatic enough to 
rouse public sentiment and warrant political intervention, these emergencies whose repercussions 
have given rise to some of the most critical challenges of our time?”79 Nixon writes that one of the 
most effective and nefarious characteristics of slow violence is its ability to become disconnected 
from collective memory or escape the forensics of resistance movements. Slow violence literally 
becomes decoupled from its original causes with the sludge of time’s passing. In this dissertation, 
I attempt to tell this story and give justice to the story of slow violence in Guåhan and uncover the 
forensic evidence that has been hiding in plain sight.  
 Related to the “slow” aspect of slow violence is eventless violence. By eventless, I mean a 
violence devoid of any sensationalism, devoid of the characteristics that would traditionally 
constitute an “event.” Not all forms of violence in this dissertation such as bombing during World 
War II are eventless or fit within the chronology and story of history. Examples of eventless 
violence examined in this dissertation include unmatched federal funding, avoidance of 
contamination cleanup due to “geographical distance,” and the conversion of land into wildlife 
refuges. None of these, from a surface analysis, constitute violent events, but I try to show that 
violence can occur in the most desensationalized, eventless manner. In Economies of 
Abandonment: Social Belonging and Endurance in Late Liberalism, Elizabeth Povinelli argues 
that suffering can be ordinary, chronic, and cruddy, never reaching the level of an event or a crisis. 
She writes that she is interested in “quasi-events that saturate potential worlds and their social 
projects.”80 Explaining this further, “If events are things that we can say happened such that they 
have a certain objective being, then quasi-events never quite achieve the status of having occurred 
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or taken place. They neither happen nor not happen.”81 Throughout the dissertation, each chapter 
focuses on a historical analysis of a realm of society such as the environment or the economy to 
try to better understand this process of sustainable insecurity.  
 Chris Cuomo makes a similar argument in his discussion on “everyday violence,” which 
is a form of violence that I argue never gets politicized to the level of an event or a crisis, due to 
its normalization within a society. To put it simply, if you grow up in a room with a putrid smell, 
you never realize that it probably should not smell that way, and thus are not conscious of the need 
to open a window and let some fresh air in. Cuomo argues, “Everyday military practices are 
actually more destructive than most other human activities. They are directly enacted by state 
power, and because they functioned as unquestioned ‘givens,’ they enjoy a unique near-immunity 
to enactments of moral reproach.”82 Everyday violence can be the slow, eventless violence that is 
also rooted in a structure that gives it a sturdy and steady foundation. 
 The third characteristic of violence in Guåhan is that it is steady, and by steady, I primarily 
situate this everyday, eventless violence as a result of being structural. In theorizing steady 
violence, I return to Zizek’s description of objective and systemic violence. Objective violence is 
the inherent violence forming the “state of affairs.” As Zizek writes, “Objective violence is 
invisible since it sustains the very zero-level standard against which we perceive something as 
subjectively violent.”83 Furthermore, he describes it as the “catastrophic consequences of the 
smooth functioning of our economic and political systems.”84 I saw a stark example of this in a 
History of Guam class I taught a couple of years ago. I used a portion of the class to discuss the 
events occurring in Ferguson, Missouri after the fatal shooting of a young black man named 
Michael Brown. After the shooting, which many in the community in Ferguson viewed as another 
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example of racialized police brutality, many protested and rioted in the streets. In the class 
discussion, my students were confused and asked why the community would react in such a violent 
way. For them, the system was smoothly functioning, with Darren Wilson (the officer who shot 
Michael Brown) making a horrible mistake, but not a mistake that should be reciprocated with 
more violence. This was one of the most illuminating teaching experiences I had regarding the 
way that systemic or structural violence is operationalized and normalized.  
 In understanding steady violence as structural, I also utilize the work of Johan Galtung, 
particularly his article, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research.” In the article, Galtung defines 
violence as “the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual. Violence is that which 
increases the distance between the potential and the actual, and that which impedes the decreasing 
of this distance.”85 He provides the example of someone dying from tuberculosis. If this death 
happened as a result of natural transmission in the 1800s, he does not see this as violence. However, 
with the modern technology of today, someone dying from tuberculosis is a form of violence. 
While acknowledging that Galtung was involved in peace research, not International Relations or 
security studies, and acknowledging that this definition may stretch too far in particular 
circumstances, I find it useful in discussing a system of violence and insecurity which, absolutely 
produces a chasm between the potential and the actual. It is a way of discussing violence outside 
of not only its dominant temporal thinking, but also in accommodating militarized actions in a 
colony such as Guåhan.   
MITIGATION: DON’T WORRY, IT WON’T HURT THAT BAD 
Guåhan and its people are affected by US exertions of power, in the several ways I outline 
above. These are routinely cushioned, I argue, via a permanent state of mitigation. In its most basic 
sense, mitigation is “the process or result of making something less severe, dangerous, painful, 
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harsh, or damaging.”86 Mitigation has a long history in environmental literature. Mitigation refers 
to “any deliberate action that is taken to alleviate adverse effects, whether by controlling the 
sources of impacts or the exposure of receptors to them.”87 I argue that control of the island is 
maintained, and processes of militarization and colonialism are made more palatable via consistent 
mitigation. Throughout the chapters, with each form of violence and insecurity, I also discuss the 
mitigation measures that allow these forms of violence to smoothly function, which all contribute 
to sustainable insecurity. 
 I relate mitigation to David Kilcullen’s theory of competitive control. Kilcullen, writing on 
irregular warfare and megatrends in the future conflict ecosystem, describes this as “In irregular 
conflict, the local armed actor that a given population perceives as best able to establish a 
predictable, consistent, wide-spectrum normative system of control is most likely to dominate that 
population and its residential area.”88 He writes regarding competitive control, “ it creates a control 
structure that’s easy and attractive for people to enter, but then locks into a system of persuasion 
and coercion: a set of incentives and disincentives from which they find it extremely difficult to 
break out.”89 Kilcullen’s theory of competitive control provides an analytical tool for 
understanding the workings of a permanent state of mitigation. Using irregular warfare as a case 
study, he shows how in communities throughout the world, stability is one of the keys to the 
sustenance of a control system. For example, although communities in Colombia may not agree 
with the drug cartels’ objectives or methods, if they are able to bring a sense of stability, 
predictability, and order, communities will accept this normative system of control. Now, it may 
seem odd to the reader to use Kilcullen’s work since it deals with irregular warfare and not, 
continuous military occupation as is the case in Guåhan. However, his theory of competitive 
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control has ramifications for all communities dealing with armed actors, and in this case, the U.S. 
military. The meat of Kilcullen’s work is in showing that predictability and consistency are what 
make people accept control from a particular group. Happiness or success is not necessary for 
control to be exerted over a population, as consistency provides some pattern to life. Kilcullen’s 
discussion of being locked into a particular system of incentives as a result of control is also 
directly relevant to this dissertation. For example, in Guåhan, money and social mobility will be 
shown to be an incentive for military enlistment and federal contracts as the incentive for 
supporting the military buildup. Many in Guåhan have become accustomed to this system of 
incentives and subsequent actions and efforts to change them are very difficult. This makes 
mitigation particularly useful; the hopeless argument that things could be worse. In a similar 
manner, I argue that it is through the predictability and consistency of the military presence in 
Guåhan, that helps enable hegemonic control over the island. In this dissertation, I show a 
permanent state of mitigation in different forms of violence have allowed militarization and 
colonialism to become more palatable.  
 Informing this permanent state of mitigation is the 665 analogy as discussed by Eyal 
Weizman. Weizman writes regarding the violence inherent in mitigation, “This number, one less 
than the number of the beast–that of the devil and total evil–might capture the essence of our 
humanitarian present obsessed with the calculations and calibrations that seek to moderate, ever 
so slightly, the evils that is has largely caused itself.”90 The 665 analogy can be summarized as 
doing as much bad as one can do before being considered evil. This is not about striving to do 
good, but rather striving to preserve one’s image. While I am not concerned with these theological 
or philosophical issues of good or evil, the 665 analogy helps demonstrate that a permanent state 
of mitigation is meant to quell resistance and never appear as something to whole-heartedly resist. 
Weizman articulates further,  
                                               
90 Eyal Weizman, The Least Of All Possible Evils: Humanitarian Violence From Arendt To Gaza (London: Verso 
Books, 2011), 6.  
 44 
The principle of lesser evil is often presented as a dilemma between two or more bad 
choices in situations where available options are, or seem to be, limited. The choice made 
justifies the pursuit of harmful actions that would be otherwise deemed unacceptable in 
the hope of averting even greater suffering…Both aspects of the principle are understood 
as taking place within a closed system in which those posing the dilemma, the options 
available for choice, the factors to be calculated and the very parameters of calculation 
are unchallenged.91 
A 665-permanent state of mitigation allows one to respond to violent acts by the American military 
with, “Yes, but…” The option of not having the military in Guåhan are seen as categorically worse 
than any harm or inconvenience they may cause, and each of the chapters of this dissertation 
demonstrate the formulation and operationalization of this thought process. I argue that the closed 
system is Guåhan’s militarized, unincorporated territory form-of-life and that changing this closed 
system necessitates a change in political status, which will be discussed in the conclusion. With 
this concluding a detailed description of my conceptual use of unincorporated territory, 
militarization, power, security, violence, and mitigation, I now move on to discussing CHamoru 
agency as well as the methods I used to write and complete this dissertation.  
A NOTE ON CHAMORU AGENCY 
 Admittedly, the material of this dissertation can get overwhelming, examining the various 
violences and forms of insecurity crafted and sustained by the U.S. military here in the island. I 
excavate these genealogies and examine the manifestations of these phenomena. Here, I want to 
make clear that I do not position my people, the indigenous CHamoru, as simple victims or passive 
recipients of these violences, powerlessness, and conditions of insecurity. Guåhan’s history is rich 
in resistance to colonialism, imperialism, and militarization from the earliest contact to present 
day. Indigenous studies is filled with scholarship on the importance of not overlooking indigenous 
agency and to represent indigenous peoples in a more decolonized manner. The canonical 
historiography of indigenous peoples throughout the world has viewed us as passive recipients of 
a more powerful oppressive force and as either noble or ignoble savages. Bill Ashcroft, Gareth 
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Griffiths, and Helen Tiffin, writes in The Empire Writes Back, “In order to maintain authority over 
the Other in a colonial situation, imperial discourse strives to delineate the Other as radically 
different from the self, yet at the same time it must maintain sufficient identity with the Other to 
valorize control over it.”92 Furthermore, Regis Stella writes, “The process of representing has 
never been neutral; it has always been politicized and contested. Its meaning has always been 
culturally defined, mediated through a set of cultural assumptions, beliefs, and truths.”93 In many 
instances, indigenous peoples have been represented as multiple adjectives including: uncivilized, 
weak, savage, evil, barbaric, primitive, powerless, etc.  
 I do not aim to replicate that here. A possible critique of this dissertation is that I delve 
deeply into the role the U.S. military has played in creating a continuum of violences and a 
condition of sustainable insecurity in the island, and spend little time in the chapters discussing 
CHamoru resistance to these various economic, environmental, land, and political acts of violence. 
The genealogy of CHamoru resistance is documented in various works by CHamoru and other 
scholars such as Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider’s A Campaign for Political Rights on the Island 
of Guam 1899-1950, the poetry of Craig Santos Perez, “Speaking the Language of Peace: Chamoru 
Resistance and Rhetoric in Guåhan’s Self-Determination Movement,” by Tiara R. Na’puti, 
“Histories of Wonder, Futures of Wonder: Chamorro Activist Identity, Community, and 
Leadership in ‘The Legend of Gadao’ and ‘The Women Who Saved Guåhan from a Giant Fish’,” 
by Michael Lujan Bevacqua and Isa Kelley Bowman, “Resisting Political Colonization and 
American Militarization in the Marianas Archipelago,” by Sylvia C. Frain, “Chamorro Women, 
Self-Determination, and the Politics of Abortion in Guam,” by Vivian Loyola Dames, “Kustumbre, 
Modernity and Resistance: The Subaltern Narrative in Chamorro Language Music,” by Michael 
Clement, “Simply Chamorro: Telling Tales of Demise and Survival in Guam,” by Vicente M. 
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Diaz, “Other Arms: The Power of a Dual Rights Legal Strategy for the Chamoru People of Guam 
Using the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in U.S. Courts,” by Julian Aguon, and 
the multiple writings of the father of CHamoru Studies, Robert A. Underwood. These mentioned 
works collectively form only a sample of the works dedicated to either displaying the history of 
CHamoru resistance or in imagining new methods of resistance forward. In excavating the 
anatomy of the giant of the U.S. military, I argue that I am also contributing to CHamoru resistance, 
and not erasing CHamorus.  
 As demonstrated, there are works already in existence that trace resistance and demonstrate 
in a more obvious way, the intracacies and complexities of CHamoru resistance. This work does 
not include detailed descriptions of CHamoru resistance and thus may give the appearance that it 
eludes CHamoru agency. However, I want to continue using the giant metaphor. To fight against 
the giant, one of the most important things to do is to learn its anatomy and physiology and create 
a manual understanding of its habitat, mannerisms, weaknesses, likes and dislikes as it can be 
extremely helpful in sustaining the fight. This is what this work aims to do. It aims to understand 
the different faces of the shape-shifting giant of the U.S. military and its presence in Guåhan. I 
view this work as a complete act of CHamoru agency. The giant does not want a manual written 
about it. The giant does not want to be completely understood. I fight against the giant through 
understanding it more thoroughly and thus view a dissertation aimed at understanding the various 
operations of the U.S. military in Guåhan and the subsequent effect on CHamoru livelihoods as a 
complete act of CHamoru agency, even if along the way, we have to admit that we have lost many 
battles. May the future generations read this as a manual, and use it accordingly to help plan their 
resistance more thoroughly.  
METHODS 
In any surgery, the surgeon needs tools, and in this surgical dissection of militarization in 
Guåhan, these tools are equivalent to methods. In this dissertation, the primary methods I use to 
 47 
most effectively analyze military security are discursive analysis, interviews, and archival research 
which are all detailed below. I tie all of these methods together in a decolonial methodology. In 
her groundbreaking book, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples, Linda 
Tuhiwai Smith identifies various strategies for decolonizing research. I situate my dissertation in 
the decolonial methodology of “self-determination and social justice” and see it as # 7 and #21 in 
her list of “Twenty-Five Indigenous Projects:” Intervening and Protecting. 
 Smith describes intervening: “Intervening takes action research to mean literally the 
process of being proactive and of becoming involved as an interested worker for change. 
Intervention-based projects are usually designed around making structural and cultural changes.”94 
My project is committed to intervening in the militarized status quo of the island and seeks to 
inspire structural changes. Through challenging the seemingly settled ontology of the military as 
a benevolent, beneficial presence of the island, this dissertation dismantles and hopes to make a 
structural change of moving away from militarization and unincorporated territory status. Smith 
then goes on to describe protecting: “The need to protect a way of life, a language and the right to 
make our own history is a deep need linked to the survival of indigenous peoples.”95 This project 
is protection. This project aims to expose the threats to come from the continuing military presence 
in the island in the hopes of investigating ways to protect us from these threats. I view this 
dissertation as a shield against security and benefit arguments regarding the military in Guåhan.  
 With these decolonizing projects at the center of my approach, I consider myself to be an 
activist researcher. Bagele Chilisa describes some of the questions that an activist-researcher asks 
about their projects: “Does this research have a clear stance against the political imperialism of its 
time?” “Does this research have a clear stance against marginalization and exploitation of the 
colonized that comes through either the research agenda pursued or the relationship of the 
                                               
94 Linda Tuhiwai Smith, Decolonizing Methodologies: Research And Indigenous Peoples (London: Zed Books, 2012), 
148. 
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researcher with the researched?” and lastly, “Does the research address power struggles, 
oppression, and social differences such as race, gender, age, and class?”96 These questions guide 
my ethics and methodology. The following is a detailed description of my methods. 
1. Discursive Analysis: 
 At the core of critical security studies is the understanding of security as a practice and not 
as an object to be studied, thus the analytical emphasis in CSS is on processes. In line with CSS, 
this dissertation looks to understand the processes enabling this insecurity, power, violence, and 
mitigation. I argue that an understanding of these processes requires a discursive analysis. Stuart 
Hall discusses the Foucauldian concept of discourse as “a group of statements which provide a 
language for talking about—a way of representing the knowledge about—a particular topic at a 
particular moment. Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language.”97 He 
explains that just as discourse produces a knowledge of things, it also “limits and restricts other 
ways of talking, of conducting ourselves in relation to the topic or constructing knowledge about 
it.”98 I see this reflected in the ways that being critical of the military in Guåhan can lead to one 
being called ungrateful, crazy, or some other derogatory term. The military seems to be elevated 
to the level of the Catholic god, who also seems to be exempt from criticism here. I attempt to 
more fully understand the strategic discursive moves that led to the acquisition and continual 
production of this status. 
 However, a goal of mine is to show that the sustainability of military insecurity does not 
occur through discursive and securitizing moves alone, but is also rooted in a material genealogy, 
and that discourse is not emphasized or prioritized more than materiality. In order to address the 
discursive aspects, I analyze news stories from local media outlets such as the Pacific Daily News, 
the Guam Daily Post, KUAM, and the Pacific News Center as well as social media outlets in 
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response to stories written by these news outlets. I also examine the documents surrounding the 
military buildup such as the Environmental Impact Statements and Records of Decision to see the 
way the military attempts to justify their expansion. Lastly, I also look to the historical 
commemorations of World War II which, many argue, serve as an origin for the rampant patriotism 
in the island. I do this through examining the historical accounts of the war, documentaries, oral 
stories of survivors, and the liberation day festivities. All of these help to form a more complete 
story regarding sustainable insecurity in Guåhan. 
2. Interviews: 
 I conducted interviews for this dissertation for one primary purpose: to gain specialized 
knowledge that only those with expertise would know. There are experts in certain fields such as 
the economy, military logistics, and Guåhan history that I greatly benefited from interviewing. I 
do not use the interviews to generalize or make correlations, but rather to obtain information not 
public or in text, or to get a more detailed understanding of particular issues. For this purpose, I 
interviewed Chief Economist of the Bank of Guam, Joe Bradley; Senator and community 
organizer, Sabina Perez; Attorney General and lawyer representing activist groups in Guåhan, 
Leevin Camacho; Professor of Guåhan History, Anne Perez Hattori; Assistant Professor of  
Groundwater Hydrology, Nathan Habana; former Senator Fernando Esteves; Associate Professor 
of Social Work, Lisa Natividad; and Former Congressman and President of the University of 
Guam, Robert Underwood.  
All of these individuals possess a high level of knowledge on particular issues and also live 
their lives in Guåhan. This aligns with my decolonial methodology by ensuring that local voices 
are not left out of the counter-narrative I am presenting. These interviews were done in person, 
and each interview lasted from 1-2 hours and were held at a place of their choosing. All participants 
were asked whether their interview could be recorded and whether or not I could use their names 
directly in the dissertation. Before the completion of this dissertation and its final submission, all 
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participants were shown the quotes and asked again whether they approve of my use of their words. 
With this research ethic, I aim to be accountable to those who took their time to talk to me, and I 
want to ensure that that I am giving their words proper contextualization and that they are 
comfortable with my usage of their interview.  
3. Archival Research: 
Tracing genealogies of military, strategic thought can be done in various ways. I chose to 
engage the works of security and strategic studies scholars who work with institutes and think 
tanks such as the Center for Security Studies, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the 
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and the Center for New American Security. For 
other official positions of the Federal Government, I searched EPA databases and reports from the 
Government Accountability Office. These think tanks produce countless reports on American 
security and thus serve as a perfect archive for tracing this genealogy. I also accessed the local 
media’s news stories to trace the chronology of events occurring. I also spent many days in the 
MARC archive. MARC stands for the Micronesian Area Research Center, located at the University 
of Guam, and it is the premier research center in Micronesia for issues of politics, history, and 
current events. As I am currently an instructor at the university, I have direct access to these 
archives, including the portions that are limited to students. In addition to these archives, a large 
part of this research was done through the reading of secondary materials such as books published 
by academic presses that deal with issues of security, power, violence, or militarization.  
I use these formal reports from these institutions, think tanks, and research centers for one 
primary purpose. These reports help illuminate the strategic thought of the military, strategic 
research centers, and the federal government regarding Guåhan. It helps fight against claims that 
I may be exaggerating or conflating the points and arguments I make throughout this dissertation. 
In my usage of primary sources, I aim to express these viewpoints to the reader that they may not 
have read previously due to the rather obscure and difficult access to these particular primary 
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source documents. I also do not just take what is written in these reports and utilize them, rather I 
critically investigate and analyze these primary sources. In his book, Culture and Imperialism, 
Edward Said, writes,  
To ignore or otherwise discount the overlapping experience of Westerners and Orientals, 
the interdependence of cultural terrains in which colonizer and colonized co-existed and 
battled each other through projections as well as rival geographies, narratives, and 
histories, is to miss what is essential about the world in the past century.99 
Inspired by Said, I engage in the military’s geographies, narratives, and histories, and illuminate 
and subsequently challenge them in this dissertation. I aim to show through a reading of their texts 
the CHamoru overlapping experience to their colonial and imperial manifestations in the island.  
POSITIONALITY 
I remember being a sophomore in college and having to do a book review in my Cognitive 
Psychology class. I chose to review a book named, The Neuro Revolution: How Brain Science is 
Changing Our World by Zack Lynch. From marketing, finance, medicine, interpersonal 
relationships, art, religion, to warfare, Lynch proclaimed that neuroscience will change these fields 
drastically forming a “neurosociety.”100 Needless to say, I was drawn in and uncritically agreeing 
with everything that he said. Discussing my draft with my professor during class, he told me the 
Neuro revolution sounded good, but he asked me one important question that changed forever how 
I read books. He said, “But who is Zack Lynch?” The heavy hammer of historiography came 
swinging down, and I sadly responded, “I have no idea.” It turns out that Zack Lynch was the 
founder of the Neurotechnology Industry Organization, a global trade association involved in 
neuroscience, neurotechnology, and brain research institutes, and NeuroInsights, which is a 
marketing research firm used to advise organizations on the impact neurotechnology will have. 
This does not invalidate everything he wrote, but that information helped me to become a more 
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critical reader. I learned of the importance of positionality from this experience. In respect of this 
experience, I provide my positionality here while at the same time acknowledging both “reflexivity 
and positionality as processes evolving over space and time.”101 
To be straightforward, I am a CHamoru man born and raised in Guåhan, who comes from 
a middle-class family. My father is a Navy veteran, but unlike most, did not have base access 
growing up, which believe it or not, does matter regarding the subject matter of this dissertation. 
There is a firm belief in Guåhan that everything is much better within the fence, so having access 
to go inside the fence, certainly affects a person’s relationship with the military and their role in 
the island. Like most CHamoru families, multiple members of my family are either currently or 
formerly in the military, and this has led to some interesting family discussions. I am currently an 
instructor of Political Science at the University of Guam, a member of the Independence advocacy 
group, Independent Guåhan, and am a CHamoru language revitalization activist.  
 This positionality is important for the purposes of this project. Guåhan is my home and 
each decision made or each use of the island by the military affects my life and the lives of my 
grandparents, parents, and children. Konai Helu Thaman writes, “As a teacher who is still a learner, 
I think decolonizing Pacific studies is about reclaiming indigenous Oceania perspectives, 
knowledge, and wisdom that have been devalued or suppressed because they were or are not 
considered important or worthwhile.”102 Thaman’s quote resonates with my approach to this 
project. I aim to dig up a suppressed indigenous CHamoru perspective to Guåhan’s colonialism 
and militarization. I do not pretend to represent or speak for all CHamorus or argue that this is the 
perspective of all, what Albert Memmi calls the colonial “mark of the plural.”103 However, I argue 
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that my positionality matters especially when it comes to my critique of International Relations in 
this dissertation, in which indigenous Oceanic perspecties have been subdued and buried.  
 As an instructor of International Relations at the University of Guam, my intervention in 
IR stems from my attempt to make it matter to my students. Coming from Guåhan, IR should end 
at the acceptance of our position as a U.S. territory and our role in the protection of the United 
States. However, I find this unsatisfactory, and thus I also aim to dissect IR and notions of security. 
In this dissertation, my positionality informs my decision to take the good from IR theory, while 
also throwing away what does not work in helping to understand or help Guåhan and the CHamoru 
people. Those most affected by IR and the geopolitical game need to speak back, and I find my 
unique positionality being important to the critical task of writing and speaking back to the 
fundamental assumptions, theories, and critiques of International Relations as a discipline. With 
my positionality out on the table, I now turn to the chapter outlines of this dissertation as a guide 
for the reader moving forward.  
CHAPTER OUTLINES 
 The core of this dissertation aims at demonstrating three things: (1) That the U.S. military 
produces a state of insecurity in Guåhan via a continuum of violences and forced powerlessness, 
(2) That this insecurity is a result of our form-of-life as a militarized, unincorporated territory of 
the United States, and (3) That this insecurity is made sustainable via a permanent system of 
mitigation leading to the phenomenon of “sustainable insecurity”. To demonstrate these three 
things, each chapter is historically detailed and necessarily so. In understanding the conditions of 
possibility for sustainable insecurity, a historical analysis is required to help the reader understand 
how we got here and how can things change. I do not emphasize historical and contemporary 
description and analysis as a method of listing wrongs done by the U.S. military. Rather, the 
historical emphasis helps understand the genealogy of these various forms of insecurities. I 
imagine each chapter transporting the reader to a particular realm of Guåhan’s militarized form-
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of-life, and through the reading of each chapter, the reader comes to see the assemblages and 
structures of violence, power, militarization, and colonialism that has been forcefully crafted as 
well as CHamoru and Guåhan’s resistance to this form-of-life. The U.S. military may be winning, 
but they have not won, and through reading each chapter, one can help come up with solutions to 
these rampant violences Guåhan faces. 
In Chapter 1, I demonstrate the entanglement of Guåhan’s militarization and its political 
status as an unincorporated territory as creating a situation of political insecurity. Using historical 
analysis of political events, I show how Guåhan’s fight for a change in political status has always 
been pushed aside in the name of U.S. national security. In doing this, I theorize the concept of 
“realism in between,” in which I argue that Guåhan’s form-of-life is crafted as a result of a realist 
power analysis in international politics and via unincorporated territory status. I engage in IR 
theory to show how a true analysis of Guåhan security is not feasible in IR due to the political 
anomaly we are and will remain if our political status is not changed. In making this larger IR 
argument, I give material evidence of “realism in between” through a discussion of China’s rise 
both economically and militarily and Guåhan’s place in buffering China from the United States. 
 In Chapter 2, I examine the structure of land dispossession that was perpetuated throughout 
Guåhan’s colonial history and which modern life in Guåhan is based. Using Patrick Wolfe’s 
argument that “invasion is a structure, not an event,” as well as his emphasis on the colonial hunger 
for territoriality, I situate land dispossession as the condition of possibility for the manifestations 
of this continuum of violences. In this analysis, I traverse the continuum showing physical violence 
in the form of bombing the island, economic violence in the economic potential loss as a result of 
land theft, as well as arguing land dispossession by the military as the origin story of environmental 
contamination of the island. I detail how the loss of CHamoru land from CHamoru hands has led 
to a state of insecurity and forced powerlessness.  
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 In Chapter 3, I fully engage with the issue of economic insecurity. In this chapter, I detail 
the multiple ways that our status as a militarized unincorporated territory has led to a diminishment 
of Guåhan’s economic potential. I address how a lack of sovereignty or representation in law-
making bodies has led to arrangements such as the Government of Guåhan having to pay a 
substantial amount due to the Compacts of Free Association made between the United States and 
other Micronesian countries. I address how the militarization of the island and the subsequent 
basing has led to military service as a meal ticket and base access as a desirable goal. Lastly, I 
describe the various forms of economic mitigation the United States gives to the island such as 
federal welfare programs and block grants to quell possible resistance to militarized, colonial 
status. I argue that this amounts to an economic form of slow, steady, and uneventful violence.  
 Chapter 4 tackles the issue of environmental violence and outlines the forms of 
contamination caused by military activities in Guåhan. From PCBs to TCE to DDT, I detail this 
toxic history to counter the mythology of the military as environmental stewards of the island. I 
geographically cover most of the terrain of the island from Andersen Air Force Base in the North, 
Ibanez/Guerrero Properties in the Central, and lastly, Dåno’ Island in the South. This shows that 
almost every region of the island has been poisoned with military toxins. In this chapter, I also 
analyze the contamination story of potential Agent Orange (AO) storage and spraying in the island. 
I use these stories to show how our forced powerlessness has seeped down to an epistemological 
level in which official scientific results, particularly through “inconclusivity,” has left Guåhan in 
a current state of unknowing regarding the extent of contamination in the island. For example, 
despite a massive amount of testimony from servicemen stationed in Guåhan during the Vietnam 
War who testify that they sprayed Agent Orange, the Department of Defense refuses to 
acknowledge the use of AO in the island. Lastly, I discuss the forms of mitigation through 
examining documents for the military buildup and military “wildlife refuge” conservation 
discourse.   
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 In the final chapter, Chapter 5, I attempt to answer a question posed by Robert Underwood 
in an article he wrote for the Micronesian Educator, “Why are there not 10,000 people protesting 
in the street?” If the chapters of the dissertation up to the final chapter have all shown that contrary 
to hegemonic belief, the military does not keep Guåhan secure, then why are there not massive 
protests countering such rampant military presence and fighting for political status change? Each 
chapter gives a piece of this answer in the form of “a permanent state of mitigation” leading to 
“sustainable insecurity.” However, I argue that this does not tell the full story of an admittedly 
successful colonial and militarist project in the island. Rather, using Ngũgĩ Wa Thiongo’s cultural 
bomb theory, Frantz Fanon’s psychoanalysis in Black Skin, White Masks, and Keith Camacho’s 
discussion of post-war commemorations, I show how the post-World War II period, particularly 
through a “liberation” discourse, hammered the head of colonialism’s nail in the island, making 
colonial attachment and feelings of patriotism run rampant in Guåhan.  
 Lastly, in the conclusion, I take the opportunity to examine alternative futures for Guåhan 
that provide a better opportunity at achieving genuine security and in making Guåhan powerful in 
every sense of the word, as described in this introduction. I examine the benefits of Guåhan being 
an independent nation-state, while fully acknowledging the critiques of the state as a form of 
political organization and the many risks of becoming a state. Despite these valid critiques, I argue 
that due to Guåhan’s unique political status and our subsequent listing on the United Nations’ list 
of non self-governing territories, the possibility of being our own nation-state does exist. Thus, I 
argue it is in Guåhan’s best interest to take this opportunity. From here, I also examine the 
possibilities of regionalism. Inspired by the work of Epeli Hau’ofa, I introduce a theory of 
“Hau’ofian Realism,” as a possible route of achieving genuine security. The final part of the 
conclusion argues that despite a bleak-looking future, that the people of Guåhan need to continue 
to resist and fight for a better future. I end the dissertation with a letter to my newborn son, 
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Matatnga Gregorio Naputi Kuper. His name translated from Fino’ CHamoru, means “fearless or 
brave.” It is in his spirit that I complete this dissertation.  
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Chapter 1:  When the U.S. Sneezes, Guåhan Catches Pneumonia: Political 
Violence and (In)security in Guåhan 
“North Korea best not make any more threats to the United States. They will be met with fire and 
fury like the world has never seen... he has been very threatening beyond a normal state. They 




I was at a lavender farm in Maui when my mother called me crying. It was April of 2013.  
Between exasperated cries, my mom yelped and pleaded, “Son, please pray. They’re going to 
bomb us.” At the time, I had no idea what she was talking about. I frantically tried to reach her 
beneath the tears and asked, “Mom, what are you talking about?” She cried, “North Korea. They 
said they are going to bomb the island.” She was referring to a threat made by North Korea 
declaring that their missiles could reach the military bases in the American territory of Guam. A 
spokesperson for the Supreme Command of the North Korean People’s Army told the media, “The 
U.S. should not forget that the Andersen Air Force Base on Guam, where B-52s take off, and naval 
bases in Japan proper and Okinawa, where nuclear-powered submarines are launched, are within 
the striking range of D.P.R.K.s precision strikes means.”2 Needless to say, I was extremely worried 
and felt powerless not being home, telling myself how unfair it would be for my island and family 
to vanish in the blink of an eye while I was on spring break enjoying myself. Yet, as unfortunate 
and frightening as this was for my mother, this is not even the latest instance of Guåhan being 
threatened by the hermit kingdom.  
In August of 2017, the island became the object of the international media spotlight as it 
was the center of back-and-forth aggressive rhetoric between U.S. president Donald Trump and 
North Korea leader Kim Jong Un. From BBC and Al Jazeera to Vice News, the streets flowed with 
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journalists all attempting to examine this small island in the Pacific Ocean that had become the 
target of discussions of North Korean nuclear potential and reach. While it was confusing for a 
large majority of the world as to why Guåhan was the focal point of this fiery rhetoric, most 
residents of Guåhan were either concerned by or already desensitized to the event. Despite these 
optimistic or pessimistic views of potential conflict, one thing that Guåhan residents were not, is 
hysterical. When hearing this news, the people of Guåhan were relatively calm over this event. We 
are used to our island’s role in war. The effects of war seep heavily into the soil of our genealogies, 
watering the roots of our experiences, with the most pertinent example being our role in World 
War II. Guåhan has consistently been a pivotal pawn in the geopolitical chess game of foreign 
powers, and the North Korea-United States rhetorical duel is simply another match played upon 
the island and its people. 
In this chapter, I examine the role of Guåhan’s political status and relationship with the 
United States in making the stories above possible. More specifically, I argue that our current 
political status as a strategically located unincorporated territory, a.k.a. colony, is the grounds by 
which the United States can gamble with Guåhan for the pursuit of their national interest in the 
Asia-Pacific region, and thus it is in U.S. interests for Guåhan to remain a colony. Whether it is 
the geopolitical game played over Chinese development in the South China Sea or the escalating 
crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the vulnerability and strategic significance of Guåhan is often 
reduced to a rung on the escalation ladder rather than a national territory to be protected. The 
population and the island itself are leveraged for power projection certainly, but also used as a kind 
of redline or trip wire for disputes in the Asia-Pacific. Thus, this chapter examines these two spear 
tips bleeding Guåhan out: (1) Our location as the reason for continued colonial status thus 
inhibiting political advancement and causing political insecurity, and (2) Due to our location and 
ambiguous political status, we are sacrificial lambs waiting to be gutted on the altar of American 
national security, which belies the myth that the American military “protects” the island. To put it 
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simply, the United States military presence not only puts us in harm’s way from a traditional 
defense perspective but also keeps us politically insecure as a colony. 
To make this argument, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section looks at 
the geography of Guåhan and the importance of its strategic location for other powers. In this 
section, I then discuss the role of Guåhan’s political status in this duet of location and sovereignty. 
I also theoretically engage with the notion of islands’ roles in geopolitics and their designation on 
the map from a “violent cartographies”3 perspective. Building on this, in the second section, I 
outline International Relations’ foundational racism and argue that as an unincorporated territory, 
International Relations as an academic discipline does not properly allow for an analysis of Guåhan 
security. I then attempt to squeeze the violences wrought onto Guåhan and its people from the U.S. 
military into a realist perspective, as opposed to a human security perspective. The third section 
shows the political history of the U.S. military’s attempt to keep Guåhan an unincorporated 
territory and their opposition to the CHamoru citizenship and self-determination/decolonization 
movement. In this section, I argue the ways in which this political violence continues to affect 
Guåhan. The last section turns to current U.S. geopolitical and security concerns in the region to 
investigate Guåhan’s future role in national security and the prospects for decolonization. I show 
how the hegemonic argument that the military keeps the island “safe and secure” is a lot more 
nuanced and complex.  
I. THE LAY OF THE (IS)LAND: MILITARY INSTALLATIONS, EXERCISES, AND 
AMERICAN HISTORY 
For many, one of the best parts of a flight is the landing. As soon as the flight attendant 
announces that the plane is about to land, most people start to look at the geographical landscape 
right outside their windows. When coming into Guåhan, one peculiarity of this landscape 
                                               




admiration is a large open space of land in the north of the island with a long tarmac runway. This 
is Andersen Air Force Base, one of the two main military installations in the island.  
As mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, 27% of the island is currently 
occupied by the U.S. military (roughly 40,000 acres) with Andersen Air Force Base encompassing 
the northern part of the island and Naval Base Guam bifurcating the southern half of the island, 
with other minor military installations scattered around. Andersen Air Force occupies the most 
northern tip of the island, which is blockaded with securitized sentry guards and barbed wire 
fences. Andersen, as it is called in Guåhan, was named after Brigadier General James Roy 
Andersen, a former chief of staff for the Army Air Force Pacific, who is believed to have died in 
1945 in an aircraft accident in the Pacific, when the aircraft he was travelling in disappeared near 
the Marshall Islands.4 Brigadier General Gentry W. Boswell and Colonel Matthew J. Nicholson 
currently lead the base as Commander and Vice Commander. The base currently hosts the 36th 
wing of the Pacific Air Forces Eleventh Air force which is divided into various groups: the 36th 
Operations Group, 36th Mission Support Group, 36th Maintenance Group, and the 36th Contingency 
Response Group. They are a non-flying wing whose mission is to provide support to deployed air 
and space forces of the United States Air Force and foreign air forces as well as support tenant 
units assigned to the bases. Supplementing this, their mission as described in the official Andersen 
Air Force Base website is in,  
executing Pacific Command’s Continuous Bomber Presence, Theater Security Packages, 
Contingency Response Operations, and peacetime and combat operations in the Indo 
Pacific Region. The Wing is also tasked to ensure the successful deployment, 
employment, and integration of air and space forces from the most forward sovereign 
U.S. Air Force Base in the Indo Pacific Region.5 
                                               
4 “James Roy Andersen,” Newspapers, accessed September 2018, 
https://www.newspapers.com/clip/2465217/james_roy_andersen_19041945/ 
5 “About Us,” Andersen Air Force Base, accessed October 2018, https://www.andersen.af.mil/About-
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Andersen is also home to the 734th Air Mobility Support Squadron, and the HSC-25 (Helicopter 
Sea Combat Squadron Twenty-Five). It is one of only four forward operating locations in the U.S. 
Air Force, and has hosted B-1, B-2, and B-52 military aircraft, most recently as a show of force 
against North Korean power projection. At Andersen Air Force Base, there is also an area named 
Hayes Igloos which is a half-mile stretch of munitions storage, hosting 15 million pounds of net 
explosive conventional munitions.6 
 Primarily in the southern half of the island, with interspersed installations in other areas of 
the island, lies Naval Base Guam. Naval Base Guam is located in Orote Point, utilizing Apra 
Harbor, which is a deep-sea harbor with the potential to host various U.S. naval seacraft. It is home 
to Commander Naval Forces Marianas, Commander Submarine Squadron Fifteen, Coast Guard 
Sector Guam and Naval Special Warfare Unit one along with 28 other tenant commands. It is also 
the home base of three Los Angeles class submarines and supports units of US Pacific Command, 
US Pacific Fleet, Seventh Fleet, and Fifth Fleet.7 It is currently led by Capt. Jeffrey Grimes as 
Commanding Officer and Commander Jason A. Wilkerson as Executive Officer. Naval Base 
Guam consist of various installations including: Naval Base Guam Barrigada, North Finegayan 
Telecommunications Site, Ordnance Annex, Polaris Point, Tenjo & Sasa Valley, and Orote Point 
(Big Navy).  
Naval Base Guam Barrigada holds transmission antennas necessary for military 
communications. The North Finegayan Telecommunications Site is home to the Naval 
Telecommunications Station Guam, also known as NCTAMS by the local population. Located in 
the village of Dededo, its strategic mission is to “provide communications support for the 
command and control of operating forces afloat and ashore in the Western Pacific including the 
                                               
6 CBS News, “U.S. Air Force base in Guam: An up-close look,” CBS News, accessed October 2018, 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/andersen-air-force-base-guam-on-the-tarmac-cbsn-on-assignment/. 
7 “About Naval Base Guam,” CNIC Naval Military Base, accessed October 2018, 
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Indian Ocean.”8 It was established in 1945 as the primary receiving station for Guam. In the 1960s, 
the navy built the Circularly Disposed Antenna Array in order to establish a worldwide intelligence 
gathering and Guåhan was heavily used for this purpose until it was decommissioned in the 1990s 
with the ending of the Cold War.9  
The Ordnance Annex, formerly known as Naval Magazine Guam, is located in southern 
Guåhan and is the largest munitions storage area on U.S. soil outside of the continental United 
States. With construction of the annex beginning in 1944, the Korean War reinforced the need for 
this ordnance storage facility. In 1954, a total of 18,513 tons of ammunition was stored at this 
installation.10 The Polaris Point installation is used to support submarines that were homeported in 
the island, and the Tenjo & Sasa Valley installation is used as defense fuel support that operates 
the storage, transfer, and pumping capacity for various fuels.11 Lastly, “Big Navy,” as it is called, 
is the main naval installation in the island. The origin of the base traces back to World War II when 
the Navy constructed a skeleton of the current base to continue their fight against the Japanese in 
the Pacific Theater. According to the official Navy Base Guam website,  
Navy Seabees molded jungle and mangrove swamp into a self-contained Navy supply 
base housing 50,000 personnel and complete with an expanded harbor and repaired and 
expanded airfield, new docks, ship repair facility, submarine base, 3,000 Quonset huts 
and more than 1,000 major structures.12 
They officially named this new base, “Naval Operating Base” and nicknamed it, “The Pacific 
Supermarket” in October 1944. It “was the largest single element of WWII Fleet support in the 
Pacific.”13 Formerly run as separate commands, both Naval Base Guam and Andersen Air Force 
                                               
8 “Mission Statement,” U.S. Naval Computer and Telecommunications Station, accessed October 2018, 
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Base are now consolidated under the new command, Joint Region Marianas, symbolizing the 
partnership between the Navy and Air Force in the island, with Admiral Shoshanna Chatfield as 
its current commander. In her role, she also acts as the U.S. defense representative to other U.S. 
affiliated political entities in Micronesia: the CNMI, Palau, and the Federated States of Micronesia.  
In addition to this heavy military infrastructure and weaponization of the island, Guåhan 
also hosts multiple joint military exercises such as Valiant Shield, COPE North, and Malabar. This 
perfectly shows Guåhan’s use not only as a U.S. base, but also as an island site utilized by various 
sovereign governments to further their national interests and protect their national securities. 
Perhaps the largest and most commonly held military exercise in the island, there have been seven 
Valiant Shield exercises since 2006. The first of these exercises, held in Guåhan and the 
surrounding waters, featured more than 20,000 sailors, soldiers, marines, and airmen. According 
to the USS Ronald Reagan Public Affairs Officer, Shane Tuck, the exercise “focuses on real-world 
proficiency in sustaining joint forces and detecting, tracking, and engaging units at sea, in the air 
and on land in response to a wide range of missions.”14  Commander Michael H. Miller wrote that 
“exercises such as Valiant Shield give us an opportunity to ensure joint command, control, and 
communication procedures are seamless.”15 It included 28 ships and 290 aircraft, and most 
importantly, allowed multiple countries to observe, including China. More recently, the 2018 
Valiant Shield exercise just finished with 160 military aircraft, 15 ships, and 15,000 Navy, Army, 
Air Force, and Marine Corps personnel with this being the first time the Army has participated.16  
Another annual military exercise held in the island is COPE North, which is a multilateral 
exercise with the Royal Australian Air Force and Japan Air Self-Defense Force meant to enhance 
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June 20, 2006, 
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multilateral air operations between the respective countries. The exercise featured more than 800 
Japanese and Australian military members. The COPE North exercise has been held annually in 
Guåhan since 1999, when it moved from Japan to the island. Indo-Pacific Command describes the 
COPE North exercises as “a keystone event to promote stability and security throughout the Indo-
Pacific by enabling regional forces to hone vital readiness skills to maintaining regional 
stability.”17 Although Australia, Japan, and the United States have participated annually, other 
countries such as the Philippines and New Zealand participated the past two years, showing the 
U.S. working with its allies against possible threats to their hegemony guised in the name of 
“security.”  
 Formerly known as the Pacific Command, the Trump administration changed the 
command’s name to the Indo-Pacific Command in May 2018. It is headquartered in Aiea, Oʻahu, 
Hawaiʻi, which has been the home to the Pacific Command since 1947. On May 31, 2018, at a 
ceremony, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis addressed the crowd saying, “Relationships with our 
Pacific and Indian Ocean allies and partners have proven critical to maintaining regional stability. 
In recognition of the increasing connectivity between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, today we 
rename the US Pacific Command to US Indo-Pacific Command.”18 Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Alex Wong, echoes the importance of this name change, 
telling reporters that the new term “acknowledges the historical reality and the current day reality 
that South Asia, and in particular, India plays a key role in the Pacific, in East Asia and Southeast 
Asia.”19 This change in military nomenclature and strategic emphasis was made highly visible in 
Guåhan. In June of 2018, the Malabar military exercise was held off the coast of the island as naval 
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ships and aircraft from Japan, the United States, and now India, engaged in anti-submarine warfare 
operations to prepare for a variety of shared threats to maritime security.20 More particularly, this 
exercise with India is being held because of Chinese engagement and island-building in the South 
China Sea. 
 This outline of military installations and military exercises in Guåhan provides a necessary 
historical context and account of the post-World War II history that led to the permanence of 
military installations in the island. Only with this historical context can we move on to the next 
section of “Why Guåhan?” After World War II, the U.S. emerged victorious as the strongest 
economy in the world, with an economy larger than all of Europe’s combined, and one of the 
world’s largest superpowers. Julian Go describes this as the period of the U.S.’s hegemonic 
maturity, simply economically unmatched.21 During this period, the U.S. turned away from more 
overtly colonial modalities, and instead primarily turned to modalities of informal imperialism 
such as maintaining influence throughout the world, with measures short of war and annexation, 
although not less violent such as assassination and regime change. During this post-WWII era, the 
U.S. focus in the Asia-Pacific was to ensure control via bilateral agreements with Asian countries 
and to ensure strategic denial in Micronesia via the TTPI (Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands) 
and the eventual Compacts of Free Association. 
In this first method of control in Asian countries, the U.S. developed a “hub and spokes” 
foreign policy architecture developing bilateral alliances with countries like Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan. The strategy here was akin to that of a bicycle wheel. As described by Victor Cha, 
“each of these allies and partners constituted ‘spokes’ connected with a central hub (the United 
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States), but with few connections between the spokes.”22 Cha argues that this architectural design 
in Asia was produced to control these countries’ agenda in a massive powerplay. This was created 
to exert political, military, and economic control over key countries in the region. For example, 
regarding Japan, he writes that the “powerplay rationale was to create a tight, exclusive hold over 
the defeated imperial power to ensure that the region’s one major power would evolve in a 
direction that suited US interests.”23 The result of this architecture was that the United States was 
able to exercise “near-total control over foreign and domestic affairs of its allies, and it created an 
asymmetry of power that rendered inconceivable counterbalancing by these smaller countries.”24 
We can see the lasting effects of these alliances with Japan and South Korea hosting large a U.S. 
military presence and being close allies with the United States. 
In Micronesia, the U.S. held the now CNMI, Marshall Islands, Palau, and the Federated 
States of Micronesia (FSM) as one strategic trusteeship. After the trusteeship ended, the Northern 
Mariana Islands became a Commonwealth of the United States (with what was supposed to be 
more power and fewer restrictions than an unincorporated territory like Guåhan), and the 
remaining islands formed three countries (Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the FSM) which all 
entered into Compacts of Free Association. Per these treaties, the United States provides a 
substantial amount of financial aid to these countries, allows their citizens to enter the U.S. visa-
free under the status of non-immigrant, and handles foreign defense. In return, these countries 
provide exclusive military access to their land and waters to the United States providing a form of 
strategic denial to other countries with interests in the region.25  
It is important to point out that despite these moves in Asia and Micronesia, the Truman 
and Eisenhower administrations immediately after World War II treated the region as merely a 
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“strategic periphery” rather than the core of interests. The primary theater of foreign policy was in 
Europe. Former Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell writes regarding the Asia-Pacific, 
“The region has been considered a ‘secondary theater’, with an American legacy of engagement 
that has often been reactive, episodic, and ambiguous, leaving behind a sense of uncertainty and a 
job half-finished.”26 This is reinforced in the words of Robert Blum, who writes that Washington 
had a “half-hearted commitment and indifference” to one region (Asia-Pacific) while it dove into 
a “forceful policy” seeking enduring peace in the other (Europe).27 America’s treatment of the 
Asia-Pacific region has also been described as an accordion with cycles of surge and retreat, just 
as an accordion moves together and subsequently retracts. Despite these surges and retreats, 
Guåhan’s role in maintaining American policing power in this region has remained constant, and 
this is important to understand Guåhan’s place in the world. No matter the United States’ emphasis 
on the Asia-Pacific region, Guåhan will always remain a militarized base ready, just in case another 
military surge is needed. Guåhan is the constant. 
II. THE MACABRE DUET: LOCATION AND SOVEREIGNTY=OPPRESSION 
The next logical question is “Why Guåhan?” Why is Guåhan the constant? Why would the 
U.S. military establish themselves so intensely in this 212-square mile island? When thinking of 
the answer to these questions, I invite the reader to picture a macabre duet: a dark room with two 
masked, white ghouls dancing together to truly bring life to the waltz of oppression. In this section, 
I demonstrate that the two ghouls dancing in the dark are the manipulation of Guåhan’s location 
and U.S. sovereignty over the island. These two factors hold each other dearly to ensure the staying 
power of the United States military in the Asia-Pacific region, all at the expense of Guåhan and its 
people. In this section, I show how the entangled steps of these two ghouls ensure insecurity in 
various manifestations.  
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Location, Island, Location 
Beginning with Ghoul #1, I turn to former historian at the University of Guam, Robert F. 
Rogers, who wrote the comprehensive canonical work on the history of Guåhan, Destiny’s 
Landfall. In his introduction, Rogers writes, “If fate is preordained but destiny is not, then much 
of humankind’s loss of innocence on this island called earth is mirrored in the often tragic, but 
inspiring history of the island of Guam since Magellan’s landfall.”28 By this, he articulates that 
“Guam, in short, was destined after Magellan to be a pawn in the realpolitik of foreign powers.”29 
Guåhan, situated in the Western Pacific, is the largest island between Hawai‘i and the Philippines 
with a major harbor, and the largest island between Japan and Papua New Guinea with the 
capability for hosting major runways. 
To quote Andrew S. Erickson, a founding member of the China Maritime Studies Institute 
at the Naval War College, and Lt. Justin Mikolay in their book chapter, “Guam and American 
Security in the Pacific,” regarding Guåhan,  
 
It is closer by fourteen hours’ flight time and five to seven days’ sea-transit time to East 
Asia than is any other U.S.-based facility. It offers the region’s only live-fire bombing 
range; an excellent deep-water port with significant room for wharf expansion; ample 
facilities for the U.S. Air Force, including its largest aviation fuel storage depots (66 
million gallons) and its largest Pacific weaponry storage (100,000 bombs); and a naval 
magazine capable of holding considerable amounts of conventional and nuclear 
munitions.30 
 Perhaps one of the most important people to write on Guåhan’s strategic importance is 
Alfred Thayer Mahan, who served as the president of the esteemed Naval War College. In his 
influential text, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, published in 1890, Mahan argued that 
if the United States wished to join the scramble for the world’s wealth, it would have to build 
warships and dispatch them to take distant islands, port, peninsulas, and strong places where a 
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navy can be protected and refurbished.31 He argued that permanent naval bases and coaling stations 
were essential to safeguarding the prosperity and national security of the United States and 
advocated for shaping a “healthy regional balance of power through forward basing, a strong navy 
and alignment among the maritime powers.”32 Regarding these forward bases, Mahan writes, 
Bases of operations; which be their natural advantages, susceptibility of defense, and 
nearness to the central strategic issue, will enable her fleets to remain as near the scene as 
any opponent…With such an outpost in her hands, the preponderance of the United 
States on this field follows, from her geographical position and her power, with 
mathematical certainty.33 
Thus, by controlling a network of bases, the United States can ensure its ubiquitous nature in the 
international system. Bringing this closer to home, Mahan’s most relevant comment regarding 
Guåhan is “No situation in our possession equals Guam for protecting every security interest in 
the Pacific.”34 Vice Admiral Jonathan Greenert, 7th Fleet Commander in Guåhan, reiterates the 
power of Guåhan’s geography writing, “Guam is a hub, Guam has geography and that will be 
enduring…it is now becoming very important to us again. Guam will always be strategically 
important because of its geography alone.”35 Geographical location does not change and thus will 
always be a reliable factor unlike economic strength and technological advancements or 
disparities.  
Guåhan’s treatment by the U.S. is not only due to its geographical location, but also due to 
its geographical ontology as an island. The dominant geographical imagination of islands usually 
encompasses two primary components. The first is that the island is small, isolated, and empty. 
The second is that the island is strategically important for foreign militaries. This leaves islands 
ripe for exploitation, colonialism, and militarization. Like an imperial magic trick, islands are 
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simultaneously important and disposable, places of exploitation and places of nothingness. They 
are not either/or, but rather both. To truly understand how Guåhan’s geography has been utilized 
for U.S. national security purposes, both location and its “islandness” need to be examined.  
The islands live in the perpetual, paradoxical shadow of hypermilitarization and laid-back, 
hospitable native lifestyle stereotypes. Islands are where one escapes or starts a new life (either as 
a soldier being stationed or someone wanting to craft a new identity). Islands are where one goes 
to get away, isolated from the rest of the world. “Islands evoke infinite imaginaries, from dreams 
of development, escape, and exoticism to exploitation and imprisonment.”36 As Adam Nicolson 
writes, “the island is a place defined by its otherness, thriving on nothing more than its distance 
and difference from the mainland to which it is opposed.”37 Distance, difference, and this feeling 
of being stuck in place are deemed the island’s unique properties, which subsequently evoke a 
sense of geographical and political inferiority.  
However, islands, peninsulas, and other seemingly small geographic spaces play an 
important, yet possibly invisible role in international relations and geopolitics, and consequently 
this means Guåhan does as well.”38 Political geographer Alison Mountz, discussing the 
geopolitical imaginaries surrounding islands writes that, “More than mere physical form, islands 
occupy a prominent place in the geographical imagination of politics. They frequently become 
sites of territorial conflict for their occupation of interstitial zones where power struggles unfold.”39 
As Ann Laura Stoler writes, “Some of the most favored concepts of political theory acquire their 
critical force precisely because they are not considered political concepts at all, or because they 
have so long been considered benign and removed from the domain of contemporary politics.”40 
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Islands are places that have always been used politically and strategically, while at the same time 
been invisibilized from the mainstream political discourse. This invisibility is enduring and 
persistent, as Rachel Oldenziel argues in her essay, “Islands: The United States as a Networked 
Empire.”  She contends that when it comes to islands, there is no such thing as obsolescence. She 
describes the changing logics in the utilization of islands ranging from coaling stations to lily pads 
(easy launch points for military missions) to holders of technology. She writes, “Even though in 
each instance the technical and geographic logics changed, the political rationales for keeping 
islands within the US orbit remained remarkably stable over the course of a century or so. 
Technical obsolescence rarely resulted in abandonment or restoration of sovereignty.”41 The 
shape-shifting nature of island use in geopolitics contributes to the paradox of their being important 
and disposable all at the same time. Islands receive the short end of the stick and are treated as if 
on the bottom of the geographical hierarchy, yet the bottom of this hierarchy is where U.S. power 
is produced. 
Furthering this explanation of inferiority, Pacific Islands studies scholar and former 
Director of the Center for Pacific Islands Studies at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, Terence 
Wesley-Smith, shows how large powers think about islands. In his article, “Rethinking Pacific 
Islands Studies,” Wesley-Smith describes three rationales for studying the Pacific Islands: the 
Pragmatic Rationale, the Laboratory Rationale, and the Empowerment Rationale. The first two 
rationales have been used by larger powers and in most cases, colonial powers. The Pragmatic 
Rationale refers to the “pragmatic need to know about the Pacific Islands places with which the 
metropolitan countries have to deal.”42 He cites Ainslee T. Embree, writing, “Without this 
pragmatic rationale, characterized by Embree as ‘the need to know one’s enemies and one’s 
friends, it is unlikely that whole programs would have been constructed around geographic areas.” 
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The second rationale, the Laboratory rationale, is described by Pacific historian Douglas Oliver. 
“I suggest that because of their wide diversities, small-scale dimensions and relative isolation, the 
Pacific Islands can provide excellent—in some ways unique—laboratory-like opportunities for 
gaining deeper understandings of Human Biology, Political Science, etc.”43 Wesley-Smith argues 
that the pragmatic and laboratory rationales have colonial implications and undertones. He writes, 
“In the pragmatic frame, on the one hand, the ultimate purpose has been influence rather than 
understanding. The laboratory mode, on the other hand, can easily reduce Pacific Islanders to mere 
objects of study.”44 From our utilization to the epistemology of learning about the islands, the 
ultimate reasons have always been strategic and/or doing things that would not be accepted in 
larger landmasses with massive populations. One only needs to look at the continuing effects of 
radiation in the Marshall Islands for a perfect example of the island as a strategic laboratory. 
The strategic thought surrounding islands regards them as the perfect locations for military 
bases. Because of their size, small populations, and perceived isolation, these islands fit outside 
legal and political norms of their times. Admiral Rich Byrd argues that U.S. occupation of islands 
should not be considered territorial expansion because “none of the islands in question possesses 
natural features of value other than the military standpoint and therefore cannot constitute 
territorial aggrandizement.”45 Once again, our distance and smallness renders us invisible as 
political entities legitimizing exploitation. U.S. president Harry Truman and Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson, wrote in 1945 regarding their island possessions that they “are not colonies: they 
are outposts, and their acquisition are appropriate under the general doctrine of self-defense.”46 
Oldenziel argues that this was a defensive and discursive move aimed at allowing the United States 
to continue to represent itself as the defender of democracy in the world while at the same time 
satisfying its imperial needs. I am tempted to ask the same question William Jennings Bryan asked 
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the American people back in the 1890s, “Is our national character so weak that we cannot withstand 
the temptation to appropriate the first piece of land that comes within our reach?”47 Reflecting on 
my home island and our lack of sovereignty, I feel the American answer remains Yes! 
Mother, May I: The Lack of Sovereignty 
CHamoru activist and poet Melvin Won-Pat Borja, who is an ardent supporter of 
independence for the island, once described his primary reason for supporting independence as the 
best political status for the island in a metaphor. He exclaimed, “I am tired of being on the menu, 
I want to sit at the table.” In many ways, his sentence perfectly explicates the second ghoul of the 
macabre duet: our lack of sovereignty. As shown in the section above, the United States did not 
consider annexing islands to be acts of imperialism and thus had an easier time militarizing them. 
The Department of Defense argued that obtaining “remote colonial islands with small colonial 
populations would be the easiest to acquire and would entail the least political headaches.”48 Our 
lack of sovereignty allows the United States to only experience minor headaches rather than the 
migraines that may ensue when dealing with other nations’ sovereignty. Yet, this is done at the 
expense of Guåhan where we have suffered from the drawn-out colonial gangrene for over 100 
years now. David Vine writes, “island bases insulated from local population problems and 
decolonization pressures were the key to maintaining U.S. global dominance for decades to 
come.”49 
Before moving forward in this analysis, it is imperative to operationally define my use of 
sovereignty in this section, as it is a word that connotes multiple meanings. Sovereignty, in one of 
its usages, is directly related to the nation-state. This usage is rooted in the work of Jean Bodin. 
Bodin, writing in the late 16th century, argued that competing power structures often lead to war 
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and chaos, thus there must be a single sovereign who exercises absolute power, and whose 
sovereignty must be perpetual in time. This sovereign, who was usually a king or monarch, derived 
his legitimacy from the divine right of kings. Bodin defines sovereignty as “absolute and perpetual 
power vested in a commonwealth.”50 Furthermore, “It is the distinguishing mark of the sovereign 
that he cannot in any way be subject to the commands of another, for it is he who makes law for 
the subject, abrogates law already made, and amends obsolete law.”51 After the Peace of 
Westphalia, this idea became applicable to the world of nation-states where the sovereign is 
supreme internally, but equal to other sovereign rulers externally. Sovereign states are supposed 
to have supreme rule internally as they are the “legitimate” users of violence in their territorial 
boundaries, but equal to each other externally. The state has become the sovereign. According to 
the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933, the state has four 
characteristics today: a permanent population, a defined territory, government, and the capacity to 
enter into relations with other states. Once a political entity is said to have possessed these 
qualifications and is recognized as a state52, it is given status as a sovereign state, in most cases. 
Confusing this notion of sovereignty as being equally external, but internally supreme is 
the usage of sovereignty within indigenous nations, and the tribal usage of the word. Sovereignty, 
as used when discussing tribes in the United States, for example, refers to this internal sense of 
sovereignty. In 1831, Justice John Marshall, in Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, defined the 
political status of tribes as “domestic dependent nations.” According to Bruyneel, “For Marshall, 
this meant that indigenous tribes were recognized as sovereign governments that did not have the 
same legal standing as foreign nations, and in fact to him they were more like “wards” of the 
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federal government.53 In a similar argument, Julian Aguon references the difference between 
internal and external self-determination. He writes, “Internal self-determination is generally 
understood as the right of a people within a state to authentic self-government in its community 
affairs. External self-determination, in contrast, is understood as the right to reject alien 
subjugation in totality, usually in the contexts of colonization or military occupation.”54 He calls 
this attempt to parse self-determination, and I would argue sovereignty, into these two components 
as fundamentally colonial, for internal sovereignty is akin to having the ability to make decisions 
in your room, but not in your house. 
In this dissertation, I argue, even if the parsing is colonial, it is telling that Guåhan lacks 
both internal and external sovereignty. As an unincorporated territory, we neither have the 
sovereignty offered to states in the world today nor do we have the internal sovereignty given to 
tribes in the United States. In Guåhan, sovereignty is not exercised by us, but rather is a fleeting 
concept as described by Michael Lujan Bevacqua. He writes of Guåhan’s unique position in the 
world, 
Any potential critiques that Guam might represent the world as it is today—its family of 
nation-states, the concepts which underpin its development—are merely exceptional and 
can be dismissed through a footnote or the invocation of an intermediary category of 
political being such as “unincorporated territory or non self-governing territory. Again, 
Guam appears here as a specter more than anything else.55 
In this dissertation, I am arguing that on all fronts Guåhan lacks sovereignty. With this operational 
definition complete, I now turn to further outlining the argument of how our lack of sovereignty is 
a significant factor in our current militarized form-of-life. 
Guåhan has consistently been the reliable default for placing military installations due to 
our status as an unincorporated territory, and ultimately stemming from this, we are technically 
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“American soil.” Our status, disputed or not, as American soil serves as the condition of possibility 
for our geographical location and islandness to consistently be exploited for U.S. security 
concerns. As the prolific Brazilian metal band Sepultura yells in a song, “War For Territory!”56 
U.S. security is best kept secure by securing the sovereignty of small islands. One of the most 
telling examples of this is when the United States was looking to put a new base in the Asia-Pacific 
region to challenge China’s possible hegemony. To spoil the end of the story, Guåhan was chosen 
as the site leading to the controversial “military buildup of the island” which will be discussed 
later in this chapter. However, before deciding on Guåhan, the U.S. military tried to make 
arrangements with Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and Australia for a new base. When all 
four countries responded negatively to the proposition, Guåhan was left because as Brigadier 
General John Doucette says, “Since Guam is part of the United States, potential operations from 
here are not subject to foreign government approval or international agreements.”57 
Robert Underwood captures this thought process perfectly saying that military activities in 
Guåhan do not require a “Mother, May I?” routine as the United States would have to negotiate in 
other sovereign states.58 Our status as sovereign American soil is very useful and important for 
U.S. military purposes, and military officials have consistently referred to the political nature of 
Guåhan as the most reliable factor in using the island, besides our location. In his book, GUAM 
USA: America’s Forward Fortress in Asia-Pacific, Colonel Jerry Rivera argues that in the possible 
case of a united Korea, which wanted to end U.S. military basing in their country, the U.S. military 
could always plan to move personnel, weapons, aircraft, and equipment to Guåhan. Rivera’s 
argument is that no matter what happens in Asia, Guåhan will always be a place to project presence 
and power. At length, he writes,  
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Withdrawing to the Marianas is not abandoning our friends and allies in the region. They 
will know that we are nearby on U.S. soil, where the U.S. has an inherent right to be, 
keeping an eye out for them just several hours away by air and several days be sea. As 
part of that strategy, U.S. military forces will constantly be flying and sailing from Guam 
and visiting all our Asian friends and allies, just to let them know we are in the 
neighborhood.59 
Rivera’s wording perfectly tells the story of Guåhan’s lack of sovereignty, particularly in his 
argument that the U.S. has an inherent right to be in the island. Statements such as these are 
depoliticized, dehistoricized, and take Guåhan’s “Americanness” for granted, leading to a 
normalized militarization of the island. Reinforcing this line of thought, Captain Robert A. 
McNaught wrote that because Guåhan was sovereign U.S. territory, U.S. forces could operate 
unconstrained from the political requirements of host countries either in training or during actual 
conflicts.60 Similarly, Erickson and Mikolay write, “Guam has the advantage of being American 
territory, reducing the political difficulty of building and operating assets there. Furthermore, 
Guam with its pro-military population and 7.7 percent unemployment is unlikely to offer local 
opposition to increased military infrastructure.”61 Also in this litany of “Guam’s lack of 
sovereignty is awesome!” comes the words of U.S. Major General Dennis Larsen who told 
reporters in Guåhan, “This is American soil in the midst of the Pacific. Guam is a US territory. We 
can do what we want here and make huge investments without fear of being thrown out.”62 
Erickson and Mikolay encapsulate all of this into one short sentence: “Clearly, the U.S. military 
can depend on Guam.”63 And depend on us they have. 
One of the ways the United States has depended on our lack of sovereignty as an 
unincorporated territory is in ensuring the U.SA. military mission of what Sasha Davis calls 
operational unilateralism. In his article, “The US Military Base Network,” Davis argues that the 
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military desires to operate unilaterally without the consent of allied governments and because of 
this, they have come to rely more heavily on colonial overseas territories for projecting military 
power. He defines operational unilateralism as the “ability of the military to strike quickly without 
any need for consultation with anyone–even the government of the territory from which they are 
launching the strike.”64 This all stems from the U.S. military concern that their ability to act with 
post-Fordist efficiency will be complicated by restrictions, host nation sensitivities, or domestic 
politics of foreign countries. The military, to avoid these obstacles, looks for base sites with pre-
arranged permissions to train and deploy without negotiation, and Guåhan, as a territory, is one of 
these ideal places. As Stephan Yates writes about Guåhan, “When God gives you a gift, it’s good 
to use it.”65  Guåhan is a gift to the United States wrapped in the sweet paper of sovereignty and 
the more we are used by the military, the less genuinely secure Guåhan becomes. 
III. GUÅHAN, THE MISFIT: VIOLENT GEOGRAPHIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
In From A Native Daughter, Kanaka Maoli wahine and ea warrior, Haunani-Kay Trask 
writes, “When viewed through island rather than continental eyes, Pacific peoples live in the 
largest danger zone in the world.”66 In this section, I examine this notion of danger zones and 
violent geographies as well as International Relations’ failure to account for Guåhan as an island 
and as an unincorporated territory. I argue that the macabre duet of our lack of sovereignty and 
geographical location leaves Guåhan permanently weaved into the fabric of the violent 
cartography of the world. Sasha Davis argues that “it is not possible to understand the global 
geography of the US military without looking more closely at the local sites where the global 
apparatus touches the ground.”67 Violence is not just what the dominant eye sees, as violence can 
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disguise or normalize itself within the fabric of society or the functioning of the international 
system.  
This leads to the discipline of International Relations. Here I problematize the traditional 
scope of security and argue that canonical IR does not leave much analytical space for a true 
examination of Guåhan security due to its political status as an unincorporated territory. Guåhan 
is not an integral part of the United States because it simply belongs to it. We are neither a state, 
nor an international organization or norm entrepreneur, and thus it is as if the scope of traditional 
IR theory leaves us out of the equation of having agency in international politics. To make space, 
or to be more honest, to force space for a Guåhan-centered approach to be taken seriously in IR, I 
take this opportunity to flesh out my theoretical intervention of “decolonial realism” or “realism 
in between.” 
To put it somewhat bluntly, Guåhan’s legal and strategic significance is a result of a realist 
international order in which the complex interaction of sovereignty, anarchy, and competition 
create the demand for peripheral spaces between empires where geopolitics can play out without 
directly threatening the heartlands of the major players. Therefore, realism is essential to 
understanding how we became the tip of the spear. However, realism’s implicit bias towards great 
powers analytically and normatively requires that we consider the positionality of realist 
theorization— ‘in between’—when we theorize about Guåhan lest we occlude the distinctive 
security environment of those who have to make a life on the tip of the spear. In this theorization, 
I utilize “in between” rather than “from below” because Guåhan is placed in a unique position 
amongst the power struggles in the Asia and Pacific Islands region. From a geopolitical standpoint, 
Guåhan acts as a redline.  
 The red line refers to “an unequivocal threat, a line in the sand that if crossed, the target 
would incur the full fury of the state that issued the threat in the first place.”68 Similarly, I use 
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Bruno Tertrais’ more concise definition as “The manipulation of an adversary’s intent through 
(mostly public) statements for deterrence purposes, referring to the deliberate crossing of a certain 
threshold by an adversary, and relevant counteraction if this threshold is crossed.”69 Red lines are 
a public declaration of deterrence through threat of punishment or retaliation. A recent example of 
a red line is Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s red line over Iran providing weapons 
for pro-regime forces in Syria. Netanyahu warned that Israel’s red line was weapons transfers to 
enemies that pose an immediate threat, and that Iran crossed it in March 2018. This led to an Israeli 
airstrike targeting an Iranian plane in Damascus loaded with weapons. Netanyahu said, “Israel is 
constantly working to prevent our enemies from arming themselves with advanced weaponry. Our 
red lines are as sharp as ever and our determination to enforce them is stronger than ever.”70  
The geometry of the world is typically divided into nation-states, non-state actors such as 
terrorist groups, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations. In this 
geometry, the red line has no geometry of its own. It is a response, a statement of intent. However, 
what I argue, is that Guåhan challenges this geometry and ontologically acts as a red line in the 
Asia and Pacific Islands region. Any red line crossing in this area of the world is met by American 
force or threat of force, and Guåhan is the geometrical, red line for which this force is generated. 
One only needs to consider that the North Korea tension in this region is met with B-52s flying to 
Guåhan, only to take off for war exercises in the Korean Peninsula. As an unincorporated territory 
with no sense of sovereignty, our whole existence is to serve as the physical embodiment of 
deterrence and counter-retaliation in the Asia-Pacific region. Thus, in any potential struggle or 
conflict between the United States and North Korea or the United States and China, Guåhan is the 
physical red line in-between. Thus, this dissertation displays the ultimately violent method of 
maintaining Guåhan as the red line in-between in the power politics struggle, and that any 
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examination of genuine security for the island and its people, needs to examine the unique security 
environment of being a red line.  
In multiple trips to the United States, I have been faced with the ubiquitous question of 
“Where are you from?” Every time I answer with Guam, I get one of two responses. It is either 
that they have no idea what or where Guam is (sometimes I am asked “What is a Guam?”) or their 
brains dig deep and excavate the one chapter in their high school history class where they learned 
that Guam had some affiliation with the U.S. during World War II. It is then that I tell them that 
Guam is an unincorporated territory of the United States. Yet, they are generally still confused and 
ask what being a U.S. territory means.  This is oftentimes the case even for those who live here as 
well. Unincorporated territories live in the shadow of anomalous forms of political organization 
and thus I argue are heavily understudied as a focal point of research in IR. As Michael Lujan 
Bevacqua writes regarding Guåhan, “My island is one big American footnote, sitting black/brown 
as day on the bottom of every red, whitewashed, and blue page.”71  
I argue in a similar fashion that Guåhan lies as one big footnote in the field of International 
Relations and security studies due to our anomalous political status. The Realist international 
order, particularly in the Neo-Realist account, presumes isomorphism between units. To put it 
another way, all states are equally sovereign, defined by borders, and seek security even if not 
primacy. Underlying this isomorphism is a presumption that the inside of the box of the state looks 
Weberian. The state commands its people as the rational monopoly holder of legitimate violence.  
The presumption of such a state structure, what John Herz calls the “hard shell” of the territorial 
state, is one in which internal order is premised on the Hobbesian security of the population out of 
anarchy before the nation-state enters the international anarchy.72 Guåhan’s unincorporated-ness 
makes it neither isomorphic with other states internally nor externally. Guåhan has divergent 
                                               
71 Michael Lujan Bevacqua, “My Island Is One Big American Footnote,” in The Space Between: Negotiating 
Culture, Place, and Identity in the Pacific, edited by A. Marata Tamaira, 120-122 (Honolulu: Center for Pacific 
Islands Studies, 2009).  
         72 J.H. Herz, “Rise and Demise of the Territorial State,” World Politics ,9, (1957): 473–493.  
 83 
security concerns from the U.S. and is not guaranteed the same level of Herzian protection as it is 
not inside the so-called “hard shell.” Unlike a traditional border zone of a territorial state that may 
be more prone to violence such as the border between North and South Sudan, Guåhan is marked 
legally and territorially as somehow inside U.S. jurisdiction and yet not quite wholly included in 
the geographic and moral body politic. I argue that the in-between legal character and neither/nor 
geographic character of Guåhan requires significantly revising Realism while still retaining the 
emphasis on material power, self-interest, and international anarchy. While this may seem like a 
limited or exceptional case not worthy of revising theory to the larger community of International 
Relations in the U.S. or other great powers like Russia or China, the misfit between strategic 
thinking from a great power perspective and the security of CHamorus could not be more vital. 
To support how Guåhan and especially CHamorus live in the abyss of IR, we must look at 
the racist origins of the discipline. To begin, I look at the work of Robert Vitalis in his book, White 
World Order, Black Power Politics: The Birth of American International Relations.73 Vitalis 
describes how the first decades of International Relations in the United States were coterminous 
with racial hierarchy and that imperialism and racism had a constitutive role in bringing forward 
this new discipline. He gives the example of IR’s first specialized journal being the Journal of 
Race Development which only eventually became renamed the Journal of International Relations 
and quotes prominent realist, E.H. Carr, who writes, “There was no science of International 
Relations…The subject so-called was an ideology of control masking as a proper academic 
discipline.”74 Vitalis argues that “the central challenge that defined the new field called 
international relations was how to ensure the efficient political administration and race 
development of subject peoples, from the domestic dependencies and backward races at home to 
the complex race formations found in the new overseas territories and dependencies.”75 
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At the core of International Relations, Vitalis writes,  
The white social scientists who offered their expertise to the new imperial state and the 
handful of critics of the new expansionist wave all assumed that hierarchy was natural, 
that it was biologically rooted, and that it could be made sense of best by drawing on 
concepts such as higher and lower races, natural and historic races, savagery, and 
civilization, and the like.76  
The same foundations of international relations can also be seen in the Insular Cases, which created 
the new status of “unincorporated territory” and in the naval government found here in Guåhan. 
As the Navy wrote regarding the CHamoru people, “There is every indication that these people 
have not yet reached a state of development commensurate with the personal independence, 
obligations, and responsibilities of United States citizenship. It is believed that such a change of 
status at this time would be most harmful to the native people.”77 This is eerily similar to the logics 
used in the foundational Insular Case Downes v. Bidwell, which legitimized unincorporated 
territories by arguing that these territories are inhabited by “alien races, differing from us in 
religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation, and modes of thought”78 and because of this, “the 
administration of government and justice according to Anglo-Saxon principles may for a time be 
impossible.”79 
In a special edition of Alternatives, entitled “Race in International Relations”, Randolph B. 
Persuad and R. B. J. Walker argue similarly to Vitalis regarding the role of race in the development 
of International Relations. In their introduction to the issue, they argue that despite having its 
origins in racist thought, International Relations as a discipline has been silent on issues of race. 
They define silence as an epistemological stance premised on removing race from the field of 
inquiry. Despite this, Persuad and Walker argue, “Race has been a fundamental force in the very 
making of the modern world system and in the representations and explanation of how that system 
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emerged and how it works. This can only be understood, however, if we look at race as an 
interrelated set of material, ideological, and epistemological practices.”80 One primary example 
was during the Balance of Power, pre-World War I era, in which large-scale violence was delayed 
because of these large powers engaging in the conquest of imperialism where they were able to 
compete through the exercise of power amongst marginalized places.  
Sankaran Krishna similarly argues that IR is predicated on a systematic amnesia on the 
question of race. He writes, “The emergence of a modern, territorially sovereign state system in 
Europe was coterminous with, and indissociable from, the genocide of the indigenous peoples of 
the ‘new world,’ the enslavement of the natives of the African continent, and the colonization of 
the societies of Asia.”81 In a brilliant discursive shift, Krishna argues that IR invisibilizes this 
history through an emphasis on abstraction and theory-building, rather than historical analysis and 
description. He writes, “By encouraging students to display their virtuosity in abstraction, the 
discipline brackets questions of theft of land, violence, and slavery—the three processes that have 
historically underlain the unequal global order we now find ourselves in.”82 I position this 
dissertation as pushing against this epistemological silencing of race, theft of land, violence, and 
slavery, and privilege a Guåhan perspective of International Relations, hence my heavy emphasis 
on history throughout the chapters of the dissertation. As Krishna writes, “By deftly defining 
international as the encounter between sovereign states, much of a violent world history is instantly 
sanitized.”83 Where does this leave us? Do we put our hands up in the air and argue that 
international relations is useless and of no relevance to our existence here in Guåhan? I argue just 
the opposite, i.e., that understanding IR’s origins and manifestations is incredibly important to our 
quest for liberation for the CHamoru people. In the same article, Krishna writes, “To understand 
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international relations, then, seek out that which IR discourse represses, hides, elides, conceals, 
and prematurely closes off as avenues for inquiry.”84  
To provide further evidence on our status in the abyss of IR, I turn to Kenneth Waltz. In 
his 1959 book, Man, the State, and War, the father of structural realism, Kenneth Waltz, 
established three images of analysis to explain the causes of war and conflict in the international 
system: the individual, the state, and the international system. Waltz argues in the first image that 
the beliefs and personalities of individuals like state leaders are a factor in explaining war. He 
argues, “War results from selfishness, from misdirected aggressive impulses, from stupidity…If 
these are the primary causes of war, then the elimination of war must come through uplifting and 
enlightening men or securing their psychic-social adjustment.”85 Waltz argues that even if human 
nature is important to understanding war, it is not sufficient enough to explain war and must be 
supplemented by an analysis of social and political institutions.  
This is when he moves to the second image level of analysis in his description of the 
internal organization of states. He explores whether domestic organization, democracy vs. 
autocracy, capitalism vs. state-run economies, for example, needs to be considered when 
examining causes of conflict. Ultimately, Waltz concludes that the second-image analysis becomes 
messy when trying to distinguish between “good” and “bad” states and what the qualifying 
characteristics of each are. He argues that even if we collectively developed these operational 
definitions of “good” and “bad,” it still would not be enough to understand why wars occur. He 
poses the question, “If bad states make war, what will change bad states to good states?”86 
It is here that he moves to developing his primary argument in his future work that 
international anarchy is the permissive cause of war. Waltz argues that due to the anarchic nature 
of the international system, states will do what they need to do to survive and that “a state will use 
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force to attain its goals if, after assessing the prospects for success, it values those goals more than 
it values the pleasures of peace.”87 There is no supreme authority or international/world 
government that can prevent wars, thus “war occurs because there is nothing to prevent it.”88 
Bringing the three images together, Waltz ultimately concludes that all three images need to be 
examined in tandem to truly understand the causes of war. He argues that “if individuals and states 
do not pursue war-like policies or do not pursue selfish interests…then even though the third image 
of international anarchy permits the occurrence of war, there would be no war.”89 
While Waltz would go on in his subsequent book, Theory of International Politics, to 
forego the first and second image levels of analysis in favor of the third-image structural approach, 
his theoretical contribution leaves my work without a foundation. So, where does Guåhan fit within 
Waltz’s levels of analysis? In a first-image level of analysis, those born in Guåhan are not eligible 
to hold the highest office of the American government, the Presidency. With the lack of even an 
opportunity for this office and the power it holds, a first-image level of analysis becomes rather 
useless. In the second-image level of analysis of looking at the make-up of the domestic state, we 
are also not relevant actors as we have no influence in American foreign policy decisions due to 
our lack of power in the form of voting representation in the House of Representatives, Senate, or 
Electoral College. This was seen in the military relocation map, an arrangement made between the 
governments of Japan and the United States to relocate American troops from Okinawa to Guåhan. 
Guåhan was not seated at the metaphorical or literal table when these decisions were made. The 
last image of analysis looking at the international system also has no place for us and deems us 
powerless. We are not a sovereign state, neither are we an influential corporation or NGO.  
This is where I see my work intervening in traditional IR literature. I aim to carve a place 
in IR to examine security and violence from the perspective of an unincorporated territory. Now, 
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one possible rebuttal of my project would be to simply argue that Guåhan is a part of the United 
States and thus my entire argument is flawed. However, I argue that this is a rather dehistoricized 
analysis of Guåhan’s political and colonial history and is an analytical lens that does not center 
around Guåhan. From this Waltzian analysis, Guåhan’s agency is usurped into the U.S. context 
while the priority of Guåhan’s security is subordinated to the mainland American polity. I move 
rather to center the scope of security from a Guåhan perspective and not simply as a footnote. I 
focus on how the misfit between unincorporation and Realist international politics leaves Guåhan 
uniquely vulnerable to being gambled with and even outright sacrificed in the pursuit of the fully 
incorporated territory of the U.S. polity, while at the same time arguing, that incorporation into the 
U.S. polity is not the answer. In the conclusion, I argue for further separation from the United 
States as opposed to this dissertation being a call to simply being included into the American 
political family.  
In all three images of analysis, we are seemingly deemed powerless. This lack of power 
leaves us in a precarious position of being a pawn in American conflicts, strategic interests, and 
wars. Yet, it is in my focus on power, powerlessness, and the material where I fundamentally agree 
with realists. Like realists, I also argue that power is the international currency of the international 
system, and that a concentrated analysis of power is necessary to understand the changes in the 
international system. However, I aim to broaden the epistemological scope of realism and argue 
against its state-centrism. This is not to say that I deny the important and significant ontology of 
the state as a primary actor in International Relations. Jairus Grove writes in “War in the Age of 
Late Globalization,” that realists see the international system as a desert ecosystem characterized 
by one dominant species with lots of space in between encounters. Grove argues instead that in 
the 21st century, the state “is one amongst a veritable rainforest of species.”90 He argues that “there 
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is no equilibrium nor Archimedean point on which a state gains total authority or an order breaks 
entirely from the state.”91 In similar fashion, my argument here is not to diminish the importance 
of the state, but to repopulate the world of IR and realism with the other contending forms of 
political organization that complicate the story. 
I take a power-based approach I deem “realism in between,” which aims to examine how 
the exercise of power in the international system and the role of geopolitics has affected the 
security of Guåhan from a Guåhan-centered perspective. International Relations may leave 
Guåhan powerless in their analysis, but it certainly has not left Guåhan unaffected by the touch of 
power. This lack of power I argue is demonstrated most obviously in our role in U.S. national 
security. I argue that our incomplete inclusion into the American nation-state as an unincorporated 
territory leaves us on the margins of American security concerns, thus making us simultaneously 
important and disposable. Perhaps more important than exclusion, is our utilization as a red-line 
and power projection hub.  
As a militarized American colony, we are spun into a circular logic of irrationality: we 
have not even a semblance of influence in the operations of the U.S. government while we bear 
the burden of their strategic militarization. Former Guåhan Congressman Ben Blaz once wrote 
regarding Guåhan’s relationship with the United States that we are “equal in war, but not in 
peace.”92 In line with Blaz, I argue that our status as a colony along with the subsequent incomplete 
inclusion into the American nation-state means that we are also not included in the scope of the 
referent object of U.S. security concerns (and neither do we argue that we necessarily should be, 
but for very different reasons that will be illuminated more as this dissertation moves forward). 
Rather, we are utilized as part of a strategic policy response, and this is a result of continuing 
American imperialism and colonialism in the island.  
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In what may not seem as directly obvious, there is possibility for realism and my anti-
imperial oriented project to work together in my analysis of critiquing security. In his article, 
“Making Machines: Unlikely Resonances between Realist and Postcolonial Thought,” Kavi 
Joseph Abraham argues that “certain lines of realist and postcolonial thought may be drawn 
together, knotting threads around shared critiques of liberal ways of violence.”93 Abraham 
describes the importance of realizing that the current imperial machine is a conjunction of racist 
imaginaries, national interest, and liberal universalism, and that concepts such as racial hierarchies, 
slavery, temporary occupations, and exploitation of workers, while seemingly illiberal, are 
methods of the liberal order. Long before Abraham, E. H. Carr argued that ideologies of peace and 
cooperation tend to act more as a veil obscuring the interests of power. Yet, liberal thought is not 
only a veil for national interests and power politics, but is actually generative of war.94 Morgenthau 
similarly argues that liberal political theory may seem to limit violence, but it does not limit 
domination in any way.95 He suggests that, “violence is a part of the arsenal of liberalism and that 
power relations still subsist under domestic legal regimes.”96 If Guåhan were to change its political 
status, or become independent for example, International Relations as a field would have to 
analytically fit Guåhan in (even if independence in no way solves all of Guåhan’s problems). In 
the next section, I examine Guåhan history to show how the United States has interfered with 
political status change thus continuing the slow violence of epistemological silencing outlined in 
this section. 
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IV. UNINCORPORATED TERRITORY FOREVER MORE: SECURITY>SELF-
DETERMINATION 
A possible critique of this chapter thus far is that the basis of this argument lies only in 
showing how the military has used our political status as a vantage point for permanence in the 
island. One may argue that there are no clear examples of the military creating a sense of political 
insecurity by deliberately trying to quell the CHamoru quest for self-determination. This section 
addresses this, and to begin, I turn to the pivotal events of 1937. After multiple petitions by 
CHamorus to be granted American citizenship, CHamorus decided to raise money to send 
representatives to plead their case to the United States Congress, which via the Treaty of Paris that 
ended the Spanish-American War, was supposed to determine the political belonging for the 
people of the newly acquired territory. Article IX of the treaty reads, “The civil rights and political 
status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be 
determined by the Congress.”97 So, beginning in 1936, CHamorus raised money to send prominent 
leaders, Baltazar Bordallo and Francisco B. Leon Guerrero, to Washington D.C. to make their case 
for citizenship.   
In order to offset some of the costs of the Guam Congress representatives’ trip, the 
Executive-Congressional Committee of the Guam Congress asked naval governor, Benjamin V. 
McCandish, to provide $5,000 of local tax revenues to help. Although originally seeming to 
support this, he and his aides eventually denied this request arguing that appropriating these funds 
for the two men to lobby for citizenship in Washington D.C. would be a breach of faith on the part 
of the Naval government with the Federal government.98 In essence, the naval government argued 
that helping to send representatives who were fighting for full inclusion into the American political 
family would be a breach of faith against the very government they were aiming to be a part of. 
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This denial did not kill the movement, however, and Bordallo and Leon Guerrero left Guåhan on 
November 17, 1936.  
Upon their arrival, the two leaders testified before Congress and to their surprise, 
encountered resistance from the Department of the Navy. In a letter from the Navy Secretary 
Claude Swanson, the Navy outlined their opposition to granting CHamorus citizenship. Their letter 
hums the tune of the macabre duet, with selections reading,  
The geographical location of Guam in the midst of foreign territory, with foreign 
commercial and colonizing interests to be considered, together with the racial problems 
of that locality, combine to provide a fertile field for international disputes. It is believed 
that the change provided for in the proposed legislation would aggravate the danger to 
peaceful international situations… 
There is every indication that these people have not yet reached a state of development 
and commensurate with the personal independence, obligations, and responsibilities of 
United States citizenship. It is believed that such a change of status at this time would be 
most harmful to the native people.99 
This line of argumentation was reinforced by Commander R.O. Davis of the Naval Office of Island 
Governments, who refused to allow Bordallo and Leon Guerrero to sit in for his full testimony due 
to the security implications of what he was going to disclose to Congress in opposing citizenship 
for CHamorus. What was made known however, was Commander Davis’ opinion that granting 
U.S. citizenship may lead to an organic act which would subsequently change the form of 
government and possibly lead to the Navy having to withdraw from the island. He said, “it was 
the position of the Department that the granting of United States citizenship to the Chamorro would 
immediately affect their administration inasmuch as United States citizens have a part in their 
government which extends far beyond the present provisions for the administration of Guam.”100 
Based on these testimonies, one could argue that the Navy’s attitude went against many of the 
ideals that Americans have historically espoused. The whole idea of power coming from the people 
was disposed of in the name of U.S. security concerns. Before moving forward, it is important to 
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clarify that I am not presenting the entire U.S. government as a monolith of opposition to CHamoru 
citizenship. There were multiple members of Congress who supported the measure as well as 
executive fact-finding missions investigating naval abuses in the islands. It is important here not 
to make dangerous generalizations of the American character.  
 World War II interrupted this CHamoru push for citizenship as the island was brutally 
occupied by the Japanese for nearly three years. As I will elaborate in the last chapter of this 
dissertation, the CHamoru war experience would alter CHamoru identity and sense of political 
subjectivity. Even after the war, the CHamoru push for citizenship would continue to be resisted 
by the Navy, once again in the name of national security. In May 1946, two years after the war 
ended, Acting Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan described the military plans for the island now 
that the war had concluded. In this letter he wrote, 
It is planned to maintain the island of Guam as a permanent full-scale Navy activity. 
Present plans encompass the operation of airfields and necessary work areas, the 
maintenance of receiving and transmitting communication facilities.101 
This would necessitate a substantial amount of land-taking which will be outlined in the following 
chapter, but the overall effect of taking nearly 60% of the island for military use would fuel the 
fires of CHamorus fighting for both citizenship and for some, an end to naval government as 
summed up in the words of Councilman Antonio S. N. Duenas who exclaimed, “Our present 
system of government in Guam is dictatorial. The governor is an absolute monarch. He is vested 
with all the absolute powers…and at will can amend, change and make new laws that will affect 
the entire island.”102  
 Expressing their frustrations with their limited power, the Guam Congress publicly walked 
out of session in 1949. When news of the protest went “viral” via major news media, the federal 
government crafted the Organic Act of 1950 officially granting CHamorus and some others in 
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Guåhan citizenship, officially making Guåhan an unincorporated territory of the United States, 
introducing a civilian government, and placing the administration of Guåhan under the Department 
of the Interior, although Congress still had plenary power over the island via the territorial clause. 
This fight for citizenship, resisted by the Navy, would eventually turn into various acts of political 
status improvement, change, and now, decolonization. After the granting of citizenship and the 
Organic Act of 1950, the U.S. remained, as it does today, sovereign over the island, thus allowing 
for further militarization of the island, even if the island was no longer under a naval dictatorship. 
The bottom line became as Rodgers noted earlier, that America “had an inherent right to be here.” 
Unincorporated territory status and American citizenship afforded some political power to 
CHamorus, as long as the federal-territorial relationship remained unchanged at its core. The 
Organic Act of 1950 was a unilateral act of Congress and was not a document crafted with 
negotiations with CHamorus, thus keeping the locus of power with the federal government. 
 This is explicated in CHamoru scholar Laura Torres Souder’s book chapter, “A Not So 
Perfect Union: Federal-Territorial Relations Between the United States and Guam.” In the chapter, 
Souder argues that “hierarchical, military rule from the top downwards, defined the federal-
territorial relationship at the onset” and from this has created an “imbalance of power favoring the 
U.S. federal interests often to the extreme disadvantage to the people of Guam.”103 Most 
importantly, Souder demonstrates the shift from citizenship to a larger concern with political 
status. She recognizes that the Organic Act of 1950 was not an act of self-determination, nor did 
it change the relationship between the island and the Federal government. She writes, “Although 
certain roles had been shuffled and new faces in civilian garb replaced the uniformed 
administrators of pre-war days, the basic vertical, unilateral relationship between the U.S. and 
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Guam did not change with the institution of civilian government.”104 Power shifts and takes 
different forms, but what is new in form is not necessarily new in content.  
 Soon after the passing of the Organic Act of 1950, CHamorus expressed dissatisfaction 
with their system of government and organized a Constitutional Convention in 1969, led by 
Senator Richard Taitano, to address how to alter the Organic Act to reflect the island’s needs. After 
roughly a year of deliberation, the Convention came up with recommendations to amend the 
Organic Act such as removing the island from the control of the Department of the Interior, just 
compensation for landowners whose land was taken by the military, and even the regulation of 
marijuana. In total, however, only the request to have some representation in the nation’s capital 
was approved. No substantive changes were made in the federal-territorial relationship. A decade 
later, Guåhan Congressman Antonio Won Pat introduced a bill to create a constitution for the 
island. The federal government reacted by introducing an edited version of the bill, which would 
ensure American sovereignty over the island. The enabling act for this Constitutional Convention 
had to, “First, recognize and be consistent with the sovereignty of the United States over Guam, 
and the supremacy of the provisions of the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States 
applicable to Guam.”105 The Constitution was overwhelmingly rejected by CHamorus because it 
put the “cart before the carabao.” It refused to address the political status of the island. The rules 
put forward by the federal government during this act kept this federal-territorial relationship 
intact, and in no way challenged it or allowed Guåhan to choose another political status, which 
would challenge or complicate the sovereignty over the island. 
 In 1975, the United States signed a covenant with the Northern Mariana Islands (NMI) who 
were administered under the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to form the CNMI or 
Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. As per the covenant, the people of the NMI were 
given local self-government over land tenure, immigration, labor, and taxes. In addition, the United 
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States provided a substantial financial assistance package including $420 million in federal 
subsidies as well as food stamps and welfare benefits. This angered CHamorus in Guåhan because 
“it seemed ironic and unfair to many that they, who had obediently and patriotically served the 
United States for seventy-five years, should have less self-government than their neighbors.”106 
Just as they were outraged after U.S. Virgin Islanders were given citizenship in 1917, CHamorus 
in Guåhan felt they were being duped once again and thought they deserved a similar political 
agreement with the United States allowing for more local control. This led to the “Guam Study.” 
 Kept hidden until 2004, in the early 1970s the Nixon administration conducted a study on 
Guåhan’s political status. Led by the Department of the Interior as a multiagency group, the Nixon 
administration appointed Fred M. Zeder to head the study. From 1973-1974 during the study’s 
deliberations, the Department of State and Department of Defense recommended giving Guåhan a 
similar deal to the Northern Mariana Islands, making the island a Commonwealth as well. The 
departments argued that this would eventually lead the two island political entities to unite as one 
commonwealth and guarantee U.S. control of the entire Mariana island chain.107 Nixon would 
eventually be replaced by Gerald Ford and during the Ford administration, the president approved 
making Guåhan a commonwealth. However, Zeder and others from the Department of the Interior 
did not agree with this decision and through bureaucratic means, left the study to die.  
 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, during the Ford Administration, wrote a memo with 
the report, which instructed the committee to meet a few objectives: 
1. Retain US sovereignty over Guam, and in particular, to maintain US control over 
Guam’s foreign affairs and defense and preserve US military basing rights to Guam. 
2. Enable Guam to move toward complete self-government in internal affairs under a 
self-drafted constitution consistent with the US Constitution in order to enhance 
prospects for Guam’s continued close relationship with the federal government, and 
for long-term stability of the island. 
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3. Help promote the material well-being of Guamanians in order to maintain stability on 
Guam. 
4. Enhance the prospects for the ultimate integration of Guam with the Northern 
Marianas if this accorded with the desires of the majority of Guamanians. 
Although the study ultimately died, what is important here is that the United States federal 
government was willing at some level to renegotiate Guåhan’s political status to appease the 
population of the island. However, as seen in Kissinger’s memo, sovereignty would not be 
affected. Any renegotiation of political status or increasing autonomy once again had to keep the 
federal-territorial hierarchy intact. Since the late 1990s and the creation of the Commission of 
Decolonization in 1997, established by Public Law 23-147, there has been an expansion in the 
push for political status change, as seen through the increasing use of international law and 
appearances at the United Nations. The military has utilized the language of loyalty and partnership 
in fighting against any potential change in political status. One of the best examples can be seen 
in the beginning of CHamoru scholar James Viernes’ dissertation.108 In his introduction, Viernes 
tells the story of Rear Admiral Paul J. Bushong. On July 27, 2012, Bushong was being relieved, 
and a Change of Command ceremony was held in which many regional leaders, federal officials, 
and members of Guåhan’s community were present. During his address, Bushong challenged any 
notion of self-determination for the native inhabitants saying,  
Any of the current talk of the US colonization of Guam or meetings of the 
Decolonization Committee is insulting to those of us who serve in the United States 
military. It puzzles me when I hear current talk of self-determination since, by my 
reading of history, that self-determination was made sixty-five years ago with the 1950 
signing of the Organic Act of Guam by the US Congress.109 
This section has hopefully proven how flawed Bushong’s argument is. The Organic Act of 1950 
was not an act of self-determination as it preserved the federal-territorial hierarchy. However, this 
leads one to wonder what the United States would do if the current push for decolonization results 
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in a status that erodes American sovereignty over the island. Is the United States thinking of ways 
to ensure control over Guåhan in the event of a political status change, such as Free Association 
or Independence, which relinquishes their sovereignty over Guåhan? 
 In the chance that the native inhabitants of Guåhan exercise self-determination and the 
United States accepts the results, the reality of our geographical location will not change. The facts 
of location are stable (barring climate change or nuclear catastrophe, of course). Yet, this does not 
stop military strategists from planning for the parameters of that future, and to that end, I end this 
section with a discussion of the words of Guåhan’s very own Robert Crisostomo. In his strategy 
research project for the U.S. Army War College, Lieutenant Colonel of the Army National Guard, 
Robert Crisostomo argues that “The United States’ Asia Pacific regional policy has the potential 
of being derailed by the island’s nascent desire to pursue its right of self-determination.”110 
Crisostomo goes on to examine the possibilities of U.S. control of the island in all three option 
scenarios (Statehood, Free Association, and Independence), ultimately concluding that 
independence would be the worst for the United States as it could lead to a partnership with 
Beijing. He advocates for the United States to keep Guåhan either as a state or as a territory, but 
ultimately argues, rightfully I believe, that the likelihood of statehood for such a small island is 
near impossible. He then argues that the United States should sweeten our status as an 
unincorporated territory by giving us voting members in the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, and ultimately allow us to have representation in the Electoral College. The poison beneath 
this sweetness is that we will still be under the plenary power of Congress. Crisostomo concludes 
his project writing, “If the U.S. considers Guam’s strategic location as a valuable national security 
asset, it must persuade Guam, through its pursuit of self-determination, to remain a valued member 
of the American family and a beacon of U.S. strategic strength in the Asia-Pacific region.”111 No 
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matter what status the native inhabitants of Guåhan choose, Crisostomo argues that the United 
States needs to find methods to ensure Guåhan’s loyalty.  
This section of the chapter has shown how Guåhan’s political status has always been an 
important factor for the United States to maintain their military interests here in the island. Through 
deliberate attempts at impeding our self-determination process and push for decolonization or 
more autonomy, those desires have always played second fiddle to U.S. security interests. In the 
next section, I look at the contemporary security environment of the Asia-Pacific region, focusing 
on China’s challenge to U.S. hegemony. This helps in critically analyzing the future of political 
insecurity as an unincorporated territory.  
V. VIOLENT FUTURES: CHINA AND THE CHALLENGING OF HEGEMONY 
“One of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will 
therefore be to lock in a substantially increased investment — diplomatic, economic, 
strategic, and otherwise — in the Asia-Pacific region.”112  
The quote above was taken from Hillary Clinton’s pivotal 2011 piece in Foreign Policy, 
“America’s Pacific Century,” where she argues that the core of American foreign policy moving 
forward should be the Asia-Pacific region. She justifies this shift in the geopolitical pendulum of 
power swinging towards the region writing that “The Asia-Pacific has become a key driver of 
global politics.” Clinton argues similarly to William Wohlforth, John Ikenberry and Stephen 
Brooks’ article in Foreign Affairs, that the U.S. needs to continue “leaning forward”113 in world 
affairs and maintain its role as the leader. Countering calls for retrenchment, Clinton writes, “From 
opening new markets for American businesses to curbing nuclear proliferation to keeping the sea 
lanes free for commerce and navigation, our work abroad holds the key to our prosperity and 
security at home.”114  
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Yet, foreign policy does not hinge on declaratory policy alone; a course of action must be 
designed. This is where she argues for the continuation of “forward-deployed diplomacy,” a 
network of strengthened security alliances, relationships with emerging powers (China), 
engagement with multilateral institutions, the expansion of trade and investment, advancement of 
democracy, and lastly, the forging of a broad-based military presence. The root of this strategic 
thinking about the Asia-Pacific region, although heavily coated in the liberal language of 
democracy promotion and neoliberal language of mutually beneficial international institutions, I 
argue is still in the realist emphasis of power, particularly stemming from U.S. fears of the loss of 
unipolarity, with countries like China looming on the hegemon horizon. To examine the root of 
this worry and shift to the region, we will focus first on China and look at two factors: (1) The 
growth of Chinese hard power and deterrence capabilities, and (2) China’s economy and soft 
power growth, which challenges U.S. hegemony. 
China’s hard power and military capabilities have grown immensely in the past 30 years 
and in such a way that the U.S. must ponder and respond to. Barry Posen writes that the United 
States has long enjoyed a “command of the commons” meaning “worldwide freedom and 
movement on and under the seas and in the air above 15,000 feet with the ability to deny this same 
freedom to enemies.”115 Yet, in the past decade or so, China has developed military technology 
that challenges this command of the commons and has adopted the A2/AD strategy. A2/AD stands 
for “Area Access/Area Denial” and is a military strategy aimed at “restricting enemy access to a 
certain strategic location, while it exerts forceful control over a territorial asset like Taiwan or a 
disputed maritime claim”116 as can be seen in the conflicts surrounding the islands in the South 
China Sea. At its core, the strategy is aimed at the three Ds: deterring, dissuading, or defeating the 
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involvement of a third power in any confrontation or conflict China may have regarding its 
territorial assets or maritime claims. A report to Congress from the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense, stated that a Chinese A2/AD capability reaching anywhere near the “Second Island 
Chain,” which connects Guåhan, Japan, and Papua New Guinea, would pose major challenges to 
U.S. security policy.117 Reinforcing this, in a Congressional Research Service article, Ronald 
O’Rourke writes, “More broadly, these observers view China’s naval capabilities as a key element 
of a broader Chinese military challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the 
leading military power in the Western Pacific.”118 
The implementation of A2/AD necessitates technological development. This 
modernization and technological development of China’s military began in the late 1980s when 
China started designing a new ship class, and this development has continued to the present. In 
2008, China had only one ballistic missile submarine and in 2016, it had four. China now has two 
aircraft carriers with plans to eventually create two to four more in the future. American strategists 
believe that these aircraft carriers are being used to demonstrate China’s status as a leading regional 
power and major world power.119 More particularly, the technology required for A2/AD 
capabilities include: anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBM), air-independent propulsion boats (AIP), 
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM), missile boats, and even mines, and it is here that we can see the 
direction China’s technological development is heading.120 
China’s anti-ship ballistic missiles, primarily the DF-21D missiles, can, when combined 
with targeting systems and maritime surveillance, give China the ability to attack aircraft carriers 
or other foreign navy ships. Andrew S. Erickson writes, “The U.S. Navy has not previously faced 
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a threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. For this 
reason, some observers have referred to ASBMs as a ‘game-changing’ weapon.”121 It is also 
important to point out that the DF-26, an intermediate-range ballistic missile may also be capable 
of anti-ship capability, and closer to home, this missile has been dubbed the “Guam Killer.”122 The 
DF-26 has a range of around 2,500 miles, making it capable of more than twice the range of DF-
21D. Another part of the A2/AD strategy is anti-ship cruise missiles. These include those obtained 
from Russia such as the SS-N-22 (which is carried on ships China obtained from Russia) and 
perhaps the most widespread of the ASCMs are the YJ-83 series, which China carries on most of 
their ships and even in some of their aircraft. These technological and weapon advancements show 
that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is increasing their potential for anti-surface 
warfare. 
Another core component of China’s deterrence strategy is their submarines and unmanned 
underwater vehicles (UUV). According to the U.S. China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, China not only has 12 Russian-made attack submarines, but has also invented their 
own submarines such as the Jin class (nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine) and the Shang 
class (nuclear-powered attack submarine) seacraft. Furthermore, O’Rourke reported that China is 
testing underwater drones in the South China Sea with real-time data transmission technology, and 
that this will help reveal and track the location of foreign submarines.123  
While this is in no way a comprehensive examination of PLAN’s modernization or 
inventory of their analysis, the point is that U.S. strategists and military analysts are taking notice 
and debating how much they should worry about this modernization and growing arsenal. Some 
examples of military responses to China’s military modernization include the Defense Innovation 
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Initiative and the Long-Range Research and Development Plan, both meant to ensure a 
technological edge over any opposing military.124 The increasing deterrence potential of China 
brings worries of possible decline of U.S. hegemony. While A2/AD as a strategy is primarily aimed 
at deterrence, scholars such as John Mearshimer argue that China needs to be in the scope of U.S. 
foreign policy simply due to the “tragedy of great power politics.” Mearsheimer argues that “if 
China continues to grow economically, it will attempt to dominate Asia the way the United States 
dominates the Western Hemisphere. The United States, however, will go to enormous lengths to 
prevent China from achieving regional hegemony.”125 If one takes this analysis seriously, then 
China’s military growth, modernization, and diversification is something that will inevitably affect 
Guåhan as Guåhan is an important power projection hub for the United States in the region. 
China’s hard power, deterrence capabilities, and military modernization are not the only 
factors in China’s growth. Another primary factor worrying U.S. strategists, analysts, and 
politicians are China’s economic and soft power growth as well as their more active foreign policy. 
From 1981-2011, China’s economy grew 10% per year, overtaking Germany and Japan’s economy 
rather swiftly. China is now the second largest economy, the world’s largest exporter, second 
largest importer, and is also now the world’s largest trading nation.126 Between 2007 and 2015, the 
Chinese economy more than tripled in size, while the American economy only grew by about 
20%,127 and in 2017, China’s economy grew by 6.5% making it roughly 2/3 the size of the U.S. 
economy. Many economists argue that the Chinese economy is set to overtake the U.S. economy 
as the largest in the world within the next decade.128  
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Yet, even if China is not the largest economy in the world just yet, their economic rise has 
already resulted in policies and actions that strategists deem to be against the U.S.’s national 
interest. One prime example is their creation of alternatives to the economic development 
institutions created after Breton-Woods, like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 
These neoliberal institutions were created after World War II and were meant to ensure that 
American economic interests were maintained through the granting of money under the condition 
of a country’s acceptance of free trade and privatization. Many countries in Oceania and Africa 
such as Fiji are turning rather happily towards China for financial assistance since China does not 
attach the same neoliberal conditions in the acceptance of a loan. This was made clear by African 
Trade Minister Rob Davies in 2010 when he said, “China’s expanding presence in Africa can only 
be a good thing because it means that we don’t have to sign on the dotted line whatever is shoved 
under our noses any longer. We now have alternatives and that’s to our benefit.”129  
Another example is the establishment of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
which was created in 2015 and was an initiative aimed at boosting the region’s economy with 
Beijing as the center of development. This was seen as a diplomatic victory for China because 
despite the United States’ objection, U.S. allies such as the United Kingdom, South Korea, and 
Australia all signed the articles of association for the AIIB.130 China’s Finance Minister Lou Jiwei 
said that the establishment of AIIB was a “first step in an epic journey meant to deepen regional 
cooperation, boost Asia’s infrastructure and support the global economic recovery.”131  Due to the 
United States’ resistance to increasing the resources of the International Monetary Fund giving 
emerging market nations a greater share in the decision-making of the institution, China created 
the AIIB.132 
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During AIIB’s founding, some U.S. analysts such as David Dollar said that while AIIB 
was a diplomatic success for China, the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) could re-establish U.S. 
importance to the Asia-Pacific economy.133 Ali Velshi, a MSNBC business correspondent also 
wrote on the importance of the TPP, “The TPP’s largest goal was to maintain U.S. trade dominance 
in Asia, bringing the various trading partners under America’s wing as a way to ward off China’s 
growing economic influence.”134 Yet, as soon as entering the presidency, his first day to be exact, 
Donald Trump pulled the United States out of this economic deal. His reasoning was that he 
wanted to move away from multilateral trade and instead negotiate trade deals with individual 
allies.135 In showing decreasing American hegemony, the other 11 countries involved in the TPP 
have moved forward with the deal despite the U.S. being absent.136 It is important that at the time 
of this writing, it is speculated that Trump may start supporting the U.S. once again joining the 
TPP. At the world Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, he said, “I would do TPP if we were 
able to make a substantially better deal. The deal was terrible, the way it was structured was 
terrible. If we did a substantially better deal, I would be open to TPP.”137 
Another initiative sought by China in further Asian integration is their “One Belt, One 
Road Initiative.” This initiative by President Xi Jingping is aimed at creating an “economic belt” 
which would link China with Mongolia, Russia, Iran, Turkey, the Balkans, and even central and 
Eastern Europe. His maritime silk road component is aimed at linking south-east China with south-
east Asia, Bangladesh, India, and the Mediterranean. The core of this project would be to invest 
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heavily in infrastructure such as transcontinental railway routes, highways, port facilities, and 
energy pipelines. The economic cost of this initiative is quite large, and China has invested nearly 
$1 trillion. This initiative has geopolitical implications that challenge U.S. hegemony, and not just 
in the Asia-Pacific region.138 As Peter Ferdinand writes, “But in the shorter term, even if the United 
States continues to be extremely important in China’s outlook, it means that Chinese leaders may 
not always be so preoccupied with the United States.”139 China’s vision in its role in the world 
moves beyond keeping its eye on the United States.  
In Oceania, some of the most visible signs of Chinese policies that threaten U.S. hegemony 
can be found in the soft power (financial aid) they are providing Pacific Island nations such as the 
Federated States of Micronesia. One root of Chinese aid to Pacific Island nations has been the 
battle for diplomatic recognition where China and Taiwan both sought various Pacific Island states 
to recognize their respective governments as the legitimate “Chinese” government. The result of 
this has been the opening of the region to Chinese investment. According to Dean Cheng who runs 
the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, “Chinese trade with Pacific Island countries 
rose by 60 percent between 2014 and 2015, reaching $8.1 billion.”140   
These factors collectively demonstrate how America’s hegemonic status and influence is 
relatively declining, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. They no longer have the same degree of 
operational freedom and unilateralism as once exercised either militarily or economically. Jude 
Woodward perfectly describes this, writing, “The US’s fear is not that countries are going to do 
what China wants, but simply that they will no longer feel obliged to do what the US wants. The 
goal of the US defense and foreign policy establishment is to stop this.”141 
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It is at this juncture that Julian Go’s analysis of empires is rather useful. In his book, 
Patterns of Empire, Julian Go compares the empires of the United States and Britain and looks at 
their foreign policy through the lens of three phases of empire: hegemonic ascendancy, hegemonic 
maturity, and hegemonic decline. In describing these patterns of empire, he writes how during the 
phases of hegemonic ascendance and hegemonic decline, empires are more aggressive and turn 
towards military means of power and economic maintenance. As author Jude Woodward writes, 
The US may be by far the most militarily powerful state on the plant and China cannot 
match that, but the US is no longer the most dynamic major economy. And while military 
power can achieve some objectives, it cannot compensate for lack of economic power. 
The US still wears the giant’s robe, but it hangs increasingly loose as its economic 
capacities shrink.142 
 By this, she argues that “The U.S.’s declining economic leverage means it is forced to rely more 
openly on military means to achieve many of its objectives.”143 This comprehensive analysis of 
China’s ability to counter American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region is meant to show that 
similar to Rachel Oldenziel’s argument, it does not seem that Guåhan will become obsolete 
anytime soon.  
VI. I FINAKPO’ (CONCLUSION) 
My partner and I travelled to Aotearoa (New Zealand) for a conference in March of 2017. 
During one of the lighter days of the conference, we decided to drive down to Auckland and 
spontaneously take a 40-minute boat ride to Waiheke island, a 35-square mile island with a 
permanent population of 7,700 people, which is best known for its enormous number of vineyards. 
After a long day of visiting vineyards, we stopped for lunch at a fish-n-chips shop near the ocean. 
In polite small talk, the hostess asked my partner and I where we were from. When we said 
“Guam,” she looked confused, and had no idea what or where Guam was. She then turned to the 
cook behind her and asked if he knew where Guam was. Amidst the tantalizing smell of frying 
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fish, he looked over at us, and asked, “Hey isn’t that the giant military base or something?” This 
is one of the most palpable effects of our militarized, colonial political status. From the stories in 
the beginning to this story now, the overall effect is that my island home, where I was born, where 
I had my first kiss, witnessed the birth of my children, and learned to be who I am today is either 
internationally forgotten or simply known for war. We have never had a chance to determine our 
own international image. We have never been given the chance for our side of the story to be the 
most dominant. In this chapter, I have attempted to show why this is the case. This chapter set the 
stage for understanding Guåhan’s role in U.S. national security and power projection. The 
following chapters, then build on this chapter, by engaging in detailed histories of life in Guåhan 
being formed via unincorporated territory status and militarization. Furthermore, through these 
histories, I demonstrate the effects of the “why” examined in this chapter from land dispossession, 
to the economy, to the environment, to the entire discursive process of CHamoru identity and 
political subjectivity as a result of war and basing in the island. If this chapter provided the “why” 
as well as “how” our political status is important for the U.S. military, the following chapters 
illustrate how such acts have been able to sustain themselves despite forced powerlessness, a 
continuum of violences, and insecurity.  
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Chapter 2: Economic Violence Step #1: Land Dispossession as the Root of 
Economic Insecurity 
The economic development and administration of relatively few native inhabitants should 
be subordinate to the real purpose for which those islands are held. Military control of 
these islands is essential as their military value far outweighs their economic value.
1 -Vice Admiral G.D. Murray  
 Beginning in 1993, CHamoru activist, Angel Santos began to “illegally occupy” his 
grandfather’s land in Mogfog, Dededo, which the U.S. Navy stole after World War II. He was 
subsequently arrested for trespassing, yet a federal judge ordered the Navy to leave Santos 
undisturbed on the land, where Santos built a wood and tin structure. A typhoon was set to hit the 
island but changed direction at the last minute. When Santos returned to the land, he found his 
structures completely destroyed. The military destroyed the structure thinking they could just 
blame it on the typhoon that was supposed to hit. Santos then started to rebuild his structures, but 
lost in another court battle, where District Court Judge John Unpingco ordered Santos to vacate 
the property. He would continue to return to this land despite the judge’s orders and was ultimately 
arrested in 1999 when Unpingco sentenced him to six months in federal prison. Santos died at the 
age of 44 from Parkinson’s Disease, although many have rumored that he was poisoned in federal 
prison. This is the story of one of Guåhan’s strongest fighters; serving prison time for reclaiming 
ancestral land which had been outright stolen by the military after World War II. In this chapter, I 
show how Santos’ story while unique in its conclusion, is very common in its origin: the 
dispossession of CHamorus of their land. Santos’ family lost their land, like many CHamorus did, 
taking away the foundation of their livelihoods; the foundation of their homes.  
In CHamoru society of the past, the foundation of our houses were built on large stone 
pillars called latte. The latte is one of the strongest symbols of CHamoru culture today because of 
its function. Usually, these houses were held up via two rows of latte with four to six latte pillars 
per row. The result was a sturdy house held up by eight or twelve strong latte insulating the house 
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against harsh weather conditions and other natural disasters. I inquire what would have happened 
to these houses if there were only two latte holding them up. Through common sense and the most 
rudimentary understanding of physics, surely, the house is doomed to fall with such a weak 
foundation. Analogizing a latte house, Guåhan’s economy is a house with only two pillars: (1) 
federal funding including military projects and basing and (2) tourism. In a similar fashion, I worry 
about Guåhan’s economy similarly sustaining itself on such a weak and imbalanced foundation of 
two pillars.  
In this chapter, I argue that the current economic two-pillar foundation has its origin in the 
rampant land dispossession of CHamorus, and I use land dispossession to tell the larger story of 
the process of economic violence in the island. This chapter acts as Part one in a two-chapter 
analysis of economic violence. While this chapter centers land and history, the following chapter 
shows the modern manifestations of economic violence that can be traced to the history outlined 
here. Collectively, these two chapters aim to address the following: (1) how the history of 
CHamoru land dispossession has not only provided the condition of possibility for our militarized 
form-of-life, but has also severely harmed our economic development potential (2) why tourism 
and military spending became the most dominant pillars (3) why other pillars have not been built 
to hold up the house of our economy and (4) how our political status as a militarized, 
unincorporated territory is intertwined with the creation, impediment, or destruction of other 
economic latte pillars. When interviewing chief economist of the Bank of Guam, Joseph Bradley, 
about the entanglement of the military with the economy, he told me that “there are layers upon 
layers to the onion(s), schemes within schemes.”2 These next two chapters are my attempt at 
peeling these layers, but as a caution to the reader, like cutting any onion, please beware that the 
layers of military entanglement with Guåhan’s economy, may cause one to tear up. With this 
analytical knife in hand, I peel the layers of this onion with various chronological cuts. In the first 
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section of this chapter, I examine economic development and stagnation in the Spanish period, 
U.S. Naval period, and Japanese occupation during World War II. The second section then engages 
with the critical transformation of the island after World War II when the people of Guåhan 
recovering from war were forced to adapt to a wage economy. Concurrently, I examine the ways 
in which economic flourishing and development in Guåhan has been dictated or affected by U.S. 
national security initiatives or our status as an American military base. David Hanlon, in his book, 
Remaking Micronesia: Discourses over Development in a Pacific Territory, 1944-1982, argues 
that economic development has consistently been a strategy of domination. He writes, 
A seemingly more benevolent, well-intentioned program of rule, the promotion of 
economic development presented a process of change no less disruptive and destructive 
than other colonial initiatives in its effects upon the peoples, places, and cultures of the 
area for Micronesia. If successful, the many and varied plans for development would 
have resulted in a total remaking of Micronesia.3 
In this chapter, I follow in Hanlon’s footsteps and look at the effects of an economy in service of 
a militarized form-of-life. 
I. EARLY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LIMITATIONS: LET THEM SERVE US! 
Spanish Period 
Before and during the period of Spanish colonization, CHamorus primarily engaged in 
subsistence farming and fishing. There was no wage economy, and people subsisted either on their 
own catch and crops or on the system of reciprocity with shared resources among members of a 
clan, a core CHamoru value called chenchule’. Although first contact with Europeans occurred in 
1521 with Ferdinand Magellan, it would not be until 1565 when Miguel Lopez de Legaspi planted 
the cross on the beach of the village of Humåtak, that Spain would officially claim Guåhan as their 
possession, and not until 1668 with the events spurred on by Diego Luis de San Vitores that the 
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island would experience the throes of colonization. From 1565 to 1815, the Spanish used Guåhan 
as a reprovisioning pit stop in their Acapulco-Manila galleon trade. At the height of their empire, 
Spain had colonial possessions in Asia and in the Americas, primarily in the Philippines and in 
Mexico. To ensure Spanish access to Asian goods, the Spanish used their ships, called galleons, to 
ensure a trading route of continued access to this Asian market. In the route from Acapulco to 
Manila (which took roughly two months) and vice versa from Manila to Acapulco (one month), 
these Spanish galleons would stop by Guåhan to replenish themselves and to provide for the 
Spanish governor of the island. “A royal order in 1668 required that the Acapulco galleons made 
Guam a port of call…The galleons carried supplies and the subsidy from Mexico for the governor, 
Jesuit mission, and colonial management.”4 Many CHamorus traded with those on the Spanish 
galleons providing them with water, fresh fruits, and woven baskets in exchange for metal goods 
like nails and knives as well as cloth. Although the CHamorus were introduced to new goods, this 
was still a barter system. 
Looking at the economic picture like a forensic archaeologist would, one begins to see the 
roots of economic hindering slowly spreading in the way that the Spanish treated CHamoru land. 
After the Spanish and their loyal CHamoru allies subdued the “CHamoru rebels,” with the ending 
of the Chamorro-Spanish War, the fabric of CHamoru life began to change, not only with religion, 
but with the treatment of land. The Spanish introduced the concept of land ownership, and 
eventually transferred much of former Chamorri (who were the higher caste in CHamoru society 
that primarily fought against the Spanish) land to those that were loyal to them (who became the 
new high class). This was considered Crown Land, which would play an important role during the 
Naval Period land takings.  
                                               




American Naval Period (1898-1941) 
When the American naval government set itself up in 1899, Captain Richard Leary was 
appointed as the first naval governor of the island. The naval government’s primary method in 
managing their newly acquired Pacific possession was that of “benevolent assimilation” to ensure 
the continuation of their presence in the region. Through education and health practices, the Naval 
government, although having most power vested in one individual, aimed to follow McKinley’s 
instructions to show the inhabitants of the island that the United States presence was one of 
benevolence.5 To accomplish this, the Americans set up an education system, a bank, healthcare 
facilities, and improved infrastructure. During the Naval period,  
Basic sanitation facilities, utilities, and other public services were modernized in Guam. 
There was a power plant in Agana to supply power to naval government offices; water 
wells were drilled and water systems were installed; a hospital was built and staffed for 
the Chamorro population. Coral was laid for the main roads. The naval government was 
concerned about public health from the beginning, making certain that nothing threatened 
to harm Navy personnel. As a side effect of this, though, the general health of the people 
of Guam improved; this, too, is a set forward in economic development.6 
In many ways, the U.S. presence in the island pushed infrastructural developments that were very 
beneficial to the people of Guåhan. The early Naval period’s economy was based on agricultural 
production and small-scale retailing and trade in copra (dried coconut meat used to produce 
coconut oil). In 1914, Atkins Kroll bought a coconut plantation and began shipping out 100-pound 
sacks of copra to various locations. Some local CHamorus, such as Joseph Ada and Pedro 
Martinez, also found success during this time of early economic development running a local soap 
factory and ice plant respectively. Pedro Martinez’s company, for example, ran an ice plant, mini-
supermarket, wholesale business, construction company (which built the first hotel in Guåhan), 
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automobile agency, and two large farms.7 Tun Pedro’s story however, was not indicative of the 
majority of the CHamoru population.  
 Besides these few successful locally-owned businesses, most forms of employment were 
through the Naval government and rules were implemented that these jobs would go to English 
speakers, thus disqualifying many CHamorus who were not yet fluent in the colonizing language.8 
Most CHamorus stuck to subsistence living and did not engage in these early emergences of a 
wage economy. It is important to note that the U.S. priority in developing the island and its 
economy was not necessarily to better the lives of the CHamoru people, but rather to produce an 
economy that would help sustain the military presence and provide the goods and services that 
servicemen would need during their stay in the island. As former President of the Bank of Guam 
Anthony Leon Guerrero writes, “Although the economic development associated with 
colonization did benefit the people of Guam, this was a side-effect, and not the principal intent of 
the colonizers.”9 For the purposes of this dissertation, I am not too concerned with intent. If our 
economic development was merely a side effect in the colonial governance of the island, without 
this being the intent of the U.S. Navy, then so it was. I quote Leon Guerrero not to produce a 
particular affect within the reader, but rather because it is important information when looking at 
the subsequent development and economic policies pursued and its connection to the continuation 
of colonial governance of the island.  
 Like the Spanish, the U.S. Navy wanted to produce an agricultural economy to ensure the 
production of goods to keep the military fed. In her article, “Navy Blues: US Naval Rule on Guam 
And The Rough Road to Assimilation, 1898-1941,” CHamoru historian Anne Perez Hattori 
describes the Naval motto to rehabilitate, organize, administer, and make productive the 
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CHamorus of the island.10 This benevolent assimilation was touted in the name of progress and  
“not only to better the material circumstances…but to achieve a transformation in the bodies and 
minds of the people.”11 Echoing Leon Guerrero’s argument that development and betterment of 
the CHamoru livelihood was a side effect, not an intention, Naval Governor Dyer, who ruled over 
Guåhan in 1904, proclaimed, 
It is therefore incumbent on us for our self-protection and efficiency to give the natives 
such care as they are unable to get for themselves, to see that they are kept healthy and 
free from contagion, are afforded practical instruction in their sole pursuit, agriculture, 
and to educate some of them to occupy some positions as clerks, mechanics, and 
intelligent laborers in the Naval Station…These people must be taught, at once, to help 
themselves in ways to make themselves useful to us.12 
When it came to development and the economy, the message was clear: make the CHamorus 
healthy and relatively well-off so that they may be useful to the Naval government. Like Dyer, 
Hattori also cites a 1906 study by Charles H. Forbes-Lindsay, in which he wrote, 
It is distinctly to the interests of the American Government to give the Chamorros ample 
educational facilities without delay. At no very distant date the requirements of the naval 
station on the island will demand a number of men to fill clerical positions and to perform 
intelligent work as mechanics and laborers. If, when that demand arises, the island can 
not furnish a large proportion of the needed working force, the positions can only be 
filled by the Government at comparatively great cost and inconvenience.13 
Through these measures, the Naval government could produce clerks, mechanics, and laborers to 
help keep their presence comfortable in the island and keep them from engaging in the types of 
labor that would make them go native. 
 The Americans were disappointed with the subsistence lifestyle of the CHamorus because 
they only caught or produced enough to feed their families and clan members and did not produce 
extra. The CHamoru ambiguity towards any form of surplus was portrayed by the Naval 
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government as an obstacle to economic development. As Captain Frederick Nelson wrote, 
“Unfortunately, these people failed to see the benefit of a surplus which they did not store but 
which through exchange, they could turn into money or an indestructible surplus…In fact, the 
unwillingness of CHamorus to work for any wages was another indication of their ignorance.”14 
The Navy was frustrated by this because of their fear of running out of food for the military 
personnel to eat in the island, thus leading to their obsession with getting CHamorus to become 
agricultural laborers. From the traditional island imaginary, these military men were essentially 
isolated on a small rock in the middle of nowhere and were afraid of this isolation and seeming 
finiteness of resources and sustenance. As Henry Beers writes,  
The state of agriculture on the island became a serious matter to the administration within 
a few weeks after the arrival of the expedition, for it became difficult to procure eggs, 
chickens, meat, and vegetables for the garrison and the men on the station ship. To keep 
up their health, fresh vegetables were essential, so a means was sought to ensure their 
production.15 
This desire to turn CHamorus into laborers and clerks to help with menial tasks and most 
importantly with Naval nourishment did not just live in the writings of Naval governor reports but 
was enacted via policy. Hattori describes the General Orders given by Governor Leary that 
impacted the development of Guåhan’s economy. General Order No. 6, for example, ordered that 
“the exportation of cattle, hogs, fowl, eggs, rice, corn, and sweet potatoes from the island is hereby 
forbidden.”16 Hattori explains, “this essentially restricted the practice of trade between CHamorus 
and trading vessels during port-of-call visits in order to conserve the island’s available fresh food 
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for Navy consumption.”17 The U.S. Office of Strategic Services wrote that Guåhan’s prewar 
economy was thrown off by the presence of the U.S. naval station work projects.”18 
 Training this work force also took place in the educational system that was set up during 
the early Naval period. In 1900, Governor Richard Leary passed General Order No. 12, which 
created a public education system for children 8-14 years of age. The intent of the school system 
was twofold: the first was as a method of American assimilation, and the second was to teach 
CHamorus the necessary skills to produce the Navy’s desired laborers and clerks. The second 
Naval governor Seaton Schroeder, wrote that through education, CHamoru children would “attain 
the standards of civilization and morality that rule in the more enlightened parts of the world.”19 
However, realistically, the implementation of education in Guåhan fit more with the insurance of 
a developed labor force. Governor George R. Salisbury wrote, “It is the desire of the Governor to 
encourage the people of the island to live on the ranches, cultivate the soil, raise stock, poultry, 
etc. and it is requested that the Teachers, Priests, Clergymen and all Civil and Military Officials 
interest themselves in attaining these results.”20 To this end, Salisbury changed the attendance age 
requirement of 8-14 years of age to 6-12 years of age. He also made an exception for students who 
lived more than two miles from school and thus encouraged them to live on their farms. The 
Department of Agriculture of the United States also helped start boys’ and girls’ agricultural clubs 
as well as school farms to help foster the CHamoru agricultural capability for surplus. Robert 
Underwood writes that Naval officials did not want education to get in the way of the agricultural 
spirit and that officials wanted to prevent a situation in which the island was burdened with “a 
semi-educated class of parasites who deem it beneath their dignity to engage in manual labor and 
aspire only to clerical and storekeeper jobs.”21  
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This paternalistic attitude and colonial desire for labor is a common feature of colonial 
projects throughout history. In Traces of History: Elementary Structures of Race, Patrick Wolfe 
points out the traditional difference between colonialism and slavery, writing, “The role that 
colonialism has assigned to Indigenous people is to disappear. By contrast, though slavery meant 
the giving up of Africa, Black Americans were primarily colonized for their labour, rather than 
their land.”22 In Guåhan, both logics of dispossession and labor were employed forcing CHamorus 
to simultaneously give up their land, as will be described later in this chapter, and work to maintain 
militarization’s smooth operations in the island. Unlike more physically brutal campaigns of 
extermination such as the British invocation of terra nullius in Australia or the Philippine-
American War, the U.S. military was not killing or beheading CHamorus. They were not 
separating children from their families or subjecting CHamorus to painful medical 
experimentation. Yet, their rule was anything but benign.  
Wolfe points out that “Colonised populations continue to be racialized in specific ways 
that mark out and reproduce the unequal relationships into which Europeans have co-opted these 
populations.”23 Through the racialization of CHamorus as primitive and in need of saving by Uncle 
Sam, the Americans wanted to make the CHamorus obedient and useful to them. The Americans 
did not physically exterminate the CHamorus, but rather had to find a way to coinhabit the island 
and hierarchize social and economic relationships. As Wolfe argues, “racialization represents a 
response to the crisis occasioned when colonisers are threatened with the requirement to share 
social space with the colonised.”24  
As proof of this unfair treatment and racialization of CHamorus as lesser, I turn to a report 
made by Baltazar Bordallo to the Secretary of the Navy Claude Swanson in 1937. Bordallo bluntly 
outlines the ways that the military personnel were treated better than the CHamorus and that 
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CHamorus were being inferiorized and unjustly treated. Bordallo not only points to practices he 
views as unjust, but along the way, he frames these practices as economically unfair. Bordallo 
writes,  
That the Service Club in Agana be required by the Naval government to pay the full 
liquor license fee of $200.00 per annum instead of the $25.00 annual fee which it now 
pays…This works a distinct hardship on merchants who operate like establishments and 
have to pay the full fee of $200.00 per annum.25 
That the license fees for motor vehicles be made applicable to the Service personnel who 
are now paying a flat license fee of $5.00 irrespectively of the make of cars they operate. 
Such discriminatory fees, now in effect in Guam, are considered unfair and inequitable, 
and would tend to promote a feeling of antipathy and animosity among our native 
population toward the Naval Administration. Attention is called to the fact that the 
service personnel enjoy the same road privileges we do, and there seems to be no logical 
reason why this especially low license fee be extended to them only.26  
Bordallo’s report shows the cumulative economic effects of Naval treatment of CHamorus in this 
early Naval period. More particularly, through racialization and a desire to make CHamorus 
laborers, there were discriminatory economic practices. This report helps make the point that 
colonialism needs to refashion the human terrain and in an economic sense, this was done through 
the deliberate attempt to make CHamorus useful enough for labor, but not too educated as to lose 
their “agricultural spirit” as well as the implementation of discriminatory economic practices. The 
U.S. military wanted to produce a narrow band of social mobility in which CHamorus would not 
fall below or rise above. Falling below or rising above the band makes the CHamoru no longer 
useful to the Naval government’s colonial experiment and makes CHamoru presence in the island 
problematic. As Anne Perez Hattori said,  
Your self-worth is now coming in this tiny paycheck rather than in the produce that you 
used to have. I think that, that kind of breaking of the spirit in a sense, it doesn’t surprise 
me. After so many decades of this, so many CHamorus have this sense “What can we do? 
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We can’t do anything. If the military goes, we’re going to starve. We are going to die. It’s 
so many decades of that kind of independent spirit being broken.27 
Tåno’ 
Labor, education, and racialization were not the only methods of economic control 
implemented by the Americans. Furthering the work of the Spanish, the Navy exploited land as a 
method of control through taxation. The first Naval governor, Richard Leary, instituted a new tax 
system that changed the old Spanish land taxation method of taxing money one earned from the 
use of their property to a system based on the size and geological type of land one owned. This 
made it difficult for CHamorus to hold onto their land without finding ways to “cheat” this unfair 
tax system. CHamorus began to understate the size of their land to avoid having to pay a larger tax 
and lose their land. Leary passed General Order No. 15, which gave CHamorus a few months to 
register their land or else their ownership of that land would not be recognized. The order reads, 
“all owners of claimants of land are hereby warned that in order that their ownership be recognized, 
they must acquire legal titles to the said land and have it registered according to law by May 15, 
1900.”28 The Naval government told CHamorus that any land that was not registered by this date 
would be considered Spanish Crown land which the United States dictated was now theirs as they 
were the new sovereign. The Naval government upon assuming control of the island automatically 
claimed all “Spanish Crown lands” to use for their purposes.29  
This was the conundrum for CHamorus at the time: pay the tax or lose their land. The 
system was set up for many CHamorus to lose their land and subsequently, their livelihoods and 
subsistence. As CHamoru attorney Mike Phillips writes, “General Order No. 15 forced the 
Chamorros to make a choice: either register their properties accurately and lose them because they 
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could not pay the taxes, or not register their lands and lose them because they were not properly 
registered.”30 Phillips also mentions that whenever the Naval government had reason to believe 
that someone was understating the size of their land, they considered this cheating the system and 
would subsequently claim that land as Spanish Crown land. According to Guåhan historian Robert 
Rodgers, “Every year, four to six titles, usually to poor land, reverted to the naval government.”31 
In these blatantly colonial times, dispossession of indigenous land was the name of the 
game. From Africa to Turtle Island to Australia and New Zealand, colonial governments inherently 
relied on the dispossession of the native of their land for strategic, economic, and political 
purposes. The economic unfair treatment and racialization discussed above are all just methods of 
continued dispossession. Glen Coulthard writes regarding forms of domination, 
It is a relationship where power–in this case, interrelated discursive and nondiscursive 
facets of economic, gendered, racial, and state power–has been structured into a relatively 
secure or sedimented set of hierarchical social relations that continue to facilitate the 
dispossession of Indigenous peoples of their lands and self-determining authority.32 
In his book, Red Skin, White Masks: Rejecting The Colonial Politics of Recognition, Coulthard 
analyzes the applicability of Marxist thought to indigenous struggles. This is useful in 
understanding the Naval government’s treatment of the island. Through his definition of 
colonialism as structured dispossession, Coulthard describes the Marxist notion of primitive 
accumulation, which Marx used to excavate the violent origins of capitalism. Coulthard writes,  
In Capital, these formative acts of violent dispossession set the stage for the emergence 
of capitalist accumulation and the reproduction of capitalist relations of production by 
tearing Indigenous societies, peasants, and other small-scale, self-sufficient agricultural 
producers from the source of their livelihood–the land.33 
Marx, in Capital, argues that the birth of capitalism can be traced to this violent process of 
dispossession, which would open up resources and the land to privatization, but also through this 
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dispossession of land, over time, a “class” of workers are produced. This class of workers, who 
come from those who lost their land, are forced into entering the exploitative wage economy.34 In 
this early Naval period, we saw the social engineering of grooming agricultural laborers with the 
simultaneous obstacles to CHamorus being able to hold on to their land. Power is structured 
through ownership and the Navy made many attempts to own CHamoru lands and livelihoods.  
Although there are problems with Marx, considering he viewed capitalism as a progressive 
stage to socialism and a classless society, and did not necessarily care about indigenous peoples 
or colonies, the argument is still very useful. So far, in this dissertation, I have pointed to the 
strategic location of the island for military purposes. However, it is important to note that from an 
economic perspective, Guåhan is also in a prime geographical location. In The Empire’s Edge: 
Militarization, Resistance, and Transcending Hegemony in the Pacific, Sasha Davis expands on 
Stephen Collier’s and Andrew Lakoff’s argument that states deploy power for three reasons: 
biopower, state sovereignty, and vital systems security. In reference to state sovereignty and 
biopower, states were originally concerned with defending territory and then managing/surveilling 
their populations.35 The latter, vital systems security, is pertinent to understanding the military 
presence in Guåhan.  
According to Davis, vital systems are “systems or processes the state views as vital to its 
continued functioning and its ability to provide for its population. Examples include electrical 
power generation and transmission, fuel distribution, and most relevant to this discussion, the 
movement of goods or “trade.” Davis describes the western Pacific as a “critical space of a 
transnational economic system the American state feels it must protect.”36 Since trade is viewed 
as a vital system the U.S. is completely invested in, the consequences of trade disruption shifts 
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from an “economic cost” into a “security threat.”37 Essentially, Davis writes, “the reason many of 
these islands are still denied full sovereignty and subjected to intense militarization is because they 
are deemed to be critical for American ‘national security’ (which in this region is essentially 
synonymous with American dominion over the vital system of trade).”38 Thus, although our 
location has been deemed from a military perspective, this does not mean that it is free of the 
temptations or machinery of capitalist accumulation.  
With Guåhan as strategically important land for militaries and inherently, the capitalist 
system, other tools are needed to understand land dispossession, and this is where the academic 
field of Indigenous Politics provides a vast array of theoretical tools. Mohawk scholar Taiaiake 
Alfred emphasizes the critical importance of land to indigenous peoples writing, “colonialism is 
best conceptualized as an irresistible outcome of a multigenerational and multifaceted process of 
forced dispossession and attempted acculturation–a disconnection from land, culture, and 
community–that has resulted in political and social discord.”39 The root of colonialism is land. 
Through Indigenous Politics, one can see how dispossessing people of their land is not simply the 
taking of “property,” but is the loss of so much more. Indigenous Politics turns away from the 
notion to view space as “the dead, the fixed, and the undialectical.”40 Instead, for indigenous 
peoples, land is a set of relations. Mishuana Goeman writes, “I begin with land as meaning-making 
place because that is at the heart of indigenous identity, longing, and belonging. Indigenous 
peoples make place by relating both personal and communal experiences and histories to certain 
locations and landscapes.”41 Emphasizing this same thought, Alfred writes in his book, Peace, 
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Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto, “Land, culture, and government are inseparable 
in traditional philosophies; each depends on the other, and this means that the denial of one aspect 
precludes recovery as a whole.”42 Alfred argues that for indigenous peoples, losing one’s land is 
essentially depriving them of not only their physical vitality, but also of their epistemological 
spring. For CHamorus, land was everything. Robert Underwood once wrote that “land is the one 
issue that can turn any Chamorro into an activist.”43 
Land as a core issue in indigenous struggles is also reflected in the words of Haunani-Kay 
Trask, who wrote, 
No one knows how better to care for our island home, than those of us who have lived 
here for thousands of years…The secrets of the land die with the people of the land. This 
is the bitter lesson of the modern age…The land cannot live without the people of the 
land who, in turn, care for their heritage, their mother.44 
In the CHamoru creation story, the island was created by two siblings named Puntan yan Fu’una. 
Upon Puntan’s death, his sister Fu’una took his body and created the universe. She took his eyes 
and made it the sun and the moon. His eyebrows became the rainbow and his back became the 
land. When she completed this, she turned herself into a gigantic, majestic rock out of which the 
first CHamorus emerged. From a CHamoru epistemological perspective, the land is imbued with 
spiritual qualities that has survived despite heavy Catholicization. Many CHamorus still ask 
permission from the ancestral spirits before entering the jungle. This shows the persistence of a 
metaphysical, spiritual nature to the land in Guåhan. Overall, in this dissertation on insecurity and 
slow violence, Indigenous Politics as a field helps to show how the dispossession of land is not 
only an economic issue, as being primarily concentrated on in this chapter, but rather, a whole 
dissertation could be written on the psychological and spiritual ramifications of massive land 
dispossession. It also helps to show how colonialism as a process has effects beyond the material. 
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With this engagement in Indigenous Politics literature, we can now move into the Japanese 
Occupation period and the post-war period where we begin to see land take a larger place for the 
military with a smaller share in CHamoru hands.  
Tiempon Gera: Japanese Occupation (1941-1944) 
The development of the island and further CHamoru inclusion into the labor force under 
the U.S. Navy was interrupted by the Japanese occupation of the island from December 1941-
August 1944. After the invasion by the Japanese on December 10, 1941, two days after they 
bombed the island, the Japanese took over the island and began implanting their ways. It is 
important to note that the Japanese had their plan of survival in the island since the 1930s when 
they tried to strike a deal with the U.S. government to lease the southern part of the island to the 
Japanese for agricultural production. They wrote regarding Guåhan land, 
Guam could produce more and better sugar than Saipan and is also well suited to growing 
coffee, cacao, tobacco, cotton, pineapple, and in the rich lowlands, maize and rice. There 
is fine timber in the hills of the south. The northern plateau, or those parts of it not needed 
for airfields, could readily be laid out for sugarcane or coconut plantations. There are no 
better fishing-grounds in the Pacific than the waters around Guam.45 
The island’s economic potential was later acted upon when Guåhan became integrated into Japan’s 
war economy. Wakako Higuchi writes regarding Guåhan’s role in relation to the Northern Mariana 
islands of Saipan and Tinian, “Supporting these islands was the first task given to Guam, to be 
achieved as soon as possible, according to the navy’s policy for proper place of the island for 
establishing “organic” industrial relations and permanent integration of Guam into the Mariana 
Islands as part of Japan.”46 Higuchi argues that Japan took the island to serve as a rear supply base 
to help the survival of the Mariana Islands as a whole. 
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 The Japanese once again, like the Americans, used CHamorus as labor in the completion 
of this goal. “A characteristic point of Guam’s planned development was complete dependence on 
CHamoru laborers, who lacked industrial skills and resources.”47 During the Japanese occupation, 
many CHamorus returned to their lanchos, or ranches, to escape being in the sight of Japanese 
soldiers. These ranch lands provided CHamorus their sustenance as they grew their crops and cared 
for the animals they would eventually kill for food. The Japanese, knowing this, began to force 
CHamorus to turn over their produce to the Japanese. They imposed a quota system on CHamoru 
agricultural production that was to be turned over to feed their troops. Many survivors of the war 
recall hiding some crops so that they would have enough to feed their families. To instill this 
mindset in CHamorus, the Japanese argued that “CHamorus should awaken from their colonized 
mentality and dependence on imports, and work to achieve food self-sufficiency and other local 
food.”48 Thinly veiled, the argument here was once again, become useful to us and feed us through 
your labor, even if it means you cannot feed your own families.  
One of the most prominent examples of this was the Japanese policy of providing 2.75 
acres to CHamoru families to cultivate their own crops, while the Japanese were simultaneously 
taking land from CHamorus for rice paddies. Private land ownership was not recognized by the 
Japanese, and they flat out stole CHamoru lands to use for these rice paddies. One of the Japanese 
priorities in Guåhan was the production of rice, and they forced CHamorus to cultivate and irrigate 
land to make it suitable for the planting and harvesting of rice. The Japanese hoped to turn Guåhan 
into the rice-production center of the Marianas, and thus provide for the Japanese colonial 
administration. In just two years, the agricultural use of Guåhan’s land jumped from 2.8% before 
the war to 7.6%.49 So, despite taking land and then allotting land to CHamorus, this did not greatly 
alleviate CHamoru suffering. Higuchi describes how the Japanese system “distributed food first to 
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the military, then to Japanese civilians, and only then to the CHamorus. The distribution of 
provisions to CHamorus was always dependent on the number of Japanese military personnel on 
the island.”50  
During their occupation of the island, the Japanese enforced the use of a new currency, 
issued rationing coupons, and only resupplied Japanese-operated stores.51 CHamorus had to 
exchange their American dollars for yen during this period to facilitate economic integration with 
Saipan, which was already under the Japanese administration. Unfortunately, during this time, a 2 
for 1 rate was imposed and CHamorus saw their money lose half of its value. They also took over 
the only bank in the island and took all CHamoru savings, causing the few that had money in the 
bank to lose it.52 In every way, the Japanese stayed true to this plan and CHamorus suffered as a 
result.  
As the end of the war grew closer, the Japanese began to worry about losing. Therefore, 
CHamoru labor was not only utilized for agriculture, but also for the fortification of the island. In 
October of 1943, the Japanese sent their Navy Construction Corps to begin construction at both 
the Sumay and Tiyan airfields. This work was extremely difficult, under the scorching sun, and 
CHamorus were usually compensated with only a tiny bag of rice. It is very important to point out 
that the Japanese were significantly more physically violent in getting CHamorus to engage in 
grueling manual labor. CHamorus who did not work fast enough on labor projects were beaten. 
For example, war survivor Vicente Taisipic participated in an oral history project of the World 
War II experience. In his interview, it was reported, 
Vicente Taisipic of Yona said people were rounded up and taken to a compound near the 
school to be indoctrinated by the Japanese. Every 15 minutes they were made to face 
north toward Japan and bow. Deprived of his childhood, at six years old he was given 
two jobs. One job was to pull the teacher’s son around the compound in a wagon for half 
an hour first thing in the morning. After that, it was classes until noon. Then the children 
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planted and harvested fruits and vegetables. Taisipic’s other job was to collect manure 
around Yona—human or animal. If he did not fill six buckets with manure, he was 
beaten. At the end of the day he would walk back to his family ranch to take care of the 
animals and bathe in the river with no soap. He felt like a living maggot.53 
Another story of the physical violence of forced labor can be found in the story of Joe Aguon, 
In late 1942, Aguon was forced to work at Tiyan, digging and bringing water to the 
Japanese soldiers. At the end of the day, he and the other assigned workers got a handful 
of rice as payment. Later in the year, Aguon was assigned to work in Cañada, Barrigada 
as a mess boy and later, he was transferred to work in Ordot digging tunnels. If the 
Japanese were not satisfied with the laborers’ work, they were told to line up face-to-face 
and slap one another. When Aguon’s turn came, he refused to slap the old man facing 
him and he was hit by the Japanese guard with a stick. The old man whispered, “Go 
ahead and slap me, I will understand.”54 
These stories are only a couple amongst many stories that illustrate the brutality and harsh 
treatment the Japanese exercised towards CHamorus and the absolute horrid conditions of this 
time period. Just like the Americans, the Japanese utilized the CHamoru people to ensure their 
own survival, usually at the expense of the CHamorus. During the Japanese occupation, Guåhan’s 
economy as well as CHamoru land and livelihoods were devastated, and many CHamorus hoped 
that the return of the Americans would free them from the darkest two and a half years of their 
lives. CHamorus were used for another power’s survival and economic stability, not their own. 
Neither the Spanish colonial period, nor the American naval period or the Japanese period saw a 
sense of true economic development for the island. CHamoru labor and land was exploited, never 
nurtured. CHamorus were not in charge of their developmental or economic present or futures. In 
the next section, I cut into the next chronological layer and show how post-war economic 
development by the Americans inhibited true economic success for the island and its people all in 
the name of security. 
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II. POST-WORLD WAR II ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION: CLOGGED ECONOMIC 
ARTERIES   
Vice Admiral G.D. Murray wrote in a military memo, “The characteristics and nature of 
the majority of inhabitants on these islands are such that the artificial or forced raising of their 
standard of living to one approaching that of the United States would be detrimental to their best 
interest and would contribute little to the safety and welfare of the United States.55” This quote 
from Murray embodies not only the thought of particular Naval officials, but also the subsequent 
actions by the U.S. military in their post-war treatment of the island. After World War II ended 
and the military secured the island from the Japanese military, they began their large-scale 
transformation of the island into a permanent forward operating base, as discussed in the last 
chapter. Naomi Klein’s groundbreaking book, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster 
Capitalism, delves deep into the phenomenon of disaster capitalism. Disaster capitalism, according 
to Klein, operates in the following manner: wait for a major crisis, sell off pieces of the state to 
private players while everyone is still recovering, and then make these reforms permanent.56 
Deriving from the thought of neoliberal capitalist Milton Friedman, the core of change comes from 
crisis. Friedman writes, “only a crisis–actual or perceived–produces real change. When that crisis 
occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around.”57 The goal is to use 
moments of intense collective trauma that shocks the political community to engage in radical 
social and economic engineering. Friedman would not write his neoliberal capitalist manifesto 
until 1962, twenty years after the end of World War II. However, this core idea of using the 
aftermath of disasters to christen a new economic and social order was seen in Guåhan, primarily, 
in what I deem a “destroy and replace” campaign utilizing what Wolfe describes as “logics of 
elimination.” 
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In “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” Wolfe argues that territoriality 
is the driving force of settler colonialism and that “settler society required the practical elimination 
of the natives in order to establish itself on their territory” thus making settler colonialism 
inherently eliminatory. Finally, Wolfe argues that “invasion is a structure not an event.”58 I argue 
that the U.S. invasion to reoccupy the island set up an economic structure that lingers today, and 
that although masked in the language of liberation, as will be discussed in the last chapter, the 
economy of Guåhan can best be understood by looking at the reconstruction of the island directly 
after the war. There is a direct connection between the island’s ontological transformation into a 
permanent military base and the parameters of Guåhan’s economy. Even if Wolfe’s argument is 
dealing directly with settler colonialism, similar colonial logics run through what Rachel Oldenziel 
calls “transport hubs” such as Guåhan, the Azores, and Hawaiʻi.59 Access to land is the priority 
and elimination of the natives is a prerequisite of this. Some colonizers directly exterminated the 
natives, and others, as argued, used racialization as a form of hierarchization. World War II was 
the United States’ opportunity to cement hierarchization and hopefully achieve an uninhabited 
strategically located island. Unfortunately for them, this did not happen and manlåla’la’ i CHamoru 
(The CHamoru still lives). 
Destroy and Replace 
U.S. victory and reoccupation of the island came largely at the expense of a massive 
bombing campaign. Beginning on July 8th, 1944, the United States military started bombing the 
island for 13 days straight before they would make landing in the island. In addition to aerial 
bombings, the U.S. Navy also began blowing up reef and lagoon obstacles off of beaches in Asan 
and Hågat (Agat). During these days of bombing, about 80% of the island’s permanent structures 
were destroyed and the capital of Agaña (now Hagåtña) was almost completely bombarded into 
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concrete rubble and by 1950, the village’s population decreased from 10,000 before the war to a 
mere 760.60 The village was completely destroyed. CHamoru historian Pedro Sanchez wrote of the 
bombardment, “Not a single dwelling remained in Asan, Piti, Agat, and Sumay, the pre-war 
hometowns of over 4,000 CHamorus.”61 During the reoccupation campaign, one group of 
CHamorus tried to contact the Americans so they paddled out into the ocean to board an American 
ship. When the group of men finally boarded, they thanked the Americans for “liberating” the 
island. The captain of the ship then responded, “Liberate? We are here to flatten the rock.”62 
  The captain’s short remark is ripe with the logics of elimination the U.S. deployed along 
with their bombs. The United States’ return was not with the intention of helping the CHamorus, 
but rather the war provided everything they needed to actualize the terra nullius dream to “destroy 
and replace” they could not achieve before the war. This is evident in the fact that many more 
CHamorus could have died if they were not forced to march by the Japanese to designated 
concentration camps. As the Japanese believed an inevitable American invasion was near, they 
began to worry that CHamorus would help signal the Americans and thus forced CHamorus to 
concentration camps such as the one in Manenggon, Yona. These marches were once again 
physically brutal as CHamorus were told in a moment’s notice to leave their households and make 
their way down to the camps. Without much food or water, many CHamorus starved, were 
physically exhausted, or suffered heat strokes as they marched. My great-grandfather, for example, 
suffered a heat stroke while working in the field and the Japanese soldiers told my family to throw 
him away because he was useless. However, his brothers-in-law decided to hide him in a cave and 
take care of him, but ultimately, he died. Thus, my grandmother lost her father when she was only 
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nine years old. Other stories of the war illustrate this harsh period such as the stories of Hannah 
Chance Torres and Juan Unpingco. 
Hannah Chance Torres, after having been beaten and berated by Japanese soldiers, died 
while she and others were en route to the Manenggon concentration camp. She had 
stopped to feed her baby and refused the soldiers’ order to move on. Her body was left on 
the side of the path. 
Juan Unpingco remembered the march and not being allowed to stop, no matter what. He 
heard babies and children crying and some old people moaning in pain. Anyone who 
tried to rest, he said, would be whipped and beaten. His father was beaten while on the 
march, even though he had done nothing wrong.63 
It was not only this deprivation and exhaustion that led to CHamoru deaths, but also the sheer 
amount of American firepower. This was a war that CHamorus had nothing to do with, yet they 
became collateral damage during both the war and its aftermath.  
 The reason why I trace this history of forced marching to concentration camps is because 
“Despite these hardships, however, incarceration proved to be a blessing in disguise. Had they not 
been moved, many CHamorus would have been killed by the American pre-invasion bombardment 
and Japanese crossfire.”64 Many CHamoru deaths were averted at the price of intense suffering 
both physically and psychologically, echoing our current predicament of a “sense of security” 
provided at the expense of genuine CHamoru security in Guåhan. Destroying and replacing may 
not have been deliberate, but it was a consequential effect of this massive and sustained bombing 
campaign of the island. This destruction of the island made the face of the capital village of 
Hagåtña unrecognizable, as many other aspects of Guåhan and CHamoru livelihood would be after 
the war, rather unrecognizable. 
After the U.S. successfully subdued the Japanese and reoccupied the island, they quickly 
began reconstructing and ultimately transforming the island to fit their security interests. In looking 
at the development of the island after the war, I turn to critical development theory to help make 
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sense of it all. Large scale development projects in the aftermath of World War II were not unique 
to Guåhan because World War II heavily changed the international system and made the U.S. a 
great power. Destruction is creative, the shock of war leads to new worlds, and for many 
indigenous peoples, it was not a good world that was created. Following World War II, 
modernizing the world became the dominant development discourse. Vincent Tucker, in his 
article, “The Myth of Development: A Critique of Eurocentric Discourse,” defines development 
as the “process whereby other peoples are dominated and their destinies are shaped according to 
an essentially Western way of conceiving and perceiving the world.”65 Furthermore, he argues 
that,  
It is an essential part of the process whereby the developed countries manage, control, 
and even create the Third World economically, politically, sociologically, and culturally. 
It is a process whereby the lives of some peoples, their plans, their hopes, their 
imaginations, are shaped by others who frequently share neither their lifestyles, nor their 
hopes nor their values. The real nature of this process is disguised by a discourse that 
portrays development as a necessary and desirable process, as human destiny itself.66 
Even if Guåhan, due to its status as an unincorporated territory, is not the traditional analytical 
referent in critical development theory, the theoretical meat remains relevant to the post-war 
transformation of the island. Guåhan’s infrastructural and economic development would be shaped 
by the United States military.  
 Immediately after the war ended in Guåhan, the U.S. military needed to finish fighting the 
Japanese in the rest of the Pacific, including Okinawa, Palau, and the Philippines. To this end, they 
utilized Guåhan as a forward naval base and an airbase for B-29s to bomb the Japanese mainland. 
General Walter H. Frank proposed that B-29 air bases would be constructed in the island after a 
pre-invasion aerial survey was conducted in May of 1944. The plan was for each air base to have 
two 8,500-foot asphalt runways and house 100 B-29s.67 To ensure absolute control over the island 
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and to achieve their war objectives, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander and Chief Pacific and 
Commander in Chief Pacific Area, declared 
All powers of government and jurisdiction in Guam and adjacent waters, and over the 
inhabitants thereof, and final administrative responsibility are vested in me as Admiral, 
United States Navy, commanding the forces of occupation and as Military Governor, and 
will be exercised through subordinate commanders by my direction…No political activity 
will be permitted other than that authorized by me or under my authority.68 
His declaration of authority showed that the old authoritarian Naval ways were going to remain, 
especially in a time of war.  
 This post-war transformation of the island was deliberately planned out. In May 1946, 
Acting Secretary of the Navy John L. Sullivan wrote a letter to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives outlining the military’s operations in Guåhan, writing, 
the installation of a fleet marine base, and the continued operation of the advance base 
construction depot, the naval operating base, the submarine base, the fleet hospital, the 
naval ammunition depot, and the naval repair base. To carry out the contemplated plans, 
specialized installations will be required for aids to navigation, radar installations, tank 
farms, and antiaircraft. To man and operate the activities, housing facilities of a 
permanent nature are planned.69   
The military plans outlined in this letter show that the complete overall transformation of the island  
would require a large amount of land to be taken.  Adding to this, Vice Admiral Forest P. Sherman, 
wrote, “When we recaptured Guam, we proceeded with the development of the island without 
regard to ownership for the most effective and rapid prosecution of the war.”70 The next section 
discusses the extensive amount of land taken from CHamorus immediately after the war to 
actualize this vision of turning Guåhan into this “permanent full-scale Navy activity.” 
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Ma Chule’ Ha’ i Tano’: Stolen Lands Out of CHamoru Hands 
Before the war, the Naval government already acquired CHamoru land via an impossible 
taxation system and the lumping of “unregistered land” into Spanish Crown lands which they 
argued was theirs due to the shift in sovereign control over the island. However, this postwar 
transformation into a forward operating base saw the largest land-taking by the military in Guåhan 
to date. Their quest to finish the war in the Pacific inevitably meant they were going to further 
dispossess CHamorus of their lands. CHamoru historian Anthony Palomo, published a memoir of 
his war experience titled An Island in Agony, and in his book, Palomo describes this ontological 
transformation of lands and the hands that own the land. He writes, “Farmlands were converted 
into airfields and villages which had escaped destruction during the actual fighting were moved 
elsewhere…And with the massive military buildup, thoughts of reverting Guam to its prewar 
agricultural economy were wishful thinking.”71 In the two largest villages before the war, Agaña 
and Sumay, 11,000 of the island’s 20,000 inhabitants were displaced as a result of the war and the 
American transformative war effort. By 1947, a total of 1,350 families had lost their land and 
homes due to military actions.72 While many CHamorus of this time understood temporary land 
taking to help the Americans finish the war, they did not expect permanent dispossession of their 
land.  
During this immediate post-war period, the military controlled close to 60% of the island 
totaling near 52,000 acres of privately held land, and a total of 85,000 acres overall with the old 
“Spanish Crown lands.” To handle the newly landless CHamoru population, the military began to 
construct “small dwellings and tent-frame structures” in the new villages of Dededo, Barrigada, 
Sinajana, Yona, Asan, Santa Rita, and Agat. Most of these structures were only made to last around 
6 months, were built with salvaged war materials, and it was once again CHamoru labor hired by 
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the government to build these temporary dwellings. By mid-1945, it was estimated that nearly 
5,000 CHamorus remained homeless in these refugee camps because they were not allowed to 
return to the villages of Agaña and Sumay yet. Many CHamorus despised being kept in these 
refugee camps and in late August 1944, a group of CHamorus led by Simon A. Sanchez and others 
decided to leave the camp and settle on land in Dededo. What is important to note here is the 
military’s response to this group of people. Instead of letting them move back, the military tried to 
move them back into the camps and even cut off all their food rations.  
Another confusing aspect of this temporary refugee housing situation was that “in almost 
every case, the land on which the houses stood were privately owned. Thus, in effect, the displaced 
persons were trespassing on private property with the government’s permission.”73 Not only were 
CHamorus dispossessed of their land, but the military also unilaterally dictated the use of land that 
they did not take. In one example, the military told the residents of the village of Tamuning that 
their land was going to be used for Naval installations. They were told that the area from a beach 
road to an area near a cliff was the new officially designated land for civilian use, and that they 
could build their new homes there. These lots, however, belonged to particular families before the 
war, and now 80 new families were building homes on their land. This caused a conflict between 
the original landowners and these new families, and the new families petitioned Congress to help 
them figure out their standing on this land. Governor Pownall, Naval governor of Guåhan, 
displaced the responsibility for settling this conflict and told the CHamorus to solve it amongst 
themselves. Even if these landowners were happy to help the landless of the time (many eventually 
became frustrated by the situation), this does not excuse the dictatorial actions being exercised by 
the United States military.  
Analyzing the two most populous villages in Guåhan before the war, Agaña and Sumay, 
where people were denied returning at the time, we can see how transformations in the name of 
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U.S. national security were detrimental to the CHamoru people. There are people in Guåhan who 
were born and raised here, but throughout their entire lives, have never stepped foot into Sumay. 
In order to visit Sumay, you need a military identification card or be “let in” with someone who 
does. A majority of the pre-war village lies inside barbed wire fences and a manned security gate. 
After the war, the U.S. took the village of Sumay and transformed it into what is now known as 
Naval Base Guam. Taotao Sumay, or people from Sumay, are now scattered throughout other parts 
of the island or living in the geologically inferior new village of Santa Rita, where the military 
relocated many of the former inhabitants of Sumay. In his thesis, CHamoru scholar James Perez 
Viernes, whose family was one of those dispossessed of their land, describes the closing off of 
Sumay. Sumay was located near Orote Point which holds the coveted Apra Harbor, Guåhan’s 
deep-water harbor with excellent docking capabilities. After the war, Admiral Nimitz requested 
for not only “those lands directly employed by the military forces, but additional land adjacent to 
the used areas to insure control of the total areas for defense and security reasons and to provide 
for future needs, installations, and possible expansion.”74  
After the war, many of the people of Sumay returned to see their homes, only to be told 
they could not return at the time. One elder remembers returning to the village where she was told 
by a military official that she was not to come back yet. “I told the captain of the army or the 
marines that’s our house, we can still live there. And he said (while waving his finger up in the 
air) ‘oh no, you can’t live there’.”75 To justify keeping CHamorus away, the American military 
told them that there were still Japanese bodies rotting in the streets, and the Americans then 
barricaded Sumay. CHamoru war survivor and former resident of Sumay, Juan Quintanilla 
Guzman, blames the Americans for destroying his village. He said in an interview with the Pacific 
Daily News, “You know, Japanese didn’t bomb the village. They only bombed the Marine barracks 
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and the cable station, which is far away from the village. The one who destroyed Sumay is the 
bombardment of the Americans, not the Japanese.”76 
While many manaotao Sumay were waiting to return to their homes and living in these 
refugee camps, they were called to a meeting in April 1945 by the military government and were 
told they would never be able to return back to their village. They were given the option of either 
relocating to the village of Agat or moving to another developed site. When people refused to 
move to Agat, the military created a new developed village on the slopes of Mount Alifan which 
was named Santa Rita. Beginning in 1945, “the U.S. military began construction of temporary 
wood and thatched-roof duplex homes and began moving families at Apla (where their temporary 
refugee camp was) one by one into the area as homes became available.” This land was surely not 
the fertile, thriving land that the people of Sumay remembered. As a news article reported in 1972, 
“the Navy could not have chosen a worse site [to relocate the Sumay people] as most of the home 
sites were on a 45-degree slope and the land was for the most part untillable and mosquito 
infested.”77 Today, this new village of Santa Rita has murals that read “Taotao Sumay.” They 
surely have not forgotten where they come from. As CHamoru elder Juan Wesley said regarding 
Santa Rita, “We try to farm and ranch but it’s not that good. We try to plant a few vegetables, but 
it’s not the same as in Sumay.”78  
Residents similarly were not allowed to return to the village of Hagåtña, or Agaña as it was 
known at the time, because of U.S. construction and architectural plans. Unlike Sumay, people 
still live in Hagåtña today, although it is important to note that before the war, it was one of the 
most populous villages in the island, and now it is one of the least populated. After the war, the 
military had plans to Americanize the former capitol of the island and turn it into “New Agana.”  
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CHamorus became visibly upset and resistant to land-takings when the military started to 
take land almost exclusively for recreational purposes. “In Agaña, roughly five hundred people 
were displaced when eighty-two lots were condemned for a park, and in Tamuning, sixty hectares 
of Tumon Beach were condemned for a military recreational center.”79 In the village of Tumon, a 
CHamoru man named John Unpingco stood in front of American soldiers and their bulldozers with 
a shotgun refusing to leave his family land.80 In the southern villages, the Navy erected fences 
around prime beaches and forbade anyone from swimming or entering the beach area unless they 
were officers, enlisted men, or their dependents. The Eighth Guam Congress argued against these 
land takings, demanding, “all beaches and seas be declared public property and that rights-of-way 
be established leading to these beaches and seas, and that any person, organization, unit, or group 
of persons shall have free access to any beach or sea either for recreation or fishing.”81 
 To defend the military’s stance of acquiring private CHamoru land for these recreational 
centers, Governor Charles Pownall argued that “to provide adequate athletic facilities for the 
personnel of the Armed Forces of Guam is of direct concern to the local Government in effecting 
law and order, harmony, and morale.”82 Here, Pownall seems to be arguing that condemning land 
was important for the overall well-being of American soldiers and that without these facilities, 
these soldiers could become disorderly and interrupt the order and harmony of the island. The 
message seemed to be, “Who knows what soldiers will do to you if they are not allowed to blow 
off some steam?” Critique within the military came from General LeMay who wrote,  
They had built tennis courts for the Island Commander; they had built fleet recreation 
centers, a Marine rehabilitation center, dockage facilities for inter-island surface craft, 
and every other damn thing in the world except subscribing to the original purpose in the 
occupation of those islands.83 
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All of this land taking was justified and, in a sense, legalized via Public Law 594, also known as 
the Guam Acquisition of Lands Act passed by the 79th U.S. Congress in 1946. The legislation 
reads, 
The Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to acquire in the name, and for the use, of 
the United States, by purchase or otherwise, land and rights pertaining thereto situated on 
or within the island of Quam (sic), including interests in fee, leasehold interests with or 
without option to purchase interests in fee, and rights-of-way and easements both 
temporary and perpetual for highways, drainage systems, water supply and 
communication distribution facilities, upon conveyance of title acceptable to him or to 
such other officer as he may designate.84 
The phrasing in this legislation of “by purchase or otherwise” would have lasting ramifications as 
“it would not be long before otherwise would translate to an outright taking of land in the name of 
military interests.”85  
Security Clearance (1941-1962): Strategic Isolation 
Before the Japanese occupation of the island, the United States was already preparing for 
a possible attack by the Japanese. They noticed the Japanese building up of forces in the 
surrounding Pacific Islands. In October of 1941, the military began to evacuate their dependents 
off the island. It is important to note that they did not evacuate nor inform the CHamorus of their 
suspicions of a Japanese attack. To prepare for this possible attack, the Secretary of the Navy 
passed Executive Order 8693 in 1941 which established the “Guam Island Naval Defensive Sea 
Area” and the “Guam Island Airspace Reservation.” This order was passed with the supposed 
intent to “preserve the security of the island as war with Japan loomed on the horizon and Japanese 
air and naval bases in the Northern Marianas menaced Guam.”86 As a result of the Executive Order, 
the Secretary of the Navy was delegated the power to authorize entry into the island. The security 
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clearance was interrupted for roughly three years due to the Japanese occupation of the island and 
then a few years after while the military rebuilt the island. The security clearance was eventually 
reinstated in 1950, three months after the Organic Act became effective.  
As a result of the security clearance,  
All persons desiring to come to Guam who are not within certain excluded categories are 
required to obtain a security clearance from the Secretary of the Navy or his subordinates 
before they are permitted to enter. A person coming to Guam for the first time files the 
application directly or indirectly with the Chief of Naval Operations. In the case of a 
citizen of the United States who is a resident of Guam and who desires to leave Guam 
temporarily with intent to return, an application for a re-entry permit must be made to the 
Commander, Naval Forces Mariana Islands.87 
W. Scott Barrett and Walter S. Ferenz, in their article, “Peacetime Martial Law in Guam,” argued 
that it was not difficult for the military to enforce the security clearance as the Navy controlled the 
only two ways to get into the island: through ship or by plane. In the former instance, one would 
have to enter via Apra Harbor, which was under the control of the Navy. At the time, all operations 
of the port were under the Commander of Naval Forces Marianas. In the latter instance, if one 
wanted to arrive to Guåhan via plane, they would have to land at Naval Air Station, where the 
current civilian airport of Guåhan is located today, but which was formerly under the complete 
control of the military. This was troublesome for many CHamorus who wanted to return home, as 
in the case of former Speaker of the Guåhan Legislature, Joe San Agustin. In the late 1940s, San 
Agustin went to attend George Washington University in Washington D.C. He had to request 
permission from the Navy to leave the island, and after he graduated, asked permission from the 
Navy to return to Guåhan. He said in an interview with Pacific Daily News, “When I graduated in 
1950, I wanted to come home. I had to write to the admiral, ‘Can I come to Guam?’ That’s the 
only way they would allow me to buy a ticket to Guam.”88  
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 When asked to justify the continuation of the security clearance policy, the Navy gave 
various positions found in different memos and letters. A review of these letters and memos reveals 
the specific seven reasons; 
1. The clearance is necessary so long as the Korean War continues. 
2. Because of the huge expenditure of appropriated funds on defense projects, Guam 
draws from nearly every walk of life civilians whose purpose is making as much 
money as possible, directly or indirectly, from the salaries of military and government 
employees. 
3. Many aliens are excluded because their long-term presence would be detrimental to 
the effective use of Guam for its primary mission of defense.  
4. The island of Guam is an important United States naval and military base, and its 
protection fully warrants those measures authorized by Executive Order No. 8683.  
5. The Navy is required by Executive Order No. 8683 to enforce the order. 
6. The clearance is necessary to enable the Navy to assist the local government in 
keeping the “riff-raff” out of Guam. 
7. Entry into Guam is limited to persons who contribute to its “strategic development.”89 
From these collective reasons, the theme of this dissertation echoes loudly: security, security, and 
more security. From our use for the Korean War to our “strategic development,” the military kept 
this security clearance policy in place even after administration of the island switched to the 
Department of the Interior, and this infuriated many CHamorus. Returning to Joe San Agustin, he 
said, “Think of it: you’re put in a cage, you’re born on Guam, and you have to ask an admiral, 
‘Can I leave Guam?’ And then I leave Guam, and I have to ask can I come to Guam. It’s like 
asking, ‘Can I go to the bathroom?’”90  
 From an economic perspective, the security clearance hurt the island’s chances of 
development. The island was essentially a closed port for twenty years after the war, with the Navy 
dictating who comes in and who goes out. Anthony Leon Guerrero, former President of the Bank 
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of Guam, writes regarding the security clearance requirement, “Consequently, it became an 
obstacle to the development of business here, for not only was it impossible to attract civilian 
investment to Guam, it also severely hindered the attempts of local businessmen to find off-island 
suppliers or to meet with them when needed”91 unlike the military and off-island contractors 
rebuilding the island who could hire “alien workers.” The economy of the island at this time was 
completely dependent on military construction projects and federal funding, and improved after 
the war (although that is not a hard thing to argue considering that there was no economic 
development during the war). There simply was no other economic engine at the time, as no 
alternative was allowed under the security clearance over the island. As legal scholar and expert 
on U.S. territorial relations Arnold Leibowitz writes, “By limiting the availability of skilled 
personnel, especially in the civilian construction market, just when Guam was attempting to 
rebuild from the destruction of World War II, the Executive Order effectively prevented economic 
development on Guam.”92 He continues, “In short, employers were forced to comply with the 
Navy’s wishes because it had the power to cut off any future importation of labor by refusing 
security clearances.”93 Anne Perez Hattori describes the security clearance as “the closing of 
Guam’s vision.” She continues saying,  
I think in that period of time, Guam becomes so insulated that we didn’t even see the 
other islands. We didn’t see anything except this path… the only ways out of Guam are 
where the bases are; it’s in California, Washington. It’s our vision of the world. It’s 
Guam, California, Hawaii…it’s not anything near us. It becomes this very controlled, 
narrow vision of the world outside of Guam and it’s defined by the path of the bases, 
which is where CHamorus went.94 
It would not be until 1962 that President John F. Kennedy would lift the security clearance and 
allow Guåhan to open up to the rest of the world.  
                                               
91 Leon Guerrero, “The Economic Development of Guam,” 92. 
92 Rodgers, Destinyʻs Landfall, 212.  
93 Leibowitz, Defining Status, 337.  
94 Anne Perez Hattori, interview, October 16, 2018.  
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This was largely the result of one of the last appointed civilian governors, Bill Daniels, 
who is notorious for importing an armadillo into the island, only to lose the armadillo somewhere 
in the Guåhan jungles. During his tenure as Governor of Guåhan, Daniels fought against the 
security clearance arguing that, “we have neglected these industrious and ambitious people and 
it’s going to be hard to build up Guam with industry, new business, and tourism…with this wall 
around the island.”95 This initiative, due to Daniels’ close relationship with key Democrats in the 
U.S. Congress, ultimately was successful, and the lifting of the security clearance ushered in a new 
era of economic development in the island. 
 The elephant in the room is that for many in Guåhan today who fight for CHamoru rights 
and the preservation of our people, culture, and language, aspects of the security clearance are 
quite agreeable. There are CHamoru activists today who would like nothing more than to restrict 
the amount of people coming into the island and settling or the number of outside investors who 
are able to buy land and start their own businesses. However, one must return to Anthony Leon 
Guerrero’s insight that this happened not with CHamorus in mind, it was just a side effect of their 
original plan to keep the island under their rule. As Barrett and Ferenz argue, 
Although one can only speculate, the real reason seems to be that the Navy hesitates to 
relinquish power which it has exercised for many years over the populace of Guam. The 
Navy once ruled Guam with an iron hand, and the enforcement of Executive Order No. 
8683 may be an attempt to retain as much of that rule as possible.96 
The security clearance was not meant to protect CHamoru land or livelihoods, but rather to ensure 
a way for the Navy to keep control over the island after the passing of the Organic Act of 1950. It 
is hard to believe the Navy’s argument that the security clearance was meant to keep Guam for 
Guamanians, when they spent the years immediately before reinstating the security clearance 
dispossessing CHamorus of their lands and transforming the island into a large military base. The 
underlying issue here is also that CHamorus never asked for the security clearance and once again 
                                               
95 Quimby, “Security Clearance on Guam.” 
96 Barrett and Ferenz, “Peacetime Martial Law in Guam,” 6-7. 
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were not able to make their own decisions even after the supposed transition to a civilian form of 
government. As a result, the CHamorus became dependent on the federal government for the 
economy and were held off for 12 years after the Organic Act from responsibly taking charge of 
the economic development of the island. So, even if one today looks back at the security clearance 
and agrees with some of the provisions, the first thing is to question why we could not make this 
decision ourselves. 
III. I FINAKPO’: CONCLUSION 
Earlier this year, I received news that my grandmother and her siblings were having an 
intense controversy over their family land. My grandmother’s sister wanted to sell the land for a 
substantial amount of money, while the rest of her siblings refused to agree to this. Although my 
grandmother’s land is located in the northern island of Saipan, not in Guåhan, I became empathetic 
to the situations of many families in Guåhan and the predicaments they may be put in. On one 
hand, there were the countless individuals and families who flat out had their land stolen. Yet, on 
the other hand, there are those who have land and want to sell the land to receive a substantial 
payment and become economically more prosperous. These are not predicaments that are easy to 
solve, and this chapter has hopefully shown all the complexity and muddiness that goes into these 
situations.  
In this chapter, I outlined the history of economic violence centering land dispossession as 
its condition of possibility. The story of the development of Guåhan’s economy cannot be told by 
arguing that Guåhan is a small, isolated island, and thus is deterministically economically 
challenged. Rather, I have shown that excluding land from this narrative is inherently flawed. The 
desire for land in the service of a militarized form-of-life has fundamentally transformed the island 
physically, economically, and as I will argue, environmentally. The following chapter builds on 
the history outlined in this chapter and provides multiple examples of the ramifications of this 
history. Furthermore, the following chapter provides reinforcement to the argument that 
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colonialism is a structure, not an event. The land taking after World War II was not a 
chronologically frozen event in the 1940s. Rather, the next chapter analyzes the structural 
consequences of this land taking from an economic perspective and demonstrates how these 







Chapter 3: Economic Violence Step #2: Modern Manifestations of Economic 
Sludge 
“Just victims of the in-house driveby. They say Jump, you say ‘How High?”- “Bullet In 
The Head” by Rage Against The Machine
1 
I am an avid Magic: The Gathering player, a trading card game created in 1993 that 
combines fantasy and strategy with the goal to get your opponent’s “life points” down to zero. 
When I find some free time on Fridays, I usually go down to the only shop in Guåhan that hosts 
tournaments for the game. One Friday, a few months ago, I stopped by the shop and had a chat 
with the shop owner. I asked him how his day was and with a smile on his face, he said it was a 
great day. Inquiring further, he mentioned that a bunch of military guys just came in and nearly 
bought his inventory out. He exclaimed, “There must be a ship in!” This anecdotal story is a small, 
but powerful example of the dominant discourse surrounding the economy of the island: that the 
military presence and consequently the federal government are economic gifts that the people of 
Guåhan should be grateful for. This is a multiscalar belief here in Guåhan. From small businesses 
to the economy overall, one sees this sentiment throughout the island. On a larger scale, I turn to 
the words of former Guåhan senator and FBI Special Agent Frank Ishizaki who wrote regarding 
the pending military buildup, 
We are apprehensive about negative impact potential that the military buildup will bring; 
however, the short-term and long-term benefits will likely outweigh the difficulties. The 
economic benefits will be positive. The sense of security from attacks by foreign 
adversaries will be enhanced. The long history of the presence of American forces will be 
maintained. Our appreciation for its protective umbrella far outweighs the risk.2 
 
                                               
1 Genius. Bullet in the Head, Rage Against the Machine (Los Angeles, California: Rage Against the Machine, 1991), 
https://genius.com/Rage-against-the-machine-bullet-in-the-head-lyrics. 





Ishizaki calls on the people of Guåhan to realize that the economic benefits of the buildup along 
with the security provided is worth the cost. In another example, chairwoman of the Guam 
Chamber of Commerce Catherine Castro told the local legislature, “We believe the short-term 
issues, concerns and inconveniences will be far outweighed by the long-term benefits to our 
community, its economy and its defense.”3 In Guåhan, the military not only provides defense, but 
it also provides a sense of economic security. Through federal funds due to military projects, 
military personnel visiting the island, and the cheaper goods found within the fence, the economic 
benefits of military presence are touted loud on the bullhorn. 
 In the preceding chapter, I provided a detailed history and analysis of how rampant land 
dispossession by the U.S. government and military served as the condition of possibility for 
economic insecurity and violence. This chapter acts as a part II to the previous chapter and 
demonstrates the modern manifestations of the process of land dispossession and subsequent 
economic stage set as a result. The first section provides various examples of economic violence 
in Guåhan, which show the intertwining of militarization and unincorporated territory status and 
lays out how bureaucracy and dependency theory are useful in understanding Guåhan’s economic 
violence situation. The second section then addresses the question of tourism, which is the only 
other economic pillar in Guåhan today besides the military, and critically examines its possible 
intersection with militarization. The third section then analyzes the proposed military buildup of 
the island focusing on the purported economic benefits. In this section, I use the proposed buildup 
as an example of “military Keynesianism” being exercised in Guåhan. The final section then 
                                               
3 John I. Borja, “Guam Chamber of Commerce: Buildup will give much-needed economic boost.”  




returns to the history of land dispossession. While the previous chapter provided a detailed history 
of the process and its structural economic ramifications, this section shows the unfair buying 
practices of this land that leads to the loss of CHamoru livelihoods.  
I. Clogged Economic Arteries: Case Studies in Bureaucratic Sludge 
 
In a fully developed bureaucracy, there is nobody left with whom one could argue, to whom one 
could present grievances, on whom the pressures of power could be exerted. Bureaucracy is the 
form of government in which everybody is deprived of political freedom, of the power to act; for 
the rule by Nobody is not no-rule, and where all are equally powerless we have a tyranny 
without a tyrant.4- Hannah Arendt 
In the quote above, famed political thinker Hannah Arendt argues that bureaucracy leads a 
situation in which blame is easily displaced and people are no longer able to properly identify the 
source of their rage or hardship. In his book, The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and 
the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy, anthropologist David Graeber argues that the world we live in 
now is an “age of total bureaucratization” and that bureaucracy is an instrument “through which 
the human imagination is smashed and shattered.”5 Furthermore, Graeber argues, “the 
bureaucratization of daily life means the imposition of impersonal rules and regulations; 
impersonal rules and regulations, in turn, can only operate if they are backed up by the threat of 
force.”6 While Graeber, in this instance, is particularly discussing the police, surveillance, and 
other forms of mechanized control, I argue that his analysis of the bureaucratization of life and the 
imposition of impersonal rules and regulations is extremely relevant when analyzing the current 
economic sludge in Guåhan. He gives credence to this, writing, 
What I would like to argue is that situations created by violence–particularly structural 
violence, by which I mean forms of pervasive social inequality that are ultimately backed 
                                               
4 Hannah Arendt, On Violence, (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1970), 82. 
5 Tomas Hachard, “Please Fill In This Form In Triplicate Before You Read Utopia Of Rules,” NPR, February 26, 
2015, https://www.npr.org/2015/02/26/387252732/please-fill-in-this-form-in-triplicate-before-you-read-utopia-of-
rules 
6 David Graeber, The Utopia of Rules: On Technology, Stupidity, and the Secret Joys of Bureaucracy (Brooklyn: 
Melville House Publishing, 2015), 32.  
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up by the threat of physical harm–invariably tend to create the kinds of willful blindness 
we normally associate with bureaucratic procedures.7  
In line with Graeber’s argument above, this section outlines the modern manifestations of this 
economic sludge. More particularly, through an analysis of federal policies that hinder Guåhan’s 
economic potential and decisions made in the name of national security, I aim to remind the people 
of Guåhan that what we deem to be the tough economic conditions of the island may not be entirely 
our fault. The bureaucracy and normalization of “government operations” are facets of the 
structure of militarized, unincorporated territory.  
 This bureaucracy and normalization of “government operations” leads many to believe that 
this is just the way it is, and I argue that this is an example of a forced dependency on the United 
States federal government to ensure continued access to Guåhan’s land and location. Stemming 
from critiques of capitalism as well as development theory, dependency theory addresses unequal 
development that leads to the eventual dependence of a colony or weaker state on a metropole or 
larger power. Dependency theory was developed in the late 1950s by the Director of the U.N.’s 
Economic Commission for Latin America, Raul Prebisch. Prebisch and others noted that economic 
growth in more advanced countries did not necessarily lead to growth in poorer countries, but 
rather that, economic activity in the richer countries often leads to dire economic problems in these 
poorer countries. He argued that by exporting their primary commodities to richer countries who 
manufactured these commodities and sold them back to poorer countries, these smaller countries 
were being taken advantage of.8 According to Theotonio Dos Santos, dependency is,  
An historical condition which shapes a certain structure of the world economy such that it 
favors some countries to the detriment of others and limits the development possibilities 
of the subordinate economics…a situation in which the economy of a certain group of 
countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another economy, to which 
their own is subjected.9 
                                               
7 Graeber, The Utopia of Rules, 57.  
8 Vincent Ferraro, “Dependency Theory: An Introduction,” in The Development Economics Reader, ed. Giorgio 
Secondi, 58-64 (London: Routledge, 2008).  
9 Theotonio Dos Santos, “The Structure of Dependence,” in Readings in U.S. Imperialism, eds. K.T. Fann and 
Donald C. Hoges (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1971), 226.  
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Dependency theorists argue that the international system comprises two sets of states, the dominant 
with the dependent, the center with the periphery, and the metropolitan and satellite states. In their 
definition, the dominant states are the advanced industrial nations and the dependent states are 
found in Latin America, Asia, and Africa. What is key to dependency theory is their analysis that 
what dependent states have in common is that external forces are of singular importance to the 
economic activities within the dependent states. These forces include “multinational corporations, 
international commodity markets, foreign assistance, communications, and any other means by 
which the advanced industrialized countries can represent their economic interests abroad.”10 I 
find these tenets of dependency theory very useful in examining the economic relationship between 
Guåhan and the United States today. In this section, there is nothing spectacular, nothing worthy 
of a documentary film, but this ordinariness is what Graeber is warning his readers about. The 
bureaucracy of policy is itself structural violence, and in Guåhan’s case, has absolutely structured 
the limits of our economic development and potential. In the following sections, I trace this history 
and present state of dependency and undertake an analysis that only begins to make sense when 
looking at these various components as a whole.  
Jones Act 
In 1920, Senator Wesley Jones introduced the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 intended to 
promote the merchant marines. The act comprehensively regulates maritime commerce between 
U.S. ports and in U.S. waters. To accomplish this, the act reserves domestic shipping for vessels 
that are built, owned, crewed, and flagged in the United States. More particularly, the act requires 
that “the ships must be owned by U.S. companies that are controlled by U.S. citizens with at least 
75% U.S. ownership, at least 75% crewed by U.S. citizens, and registered in the United States.”11 
Furthermore, “the steel used in any foreign repair work on a Jones Act vessel must be less than ten 
                                               
10 Ferraro, “Dependency Theory.” 
11 “Jones Act,” Transportation Institute, Accessed October 2018, https://transportationinstitute.org/jones-act/ 
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10% of the ship’s total weight.”12 This affects Guåhan and the prices of good that come to the 
island as the Jones Act shipping restrictions greatly drives up the cost of imports. As a Guåhan 
senator said, “The Jones Act has been hurting us for so long. We have every day struggles because 
of the Jones Act––the high cost of food, of everything. We have to bring everything in.”13  
Besides the strict rules for domestic shipping, another factor driving up the price of imports 
into Guåhan is that the number of Jones-Act eligible ships is quite small. As of February 2016, 
there were only 91 large Jones-Act eligible vessels, and since 2010, 89% of commercial vessels 
produced in U.S. shipyards were smaller vessels like tugboats. By 2015, U.S. flagged ships only 
carried 1% of U.S. trade. Shipbuilding as an industry has declined immensely, and today, China, 
South Korea, and Japan account for 91.4% of new ship production, and there are only three 
domestic builders of large commercial ships left in the United States.14 Lastly, Guåhan’s 
geography as an island in the middle of the Pacific Ocean makes it extremely distant from the 
United States (and this also applies to Alaska and Hawai’i, which have joined Guåhan in seeking 
Jones Act exemptions). “These regions are most severely affected by the act because of their long 
shipping distances from the contiguous US and because geography prevents them from using 
substitute modes of transportation such as trucks, trains, and pipelines.”15 
These three factors collectively form a spear tip hurting Guåhan’s economy and the ability 
for people in the island to afford basic goods. This goes back to comparative advantage. Excluding 
foreign ships from supplying services on domestic routes denies American businesses access to 
the best shipping, imposing large amount of loss on the American consumer, who has to make up 
the cost. In the case of Puerto Rico, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York found that the 
                                               
12 Ted Loch-Temzelides, “The Jones Act: Friend or Foe?,” Forbes, September 28, 2017, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/thebakersinstitute/2017/09/28/the-jones-act-friend-or-foe/#ef2d0da4faaf 
13 Louella Losinio, “Business, political leaders push for lifting of Jones Act,” Guam Daily Post, October 16, 2017, 
https://www.postguam.com/news/local/business-political-leaders-push-for-lifting-of-jones-act/article_fa0b3be2-
aff7-11e7-97bd-2f7281249fcc.html 
14 Thomas Greenes, “An Economic Analysis of the Jones Act,” Mercatus Center, 2017, accessed at 
https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mercatus-grennes-jones-act-v2.pdf 
15 Greenes, “An Economic Analysis of the Jones Act.” 
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“shipping cost for a twenty-foot container from the mainland United States to Puerto Rico was 
$3,063, but only $1,503 for the same container from the mainland United States to the Dominican 
Republic.”16 Regarding gasoline, one estimate mentions that the Jones Act raises the price of gas 
by as much as 15 cents per gallon because of the higher cost due to the U.S.-flagged ships.17 In 
Hawai‘i, State Senator Sam Slom wrote, “It is now known that the Hawaiian cost of living, 
primarily because of our additional shipping cost and because of the Jones Act, are now 49% 
higher than the U.S. mainland. And this is becoming unbearable. It’s difficult for individuals. It’s 
difficult for families.”18  
Joseph Bradley, chief economist of the Bank of Guam, writes regarding the impact of the 
Jones Act in Guåhan; 
The costs of goods shipped to Guam from the States is artificially inflated by the 
requirement that cargo, baggage and passengers shipped between two successive U.S. 
ports must be carried about U.S.-flag vessels…In addition to these costs, the veritable 
monopoly granted to U.S. shipping lines in the Guam trade allows the imposition of 
monopoly prices on goods shipped to Guam from the U.S. raising the landed cost of 
goods on the island. The best estimate of the impact of the Jones Act on the cost of goods 
from the United States sold in Guam in 1994 was $32.5 million.19 
Bradley shows how Guåhan is affected similarly to Puerto Rico and Hawai‘i by the Jones Act. 
However, when it comes to Guåhan, the picture gets a little more distorted. Unlike the others, 
Guåhan is exempt from the U.S.-built component of the Jones Act requirements. Foreign-built 
ships can enter Guåhan, as long as they meet the remaining qualifications of ships being U.S. 
owned, crewed, and flagged. Yet, legislators in Guåhan have realized that this makes no sense as 
we are only de jure exempt, not de facto exempt. Former Senator Frank Blas Jr. argued; 
                                               
16 Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Report on the Competitiveness of Puerto Rico’s Economy, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, June 29, 2012, accessed at 
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/regional/PuertoRico/report.pdf 
17 Patrick Holland, “Help Puerto Rico by Repealing the Jones Act,” Economics 21, July 15, 2015, 
https://economics21.org/html/help-puerto-rico-repealing-jones-act-1403.html 
18 “Puerto Rico’s Debt Crisis: Why There’s No Quick Fix,” Knowledge at Wharton, Accessed October 2018, 
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/puerto-ricos-debt-crisis-why-theres-no-quick-fix/ 
19 Joseph Bradley, “Analysis of Economic Options,” Guam Commission on Decolonization, June 12, 2000, 84. 
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Since it only makes sense for shippers bringing goods here to first stop in Hawaii, the 
exemption is useless–unless it is extended to all other noncontiguous parts of the United 
States as well. It has very little effect on our shipping costs because other non-contiguous 
U.S. ports that shippers would need to connect thru to make a shipping route sustainable 
are subject to all the restrictions.20 
We are still “functionally shackled” to the U.S. built requirement because the natural trade line 
from the West Coast to Guåhan passes through Hawai‘i, which is not exempt from the built 
requirement, and shipping lines have to mount at both Hawai‘i and Guåhan to make it worth the 
trip from a financial perspective.21   
The rationale for the Jones Act is a familiar one: security. At the time of its passing, it was 
to ensure that the United States maintained a strong Navy, based off the views of Alfred Thayer 
Mahan discussed in Chapter 1. The act was passed after World War I and was to insure that the 
United States was “not forced at some future date to have our Navy’s ships built or repaired by 
foreign nations.”22 It was meant to avoid repeating the shipping shortage that occurred in World 
War I, when “lack of access to foreign shippers left America’s military without adequate means 
for moving men and material to the war zone.”23 Supporters of the Jones Act maintain that 
eliminating the act would be a detriment to U.S. national security. For example, Loren Thompson 
of Forbes Magazine, argues that without the Jones Act, the Navy would have to spend billions of 
dollars on new vessels. 
The U.S. Navy maintains a reserve fleet of military sealift vessels, but its war plans 
assume the availability of a sizable U.S. commercial fleet that can supplement the reserve 
ships…However, 90% of U.S.-flagged tankers and 36% of the U.S. flagged container 
ships are used on routes protected by the Jones Act. If the Act were repealed, these 
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vessels would either cease operation or be registered elsewhere. The Navy would have to 
greatly expand its organic sealift assets.24 
Echoing this, Representative John Garamendi of California, who was appointed by President Bill 
Clinton to negotiate the Commonwealth Act for Guåhan, wrote regarding the importance of the 
Jones Act, 
Our military has had to turn to foreign-flagged vessels for sustainment in times of war, 
and experience shows that can have dangerous consequences. In the 1991 Gulf War, our 
armed forces relied on 192 foreign-flagged ships to carry cargo to the war zone. The 
foreign crews of thirteen vessels mutinied, forcing those ships to abandon their military 
mission. Would foreign flag carriers be any more reliable today, especially for a long-
term deployment into active war zones?25 
To end his passionate argument, he warns, “As we look to the future, if we want to keep the United 
States as a great maritime power, we would be wise to preserve and protect this flexible, durable, 
and valuable maritime policy.”26 The Jones Act is just another example of Guåhan’s economy 
being affected by U.S. national security concerns. The United States’ need for a strong military 
and a strong Navy not only led to our acquisition, but also currently affects our economy. 
Social Warfare Programs 
With her Master’s in Public Health, my partner applied for a job at the Guam Department 
of Public Health and Social Services. Upon her hiring, she was told she would be a supervisor for 
the local welfare programs. From time to time, I would visit her at work and upon entering her 
workspace, I was immediately greeted with a line of people waiting to see their case worker. This 
is dependence in its purest form. People are literally depending on these social welfare programs 
to buy food for their children or receive any form of healthcare. Shifting the scale of dependency 
theory down to the community and individual level, it is these welfare programs that I argue are 
the most affectively persuasive methods in framing the military presence and the subsequent 
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The Hill, October 18, 2018, https://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/412121-the-jones-act-is-a-needed-for-
our-economy-national-security-and 
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federal funding that comes with our status as a military base/unincorporated territory as absolutely 
necessary. I dare to say these are forms of social warfare. Forced dependency disguised as the hand 
that feeds.  
I invite the reader to metaphorically close their eyes and imagine this scenario. Imagine 
that the only sustenance you get throughout the day are cans of the soda, Mountain Dew, which I 
provide to you. There is not a single person who would argue that Mountain Dew is good or healthy 
for you. However, it is the only thing that is provided to quench your thirst. You become extremely 
attached to the sweet yellow nectar, even seeing it as a source of life. If I suddenly stopped giving 
you Mountain Dew every day, you would probably beg me to come back and give you the yellow 
bottle because it is all you are familiar with. However, in this scenario, unknown to you, the 
recipients of the Mountain Dew, there have been cases of water in the back corner of the room 
waiting to be opened. I use this metaphor to help us understand dependency as a result of 
colonialism in its various forms. However, in the case of social welfare programs, sometimes there 
is literal Mountain Dew involved.  
Guåhan, as an unincorporated territory, is eligible for certain federal social welfare 
programs, and disqualified from others. We are eligible for the following Federal-State programs: 
Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled; Child Support Enforcement; Foster Care and Adoption 
Assistance; Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF); Material and Child Health Block 
Grant; Medicaid; State Children’s Health Insurance Program; Child Care and Development Block 
Grant; Older Americans Act; Social Service Block Grant; Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP); Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women; Infants, and Children 
(WIC); and others, but not eligible for the Nutrition Assistance Program Grant. Regarding 
programs that provide direct payments to individuals, Guåhan is eligible for Pell Grants, Medicare, 
and Social Security Retirement, but is not eligible for Supplemental Security Income (SSI). The 
extensive number of programs that the federal government allows us to participate in is viewed by 
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many as generous gifts handed to an otherwise suffering people, and many people rely on these 
forms of social welfare. 
In his article, “Development and Social Goals: Balancing Aid and Development to Prevent 
Welfare Colonialism,” Erik Reinert uses the work of Robert Paine to discuss how to develop 
without creating a sense of dependency. Paine defines welfare colonialism as  
the vehicle for stable governing at a distance through exercise of a particularly subtle, 
non-demonstrative, and dependency-generating form of neocolonial social control that 
pre-empts local autonomy through well-intentioned and generous, but ultimately morally 
wrong policies. Welfare colonialism creates paralyzing dependencies on the centre in a 
peripheral population, a centre exerting control through incentives that create total 
economic dependency, thereby preventing political mobilization and autonomy.27 
Reinert sees welfare colonialism operating in three steps: The first is a reversal of the colonial 
drain of the old days, the net flow going to the colony rather than to the mother country. The second 
is the integration of the native population in ways that radically undermine their previous 
livelihoods, and the third is the placing of the native population on unemployment benefits.28  
 Our neighbors in Micronesia experienced a deliberate attempt at welfare colonialism. 
During their transition to free associated states, the United States wanted to find ways to ensure 
the islands’ continued dependence on U.S. money. In 1963, the Solomon Report was completed, 
a report primarily written by Harvard professor of business administration, Anthony Solomon, 
which argued that moving these islands into a permanent relationship with the United States should 
be the American objective. The planners knew that this more permanent relationship would have 
to be determined in a plebiscite, and they had to ensure the results of the plebiscite went their way. 
In the introduction to the Solomon Report, the authors ask, “What should be the content and cost 
of the minimum capital investment and operating program needed to insure a favorable vote in the 
                                               
27 Erik Reinhert, “Development and Social Goals: Balancing Aid and Development to Prevent Welfare 
Colonialism,” U.N. Economic Social and Economic Affairs Draft Paper, 2006, 
https://www.un.org/esa/desa/papers/2006/wp14_2006.pdf 
28 Reinhert, “Development and Social Goals.” 
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plebiscite, and what should be the content and cost of the maximum program that could be 
effectively mounted to develop the Trust Territory most rapidly?”29 
To achieve this, Solomon and others advocated for the United States to endorse a major 
capital improvements program, an expansion of general employment opportunities, and the 
implementation of a social security system. The strategic importance of the islands was too 
important to simply give up. As David Hanlon writes, “The authors of the Solomon Report worried 
that while the American administration risked becoming simply custodial, increasingly assertive 
anticolonial forces within a less malleable United Nations were attempting to promote the 
development of an independent Micronesia.”30 In another report, the Nathan Plan, it was argued 
that free markets and unregulated, unfettered capitalism would be the best serving system for 
improving the lives of Micronesians. As part of the plan, it even went as far as to propose relocating 
all the islanders to urban centers of the islands to promote labor. 
Both the Solomon Report and the Nathan Plan point to a consistent ploy by the United 
States government to ensure continued access and “strategic denial” in the Micronesian islands via 
economic incentives. This is reflected in the amount of funding the U.S. provided to the 
Micronesian Islands before and after the Solomon Report. In 1962, the year before the report was 
published, U.S. aid to the area was $6.1 million. However, one year later and the year the report 
was written, U.S. spending jumped to $15 million. Even more telling of this trend is that in 1976, 
U.S. assistance jumped all the way to $75.1 million. More directly relevant to this section, the 
islands also saw funding for social welfare programs in the early 1970s. From 1974-1979, the U.S. 
provided the Trust Territory government $120 million, equaling roughly $20 million per year. “By 
March 1979, 90 federal offices were operating within the islands.”31 This story from Guåhan’s 
                                               
29 Friends of Micronesia and Micronesian Independent, Solomon Report: America’s Ruthless Blueprint for the 
Assimilation of Micronesia, 1971. 
30 Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, 92. 
31 Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia, 170. 
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neighboring islands helps to show the role of economic development, and in particular, social 
welfare in creating a sense of dependency on the United States.  
In Guåhan, I argue that this sense of dependency is a reason for the continuous federal 
grants-in-aid and for the strong discourse of U.S. presence as necessary in the island. The numbers 
for social welfare are telling. In 2015, Guåhan’s Department of Public Health Division of Public 
Welfare issued a total of $109.6 million in SNAP benefits for 56,169 people. They also spent $81.6 
million in Medicaid for an eligible 44,366 people, and $11.07 million for an eligible 12,157 people 
for the locally funded Medically Indigent Program (MIP). Overall, the Division of Public Welfare 
which oversees SNAP and TANF served 124,657 clients.32 Statistics show that in 1994, only 1 in 
every 8.4 Guåhan residents received food stamps, while in 2015, 1 in every 3.4 residents received 
them. Overall, in 2015, the local government spent $294.8 million in federal grants. When looking 
at a political entity like Guåhan, with roughly only 160,000 people, 1 in every 3.4 residents looks 
very significant as a statistic.  
When analyzing the three steps of welfare colonialism as described by Reinart, one can see 
its completion through a dependency on social welfare programs. Guåhan’s influx of federal 
money is extremely important to the economy. The landscape changed and forced CHamorus to 
participate in the wage economy after the war, and now the statistics above show a heavy 
dependency on social welfare programs that make Uncle Sam look extremely generous, rather than 
someone who has created the condition of possibility for this economic condition of dependence. 
From the Solomon Report regarding the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands to the 1 in every 3.4 
residents in Guåhan, welfare colonialism is alive and well in Micronesia, and any future attempts 
at sovereignty in Guåhan need to be wary of similar tactics that may be used against us.  
                                               




COFA: Bearing the Burden of Security in Micronesia 
In a recent legislative forum for the aspiring senators of the island, one candidate proposed 
a moratorium on allowing citizens from the Freely Associated States (Palau, the Marshall Islands, 
and most relevant to Guåhan’s case, the Federated States of Micronesia) to enter Guåhan. At this 
event, the candidate said, “I am calling for a moratorium on the COFA treaty because of the 
economic and cultural crisis that is happening in Guam.” In providing his reason for calling for 
the moratorium, he responded, 
Do you know that 25% of the kids that are enrolled in the Guam Public School System 
are from the [FAS] islands? And it’s put a drain in our school system and the federal 
government is not reimbursing us the money that is owed to us. In 2016, there were 4,217 
people arrested on Guam, 1,297 of them were citizens from FAS–38%–and they make up 
17% of our population and I blame the U.S. Congress for not implementing programs that 
will vet the immigrants coming into Guam.33 
The candidate was frustrated with what he saw as congressional ignorance when it came to the 
impacts of the various Compacts of Free Association on the Government of Guam. I argue that the 
unfunded federal mandates the Government of Guam is burdened with is another prime example 
of Guåhan’s economy being affected by U.S. national security concerns. The economic impacts of 
the Compacts of Free Association squeeze the purse pocket of GovGuam.   
 Before moving forward with this argument, I must say that this is a very sensitive issue 
especially in the current American political climate of Trump and anti-immigrant rhetoric dividing 
their country.34 By articulating this argument, I am not engaging in xenophobic thought, nor the 
stereotypical racism that does occur in the island against those from the Federated States of 
Micronesia, in particular. I am not pushing Trumpian racism, but rather, argue that these problems 
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were created as a result of our status as an unincorporated territory in this part of the world and 
because of U.S. security interests in this region of Micronesia.   
 The Micronesian islands that comprised the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands all made 
various agreements with the United States regarding their respective future political statuses. The 
Northern Mariana Islands wanted a closer relationship with the United States, fighting for 
commonwealth status, which is akin to being an unincorporated territory with a slightly increased 
degree of autonomy. The rest of the islands wanted to maintain a relationship with the United 
States, but not at the expense of giving up complete sovereignty. This led to the Compacts of Free 
Association, which gave birth to the new countries of the Republic of Palau, the Republic of the 
Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. Per these agreements, the United States 
handles these countries’ national defense, provides them with federal funding assistance, and 
allows visa-free travel to and from the United States. In exchange, these countries agree to deny 
any other military from entering their waters or setting up bases in their land and allow the United 
States to use some of their land base for military purposes. In essence, the United States provides 
a sense of economic opportunity to the citizens of these countries in exchange for exclusive access 
to Micronesia for national security and regional hegemony purposes.35 These Compacts of Free 
Association, signed in 1986 for the FSM and the Marshall Islands, and in 1994 for Palau, were 
strategic agreements. 
 As part of these agreements, the citizens of these countries are unrestricted to travel to, 
lawfully hold jobs, and establish residence as non-immigrant aliens. Per the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, a nonimmigrant is “an alien who seeks temporary entry to the United States 
for a specific purpose.”36 However, in the case of citizens of COFA states, their stay does not need 
to be temporary, and many have set up new lives, particularly in Guåhan and Hawai‘i. Due to the 
                                               
35 David Hanlon, Making Micronesia: The Political Biography of Tosiwo Nakayama (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 2015). 
36 “Nonimmigrant,” U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Accessed October 2018, 
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perceived costs and burdens on the local government, the United States Congress “promised to 
appropriate sums to cover costs incurred by Guam resulting from any increased demands placed 
on educational and social services by immigrants from FSM, RMI, and the Republic of Palau.”37 
In a report from the Governor of Guåhan’s office regarding the effects of the Compacts of Free 
Association on the local government from 2003-2015, they demonstrate the impacts in the 
different social sectors. Beginning with education, they demonstrate that in 2015, FAS citizens 
comprised 25.8% or a quarter of the total student membership of the island; a significant rise from 
less than 5,000 students in School Year (SY) 2003-2004. Financially, in SY 2003-2004, it cost the 
Department of Education $17,224,876 when considering the $4,912 per student per school year 
cost. In SY 2014-2015, it cost the local government $61,888,284.00, and the total costs from 2004-
2015 was $446,461,624.0038  
 Moving to public safety, the report outlines that in 2010, there were 873 FAS citizens who 
were incarcerated in Guåhan jails for a total of 58,775 client-days. The government argues it costs 
$98.00 per day to house an individual person, so this amounts to a total of $5,757,990 for the 
housing of FAS citizens in the jails. In FY2015, the number of client intakes of FAS citizens 
increased to 1,119 intakes. Total client days increased 11% between FY 2014 to FY 2015, with 
70,753 client days in FY 2015 amounting to a total of $8,385,646.39  
 Lastly, in the realm of health and welfare, the numbers are also staggeringly high. In FY 
2015, the Division of Public Health spent $2,126,138 for services to FAS citizens, the Division of 
Public Welfare expended $21,126,850, and the Bureau of Health Care under the Medically 
Indigent Program (MIP) and Medicaid (dual citizens), spent a total of $5,958,026. This combined 
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spending from the Department of Public Health and Social Services from FY 2004 to FY 2015 
was $153,704,648.40  
The largest problem here is that the United States Congress has consistently failed to help 
alleviate the costs associated with large-scale immigration they allow into the island without the 
consent of the people of the island. Immigration control, economy, and sovereignty all collide 
when it comes to the issue of the impact of the Compacts of Free Association here in Guåhan. In 
2003, the COFA Amendments Act began appropriating $30 million annually in funding “to aid in 
defraying costs incurred by affected jurisdictions of qualified nonimmigrants from the Federated 
States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau,”41 with the 
affected jurisdictions being American Samoa, the CNMI, Guåhan, and Hawai‘i. To show this 
lopsidedness through numbers, for FY 2017, the Government of Guåhan argued that compact-
impact costs in all sectors for the year totaled $147 million dollars.42 However, Guåhan’s share of 
the $30 million was only $14.9 million for FY 2017. This difference between GovGuam’s reported 
amount and the amount given by the federal government is a staggering $132.1 million. 
Furthermore, FAS citizens are not allowed to attend the military’s DODEA school system 
and are not treated, except for absolute emergencies, at the Naval Hospital. They attend school in 
Guåhan’s Department of Education, utilize civilian clinics, and get treated at the two civilian 
hospitals: Guam Memorial Hospital and the Guam Regional Medical City. FAS citizens (who are 
not U.S. citizens) are entitled to the Medically Indigent Program (MIP), but are not entitled to 
Medicaid, SNAP, or TANF otherwise known as welfare. MIP is 100% locally funded, while 
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Medicaid, SNAP, and TNAF are fully federally funded. The message seems to be, if the 
Government of Guåhan funds it, make them eligible, but if fully federal funded, disqualify them.  
To alleviate this strong compact impact, former Guåhan delegate in the U.S. House of 
Representatives Madeleine Bordallo co-sponsored H.R. 4761, also known as the Compact Impact 
Relief Act. Co-sponsored by Hawai‘i representatives Colleen Hanabusa and Tulsi Gabbard, as 
well as CNMI delegate, Gregorio “Kilili” Sablan, the act aimed at accomplishing the following: 
increasing FMAP funding for hospitals and clinics, increasing ESSA funding for public schools 
and reclassifying FAS citizens as “federally connected,” making Compact migrants eligible for 
federally funded community service programs like AmeriCorps and Youth Conservation Corps, 
and allowing Compact migrants to be eligible for SNAP and TANF.43 This bill was introduced in 
January 2018, and at the time of writing, has still not been passed. In her reasoning, Bordallo 
writes, “I continue to believe that the Compacts are an important national security and economic 
agreement between the U.S. and the Freely Associated States, but the federal government must do 
more to help the affected jurisdictions’ governments with the costs they bear to provide services 
to these migrants.”44 
Now, a whole dissertation could be written on the possibly racist origins of such a large 
number of FAS citizens being imprisoned. A whole dissertation could be written on the socio-
economic conditions that lead Pacific Islanders to suffer so disproportionately from particular 
illnesses, and a whole dissertation could be written on the racist origins of what is designated as a 
“crime.” However, for the sake of the economic argument being made here, I only hope to show 
how the Government of Guåhan is tasked with lopsidedly handling the associated costs of such 
unrestricted immigration into the island. I also hope to show how the costs of U.S. national security 
interests in this region consistently end up hindering the economy in a form of economic violence. 
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Guåhan had nothing to do with the Compacts of Free Association, yet we bear the burden of 
ensuring this strategic agreement with these three Micronesian countries remains strong. CNMI 
delegate Gregorio Kilili Sablan put it best when explaining his reason for co-sponsoring the 
Compact Impact Relief Act, saying, “The U.S. Pacific insular areas should not be saddled with an 
unfair share of our nation’s foreign policy cost.” In one short sentence, Sablan captures much of  
the essence of this dissertation. 
Bifurcated Benefits and Military Enlistment 
In an interview, Guåhan’s Attorney General Leevin Camacho, who worked to fight against 
the military buildup of the island, said that the greatest economic effect of the military in the island 
has been the creation of a dual economy, one economy inside the fence and one outside the fence.45 
In Guåhan’s case, fences not only demarcate physical spaces, but also prices, opportunities, and 
healthcare. U.S. Senator John Edwards, once spoke before the Democratic National Convention, 
passionately saying, “We shouldn’t have two different economies in America: one for people who 
are set for life, they know their kids and their grand-kids are going to be just fine; and then one for 
most Americans, people who live paycheck to paycheck.”46 Both Camacho and Edwards capture 
Guåhan’s bifurcated economic situation with a clear hierarchy, once again with the military 
situated in the fenceline sitting rather comfortably at the top.  
For those with “base access,” meaning that they can get onto base via a military 
identification card, it is viewed as a benefit and a privilege. For many, it is the material embodiment 
of dependency and “greener grass” on the other side (of the fence). The first aspect of this greener 
grass is being able to shop on base via the Navy Exchange, the AAFES (Army and Air Force Air 
Exchange Service), and the commissary. According to Military Times, “Exchanges are on-base 
stores (with an online component) that sell a variety of items ranging from clothing and shoes to 
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toys, furniture, home appliances, and electronics. They have on-base gas stations and stores that 
sell alcoholic beverages.”47 In addition to exchanges, commissaries are “on-base stores that sell 
discounted groceries to authorized customers.”48 Headquartered in Fort Lee, Virginia, there is a 
worldwide chain of commissaries (which reflects the American global basing network) operated 
by the Defense Commissary Agency (DeCA).  
The commissary benefit stems back centuries to 1825, when Army officers at particular 
posts could purchase goods paying at-cost prices, although now commissaries sell goods at cost 
with a 5% surcharge to help maintain commissary functioning. This was extended to enlisted men 
in 1867. According to the official commissary website, “From the start, commissaries were meant 
to take on-post retail functions out of the hands of civilian vendors and post traders and allow the 
Army to take care of its own.”49 Although originally intended for the Army, as of today, all 
branches of the Armed Services including the Coast Guard, and most relevant to Guåhan’s case, 
even the National Guard are allowed access. More importantly, immediate family members of 
these service personnel are considered eligible commissary shoppers. Through DeCA, the Federal 
government can “provide a sense of community for military personnel and families, enhance 
readiness by enabling troops to focus on the mission while deployed and not worry about their 
families’ well-being, provide considerable savings as compared to commercial grocery stores.”50  
To achieve the considerable savings portion of this mission, the Federal government via 
the Department of Defense subsidizes these commissaries. DeCA is given direct appropriations 
from the Department of Defense, and this is significant considering Trump increased the military 
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spending budget to more than $700 billion for FY 2018-2019.51 These funds for DeCA operations 
come from a Department of Defense Working Capital Fund or WCF, which is “a type of revolving 
fund used to finance operations that function like commercial business activities.”52 Congress 
provides this direct appropriation to the fund and fund managers use these funds to buy parts or 
supplies or to contract for services. DeCA’s WCF includes resale stocks, commissary operation, 
and the Surcharge Collections Trust Revolving Fund (taken from the 5% surcharge). In H.R. 5515, 
known as the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, which 
became law on August 13th, 2018,53 DeCA’s Working Capital Fund was appropriated 
$1,266,200,000 which would go to “allowing patron access to fully-stocked shelves of high-quality 
products in a clean and safe facility that offers exceptional customer service each and every day.”54 
Unlike commissaries, post exchanges do not receive much federal appropriation, but rather, 
each “funds 97 percent of its operating budget through the sale of goods and services.”55 However, 
the remaining 3% of their funding does come from appropriated funds, which is expended to 
transport “goods overseas per the legal requirement to make American goods available to those 
serving abroad.”56 In FY 2015, for example, the exchanges were appropriated $0.2 billion to help 
fund transportation costs to overseas and remote locations.57 These exchanges are an 
instrumentality of the U.S. government, and as such, are “entitled to the immunities and privileges 
enjoyed by the Federal Government under the Constitution, federal statues, federal legal 
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precedents, established principles of international law, and international treaties and 
agreements.”58 As non-appropriated fund instrumentalities, they were established primarily for the 
purpose of providing for Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) programs in the military, which 
also provide for daycares, movie theaters, bowling alleys, and fitness centers.  
As a result of this, according to the Army and Air Force Exchange website, the prices 
charged for goods in these exchanges will not include any amount for taxes that are not applicable 
“because of the Exchange’s immunity from direct state or local taxation and because of federal, 
state, or local tax exemptions for sales to the federal government.” Thus, the goods at the 
Exchanges are tax-free and do not acquire added costs in Guåhan. Even if Guåhan is also 
considered a duty-free port outside of the U.S. Customs zone, Guåhan goods do not have Federal 
government subsidized shipping of goods like the exchanges do.  
Because of the harsh price increase on goods outside the fence due to the Jones Act and 
Guåhan’s heavy dependence on imports for necessities such as food, commissary access is 
extremely coveted. It is common when someone is having a party, to give a list to someone who 
has “base privileges” to purchase for them. Civilian stores in Guåhan simply cannot compete with 
commissary prices, and thus consumers in the island with commissary access consistently choose 
to shop on base, thus further reinforcing our feeling of dependency on the military’s presence here.  
This notion of bifurcated benefits and privileges, between outside the fence and inside the 
fence is a large factor in why many CHamorus continue to join the military. Although there are 
strong discursive and patriotic elements to their military service, I argue that the economic benefits 
provided through military enlistment is by far the strongest factor in Guåhan’s high enlistment rate 
per capita. In 1973, the United States Armed Services switched to an all-volunteer force primarily 
due to the Vietnam quagmire, where the military became disappointed with undisciplined draftees. 
Other factors included a bipartisan emphasis against the conscripted nature of the military at the 
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time as well as the fact that obtaining enough volunteers became possible at acceptable budget 
levels of the time.59 This meant that the Armed Services needed to begin enticing people to fill 
their numbers, as they could no longer just draft their members. This is when we begin to see the 
development of what Jennifer Mittelstadt calls the “military welfare state.”60 She argues that the 
social welfare programs for soldiers and their families became a strong incentive for people to 
enlist in the military. Joining the military gives one access to what has been called the most socialist 
institution in the United States.61 For example, the commissary benefit, “is an integral part of the 
military compensation package and a top retention factor for staying in the military.” In Guåhan, 
we see this economic retention factor in full force.  
In 2018, 29 soldiers received $20,000 enlistment bonuses just for signing with the Guam 
National Guard. Four others got $17,500, another a $12,500 bonus for enlisting. For families with 
little to no prospect for bettering their financial situation, these enlistment bonuses are a strong 
reason to join the military. Public Information Officer for the Guam National Guard, Major 
Josephine Blas, said this herself, “These incentives are one way to increase the size of the Army 
as a whole–active, Guard and reserve.”62 On the National Guard website, in big letters, it reads 
“What You Get: A Support Structure For Your Life.”63 This support structure can be seen in 
numerous ways. In addition to access to the shopping centers and discounted grocery stores 
mentioned above, being either in the military or the dependent of a military member comes with a 
whole list of benefits. As Jennifer Mittelstadt writes, 
For the more than 10 million Americans who volunteered for active duty after 1973––and 
their tens of millions of family members––the military provided an elaborate social and 
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economic safety net: medical and dental programs, housing assistance, subsistence 
payments, commissary and post exchange privileges, tax advantages, education and 
training, dozens of family welfare programs, child care, and social services ranging from 
financial counseling to legal aid.64 
The free medical and dental care through the Department of Defense’s health care program, 
TRICARE, are among the most attractive benefits. Almost boasting the socialist nature of the 
institution, the Navy’s website reads, “Rising medical costs and skyrocketing insurance premiums 
can make it difficult to afford quality medical care. In America’s Navy, we pride ourselves on 
providing world-class health insurance to Sailors and their families.”65 In Guåhan, this means 
access to the Naval Hospital, which only those with military and base privileges can utilize, unless 
there is a serious emergency such as car crash victims, in which case the hospital will see civilians 
without benefits.  
Enlisting in the military also provides for up to $400,000 in life insurance, and some 
branches such as the Navy extend life insurance benefits to spouses and dependent children of 
servicemen. In addition, there are good retirement benefits: (1) Receive $30,000 after 15 years and 
then receive a retirement fund after 20 years that equals about 40% of his or her highest pay, and 
(2) Receive no cash bonus at 15 years but receive a retirement fund after 20 years of service that 
equals about 50% of his or her highest pay.66  
In the realm of education, servicemembers are eligible for the Tuition Assistance Program 
(which pays for up to 100% of the cost of tuition or expenses, a maximum of $250 per credit and 
a personal maximum of $4,500 per fiscal year per student), the Post-9/11 GI Bill (which now pays 
all public school in-state tuition and fees, provides for a living stipend and an allowance of books, 
and is also available to military spouses and children), as well as the Loan Repayment Program.  
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If moving to an overseas base, the military provides soldiers who are authorized to live in 
private housing with Overseas Housing Allowance. This allowance covers rent, 
utility/maintenance expenses, as well as a move-in housing allowance. This has led the real estate 
market near military bases to skyrocket in price, to the detriment of the local population. The nature 
of the housing allowance also means that renters do not need to worry about military personnel 
skipping payments, because the Department of Defense pays servicemembers regularly to cover 
the cost of housing and utilities.67 As Director of Guåhan’s Section 8 program, which helps provide 
housing to low-income families wrote, “We’re finding that more people are opting to rent their 
properties to military service members, because they get housing allowances...Landowners aren’t 
coming out and saying, ‘I’ll only rent to the military,’ but that’s exactly what’s happening.”68 With 
the exception of the upper echelons of a community, locals cannot compete with the security of 
payment that landlords get by renting to those whose housing is subsidized by the Federal 
Government. With all this subsidized funding in the form of health care, education, and housing, 
servicemembers also receive a Cost of Living Allowance, on top of other benefits such as military 
discounts at stores, movie theaters, and restaurants.  
This chapter has pointed to the various ways that our status as a military base and 
unincorporated territory has hindered the economic development and flourishing of the island and 
has subsequently produced a sense of dependency on the United States military and federal 
government. The lack of economic alternatives is the core factor that makes military service so 
attractive. It is guaranteed personal security: housing, healthcare, and food, all automatically taken 
care of. This is a guarantee that an economy like Guåhan’s cannot promise everyone. This helps 
to explain both why the local community in Guåhan thinks military projects and federal spending 
are breadbaskets of money, and also helps to explain a high enlistment rate amongst CHamorus. I 
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argue that it is economically and epistemologically violent to limit the imagination of an entire 
people’s economic success to “join the military.” This is a slow, sludgy process of violence, an 
extremely effective form.  
II. (MILI)TOURISM?: THE ALTERNATIVE 
It is quite an experience writing about Japanese economic and physical violence during 
World War II while being surrounded by Japanese tourists in a coffee shop. Every sentence I write 
on the horrors of CHamoru laborers being beat by Japanese soldiers feels as if it is reverberating 
off the walls of this coffee shop being entangled with the massive amount of Japanese language 
surrounding me. Yet, this is Guåhan’s new reality. In 72 years since the war, we went from a 
brutally suppressed Japanese occupied territory to a haven for Japanese tourists to enjoy a taste of 
sun and sand “Where America’s Day Begins.” In this section, I outline the complexities of the 
tourism pillar of Guåhan’s economy as it is simultaneously intertwined with militarization. I argue 
that the tourism industry in Guåhan is important in developing economic alternatives to counter 
our sole dependence on federal funding, while at the same time, argue that a critical analysis of 
militourism is needed to see the underlying militarist logics of the industry. I begin by briefly 
looking at the history of the tourism industry in Guåhan. 
In 1952, Public Law 67 was passed, which was meant to plan for establishing a travel 
industry in Guåhan. However, due to the security clearance, nothing could be done to implement 
these plans. It would not be until the security clearance was lifted in 1962 when Guåhan opened 
its doors to the outside world, that the development of the tourism industry begins. The following 
year, 1963, the Government of Guam created the Guam Tourist Commission, which started with 
an initial budget of $15,000. According to the Guam Visitors Bureau, “the Guam Tourist 
Commission immediately began aggressive travel trade promotions in Japan and Southeast Asia. 
Additionally, the Commission worked diligently on the development of a Guåhan tourism plan 
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and lobbied air carriers to increase flight service to Guåhan for potential market areas.69 From this, 
Guåhan had 6,600 visitor arrivals in 1967 when Pan American World Airways first established 
their round-trip Guåhan-Tokyo route. This set a precedent for the tourism industry as Japan has 
been the number one source for the tourism market in recent (although this seems to be changing 
at the time of writing in 2018 as Japan arrivals are decreasing with Korea arrivals significantly 
increasing). 
By 1972, the Guam Hotel Association was formed, and by this time, six hotels took part 
(Guam Hilton Hotel, The Cliff Hotel, Guam Dai-Ichi Hotel, Fujita Guam Tumon Beach Hotel and 
the Reef Hotel). These would be the first of many hotels currently located in the district of Tumon, 
which is the center of tourism in the island today and has been described as Guåhan’s Waikiki. By 
1980, it was reported that there were 2,435 hotel rooms and 300,763 annual visitor arrivals, and 
by 1990, this rose to 4,955 rooms and 780,404 visitors.70 The present numbers are quite impressive 
as Guåhan received 1.4 million visitors in 2015, 1.53 million arrivals in 2016, and 1.54 million 
arrivals in 2017.71 Tourism grew from less than 10 hotels and 6,600 visitors in 1967 to over a 
million visitors per year since the industry’s inception. It has consistently been a significant pillar 
of the island’s economy. In the Guam Visitors Bureau’s 2017 report, it was published that the total 
tourism economy sales for FY2016 equated to $1.8 billion, contributing 12.1% of the island’s GDP 
in 2016. The report reads,  
In other words, tourism supports around 34% (1 in every 3 jobs) of all employment on 
Guam. The TSA (Tourism Satellite Account) report stated that visitor spending directly 
supported 100% of employment in hotel lodging, 50% of retail employment and about 
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42% of employment in the food and beverage industry. This equates to around $617 
million in the form of tourism labor income or the compensation to our workforce.72 
As Guåhan’s former governor Eddie Baza Calvo proclaims, “Tourism remains Guam’s primary 
industry, and we must encourage its growth with strong resolve. We will do this by improving 
Product Guam as a destination that is not only attractive for our visitors, but a better home for 
Guam residents to live.”73 
 The tourism industry is seemingly positive and beneficial for the island. However, a more 
critical analysis of tourism aims to address whether the tourism industry and the militarized nature 
of the island are intertwined. I also explore how Guåhan’s status as a military base affects the 
tourism industry. In investigating the former, I turn to the theoretical tool of “militourism.” 
Banaban scholar Teresia Teaiwa defines militourism as “a phenomenon by which military or 
paramilitary forces ensures the smooth running of a tourist industry, and that same tourist industry 
masks the military force behind it.”74 Clarifying this definition, she writes,   
It goes beyond the simple presence of military bases and tourist resorts on the same 
islands or in the same archipelagoes. Often, the tourist industry capitalizes on the military 
histories of islands…Altogether, tourism is able to flatten, tame, and render benign the 
culture of militarism. The military, in turn, endorses the industry by patronizing hotels 
and related facilities during R&R leaves…This collaboration between militarism and 
tourism effects complex processes of displacement and social mobility for Islanders, 
affecting the physical, mental, and emotional health of island bodies.75 
In her book, Holidays in the Danger Zone: Entanglements of War and Tourism, Debbie Lisle 
argues that both war and tourism share the same production of difference, which reinforces a 
colonial hierarchy. She writes, 
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Though the purposes of war and tourism seem unrelated and even antithetical (one 
oriented toward political violence, the other toward leisure), they both produce 
foreignness within a global order that must be either conquered through military combat 
(i.e., vanquishing the enemy) or consumed through tourism (i.e., commodifying the 
Other) …Both practices are structured in advance by shared productions of difference.76 
Critics of militourism show the methodology through which the tourism industry and the 
militarization of countries or places mutually constitute one another.  
One classic example of militourism and their shared production of difference is Hawai‘i. 
In her classic essay on tourism in Hawai‘i, “Lovely Hula Hands: Corporate Tourism and the 
Prostitution of Hawaiian Culture,” Haunani-Kay Trask argues how the tourist industry in Hawai‘i, 
including its infrastructure and desire for land, has come at the expense of Hawaiian lands and 
people. Furthermore, she argues that the tourism industry reinforces tropes of Kanaka Maoli 
culture that have been utilized to portray the island as hospitable, and beneath all that rhetoric, 
penetrable. She writes, “The point of course, is that everything in Hawai‘i can be yours, that is, 
you the tourists, the Non-natives, the visitors. The place, the people, the culture, even our identity 
as a ‘Native’ people is for sale.”77 It is not a coincidence that this touristic image of Hawai‘i as 
penetrable fits perfectly with a place where nearly a quarter of the land is occupied by the U.S. 
military.  
On a discursive level, we can see similar connections here in Guåhan. Hospitality has been 
one of the core images canonically crafted to depict the CHamoru people and the island, and one 
sees it in both tourism ads and military public relations campaign. For example, on the front page 
of the website for Visit Guam, it reads, “Known for our warm, hospitable people, Guam is a 
destination like no other.”78 Similarly, on the website “Paradises: Asian and Pacific Resorts,” 
Sarah Moon writes, “Guam boasts a rich culture, gorgeous beaches, year-round tropical weather 
conditions and some of the most hospitable inhabitants in the world…Guam’s indigenous 
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Chamorro people are warm and welcoming, keen to share the gift of their island with visitors.”79 
Now, compare this to similar words by the military. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates 
reflected on a visit to Guåhan, saying, “The people of Guam have been hospitable to our military 
forces for a very long time, and we want to keep that relationship strong as we go forward and deal 
with issues associated with the growth.”80 Lastly, in a description of Naval Base Guam, the 
Commander of the Navy Installations Command writes, “Friendliness and giving are the spirit of 
Guam and the Chamorro people. A great place to see that are in the fiesta celebrations held across 
the island…Those who join are welcomed, fed delicious food, and made to feel a part of the 
community and family.”81 Clearly, both the military and the tourism industry thrive on the image 
of Guåhan and its people as being very hospitable and welcoming. 
Another connection between militarism and tourism in the island is the tourism industry’s 
appeal towards the “Americanness” of the island. On “Visit Guam,” one finds, “A trip to Guam is 
like visiting the four exotic corners of the globe. Guam is considered the hub of the western Pacific 
and undeniably Micronesia’s most cosmopolitan destination-a true example of the great American 
melting pot.”82 The Guam Economic Development Authority, which is set up to find ways to bring 
investment into the island, invites investors, writing, “As a member of the American family, Guam 
is able to offer visitors a stable and secure environment. Federal law provides local self-
government on Guam, U.S. citizenship for her people, and application of the U.S. Constitution to 
the island.”83 The military and U.S. jurisdiction over the island is a selling point in attracting both 
tourists and investors. Vernadette Vicuña Gonzalez writes, “The same logics that rationalize the 
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uneven economic and cultural landscapes resulting from unregulated tourism also justify the 
continuing presence of the American military in the Pacific: jobs, stability, protection, and foreign 
exchange.”84 In many ways, the stability of the tourism industry is purported to be related to the 
stability of the military presence.  
The interesting position that the tourism industry presents in Guåhan is that while arguably 
being intertwined with the militarization of the island, it is also the only current plausible economic 
alternative that Guåhan has to full reliance on the military. In this section, I do not attempt to 
resolve this contradiction, but rather to illuminate tourism’s peculiar place in the island. Rather, I 
caution those who completely demonize tourism, as it is a glimpse of an economy that, although 
related, is not fully a side effect of militarization. I also caution against those who view tourism as 
the innocent economic engine. I have provided evidence to the contrary and have shown that many 
of the logics which drive tourism are derived from Guåhan’s “Americanness” and present usage 
as a military base.  
III. GUÅHAN’S  LOPSIDED MILITARY KEYNESIANISM: BLURRING THE ECONOMIC 
EFFECTS OF THE MILITARY (BUILDUP) 
At the height of the military buildup fervor in Guåhan from 2010-2012, one could not drive 
a day around the island without seeing trucks belonging to construction companies bearing stickers 
that read “I Support the Military Buildup!” Upon hearing the news of the military buildup, 
construction companies rallied around its success touting the vast economic benefits and 
opportunities the buildup would bring. Returning to Guåhan’s Chamber of Commerce president, 
Catherine Castro, she argued that “the military buildup will be a major boost for growing our 
economy. To date, no other alternatives for creating jobs has even been suggested or can come 
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close.”85 Former Guåhan senator and current delegate to the U.S. House of Representatives, 
Michael San Nicolas, said in a public forum regarding the military buildup, “It’s necessary for us 
to support it because it’s going to create the opportunities to allow our people to stay here on Guam 
and find jobs and not have to leave.”86  
I argue that the buildup is the latest manifestation of a form of military Keynesianism in 
Guåhan. Military Keynesianism is described as the belief that military expenditure represents a 
useful way to stimulate the economy. From a military Keynesianism standpoint, the more the 
military spends, the better the economy is. The roots of military Keynesianism are found in 
political economist John Maynard Keynes’s works on employment, interest, and money, where he 
argued governments should spend money and be the primary consumer to jumpstart the economy. 
The military twist of Keynesianism is primarily found in the United States with its large military-
industrial complex. To quote Peter Custers, “Whereas European governments were seen as relying 
on social spending to promote the regulation of their business cycles, US governments in the 
second half of the twentieth century frequently relied on expanded military allocations to ensure 
an adequate level of aggregate demand for commodities.”87 Keynesian economics is rooted in the 
presumption that government spending creates an addition to the economy’s demand thus 
subsequently giving life to labor and resources that would have been idle otherwise. Military 
spending creates a multiplier effect for the military.88 
The policy itself is rooted in the infamous document, NSC-68, drafted in 1950 by the U.S. 
National Security Council, where the authors argued, regarding military spending, 
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From the point of view of the economy as a whole, the program might not result in a real 
decrease in the standard of living, for the economic effects of the program might be to 
increase the gross national product by more than the amount being absorbed for 
additional military and foreign assistance purposes. One of the most significant lessons of 
our World War II experience was that the American economy, when it operates at a level 
approaching full efficiency, can provide enormous resources for purposes other than 
civilian consumption while providing for a high standard of living.89   
This was a response to World War II and the fear of its aftermath. In 1940, military spending rose 
600% in 12 months and reached 42% of the gross domestic product of the United States in 1943-
1944. “Factories operated seven days a week; U.S. labor productivity quickly rose to levels that 
were multiples of those of Germany and Japan…the economy expanded at its highest rate ever–
real GDP was up by 52.4% and unemployment fell from 14.6% in 1940 to only 1.2% in 1944.”90 
While a significant positive boost for the American people, many leaders began to worry what 
would happen after the war ended. From these worries and subsequent actions taken, the 
permanent war economy in the United States was born, a reliance on military spending for the 
economy itself became a way to avoid economic regression. Military Keynesianism effectively 
thrived under various administrations with the combination of military contractors, military 
personnel, and policy makers working together to ensure continued military spending.  
 Worries of decreasing military spending have sprouted answers from various defense-
related occupations. Professor of Industrial Engineering Seymour Melman warned, “if the U.S. 
military received less funding it would not employ 20-30% of all research scientists and engineers, 
nor would it absorb up to two-thirds of all U.S. research and development outlays.”91 Martin 
Feldstein, in the Wall Street Journal, argued that any cuts to the Department of Defense’s budget 
would be a mistake. He writes, “the US government recognized the need for increasing 
government to offset the decline in consumer demand in the economy and argued that a rise in 
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military spending would be the best way to provide this stimulus.”92 Controversial American 
defense official George Kennan wrote in 1987, “Were the Soviet Union to sink tomorrow under 
the waters of the ocean, the American military-industrial complex would have to remain, 
substantially unchanged, until some other adversary could be invented. Anything else would be an 
unacceptable shock to the American economy.”93 Unfortunately, Kennan is right, because 
“military spending is higher than it was at the height of the Cold War, despite the absence of any 
comparable enemy investment.”94 
 For Guåhan, military Keynesianism is evident in the current buildup. Stephen Nygard, 
publisher of the Guam Business Journal, supported the military buildup arguing that it would be a 
great boost to the construction industry. He writes on economic recovery, “The leading edge of 
any recovery is usually behind the construction industry, and they’ve been really busy with military 
projects.”95 In carrying out the military buildup, construction companies have already seen some 
cashflow. Black Construction Corporation, in September of 2018, was awarded a $82 million 
contract to design an aircraft maintenance facility. In addition to them, Fargo Pacific Inc., Modern 
International Inc., Pacific Rim Constructors, Reliable Builders Inc., and Serrano Construction and 
Development Corp. are all being awarded construction contracts that total $240 million to 
renovate, build, modernize, and repair various federal and military facilities and installations.96  
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 Besides construction, the Socioeconomic Impact Assessment Study on the Guam and 
CNMI Military Relocation outlines the various economic benefits the buildup would bring. The 
authors divide these benefits into direct impacts, indirect impacts, and induced impacts. Direct 
impacts are those associated with project-related construction and operations, indirect impacts 
come from the expenditures to businesses that supply goods and services for construction and/or 
operational activities that would be associated with the proposed action, and induced impacts are 
the result of spending from wages and salaries derived from jobs generated by the proposed action. 
Breaking down these economic impacts they argue the following: 
Civilian labor force demand is expected to increase by a maximum of 7,031 full-time 
jobs in 2021 (6,150 related to construction and 881 related to operations); of the 7,031 
jobs, 3,058 are estimated to be taken by Guam residents. At steady-state, by 2028, labor 
force demand is expected to increase by 1,438 full-time jobs, 762 of the jobs are 
estimated to be taken by Guam residents. 
Civilian labor force income is expected to increase by a maximum of $296 million in 
2021 and reach a steady-state level of $67 million in 2028. The estimated average salaries 
for jobs related to the construction phase ($38,600) and the military operational phase 
($46,000) would be considerable higher than the 2012 Guam median salary of $28,074.  
Gross Island Product (GIP) is expected to increase by a maximum of $635 million in 
2021 and decline to a steady-state level of $75 million by 2028. The primary driver of 
GIP impacts in 2021 would be DoD construction activity. During the steady-state period, 
GIP impacts would be primarily driven by expenditures related to Marine Corps 
operations.97 
For many in Guåhan, these statistics above help to show how the military buildup is a meal ticket 
for the island’s economy. Former Lieutenant Governor of Guåhan, Ray Tenorio, said at a forum 
for the construction industry in Guåhan, “We all recognize the economic benefits, the number of 
jobs that come from it. We also understand the economic long term implications of additional 
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personnel, and the military apparatus that brings the civilian higher paying jobs. We all understand 
the construction industry and the implications of being able to do this military buildup.”98 
 Many opponents of the military buildup have argued that the economic benefits of the 
military buildup are not worth the environmental damage, which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. They argue that we used to be rich in land, and that the military buildup is a further 
desecration of land that was taken away from CHamoru families immediately after the war. 
However, in this section, my purpose is to show how a sense of dependency and military 
Keynesianism in Guåhan has produced the conditions of possibility for the people of Guåhan to 
react so positively and strongly to this proposed buildup. The continuum of violences made 
palatable through economic forms of mitigation. When one has little to eat, anything starts to look 
good, even if it isn’t good for you. I argue that the military buildup is simply the most obvious 
manifestation of a crafted dependency on the military, both material and discursive. 
IV. I TANO’-TA, I LINA’LÅ’-TA: THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LOST LAND 
Once a year during the annual July “liberation” festivities, Naval Base Guam allows 
CHamorus to enter their gates and visit the graves of their loved ones in Sumay village. In the 
2015 memorial mass, Naval Commander Captain Andy Anderson addressed the crowd, saying, 
“Today’s event is a commemoration of what people endured and sacrificed during WWII, the 
reason that it’s important is so that we allow families access to the installation, back to their 
territorial lands if you will, to pay homage to the sacrifices that their families endured.”99 His 
statement is ripe for political analysis, especially the words, “if you will.” Saying “if you will,” 
invites the listener to accept the premise of the statement. Earlier I discussed land dispossession as 
a critical component to the remaking of the life and economy of the island. In this section, I analyze 
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the actual economic effects of this land loss, not just as a necessary condition for economic change, 
but as an actual loss in terms of dollars. So, I invite the reader to imagine, if you will, the amount 
of cash in CHamoru hands if we were allowed to keep our lands.  
Pacific historian Douglas Oliver once said, “If a single criterion were to be used to test the 
survival of any native community it would be: To what extent have they retained their lands?”100 
In Guåhan, the answer to this question is that the military currently occupies 27% of the island’s 
land. I reiterate that “invasion is a structure, not an event” and the current occupation of CHamoru 
land cannot be viewed as events in our history, but as a structure and as a very real and very present 
form of “slow violence,” creeping further and further along in our economic arteries, clogging 
potential flow. In his report, “An Analysis of the Economic Impact of Guam’s Political Status 
Options,” Joseph Bradley discusses the economic potential of the three political statuses available 
to the native inhabitants of Guåhan: statehood, free association, or independence. A large section 
of his report focuses on the role of land. 
Bradley is honest in writing that Guåhan’s small land base of 212 square miles limits the 
potential for economic development, and this is the nature of our geography, geology, and smaller 
population size. However, he follows this up, writing,  
The ‘best’ land in Guam for development purposes is in the northern half of the island, 
but a substantial portion of this land is held by the U.S. federal government, and therefore 
unavailable for civilian economic use. Further, much of the land owned by the U.S. Air 
Force in the northern half of the island is left idle, including that which restricts access to 
the prime private beach areas of Urunao. The sprawling air base also covers much of the 
Northern Aquifer, and ground water pollution from military activities there have forced 
the closing of several wells in recent years. In this regard, a substantial portion of Guam’s 
most economically valuable land goes unused because of land tenure restrictions.101  
Bradley argues that the effects of massive land-taking after the war has resulted in a situation 
where, even if the square mile area of the island is small, CHamorus miss out on being able to use 
27% of the land mass, whether for agriculture, housing, or development on our terms. This report 
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was written in 2000 and Bradley gives the numbers of revenue loss in the value of (FY2000) 
dollars.  
It was estimated in 1992 that the holdings of idle land by the federal government in Guam 
cost the local government as much as $69 million annually in foregone government 
revenues alone. In addition to the northern U.S. Air Force landholdings, U.S. military 
lands in Guam include the former political and economic capital of Sumay, which is part 
of the extensive southern holdings by the U.S. Navy. The contribution that excess land 
held by the U.S. military would make to Guam’s Gross Island Product (Gross Domestic 
Product) in 2000 is estimated to be $1.1 billion annually, if it were available for civilian 
use. This is more than one third of Guam’s GIP.102  
Adjusting to 2018 dollars, the Bureau of Labor Statistics consumer price index writes that prices 
in 2018 are 46.60% higher than prices in 2000. With this adjustment, $1.1 billion in 2000 is worth 
$1,612,560,394.89 today in 2018.103 In an October 2017 report by the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office on territorial debt, they write that Guåhan’s debt increased from $1 billion 
in FY 2005 to $2.5 billion in FY 2015, where debt grew 13% on average per year.104 One wonders 
how much the island would be in debt if it was able to use even 15% more of the land that the 
military occupies.  
 To further show the continuum of violence and insecurity regarding the land and economy, 
I turn to the “compensation” process held by the military after the rampant land takings. Beginning 
in 1947, three years after the war’s end, the Naval government created the Land and Claims 
Commission and the Superior Court of Guam to determine a “fair” price for the land they stole 
during and after the war. According to Penelope Bordallo Hofschneider on the unfair nature of this 
process,  
These Americans determined the value of each parcel of land and then apprised the 
owner of the government’s offer. If the offer was accepted, a purchase was made on the 
spot. If not, the land was taken by the Government anyway, by condemnation, and the 
case was referred to the Superior Court. Here, a single judge, an American and employee 
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of the Naval government, decided whether or not the government’s offer was fair 
compensation. The only appeal available to a native landowner was located 10,000 miles 
away in Washington D.C., in the office of the Secretary of the Navy.105  
CHamoru congressman Joaquin Perez commented on this process, writing,  
The Secretary of the Navy maintains his office, shall we say, nine thousand miles away, 
and it is very obvious that a party desiring to appeal cannot economically be present at a 
hearing…A man is entitled to present his case in the best possible manner. A man is 
entitled to present his case face-to-face. Robbing a man of that privilege is certainly 
robbing him of a portion of the justice due him.106 
Many CHamorus denied the offer, and the prices being offered were also economically 
manipulative. The Navy decided that the price of all the lands in the compensation process were 
to be set at their 1941 values, despite CHamoru rebuttals that the value of the land had increased 
during the Japanese occupation as it was brought into more large-scale cultivation.  
However, the Naval government refused to acknowledge this and kept their prices to the 
1941 values.  When asked about the value of land in Guåhan, Commander L.J. Watson of the Navy 
said, “astonishingly low.” He reasons, “It has never been freely sold, and an analysis of recorded 
instruments show that practically all exchanges of land or sales of land have been between relatives 
and so on.”107 The result of this is quite saddening. For example, for the 15-acre site of the current 
officers’ housing in Guåhan, Libugon, which was renamed Nimitz Hill, the Naval government 
offered $14.10 total. In Tumon, the military offered a CHamoru landowner $34.00 for 32 months 
of rent, and one Guåhan congressman of the time mentioned that a sixty hectare piece of prime 
farm land which could yield $1,000 a month, would only be worth $3,000 according to the 1941 
prices being utilized by the Navy.108 CHamorus understood that they were getting ripped off, and 
that their land was worth way more than what was being offered by the Navy. B.J. Bordallo wrote, 
“We had an artificially depressed land market resulting from the military’s deliberate policy of 
isolating Guam from the rest of the world… Since this artificial depression was caused by the 
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Navy’s deliberate closed-door policy, is it fair that just compensation be measured by 1941 Guam 
values?”109 
It was not just the price devaluations that were problematic for CHamorus, it was also the 
nature of the process. Because the Naval government did not receive the $1,630,000 appropriated 
by the U.S. Congress until three years after the war, the process of compensation took a while to 
commence. However, during this time, the military took the land anyway and did not return it to 
the original landowners. Essentially, for three years, CHamorus were confused as to what was 
going on with their land, and much of this land was productive. At the Public Lands Committee 
Hearings, many raged against the fact that the military condemned “half or more of the most arable 
land on the Island of Guam, suitable for agriculture and the raising of livestock.”110 Hofschneider 
argues, 
Consequently, the future economic recovery of the island, which was basically self-
sufficient in production of food before the war, was seriously threatened. In the opinion 
of various witnesses, the Navy’s current policy of leasing idle government property to 
farmers for a maximum period of twelve months was stifling the island economy. No 
reasonably intelligent farmer was willing to invest in and cultivate a piece of property 
that might be taken away from him the next year.111 
The entire handling of the land compensation (and condemnation) process was a slap in the face 
to CHamorus who passed down these lands from generation to generation. In 1977, an organization 
named the Guam Landowners Association filed a class action lawsuit against the U.S. government 
demanding monetary compensation for their condemned lands. This lawsuit represented 1,377 
land claims for 3,525 parcels of condemned land. Unfortunately, “On 25 May 1983, the U.S. 
Justice Department offered to settle all the claims out of court for a total payment of $39.5 million, 
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a figure far below the $500 million estimate by then-Guam delegate to the U.S. Congress, Antonio 
B. Won Pat.”112  
 Lastly, I end this section with the largest effect of this whole situation. For the first time in 
CHamoru history, the compensation hearings placed CHamorus in a culturally taboo place: the 
valuation of land in dollar amounts. Land was CHamoru livelihood, where they grew their crops, 
what they passed down to their kids, and called their own. Yet, after the war, they had the choice 
of having the land merely condemned or accepting low monetary offers. Even more, with the 
lawsuit, many CHamorus argued that their land was worth a lot more than what was offered. Even 
though the military has returned a massive amount of land from occupying 63% after the war to 
27% today, it almost seems as if the cultural damage is done. Families in Guåhan today consistently 
fight over land or sell their land to move to the states. For some CHamorus today, their connection 
to the land is severed as the traumatic history of land dispossession not only had material 
consequences, but also these Ngugian cultural bomb effects.  
Being forced into the wage economy changed CHamoru lives and this is noted by U.S. officials 
as well. For example, in a report to the United Nations in 1947, the Navy reported, 
The war-time and post-war development of Guam as a major military base has firmly 
established a wage economy, and it is extremely doubtful if the island will ever return to 
the basically agricultural economy it possessed before the war. On the other hand, the 
island government believes that the complete rehabilitation and extension of the 
agricultural potentialities of the island will be to the best interest of the Guamanian 
population.113 
Adding to this, Robert Cootes of the Division of Land Utilization of the Department of the Interior, 
wrote of agriculture in Guåhan, 
A considerable acreage of good agricultural land has been taken for military use. Most 
will remain within military reserves. Much of that which may be returned to private 
ownership has been rendered unfit for crop production. The loss of this agricultural land 
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has necessitated the use of poorer land in its stead or has forced the former operators to 
abandon farming and accept wage employment.114 
CHamorus in a matter of a couple of decades were forced to radically reformulate their relationship 
to land, and this is extremely damaging to an indigenous people who called themselves “i taotao 
tåno,” or “the people of the land.” For what are CHamorus without their land? This is something 
many CHamorus are still trying to figure out today as we look around at military fences, foreign-
owned acres of land, and houseless members of our people lying in the streets. With the taking of 
land, came the violent taking of livelihood and sustenance, in whatever form that may have been, 
creating a condition of insecurity prevalent throughout the island. 
V. I FINAKPO’: CONCLUSION 
  Authors of the comedy blog “U might B from Guam…,” write, “U might B from Guam if 
you feel that Guam stands for Give Us American Money.”115 Through the peeling of chronological 
layers, this chapter argued that despite the hegemonic discourse that Guåhan would not survive 
without U.S. military presence, the military’s presence here and our subsequent treatment in the 
name of U.S. security interests has hindered Guåhan’s economic development and produced 
dependency on the American nation-state. Throughout the chapter, we saw how an assortment of 
tools for economic hindering was used, intentionally or unintentionally, by the United States, and 
that some of these like dramatic land transformations were spectacular, while others such as the 
Jones Act, are just the result of bureaucratic policies.  
 Robert Underwood recently described how the most fundamental result of this hundred-
year hindrance was rather epistemological. He said, “In Guåhan, there is no blank slate. One 
always begins with the presumption that the military is a key factor in whatever one is doing.”116 
For the economy today in Guåhan, this is the reality. All attempts at something new, especially the 
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development of a new industry needs to clear itself with the U.S. military needs of the island. With 
every step, the question that needs to be asked is, “Will this interfere with U.S. security interests 
for the island?” History has shown that U.S. national security interests will always supersede 
Guåhan’s economic development. Underwood once wrote, “The policies in the past have been so 
beset with injustices to individual families and have been so disruptive to land ownership by the 
CHamoru people, that land has been the only issue in Guam which radicalizes even the most mild 
mannered CHamoru.”117 Anthony Leon Guerrero writes, “If we are to develop our economy, we 
will have to do it ourselves. The colonizers not only do not help in economic development, they 
discourage it, either through direct actions or by setting up systems that make us dependent on 
their continuing activities.”118  
 This chapter, acting as a part II to the previous chapter has demonstrated the shape-shifting 
forms of power and violence operating from land dispossession and trickling down as a condition 
of possibility for economic violence. In this detailed history, I have attempted to show the reader 
just how our form-of-life here in Guåhån was crafted in various ways because of U.S. military and 
national security concerns and initiatives. I also showed that this forced dependence has made 
these economic and land violences more palatable creating sustainable insecurity.  In the following 
chapter, I move on to discuss environmental violence, insecurity, and mitigation efforts 
contributing to sustainable insecurity. In the end of the same piece above, Leon Guerrero 
concludes, “We must continue this effort until the colonizers are actually compensating the people 
of Guam for the full value of the benefits that they receive from using our land and our location, 
the two principal resources with which our people are blessed.”119 I can find no better way to end 
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this chapter. The battle for economic prosperity is directly tied to the military, and we must 










Chapter 4: The Poison of The Spear’s Tip: Environmental Violence and 
Insecurity in Guåhan  
Growing up, my family and I made frequent trips to California. My mom’s brother lived 
in Redwood City, California and thus we would take vacations to visit him during the summers. I 
loved it out there. The weather was cool, there was so much to do, and it seemed like a whole new 
world to me. Yet, there was one thing I could never get on board with: drinking the tap water. I 
vividly remember being offered water straight from the faucet to drink and looking at the glass 
with a mixture of disgust and confusion. I wondered why my family offered me something so gross 
to consume. Being raised in Guåhan, it was an unwritten rule that one was not supposed to drink 
the tap water.  Before the age of home appliance water filters, most people in Guåhan such as my 
family, resorted to buying multiple 5-gallon bottles of water that they would refill at a store that 
had its own filtration system. When I asked my grandma why we could not just drink the water 
from the faucet, she would warn me that the water was dirty and contaminated. This has stuck with 
me to this day and I honestly still do not drink the tap water. If one were to just move to the island, 
they may think this to be just a local folktale rooted in untrue stories passed on culturally. They 
may find it to be the musings of a population still rooted in “mythology.”
1 This chapter demonstrates how this fear of drinking tap water is not rooted in unjustified 
beliefs, but rather, is the societal vestige of a history of contamination of the soil and water here, 
with the U.S. military as the main offender, but certainly not the only one. In this chapter, I show 
the material roots of this local fear of Guåhan tap water through examining the larger problem of 
environmental contamination caused by military activities and basing here, and subsequently how 
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despite massive evidence of contamination, the U.S. military is still viewed by many as good 
environmental stewards of the land. 
To examine this phenomenon of large-scale contamination caused by the military presence 
here in Guåhan, this chapter is divided into five sections. The first section delves into the literature 
on environmental security, environmental racism, and environmental violence to further reinforce 
the argument that Guåhan security is put at major risk via the environmental insecurity caused by 
military activity. The second section introduces the geological makeup of the island as well as its 
water distribution systems. The third section discusses the facts of and history of military 
contamination in the northern part of the island due to Andersen Air Force Base, as well as facts 
of and history of contamination due to military activity and presence in the central and southern 
parts of the island, with emphasis on Superfund sites and Naval Base Guam. The fourth section 
examines the controversy surrounding the spraying of Agent Orange in the island. Using the 
proposed military realignment as a focal point, the fifth section discursively analyzes the attempts 
at justification the military gives in justifying possibly harmful environmental actions.  
I. TOXIC VIOLENCE 
To begin, I want to restate Robert Nixon’s definition of slow violence. Nixon describes 
slow violence as a “violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed 
destruction that is dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is typically not 
viewed as violence at all.”2 In the last chapter, I demonstrated the slow-moving nature of economic 
violence. In this chapter, I demonstrate how numerous acts of slow violence have been committed 
against Guåhan’s environment. Before throwing ourselves into the toxic abyss of contamination, 
it is necessary to engage in the literature on environmental racism, justice, violence, and security 
to give us a framework for moving forward. As this dissertation is concerned with and attempts to 
problematize security, I begin with environmental security.  
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Environmental security, as a mainstream concept in security, sticks to the traditional 
nation-state referent, where since the 1980s, resource scarcity and environmental degradation came 
under the rubric of states’ security concerns. This move of placing the environment under the 
security rubric has caused great debates amongst policymakers and academics. Some 
environmentalists argue that this is a beneficial move for the environment as it forces the state to 
take these issues seriously. Others, however, such as the authors in the anthology, The Secure and 
The Dispossessed: How the Military and Corporations are Shaping a Climate-Changed World, 
argue that securitizing the environment simply leads to the state adopting Malthusian policies akin 
to an “armed lifeboat,” in which the powerful arm themselves and work towards keeping anyone 
else from accessing their resources. Ben Hayes explicates this problem of securitization this way, 
“In this model, poverty, injustice and the protests and resistance this causes are seen not as 
fundamental social-policy failures, but as a source of potential social unrest to be predicted, 
managed and countered.”3  
One of the first works to really popularize environmental issues as part of the security 
agenda was Robert Kaplan’s piece, “The Coming Anarchy,” in which he argues that environmental 
degradation would lead to an exacerbation of the effects of disease, conflict, and civil instability, 
which would eventually affect the global North.4 Similarly, Michael Klare argues that increased 
resource scarcity and rising population levels will lead to further ethnic and religious violence. He 
argues that states’ security depends on things like oilfield protection, the defense of maritime trade 
routes, and the ability to export energy products, and furthermore, that a change in the environment 
may affect these vital systems necessary to state security. Thus, the ability of a state to secure these 
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vital systems will determine its survival.5 Compounding these issues is climate change. The U.S. 
military takes the threat of climate change quite seriously, arguing that climate change is a “threat 
multiplier.” As the 2010 DoD Quadrennial Defense Review reads, “Climate change will contribute 
to food and water scarcity, will increase the spread of disease, and may spur or exacerbate mass 
migration.”6 Supplementing this view of climate change as a threat multiplier, military strategists 
argue, “In national security planning, it generally can take about 30 years to design a weapons 
system and bring it to the battlefield, so it is important to anticipate future threat environments. It 
is not less important to anticipate and prepare for the challenges we may face in the future as a 
result of climate change.”7  
I argue that environmental security from a U.S. perspective is not the way for Guåhan to 
ensure the health of our environment. As previous chapters have shown, Guåhan is not within the 
referent object of United States security concerns, but is rather a simultaneously important and 
disposable tool and means to ensuring the continuation of U.S. national security, which creates our 
form-of-life here in Guåhan. Our environment has been the one harmed in the name of national 
security. As Rachel Woodward argues, even U.S. military presence in the island affects the 
environment. “The vast majority of military activities, whether conflict-related or not, have some 
sort of impact on the natural environment. Maintaining military forces is itself an act with 
environmental repercussions. Armed forces demand the use of natural resources, to keep them 
equipped, supplied, and trained.”8 To be clear, I am arguing that the military does not keep Guåhan 
secure, especially from an environmental perspective, and concurrently, that the dominant 
paradigm of “environmental security,” is not the best theoretical framework to alleviating this 
problem.  
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The literature on environmental racism and violence becomes more useful in understanding 
the military’s effect on the environment of Guåhan and the entanglement of various colonial forces 
in using the environment as a tool of sustaining empire. Environmental racism can be defined as 
“racial discrimination in environmental policy-making and the enforcement of regulations and 
laws, the deliberate targeting of people of color communities for toxic waste facilities, the official 
sanctioning of the life-threatening presence of poisons and pollutants in our communities, and the 
history of excluding people of color from leadership in the environmental movement.”9 In the 
United States, this is extremely evident. Researchers at the National Center for Environmental 
Assessment, in February 2018, reported that people of color are significantly more likely to breathe 
polluted air. The authors concluded, “results at national, state, and county scales all indicate that 
non-Whites tend to be burdened disproportionately to Whites.”10  
In Guåhan’s case, an understanding of environmental racism needs to be linked to the 
military effects on the environment as I argue both logics (environmental racism and 
militarization) entangle their operations here. First, for many, military effects on the environment 
come as a result of war. However, it is important to note that a significant proportion of military 
contamination, destruction, or alteration of the environment comes from “peacetime” military 
preparation. As Rachel Woodward argues, “Militarism and military activities in non-conflict 
situations exert control over space in ways and through means which frequently render this control 
invisible, exerted by military forces during and following armed conflicts.”11 Similarly, Brandon 
C. Davis argues, “Nearly all aspects of America’s condition of permanent war are predicated on 
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the military’s ongoing occupation of public land.”12 Both of these quotes show that in a state of 
permanent war where “non-conflict situations” are still used to prepare for war, the military will 
hold onto land for this preparation, and consequently alter the land and environment of the locale.  
Militarization and basing themselves have established patterns of environmental effects, 
culminating in environmental violence, a slow toxicity that manifests itself with the passing of 
time. As John W. Hamilton writes in the Stanford Law Journal, “Too often… however, the mere 
act of living on or near a military base results in exposure to dangerous toxins that slowly poison 
military service members, their families, and nearby communities. Pollution at military bases is so 
widespread and endemic that more than two-thirds of all Superfund sites listed by the EPA–nearly 
900 sites in all–are military affiliated.”13 Furthermore, environmental violence can be seen in two 
forms: (1) The environmental process of creating the base and (2) The operations of the base once 
it is established. In articulating these two forms of environmental violence, we see its various 
manifestations.  
This is the peculiarity of Guåhan’s position. There is no wave of relief for our environment 
in regard to militarization. We were not only a war zone in the 1940s, but we have been subject to 
the effects of war continuously since then. Toxicity is a cancer, literally and metaphorically, and 
we live in a state of permanent mitigation. In the following sections, I show the extent of 
environmental contamination on and surrounding the island. In addition, I argue that the 
environmental contamination of the island has epistemological implications due to the politics of 
doubt surrounding the inconclusivity of particular accounts of contamination. I begin with an 
analysis of the geology and geography of Guåhan.  
                                               
12 Brandon C. Davis, “Emergency Powers and the Militarization of American Public Lands,” in Proving Grounds: 
Militarized Landscapes, Weapons Testing, and the Environmental Impact of U.S. Bases (Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, 2015), Loc 511, Kindle.  
13 John W. Hamilton, “Contamination at U.S. Military Bases: Profiles and Responses,” Stanford Environmental Law 
Journal, 35. no. 2 (2016): 224. 
 197 
II. AQUIFERS AND LIMESTONE: GEOLOGY AND GEOGRAPHY OF GUÅHAN 
Guåhan’s geology is divided into two halves. The northern half of the island is composed 
of a limestone plateau bordered by steep cliffs, while the southern half of the island is composed 
of dissected volcanic upland with a discontinuous ridge of mountains paralleling the west coast of 
the island. The island is split in half via a fault zone between Adelup Point and Pago Bay. This 
difference in geological formation has substantial impacts for a discussion on environmental 
contamination. Two of the core physical properties of limestone is its porosity and its permeability. 
The porosity of a rock refers to the proportion of the rock that is made up of spaces or cracks 
between the grains, while the permeability of a rock is its ability to allow fluids to “pass from one 
pore space to another by capillary action or along cracks and fissures.”14 Porosity and permeability 
are directly connected. The porosity of a rock helps determines the extent to which liquids can 
permeate and move through the rock. According to the Guam Geological Survey, the northern part 
of the island is so permeable that there are no permanent streams on the limestone plateau.15  
This permeability becomes a problem because it is in the northern half of the island where 
one finds the only aquifer in the island: the Northern Guam Lens Aquifer (NGLA). The Northern 
Guam Lens Aquifer is “the limestone bedrock that underlies the entire northern half of Guam and 
contains a large and permanent body of fresh groundwater. This body is approximately lens-
shaped, being the thickest in the island’s interior and thinnest along the island’s perimeter.”16 John 
Jenson, director of the Water Environmental Research Institute of the Western Pacific or WERI, 
argues that Guåhan has the best aquifer in the world. Speaking before the Rotary Club of Guam, 
Jenson said, “Guam is fortunate to have a limestone aquifer separating layers of infiltrated 
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rainwater, a natural fresh water lens and a limestone bedrock, which all play a role in maintaining 
clean water.”17 He continued, “We have one of the world’s best aquifers in terms of the amount of 
water that’s available per capita, the ease at which you can get it out and the natural aspects that 
help keep it clean, you couldn’t have designed a better aquifer, but the things that make it good, 
make it complex, which makes it interesting.”18 Nathan Habana, groundwater hydrologist at 
WERI, discusses this complexity,  
The aquifer’s limestone surface is very permeable. Storm waters easily infiltrate, 
ephemeral runoff move into surface depressions and sinkholes that provide conduits in 
the bedrock that contribute to much of the fast recharge to the lens…Dissolved chemical 
species may be carried by storm runoff and infiltrate, drain, percolate, or channel through 
conduits in the vadose zone and enter the freshwater lens as it is recharged…These 
vulnerabilities mean development over the aquifer requires careful planning as it expands 
and increased civic development, especially in managing wastewater and contaminant 
disposal.19 
This permeability reflects the geology of the aquifer. Contrary to what one may imagine the aquifer 
looking like, it is not a giant pool of water floating underneath the surface. Rather, the water is 
held within the porous rocks.  
 The mere porosity and permeability of the rocks that comprise the aquifer is not the scariest 
part of this story. Rather, it is the sheer amount of people in Guåhan who depend on the aquifer as 
a water source. About 80% of the island’s utility water comes from the NGLA. Deep wells 
penetrate the lens to pump or extract fresh water. The Guam Water Authority has two main types 
of wells they use to get water from NGLA: vertical production wells and one tunnel well (Tumon 
Maui well). The remaining 20% of the island’s water comes from one spring reservoir (the Santa 
Rita Spring), a river water treatment facility (Ugum River) and the Fena Lake Reservoir (which is 
controlled by the United States Navy).20 The health of the aquifer affects roughly 80% of the 
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island’s population, thus making it imperative to consistently monitor the health of the well and 
control other sources of contamination, of which there are many. Habana also notes, “Another 
potential source of contaminant is via wastewater disposal, septic tanks, cesspits, or leaky sewer 
lines. Then there is the illegal dumping of chemicals or spills over the surface that may be 
transported to the lens through the hydrologic process.”21 Among the diverse sources of 
contamination into the aquifer, the military is a major factor that needs to be illuminated. With this 
understanding of the basic geology and geography of the island complete, the next section outlines 
the various methods of contamination caused by the military.  
III. DRIP, DRIP, POISONOUS DRIP: MILITARY CONTAMINATION  
On March 1, 2018, a contractor for the Department of Defense was fined $100,000 by 
Guåhan’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for leaking over 110 gallons of jet fuel and 
contaminated water in the villages of Harmon and Agaña Heights. The company, NOVA-UCCo 
was hired by DoD to construct a fuel pipeline from the Sasa Valley fuel farm in the south all the 
way to Andersen Air Force Base in the north part of the island. Even worse, the leak lasted for five 
months from May to October 2017 without NOVA ever reporting it to the proper authorities until 
November 2017. Although originally charged $350,000 in fines by EPA, NOVA, a part of a 
company worth $7 billion, negotiated the price down to a mere $100,000. In this section, I 
illuminate more examples of military or military-related neglect in regard to the environment. 
Rachel Carson famously wrote, “Herbicides and insecticides should be unmasked as biocides: 
those supposedly precise weapons in the ‘war’ on pests targeted nothing more precise than life 
itself.”22 In this section, I outline the history and continuing presence of military contamination in 
Guåhan including herbicides, pesticides, fuel, PCBs, and other dangerous chemicals, and most 
especially, their attack on Guåhan’s life itself.  
                                               
21 Nathan Habana, interview, October 8, 2018. 
22 Rachel Carson, Silent Spring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1992), 32.  
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 Before moving forward however, it needs to be clear what I am arguing in regard to 
contamination and its resolution. Contamination tends to be viewed in terms of a binary: 
pure/contaminated or clean/dirty and that the fix is to make what was once contaminated, clean 
again. This becomes all too tempting for readers of this dissertation to postulate that my solution 
is for the United States military to simply clean up what they have contaminated. This, however, 
is not the solution I propose. Making what was once contaminated, pure or clean again, is definitely 
not a bad thing, but these “purification” or “remedial” actions taken without changing the very 
nature of our relationship with the United States does very little. The chapters thus far have detailed 
the processes by which Guåhan and her people’s form-of-life has been crafted from forced 
powerlessness, a continuum of violences, and sustainable insecurity. I have demonstrated the 
entanglement of militarization, unincorporated territory status, and its constitutive effects on 
Guåhan’s economy and political ontology. Purifying and cleaning up contaminated sites acts as a 
band aid to a much larger issue: Guåhan’s relationship to and usage by the U.S. military. Colonial, 
militarized rule can still exist in a world where the military has reversed their past contamination 
of water and soil. It is simply not enough for the military to argue “Your argument is that we have 
contaminated the land and water. We have fixed this. Things can go back to normal.” This 
dissertation is a genealogy of the sustainable insecurity that has become normalized, and I argue 
that is until we can change the definition of “normal” here in Guåhan that we can more accurately 
solve problems as a result of our colonization and militarization. With this clarification, I now 
proceed with a historical analysis of military contamination in the island.  
Formerly Used Defense sites, IRP sites, and SuperFund sites: The Politics of Site Choosing  
The sites that I discuss in this section are all considered Formerly Used Defense Sites 
(FUDS), Installation Restoration Program sites (IRP), or Superfund sites. The Department of 
Defense is responsible for the cleanup of properties that were formerly owned by, leased to, or 
otherwise possessed by the United States and under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Defense 
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prior to October 1986 as well as active sites. The cleanup program is called the Formerly Used 
Defense Sites program and the Department of Defense has placed the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers in charge of carrying out the program on behalf of DoD and the Army. On their website, 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers state, “The U.S. Army and DoD are dedicated to protecting 
human health and the environment by investigating and, if required, cleaning up potential 
contamination or munitions that may remain on these properties from past DoD activities.”23 The 
origin of being granted this responsibility can be traced back to the 1980s. 
In 1980, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
(CERCLA), more commonly known as Superfund, was passed by Congress providing federal 
authority to directly respond to reports of threatened releases of potentially hazardous substances 
into the environment. Through taxing chemical and petroleum industries, a trust fund was created 
to help clean up hazardous waste sites. The act did various things including: (1) Establishing 
prohibitions and requirements concerning closed and abandoned hazardous waste sites, (2) 
Providing for liability of persons responsible for releases of hazardous waste at these sites, and (3) 
Establishing a trust fund to provide for cleanup when no responsible party could be identified.24 
In 1986, CERCLA was amended via the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act 
or SARA. Through this amended act, seven things were changed or added to the original act 
including increasing the size of the trust fund to $8.5 billion, increasing state involvement in every 
phase of the Superfund program, stressing the importance of permanent remedies and innovative 
treatment technologies in cleaning up hazardous waste sites, as well as providing new enforcement 
authorities and settlement tools. Most importantly, section 211 of SERA established the 
Department of Defense Environmental Restoration Program, or DERP, which mandated that the 
Department of Defense follow the same cleanup regulations that private entities had to follow 
                                               
23 “Formerly Used Defense Sites,” U.S. Army Corps of Engineering, accessed November 1028, 
https://www.usace.army.mil/missions/environmental/formerly-used-defense-sites/ 
24 U.S. Code, Title 42, Chapter 103, Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability. 
Accessed at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-103 
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under CERCLA. Prior to SERA and the establishment of DERP, Superfund did not apply to 
military installations, rather DoD adopted similar provisions for its own environmental cleanups. 
As part of the Defense Environmental Restoration Program, cleanup activities at FUDS and active 
sites come from the environmental restoration accounts while the Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) accounts fund cleanup activities at certain closing or realigning installations. DERP is 
also divided amongst the Installation Restoration Program, which handles contaminants at FUDS 
or active sites, and the Military Munitions Response Program (MMRP), which was established in 
2001 to address munitions such as unexploded ordnances. Furthermore, the Air Force administers 
its program through its Environmental Restoration Branch while the Navy administers theirs 
through the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. It is important to note that 900 of the 1200 
Superfund sites are either “abandoned military sites or facilities that produced materials for the 
military, were used to landfill military waste, or otherwise supported war efforts.”25 
The military uses a specific process when identifying potentially contaminated sites, and 
that alone is problematic. As U.S. House Representatives of the time, Joel Hefley, Gene Taylor, 
and Robert Underwood, write in a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, “The location 
of such waste may not be known because, until the 1970s, disposal of contaminated waste and 
debris was not subject to stringent environmental laws, and DoD did not maintain comprehensive 
records on its disposal practices.”26 This report indicates a change in the military’s identification 
process from the 1980s to the 1990s. In the 1980s, the Department of Defense was more meticulous 
in their identification, actively searching records and maps. When first identifying potentially 
contaminated sites, the DoD would hire contractors, review archival records and maps, inspect 
properties, interview individuals, and analyze photographs. However, in the mid-1990s, they 
                                               
25 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, “Reducing Environmental Cancer Risk: What We Can Do 
Now,” April 2010, https://deainfo.nci.nih.gov/advisory/pcp/annualreports/pcp08-09rpt/pcp_report_08-09_508.pdf 
26 Government Accountability Office, “Environmental Cleanup: Better Communication Needed for Dealing with 
Formerly Used Defense Sites in Guam,” Government Accountability Office, April 11, 2002. 
https://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-423, 1. 
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began to simply rely on referrals from Guåhan’s EPA or discovery during construction projects or 
other activities.  
According to the GAO report, “Under the current approach, DoD generally limits its efforts 
to search for potentially contaminated locations, instead concentrating on cleaning up locations 
already identified.”27 Prior to the shift, the DoD identified 202 potentially contaminated sites. After 
the shift, the number of additional locations added to the list was only five, four active installations 
and one formerly used defense site. This shows that there is an uncertainty regarding other 
potentially contaminated sites, and that it will take further community effort and local government 
action to identify them. However, the military has their own number of sites they have identified 
in the island. John J. Jackson, director of the Joint Guam Program Office (JGPO), which was 
charged with the responsibility of handling the requirements associated with the rebasing of 
Marines from Okinawa to Guåhan, in a letter to Associate Professor of Social Work at the 
University of Guam, Lisa Natividad, writes,  
Of the 95 Air Force and Navy IRP sites, 41 have been cleaned up and the actions 
associated with those sites are complete; 22 sites have had all clean-up actions completed 
and are awaiting final administrative actions to be finalized before they are declared 
complete; 16 sites are in a long-term management status; 7 sites are undergoing clean-up; 
and 9 sites are undergoing feasibility studies or investigation to determine what future 
actions, if any, or required at those sites.28 
This is just a brief glimpse of identified sites, but what this section has shown is that we truly do 
not know the full extent of contamination here in Guåhan due to the politics of site choosing. I 
now move to focus on some of the actual identified sites that can be directly traced back to military 
activities in Guåhan.  
                                               
27 Government Accountability Office, “Better Communication Needed,” 6.  
28 John Jackson, “Letter to Lisa Natividad from John Jackson of Joint Guam Program Office,” February 8, 2010, 2.   
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Andersen Air Force Base: Northern Guåhan 
I begin this excavation of contamination in the northern part of the island due to the 
prevalence of contamination and proximity to Guåhan’s only aquifer. In the north, one finds 
Andersen Air Force Base, which, as described in Chapter 1, is primarily a support squadron, but 
also has one of the largest stores of ammunition amongst Air Force bases. According to the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, there are many hazardous substances at AAFB with sources 
such as “unlined landfills, drum storage and disposal areas, chemical storage areas, fire training 
areas, waste storage areas, a laundry, and industrial and flight line operations”29 contributing to the 
contamination of the land and water there. The Andersen Air Force Base has various components, 
including the main portion of the base which consists of North Field and Northwest Field, the latter 
of which is an inactive airfield; and MARBO annex and Harmon Annex, which are detached 
components. Among these various locations, there are 38 disposal sites where different chemicals 
were disposed of. 
In a GAO report entitled, “DoD Installations in Guam Having Difficulty Complying With 
Regulations,” the authors reiterate, “According to Guam’s EPA records, Andersen Air Force Base 
and the Guam Naval Complex are the major hazardous waste generators in Guam.”30 The report 
documents that between the years 1985-1986, AAFB had a total of 23 violations of the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, which regulates management of hazardous waste. These 
violations include the following: not taking adequate steps to keep waste from entering the ground 
in the event of a leak, not storing waste on an impermeable floor, having no raised edges or dikes 
to contain a spill, and no protection from the weather conditions of the island. At the time of the 
GAO report, they found that of the nine base maintenance shops and facilities, eight were still 
discharging pollutants such as antifreeze and cleaning solutions into storm drains or directly on 
                                               
29 “NPL Site Narrative for Andersen Air Force Base, National Priorities List,” U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency, accessed November 2018, https://semspub.epa.gov/work/09/2400181.pdf 
30 Government Accountability Office, “DOD Installations in Guam Having Difficulty Complying With 
Regulations,” Government Accountability Office, April 1987, https://www.gao.gov/assets/150/145441.pdf,  8.  
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the ground. When GAO interviewed Andersen Air Force Base officials regarding these violations, 
their answers were quite shocking. They stated that “the constant turnover of maintenance 
personnel and the lack of staff to adequately inspect the hazardous waste generators were major 
causes of the improper handling.”31  
An ubiquitous chemical found throughout many of these sites is TCE or trichloroethylene, 
a colorless liquid with a sweet, chloroform-like odor. In 1978, officials at Andersen Air Force Base 
discovered that the drinking water was contaminated with TCE, and the suspected source was the 
landfills discussed above. “Tests of samples taken over the years from the 11 Andersen AFB wells 
revealed that TCE was present at concentration levels that, according to EPA, pose an unacceptable 
health risk to those who consistently drink the water.”32 One of these wells, located in MARBO 
(Marianas-Bonin Command) off of the main base in Yigo, indicated concentrations of TCE as high 
as 29.9 parts per billion, well above the EPA safety guideline. As articulated in the Installation 
Restoration Program Phase I Records Search for Andersen Air Force Base,  
The remaining Marbo wells and the Tumon Maui well have all shown traces of TCE 
contamination. One possible source of contamination is a historical landfill site which 
was operated between 1945 and 1962. This landfill was used for disposal of waste dry-
cleaning fluids; waste petroleum, oils, and lubricants; and waste degreasing solvents–all 
possible contaminant sources. Hydrologically, Marbo Wells No. 1 and 2 are directly 
downgradient of the former disposal site.33 
Toxicity flows and TCE flowed down from the contamination sites to wells further south.  
TCE is a solvent and was often used on military bases to degrease and clean mechanical 
equipment or remove paint and debris. Many planes were washed down with a TCE and water 
solution and subsequently used at many Air Force bases. In addition, the Air Force also used TCE 
to clean computer circuit boards in equipment such as tanks and fixed wing aircraft. It has been 
                                               
31 Government Accountability Office, “DOD Installations in Guam.” 21.  
32 Government Accountability Office, “Hazardous Waste: Abandoned Disposal Sites May Be Affecting Guam’s 
Water Supply,” May 1987, https://www.gao.gov/products/NSIAD-87-88BR, 2.  
33 Reynolds, Smith and Hills Inc., “Installation Restoration Program Phase I Records Search for Andersen Air Force 
Base,” March 1985, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a163667.pdf,  3-17.  
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identified in soil or groundwater at more than 700 Superfund sites.34 TCE is known for being 
extremely dangerous to human health, and the EPA has described it as one of the most volatile 
organic compounds to be regulated in drinking water as well as one of the priorities for regulation 
under the Toxic Substances Control Act.35 TCE is very dangerous due to the ease in which one 
can be exposed to it. A chemical property of TCE, as a solvent, is its ability to change from a liquid 
to a gas at normal outdoor and indoor temperatures, and solvents in water can move into the air in 
homes where the water is being used. For example, heating water contaminated with TCE for 
cooking or bathing can release the TCE into the air, causing an additional means of exposure.  
In a 2013 study in Environmental Health Perspectives, researchers concluded that “TCE is 
carcinogenic to humans by all routes of exposure and poses a potential human health hazard for 
noncancer toxicity to the central nervous system, kidney, liver, immune system, male reproductive 
system, and the developing embryo/fetus.”36 In describing its carcinogenicity, the authors find that 
there is a causal link between TCE and kidney/liver tumors and Non-Hodgkin Lymphoma. 
Furthermore, the noncancer toxic effects listed above are quite serious. There is strong evidence 
that TCE causes changes in trigeminal nerve function, nephrotoxicity (toxic kidneys), autoimmune 
diseases and hypersensitivity disorders, male reproductive toxicity (due to its effect on sperm and 
hormone levels), and fetal cardiac malformations.37  
In the MARBO Annex of Andersen Air Force Base referenced above, Waste Pile 6, Waste 
Pile 7, and Landfill 29, were all identified as having soil exceeding acceptable risk levels. Waste 
Pile 7, for example, was an abandoned quarry filled with waste and then covered with soil. Not 
only was TCE found here, but lead, DDT, and PCEs were also found. Waste Pile 6 was another 
quarry used as a dump. The site is said to have an area containing six car battery casings, one with 
                                               
34 Weihsueh A. Chiu, Jennifer Jinot, Cheryl Siegel Scott, et al., “Human Health Effects of Trichloroethylene: Key 
Findings and Scientific Issues,” Environmental Health Perspectives, 121, no. 3 (March 2013): 303. 
35 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, IRIS Toxicological Review of Trichloroethylene (Interagency Science 
Consultation Draft), 2009, http://cfpub.epa.gov/ncea/iris_drafts/recordisplay.cfm?deid=22536. 
36 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, IRIS Toxicological Review of Trichloroethylene 
37 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, IRIS Toxicological Review of Trichloroethylene 
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nine alkaline radio batteries, one with three unknown batteries, a pile of roofing material, an area 
containing subsurface metal debris, an area with empty drums in the subsurface, and lastly a drum 
pile of 108 deteriorated drums of asphalt, which many have leaked into the ground. Contaminants 
found at the site include metals such as arsenic, cadmium, and lead. Lastly, Landfill 29, also 
located at MARBO, includes a 2.44 acre landfill that contained municipal waste as well as copper 
metal debris and deteriorated drums. The site contained antimony and lead.  
Antimony is a metal that is used in flameproofing textiles, vulcanizing rubber, 
manufacturing paint pigments, electronic semiconductors, fireworks, as well as in bullet casings. 
Antimony, chemically and biologically, resembles arsenic and can affect the heart, gastrointestinal 
tract, respiratory tract, skin, and liver. It can affect heart beat and blood pressure, irritate mucous 
membranes, and cause anorexia, diarrhea, and vomiting.38 Similarly, arsenic is another 
contaminant of concern found in the MARBO area. Arsenic is a naturally occurring element that 
is found in the Earth’s crust, but also found in water, air, food, and soil. Arsenic can be found 
organically and inorganically, with inorganic arsenic being highly toxic. Inorganic arsenic can be 
found in soil, sediment, and groundwater, as opposed to organic arsenic, which is found in fish 
and shellfish. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), arsenic is a confirmed 
carcinogen with acute and long-term effects. Acute effects include vomiting, abdominal pain, 
diarrhea, muscle cramping, and even death, while the long-term effects are skin cancer, bladder 
and lung cancer, diabetes, pulmonary diseases, and cardiovascular disease. Arsenic contamination 
in groundwater is unfortunately found in many places around the world, with countries like 
Bangladesh, having roughly around 39 million people being exposed to arsenic above their 
national standard of exposure.39 
                                               
38 Safe Drinking Water Committee, Drinking Water and Health Volume 3 (Washington, D.C.: National Academy 
Press, 1980), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK216593/pdf/Bookshelf_NBK216593.pdf 
39 “Arsenic,” World Health Organization, Accessed November 2018, https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-
sheets/detail/arsenic 
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This is just a selection of contaminants found in Guåhan, and there are those who argue 
that these contaminants are a source of plaguing medical problems in the island. Guåhan’s first 
Territorial Epidemiologist, Robert Haddock, reported that the incidence of cancer in Guåhan is 
high and that it may be increasing, particularly cancer of the buccal cavity, liver, gallbladder, and 
the pancreas.40 Lisa Natividad, who works with breast cancer victims and survivors, writes, 
“Findings reveal that the villages of Yigo and Santa Rita had the highest incidence rates. These 
two villages have the largest military populations and are home to the island’s two largest U.S. 
military bases.”41 Furthermore, she argues that, “The high manifestation of cancer in these two 
villages may be related to their close proximity to radiation and toxins such as agent-orange and 
other contaminants from the military’s dumping practices.”42 This argument for the relationship 
between Guåhan cancer incidence rates and military contamination suffers from extraneous 
variables and insufficient proof of causation, leading to a state of inconclusivity and a politics of 
doubt which I discuss at length later in this chapter.  
Dåno’ (Cocos Island) and PCBs 
The tiny island of Dåno’, known today as Cocos Island, is located off the coast of Malesso’, 
the island’s most southern village. There are daily ferries to the island, but one could also reach 
the island via jet ski or by participating in an annual swim competition from the coast of Malesso’ 
to the island. The island is used for two purposes. 2/3 of the island is run as a tourist destination, 
Cocos Island Resort, where tourists can scuba dive, parasail, or even ride dune buggies. The 
remaining 1/3 of the island is run by the Department of Parks and Recreation as a wildlife 
conservation area, since it is free of the brown tree snake, which has decimated most of Guåhan’s 
endemic bird species. Before this current use, the island was used by the U.S. Coast Guard as a 
                                               
40 Robert L. Haddock, Rebecca J Talon, Helen JD Whippy, “Ethnic Disparities in Cancer Mortality Among 
Residents of Guam,” Asian Pacific Journal of Cancer Prevention, 7, (2006): 411-414. 
41 LisaLinda S. Natividad, “Social Support Use By Chamorro Women on Guam Diagnosed With Breast Cancer,” 
(PhD diss., Capella University, 2007), 54.  
42 Natividad, “Social Support Use.” 
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Long-Range Navigation Station (LORAN), where the Coast Guard utilized the hyperbolic radio 
navigation system from 1944-1965.  
Around 1965, it was discovered that large concentrations of PCBs were being found in the 
fish and sediment in and around the island. PCB is an acronym for polychlorinated biphenyl, an 
organic chlorine compound that is non-flammable, chemically stable, has a high boiling point and 
electrical insulating properties. It is due to these physical and chemical properties that PCBs were 
used for electrical, heat transfer, and hydraulic equipment, plasticizers, or as pigments.43 The Coast 
Guard used PCBs in their electrical equipment such as transformers and capacitators. More 
particularly, they used electrical transformers at the station to convert the power supplied by diesel 
generators to run the LORAN equipment necessary for their military operations.44  
The health effects of PCBs include cancer, and what is most telling for Guåhan, is that 
according to the EPA,  
The types of PCBS that tend to bioaccumulate in fish and other animals and bind to 
sentiments happen to be the most carcinogenic components of PCB mixtures. As a result, 
people who ingest PCB-contaminated fish or other animal products and contact PCB-
contaminated sediment may be exposed to PCB mixtures that are even more toxic than 
the PCB mixtures contacted by workers and released into the environment.45 
The primary targets for cancer as a result of the carcinogenicity of PCBs include the liver, 
gallbladder, and biliary tract. In addition to cancer, PCBs have other adverse health effects such as 
dermal lesions, reproductive and developmental effects, endocrine effects, and hepatic effects. 
Regarding reproductive and developmental effects, the Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease 
Registry cites a Michigan Maternal Infant Cohort Study published in 1984 in which pregnant 
women who consumed PCB-contaminated fish saw a significant decrease in the gestational age, 
                                               
43 “Learn about Polychlorinated Biphenyls,” Environmental Protection Agency, accessed October 2018,  
https://www.epa.gov/pcbs/learn-about-polychlorinated-biphenyls-pcbs.  
44 S. Ian Hartwell, Dennis A. Apeti, Anthony S. Pait, Andrew L. Mason, Char’mane Robinson, “An Analysis of 
Chemical Contaminants in Sediments and Fish from Cocos Lagoon, Guam,” NOAA National Centers for Coastal 
Ocean Science Stressor Detection and Impacts Division, December 2017.   
45 “Learn about Polychlorinated Biphenyls,” Environmental Protection Agency 
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birth weight, and head circumference of their babies. In addition, these children were shown to 
still be deficit in weight gain, responsiveness, and reduced performance on the visual recognition-
memory test. At 11 years of age, these children were three times more likely to have low full-scale 
verbal IQ scores, more difficulty in paying attention, and twice as likely to lag behind in reading 
comprehension.46  
The issue, as seen in the previous examples of contamination, is disposal. According to a 
report by the National Centers for Coastal Ocean Science, “It is thought that contamination in the 
lagoon is the result of PCB-contaminated equipment being discarded on the land and in the water, 
along with the transport of PCBs in runoff from the island as might occur during a heavy rainfall 
event.”47 Anecdotal information from those who served at the LORAN station told researchers that 
there were multiple occasions in which the debris was taken to a side of the island to be carried 
away by the next large typhoon or debris was simply buried in dump pits. The former plan for 
disposal proved quite effective as Typhoon Allyn removed a substantial portion of the Coast Guard 
machinery in 1949.48 From these disposal practices in conjunction with Guåhan’s geographical 
position in the Pacific’s Typhoon Alley, contamination has become a problem, particularly 
surrounding the fish near Cocos.  
A National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) sampling of fish 
surrounding Cocos Island revealed that PCB levels were in the hundreds of micrograms per 
kilogram, which is beyond the advisory level for consumption. In 2005, surveys were conducted 
on Cocos Island by Coast Guard contractors to remove remaining debris and perform a 
toxicological report of the island. The report indicated elevated levels of PCBs in the soil and in 
fish in the waters adjacent to Cocos. As Civil Engineering Unit Lieutenant Commander Todd 
                                               
46 “PCB Toxicity,” Agency for Toxic Substances & Disease Registry, accessed October 2018, 
https://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/csem/csem.asp?csem=30&po=10 
47 Tony Paitisa, “Studying Contaminants in Cocos Lagoon, Guam,” National Centers for Coastal Ocean Science, 
May 19, 2015, https://coastalscience.noaa.gov/news/studying-contaminants-in-cocos-lagoon-guam-blog-post-1/ 
48 Hartwell, “An Analysis of Chemical Contaminants from Cocos Lagoon, Guam.” 
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Wimmer said to local media, “In 2005, we actually removed 400 cubic yards of soil finding a 
landfill site on the island which we thought was contributing to polychlorinated biphenyls 
contamination.”49 However, in a 2017 report of contamination, researchers found that there were 
spikes in the level of PCB contamination in fish. Wimmer said he was surprised at these spikes 
considering their 2005 cleanup of the island. According to this scientific report, “Nine of the 
thirteen fish samples or approximately 70% of the fish samples collected from around Cocos Island 
were also above USEPA recreational SV of 20 ng/g for total PCBs.”50 SV or surface value refers 
to a threshold concentration of concern for a chemical contaminant in fish that may have a critical 
toxic or carcinogenic effect on humans. This report shows that for recreational fishers, nine of the 
fish samples exceeded the surface value of 20 nanograms per grams for total PCBs. In tracing this 
continued source of contamination, the report offers some possible sources: “One possibility is 
that PCBs are being transported via water from Cocos Island (through surface water runoff or 
groundwater) and then subsequently taken up by fish. It is also possible that the fish may be 
accumulating contaminants through the food chain, sediments, or perhaps a combination.”51 
One shocking discovery from this 2017 report was finding DDT contamination amongst 
these fish as well. Once again, 70% of the fish samples from around the island were above the 
USEPA subsistence SV for total DDT of 14.4 ng/g. DDT is an acronym for 
dichlorophenyltrichloroethane, which was once used as a pesticide to control insects like 
mosquitoes who may carry malaria, typhus, or other insect-borne human diseases. It was also 
useful for insect control in livestock production as well as home gardens. However, DDT was 
banned in 1972 due to its potential for environmental damage. According to the EPA, DDT is very 
persistent in the environment, can travel long distances in the upper atmosphere, and accumulates 
                                               
49 KUAM, “Coast Guard looking into PCB contamination on Cocos Island Lagoon,” KUAM, October 6, 2016, 
http://www.kuam.com/story/33275549/2016/09/Thursday/coast-guard-looking-into-pcb-contamination-on-cocos-
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50 Hartwell, “An Analysis of Chemical Contaminants from Cocos Lagoon, Guam,” 22. 
51 Hartwell, “An Analysis of Chemical Contaminants from Cocos Lagoon, Guam,” 26.  
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in fatty tissues. These factors account for DDT’s concentration in the environment still being 
present despite it being banned 46 years ago. This contamination “seems to reflect usage and 
perhaps storage or disposal of DDT on the island. DDT at the LORAN station may have been used 
specifically to help prevent outbreaks of malaria in USCG personnel, as there have been several 
outbreaks of malaria on Guam in the past.”52 
These sources of contamination led to a health advisory, issued in 2006 and still in effect 
today, warning people to limit or avoid eating fish caught in and around Cocos Lagoon because of 
contamination. This is problematic for a community such as Malesso’, in which many rely on 
fishing as a source of sustenance. CHamoru fisherman and Malesso’ resident John Champaco 
expressed his frustration at the lack of communication saying, “No one’s talking to us about these 
things. We’re still fishing out there. What else can we do? We have to provide for our families.”53 
Regarding the extent to which Malesso’ rely on fishing, Champaco told local media that five to 
six boats go out each day to fish around the area and during atulai season (a very popular fish in 
Guåhan cuisine), he and his crew regularly bring in six to seven boatloads of atulai a day. Former 
mayor of Malesso’, Ernest Chargualaf, echoed Champaco’s calls for clarification, exclaiming, 
“We need a toxicologist and other experts to tell us what these latest results mean to our 
health…There is only a fish consumption advisory, not an order to stop eating fish from the area.”54 
Following this, 87-year old cancer survivor, Bernabe Barcinas, expressed a grim reality saying, 
“When I was young, I would go out fishing day and night. It’s been so long. What can people 
actually do now–it’s too late.”55 The continued clean-up of Cocos Island is ongoing, yet in the 
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meantime, I hope that the fishermen and fisherwomen of Malesso’ find solace, and if not that, at 
least clarification. 
Ibanez/Guerrero Properties 
In the small, central village of Toto lie the family lands of the Ibanez and Guerrero families. 
One property, approximately 5 acres, is owned by Vicente Ibanez and his wife and consists of six 
structures located throughout portions of the property. Domingo B. Guerrero owns the remaining 
one acre. These sites were known as the “Fifth Field,” due to their use by the U.S. 5th Marine 
Supply Depot. In an interview, Vicente Ibanez said his “property was initially used as a limestone 
quarry at the conclusion of World War II and then as a landfill when American forces departed 
Fifth Field at the beginning of the Korean conflict.”56 The landowners argue that excess military 
supplies and vehicle parts were dumped into their lands, burned, and then backfilled.  
An interview with Mr. Guerrero revealed that his land was the site of “military supply 
warehouses, a military vehicle baseyard, and a shooting range.”57 The year after this interview, in 
1987, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers identified the site as eligible for mediation actions under 
DERP-FUDS. In the inventory report, it was reported, “Unidentifiable metal debris and glass 
ampules of calcium hypochlorite powder were subsequently discovered in a septic tank excavation 
on the Ibanez property. Various kinds of metal debris including gun oil, containers, ammunition 
containers, helmets, and gun cartridges were found along with other debris at the Guerrero 
property.”58 The ampules of calcium hypochlorite are a bleaching agent to treat water but have 
adverse health effects including chemical burns as well as irritation to the respiratory tract. Ibanez 
told local media, “When I was a kid all you have to do is pick it up and throw it and it sparks and 
there’s an odor coming out of it; we don’t know also if that’s a potential hazard for us or our 
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children among this compound.”59 In 2009, soil tests were conducted and researchers discovered 
oil, benzo(a)pyrene, arsenic, lead, mercury, pesticides and PCBs in the surface soil, as well as 
metals and pesticides in subsurface soil.  
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineering eventually settled on a remediation plan of 
excavation and off-site disposal. By this, they were to excavate the top two feet of soil and then 
backfill the area with clean soil. They wrote that proceeding with this excavation and off-site 
disposal plan would not destroy but rather transfer contamination to a landfill, and that this was 
the most realistic option due to low cost. However, this did not satisfy the landowners, and I 
demonstrate the interesting dynamic between the affected families and the military contractors in 
charge of the clean-up in an exchange in a KUAM article regarding the Ibanez/Guerrero properties. 
Linda Ibanez explains, “It takes years to do sample testing, to do all the assessment and tell us you 
are at risk, you’re a human threat but we can’t do anything yet until funding?”60 Replying to this, 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers program manager, Helene Takamoto, told local media, “For us to 
enact and start the debris removal project it has to be qualified as an immediate danger to life and 
safety because if it’s just buried in the ground that doesn’t really qualify to being an immediate 
danger to life and safety.” Victoria Leon Guerrero, whose family land is in the property, then 
argued, “There’s a bad connection between PCBs and pesticides and miscarriages and birth defects 
and that’s been proven in our family, we’ve lost children living in this property.” Ending the 
exchange, Takemoto simply retorted, “That’s why we are stepping in taking a responsibility to 
clean this up—the only other way that you can do that is you turn around and plan to get 
compensation for any kind of clean up that you’ve done through litigation.”61 Seven years after 
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this exchange, I interviewed Victoria Lola Leon Guerrero and asked her if there was any progress 
on the cleanup. She unfortunately responded, “No progress.”   
The Ambiguity of Cleanup 
In this section, I examine the multiple political and economic factors dealing with the 
cleanup process to demonstrate the intersectionality of these issues. For Guåhan and its treatment 
by the military, an environmental and scientific analysis and proposed solution alone is not nearly 
enough. Cleaning up formerly used defense sites is a political process with economic implications 
and to analyze the contamination problem without addressing these factors is akin to placing a 
band-aid on an infected wound and calling it a day. The scientific solution may not be in the best 
interests of the colonial power, and thus, the cost of cleanup outweighs the actual cleanup, leading 
to a politics of worth for the people of Guåhan. The stench of contamination weighed against the 
undesirable emptying of the treasury.  
In the case of the Ibanez/Guerrero properties, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers chose the 
most cost-efficient and cheapest option. I argue that that for a Department of Defense who is 
consistently appropriated billions of dollars per year, that cost-efficiency when it comes to cleaning 
up FUDS in Guåhan is not an indication of economic decline, but rather is a revelation of our (lack 
of) importance to the American nation-state. However, I also argue that military cleanup is not a 
priority of the military’s and that shows how environmental violence, even if not intentional, is a 
byproduct of military activities. In a 2001 GA report entitled, “Environmental Contamination: 
Cleanup Actions at Formerly Used Defense Sites,” the authors write, “According to the Corps’ 
database, 2,382 of these projects were considered complete as of the end of fiscal year 2000. 
However, over 57% of the projects reported as complete were completed as a result of a study or 
administrative action without performing any actual cleanup action.”62 Additionally, between 1984 
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and 2000, only 4% of the total expected cost of cleaning up these locations had been funded in 
Guåhan, as opposed to 16% nationwide.  
This is where our islandness and our status as an unincorporated territory comes to the 
forefront. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineering responded to the statistic above, writing, 
Even though contaminated locations in Guam pose risks to human health and the 
environment that are similar to risks posed by such locations nationally, unfunded 
projects in Guam have ranked lower when the work is sequenced. When sequencing 
work, the Corps considers not only a contaminated location’s risk but also such factors as 
opportunities to group projects together, especially in remote areas where logistics are 
difficult and transportation costs are high, and concerns expressed by affected 
stakeholders.63 
Because of our cartographic and geographical distance to the US government, it simply does not 
make sense to fund remaining cleanup projects. One can argue that this inaction is not malicious, 
but rather simply technical and most efficient. I would argue that technicality and efficiency can 
be tools of violence and that malicious intentions are not the only ones that produce violent results. 
In his book, Identify and Sort: How Digital Power Changed World Politics, Josef Teboho Ansorge 
argues precisely that it is the mask of technicality which the sovereign hides behind to ensure 
control over its population. Ansorge argues regarding technology, “Marked by rationalizing 
impulses—stemming from proto-scientific capitalist practices—it depoliticizes social and political 
issues and privileges a centralized, uniform, and standardized sovereign knowledge that 
marginalizes other habits of thought.”64 Technology and bureaucracy act as tools of 
depoliticization, marking what Ian Shaw calls a “rule by nobody.”65 This technical answer of 
prioritization of work sites, efficiency, and simply not enough funding all appear to be bureaucratic 
or technical problems/obstacles, and not a clear demonstration of power and hierarchy. However, 
a deeper analysis shows how these facts are the byproduct of a colonial relationship. The military 
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is responsible for cleaning up these sites, and yet, due to the “efficiency” argument, is foregoing 
this responsibility. However, I argue that this efficiency argument masks the larger picture here: a 
colonial picture. Quite simply, they do not clean these sites because they do not have to. It is 
environmental racism and colonialism alive and well, shape-shifted to a mask of “efficiency.” 
 There is also a direct connection between remediation efforts and rampant land 
dispossession. In the reports of site remediation in Guåhan, a common phrase one will find is 
“Access to ______ is restricted; therefore, past, current, and future exposures to the general public 
are not expected.” For example, in an analysis of contaminated sites in Andersen Air Force Base 
regarding Landfill No. 6, the evaluation of public health hazards in the soil section reads, “Access 
to LF-6 is restricted; therefore, past, current, and future exposures to the general public are not 
expected.” This is the case for other sites such as Landfill Nos. 8, 12, 13, and 14. The logic is 
violently twisted. DoD argues they do not need to remediate sites in the island because public 
access is not expected. This is heavily compounded with a majority of the population of the island 
not being able to walk on the sites of contaminated soil. Land dispossession, in the end, helps bear 
some responsibilities of remediation due to multiplied restrictions.   
IV. MANUFACTURING DOUBT AND BUREAUCRATIC POWERLESSNESS: AGENT ORANGE IN 
GUÅHAN? 
As I write this in November of 2018, it would have only been three weeks since the passing 
of Leroy Foster, a retired Air Force veteran, who spent a majority of his life urging Congress to 
recognize that Agent Orange was sprayed in Guåhan. During the Vietnam War, Foster was 
stationed in Guåhan and reported that he sprayed tens of thousands of gallons of Agent Orange in 
and around the base and along fuel lines running across the island. Throughout his life after being 
stationed in Guåhan, he was diagnosed with five types of cancer along with a tragic twenty-eight 
autoimmune diseases which he attributed to the Agent Orange he sprayed in the island. The reader 
may feel sorry for Foster, and simply ask what the federal government did in response to 
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compensate him for this exposure. This is where the problem lies. The Federal Government denies 
ever spraying Agent Orange in the island, and this has led to an unfortunate and interesting 
predicament of “he said, they said,” because there are multiple veterans of the U.S. military who 
admit to spraying Agent Orange in the island, despite the official DoD narrative. In this section, I 
examine the official DoD denial and the testimonies of veterans who admit to spraying Agent 
Orange during their stationing in Guåhan. Following this analysis, I turn to the politics of doubt 
and unincorporated powerlessness as a byproduct of colonialism and militarism in Guåhan, and 
demonstrate how this leaves Guåhan in environmental uncertainty which in turns heavily 
contributes to sustainable insecurity.   
Agent Orange is a dioxin herbicide mixture, in the same family as Agent Purple, making 
up the family nomenclature of “rainbow herbicides.” It was primarily sprayed from 1962 to 1971 
during the Vietnam War to remove vegetation that was providing cover to the Vietcong forces. 
With Vietnam as the primary battleground, it was also sprayed near its borders with Laos and 
Cambodia. Agent Orange is composed of two different chemical components: 2,4-
dichlorophenoxyacetic acid and 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic acid that together comprise the 
herbicide. Agent Orange is extremely toxic and is linked to various diseases and health conditions 
such as cancer, including chronic b-cell leukemias, Hodgkin’s lymphoma, multiple myeloma, non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma, prostate cancer, respiratory cancers, and soft tissue sarcomas. Beyond 
cancer, it is linked to amyloidosis, ischemic heart disease, Parkinson’s disease, peripheral 
neuropathy, and porphyria cutanea tarda.66  
More than ten years after the war, the Federal government realized the adverse health 
effects due to exposure to Agent Orange and passed the Agent Orange Act of 1991, where veterans 
who served anywhere in Vietnam between January 9, 1962 and May 7, 1971 are presumed to have 
been exposed to herbicides such as Agent Orange. As a result of the law, these veterans were made 
                                               
66 “10 things every Veteran should know about Agent Orange,” U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, accessed 
October 2018, https://www.blogs.va.gov/VAntage/17744/10-things-every-veteran-know-agent-orange/. 
 219 
eligible for compensation if they fit this criterion and were suffering from the various diseases 
listed above. Furthermore, the Office of Veterans’ Affairs realized that there were birth defects 
associated with a parents’ exposure to Agent Orange such as Spina Bifida, and thus a veteran 
parent who conceived a child after they entered Vietnam was eligible to file for benefits to help 
support their child.67 Nowhere is Guåhan covered under this act, despite a significant number of 
veterans coming out to tell their stories of spraying the herbicide in the island.  
I now turn to the testimonies of these various veterans. Leroy Foster, the outspoken 
advocate of allowing veterans who served in Guåhan during this period to be covered under Agent 
Orange exposure contamination legislation, served in the Air Force and was stationed in the island 
during the Vietnam War. In his testimony to the Office of Veterans’ Affairs, he describes how he 
prepared, mixed, and sprayed Agent Orange and Agent Blue herbicide in Guåhan between 1969-
1971. He was assigned to the 43rd Supply Squadron Fuels Division and was tasked with controlling 
vegetation overgrowth. Foster writes, “I often would have to spray entire pipe lines, hydrant pump 
stations on the flight line, the Quonset huts storing the packaged oil for the B52 bombers, the fuel 
valve pits, the security fences surrounding the flight line, the fuel storage facilities…Tumon Tank 
farm, and the entire Cross country pipeline.”68 Furthermore, he testifies, “I mixed diesel fuel with 
Agent Orange then I sprayed it by truck all over the base to kill the jungle overgrowth. None of 
the older service members wanted to do the work so because I was the low man on the totem pole, 
it was left to me.”69 
Ralph Stanton, a fellow Air Force veteran, also submitted testimony to the Office of 
Veterans’ Affairs supporting LeRoy Foster’s testimony. Stanton served in the 43rd CES Fuels 
Maintenance Station. He wrote how he crossed paths with Foster often and would see him spray 
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the herbicides frequently. So frequently, in fact, that Stanton described being incredibly bothered 
by seeing Foster around. “The spray made me sick at my stomach, so I hated to see him coming 
our way. My words are still stuck in my mind after all this time, Here Comes That Little Bastard 
Spraying Again.”70 Foster developed boils all over his body just days after starting this assignment, 
and later was afflicted with Parkinson’s disease and ischemic heart disease. Unfortunately, Foster’s 
daughter developed cancer as a teenager and his grandchild was born with 12 fingers, 12 toes, and 
a heart murmur.71 Next is the testimony of Edward Jackson, a sergeant with the 43rd Transportation 
Squadron who served in Guåhan in the 1970s. He writes, “Andersen Air Force Base had a huge 
stockpile of Agent Orange and other herbicides. There were many, many thousands of drums. I 
used to make trips with them to the navy base for shipment by sea.”72 Regarding disposal, Jackson 
writes, “I would back my truck up a small cliff that sloped away towards the Pacific Ocean. I 
personally threw away about 25 drums. Each individual drum was anywhere from almost empty 
to almost full.”73 
 Collectively, these testimonies have helped respark the Government of Guam’s interest in 
settling the truth of whether or not Agent Orange was sprayed in the island. To this end, a task 
force was led by then Senator Fernando Esteves, vice-chairman of the Committee on Health, was 
convened to “review and record reports from the community” on the use of PCB, DDT, and Agent 
Orange in Guåhan. Esteves describes the task force’s work as analyzing these records, reports, and 
research data and correlating them with the congenital health problems that are prevalent in the 
island.74 In addition to the local task force, Guåhan’s former delegate to the US Congress, 
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Madeleine Bordallo, wrote a letter to the Government Accountability Office asking them to review 
all the documentation related to the handling and transporting of Agent Orange in order to hold 
DoD accountable.75  
 At the time, former Governor of Guåhan Eddie Baza Calvo issued a directive to Guåhan’s 
EPA to conduct an analysis on soil samples. AECOM, a private contractor selected by the Naval 
Facilities Engineering Command Marianas, was tasked to develop the quality assurance 
procedures, and they were the ones who performed the soil sampling. The samples were collected 
from April 23-26th of 2018 and were taken from “areas surrounding former fuel pipelines, airfield 
perimeter fence lines, and a fenceline surrounding the aboveground storage tanks within Andersen 
Air Force in Yigo.”76 It is important to note that no other locations were chosen for soil samples. 
Procedurally, it was agreed that the two laboratories were to test the soil samples separately, and 
the results differed. AECOM’s lab, the military contractor, found no traces of Agent Orange, while 
the EPA lab found traces of Agent Orange, albeit at a non-toxic level. Ultimately, these tests were 
deemed “inconclusive.” 
 Former Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo then requested that the Government 
Accountability Office investigate the issue of Agent Orange in the island. However, this became 
a very controversial issue due to the GAO indicating that it would not conduct any of its own 
testing but would use the samples collected by the two agencies. Fortunately, however, the U.S. 
EPA and Guåhan EPA agreed to conduct tests for AO presence at non-military sites across Guåhan. 
Bordallo argues, “The EPA should always have tested for Agent Orange island-wide and not just 
on military installations. I am encouraged that they will examine off-base and non-military sites 
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for potential traces of Agent Orange.”77 On November 15, 2018, the results of the GAO were 
released and once again, the people of Guåhan were left in a state of inconclusivity. According to 
the report, which examined shipping logs of Agent Orange to see if vessels carrying Agent Orange 
stopped in Guåhan, “While the logbooks GAO reviewed identify when vessels left various ports 
as they traveled to and from Vietnam, they do not show whether and how much cargo was loaded 
or unloaded at those ports.”78 Furthermore, they report that, “Without a reliable list with complete 
and accurate information and a formal process for DoD and the VA to coordinate on 
communicating this information, veterans and the public do not have quality information about the 
full extent of locations where Agent Orange was present and where exposure could potentially 
have occurred.”79 
 I return to the counternarrative of the veterans, who argue that the testing procedures are 
inherently flawed. John Wells, an attorney for the group, Military Veterans Advocacy, articulates 
two problems with the testing. The first is that the initial soil samples were only taken from one 
site which may have already been remediated, and the second is that the passage of time makes it 
more difficult to see traces of the herbicide. Wells suggests that the Guåhan EPA invite veterans 
who either sprayed or witnessed the spraying of the herbicide to physically identify the locations 
of these sprayings. Moyer writes to Madeleine Bordallo, “We hope your office can assist us so we 
can get the justice we all so richly deserve for all the Chamoru/Guamanian population and the 
veterans who served on Guam and have disease rates that are parallel to those ‘Boots on the 
Ground’ Vietnam veterans.”80  
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 Testing sites are not the only problem, but also the chemical properties of Agent Orange. 
The n-butyl which forms both the 2,4-D and the 2,4,5-T components of Agent Orange break down 
rapidly into acid forms, and the acid forms’ half-lives can range from several days to many months. 
Also, after Agent Orange is sprayed, it can be washed out by rain, degraded by sunlight, or turned 
into a vapor.81 Lastly, the carcinogenic component of Agent Orange can also come from the 
burning of materials such as wood or waste thus possibly confounding results that Agent Orange 
was sprayed in the island. These scientific factors make it very difficult for conclusive results to 
be produced or for this question to ever be settled. The Agent Orange issue is one filled with doubt, 
ambiguity, narrative/counternarratives, and it is not only the veterans, but also the people of the 
island who have to live within the liminal zone of “Did they or did they not?” An uncertainty that 
if never answered, will lead to business as usual: potentially toxic.  
Doubt and Power: More Than Five-Letter Words 
This predicament Guåhan is placed in, “Did they or did they not?” is not unique in any way 
to the island, and the manufacturing of doubt has been exposed as a common tool by governments 
and corporations in shielding past actions. Through doubt, government regulation or disciplinary 
action against a corporation can be thwarted. Doubt becomes the product of these corporations. In 
their book, Merchants of Doubt: How a Handful of Scientists Obscured the Truth on Issues from 
Tobacco Smoke to Global Warming, Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway describe the 
weaponization of doubt to keep controversy alive.82 By this, they refer to corporate and at times, 
state interests to never settle the science of an issue. Through the production of doubt, or as we 
saw in the Agent Orange example, the permanent inconclusivity of an issue, an obstacle to the 
implementation of major change and redress is presented. They dub this the “Tobacco Strategy,” 
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and trace it back to the deliberate attempts by some scientists to keep cigarettes safe from 
indisputable medical evidence that would hinder sales.  
In the 1970s, cigarettes were under public scrutiny for their correlation with various 
diseases such as cancer and heart disease. In May 1979, a group of tobacco executives gathered in 
a room and discussed a new program in which biomedical funding would be given to various 
universities to study degenerative diseases such as cancer, heart disease, and diabetes. When asked 
why tobacco money was being used to fund these various research projects, the lead scientist told 
the group of tobacco executives, to develop “an extensive body of scientifically, well-grounded 
data useful in defending the industry against attacks.”83 Oreskes and Conway describe this goal as 
“to fight science against science–or at least with the gaps and uncertainties in existing science, and 
with scientific research that could be used to deflect attention from the main event. Like the 
magician who waves his right hand to distract attention from what he is doing with this left, the 
tobacco industry would fund distracting research.”84 
One particular example of the Tobacco Strategy in Guåhan is the article, “The Agents 
Orange and Purple Controversy on the Island of Guam,” by Alvin L. Young and Kristian L. Young. 
In the article, the Youngs argue “from the submitted documentation, all identified historical 
records and studies by the United States Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry and 
Environmental Protection Agency is that no plausible scenarios of exposure to Agents Orange or 
Purple occurred at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam.”85 To provide evidence for their conclusion, 
they quote military documents such as a letter from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 
to Congressman Lane Evans, where they argue, “The presence of dioxin contamination at a site 
does not necessarily indicate Herbicide Orange was used or stored at that site, i.e. the dioxins at 
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sites referenced in the Public Health Assessment were associated with burning material.”86 The 
Youngs argue that it is highly implausible that Agents Orange and Purple were used in Guåhan as 
there are multiple alternative explanations for veteran testimonies. 
What makes this more fitting in the Tobacco Strategy is another core investigative 
journalism tool: researching the authors of articles. Alvin Young is referred to as Dr. Orange, due 
to his long work with Agent Orange cases as a purported expert on herbicides. According to 
ProPublica, a Pulitzer-prize winning investigative journalism nonprofit, Young has helped to shape 
the opinion of the Department of Veterans’ Affairs regarding how to treat cases of Agent Orange 
exposure made by veterans. Young is ardently of the opinion that few veterans were exposed to 
Agent Orange and that those that were, were only exposed to small doses, and thus were not 
harmed. “Some vets, he wrote in a 2011 email, were simply freeloaders, making up ailments to 
cash in on the VA’s compensation system.”87 In Young’s 2006 article, “The Agent Orange Fiasco,” 
he and his co-author write, “Many lessons can be learned from the history of the Agent Orange 
panic. One is that when a government offers presumptive compensation for diseases (as by the 
Agent Orange Act of 1991), many persons will show up to collect. Some will not even have any 
disease.”88 Commenting on Young’s long history of denial, Linda Birnbaum, director of the 
National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences, said, “Most of the stuff he talks about is in 
no way accurate. He’s been paid a hell of a lot of money by the VA over the years, and I think they 
don’t want to admit that maybe he isn’t the end all and be all.”89 
It is not in the scope of this dissertation nor in my expertise to scientifically solve this issue 
once and for all. Rather, as a political scientist interested in security, power, and violence, I find 
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the cloud of doubt surrounding the Agent Orange issue in Guåhan as demonstrative of the political 
process at work. More particularly, the mechanisms of the political process made thousands of 
miles away from Guåhan directly affect us and our ability to clearly move forward in planning the 
future of our environment. Not solving the Agent Orange issue is leaving a large part of our 
environmental story up in the air. How, for example, would an Independent Guåhan plan its 
environmental policies with the issue of whether or not Agent Orange is still afflicting us, left to 
linger as mere smoke in the clouds of doubt? To end this section on the production of doubt and 
the entanglement of power with science, I turn to a quote by Bruno Latour, who wrote, “If 
geologists themselves, rather serious and solid types, see humanity as a force of the same amplitude 
as volcanoes or even of plate tectonics, one thing is now certain; we have no hope whatsoever–no 
more hope in the future than we had in the past–of seeing a definitive distinction between Science 
and Politics.”90 The politics of doubt creates a violence of epistemology sustaining insecurity from 
being whole-heartedly challenged. 
V. CARCERAL CONSERVATIONISM: WILDLIFE REFUGES AND FALSE STEWARDSHIP 
In the northern part of the island lies one of the three annexes of the Guam National 
Wildlife Refuge run by the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service: The Ritidian Unit. It was established in 
1993 and encompasses 1,217 acres, including 385 terrestrial acres and 832 acres of submerged 
areas offshore. When it was established, it was meant to protect three endangered species: the 
Mariana fruit bat, the Micronesian Kingfisher, and the Mariana Crow. On the surface, this appears 
to be a good thing, a positive environmental effect. The wildlife refuge provides a place for these 
species to recover in numbers and hopefully be introduced at a healthy population back into the 
island. Yet, wildlife refuges have an uneasy relationship with indigenous peoples and as I argue, 
can be seen in the case of Guåhan, this relationship is heavily entangled with the U.S. military 
                                               
90 Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the Moderns (Cambridge :Harvard 
University Press, 2013), 9.  
 227 
presence in the island. In this section, I articulate the processes of “military environmentalism” 
and “greenwashing” operating in the island.  
Military environmentalism refers to the “greenwashing” of the American military. The 
contention and seemingly paradox of military environmentalism can be traced back to a quote by 
military historian John Keegan who wrote, “War is wholly unlike diplomacy or politics because it 
must be fought by men whose values and skills are not those of politicians or diplomats. They are 
those of a world apart, a very ancient world, which exists in parallel with the everyday world but 
does not belong to it…The culture of the warrior can never be that of civilization itself.”91 The 
“greenwashing” of the American military has been seen as a move away from analyses like 
Keegan’s. The essential component of greenwashing and military environmentalism is the 
argument that military activities are compatible with environmental goals such as conservation. In 
its most extreme version, “ecological militarization points not just to the compatibility of 
militarism and conservation, but claims that conservation successes could only be accomplished 
thanks to the exclusionary policies of military activity.”92  
Similarly, an article in Bioscience, reports that “The densities of ESA status species and 
imperiled species are at least three times higher on military lands…These findings highlight the 
continued importance of public lands for the survival of America’s plant and animal species.”93 
Before moving forward, it is important to note that the previous statement is not entirely untrue. 
The exclusionary policy of military activity has produced a side effect of particular species being 
conserved and can lead to biodiversity. For example, the Korean Demilitarized zone is home to 
3,514 species, equaling roughly 67% of the total species of the Korean peninsula. 50% of the total 
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population of the White-Naped Crane, which is one of the most endangered birds in the world, 
also thrives in the DMZ.  
However, before celebrating the success of military environmentalism and conservation, it 
is mandatory to examine why this is the case. Quite simply, the answer is lack of access. 
Conservation is only effective because humans are not allowed in. In an article entitled, “The 
effects of modern war and military activities on biodiversity and the environment,” the authors 
describe how the Marshall Islands, subject to nuclear testing, has a recovering reef with some 
species of coral thriving. Postulating the reason for this, they write, “Because of the area having 
large degrees of residual radioactivity, human exclusion from many of the test site islands has 
generated a marine protected area of sorts alleviating anthropogenic stress.”94 This demonstrates 
that the connection between wildlife refuges and militarization is traced back to the Patrick Wolfe 
argument that territoriality (land) is the driving force of colonialism. Peter Harris articulates this 
writing, “I argue that military environmentalism has the effect–likely intentional–of securing the 
Pentagon’s long term access to island bases.”95  
Harris makes the point that we need to be more critical of conservation and wildlife 
initiatives initiated by the federal government in areas they deem as “strategically important.” 
Harris argues that these initiatives are public-relations friendly ways to actually ensure future 
access to these areas in case they deem it necessary for “security purposes.” The core of his 
argument lies in the impossibility of reconciling the two objectives of military access and 
environmental protection. He argues, “Environmental regimes premised upon military 
custodianship of the natural environment are unsustainable because they are entirely dependent 
upon the continued acquiescence of a military establishment whose objective is to fight and win 
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wars, not protect the environment.”96 I agree with Harris’ analysis that these two objectives are 
irreconcilable. Connecting it directly to the situation in Guåhan, Harris writes, “Quite simply, 
overlay land can be reclaimed for military use whenever the DoD chooses. This would not be the 
case if, for example, all federally controlled areas of Guam were transferred to local Guamanian 
jurisdiction. Military stewardship of the natural environment is thus a convenient measure to 
ensure the Pentagon’s access to Guam in perpetuity.”97 
Laurel Mei-Singh terms this method of control “carceral conservationism,” which she 
defines as “the territorial compromise between grassroots efforts for environmental self-
determination and state imperatives to control land and natural resources.”98 With Harris’s 
justification of military creation of wildlife refuges, the picture becomes clear that the carceral 
aspect of conservationism is in keeping indigenous peoples (in our case, CHamorus) out of land 
they may need to use in the future. From a Gramscian perspective, the hegemony of conservation 
is in its benign face. It becomes extremely difficult to argue against federal control of wildlife 
refuges because to do so makes one seem “anti-conservation.” On a discursive level, wildlife 
refuges become a sufficient target for a Lakoffian framing analysis. Linguist George Lakoff argues 
the importance of framing in politics. He gives the example of “tax relief.” Conservatives utilize 
this frame of “tax relief” to make taxes appear as a burden or at worse, a disease. Lakoff argues 
that invoking the frame and saying one is against “tax relief” makes it seem as if one is opposed 
to helping lift a burden.99 Lakoff encourages us to change the frame, not negate the frame. In a 
similar fashion, the creation of the “conservation” frame makes resistance more difficult. 
From an environmental perspective, however, the latest fight over the military buildup in 
the island reveals how the “conservation” aspect of the wildlife refuge is expendable in the name 
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of military interests and “national security.” With the revised plans for the buildup outlined in the 
Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS), the Ritidian Unit of the Guam Wildlife 
Refuge is set to be affected. To quote at length the effects of the Live Fire Range Training Complex 
(LFTRC) on terrestrial biological resources, 
The primary impact from these projects would be the potential loss of native inhabitant 
and the increased potential for the spread of invasive species. All five resource areas 
would be significantly impacted by the direct and indirect impacts of the LFTRC and 
cantonment combinations, except there would be a less than significant impact on native 
vegetation for all combinations. The adverse impacts would occur during construction 
and operations phases. Most of the projects require ground disturbance, and the 
assumption is that terrestrial biological resources would be affected. The terrestrial 
biological resource health on Guam would continue to decline and threatened and 
endangered species would continue to be vulnerable to natural and anthropogenic 
stressors.100 
In the SEIS, with the LFTRC being located at Northwest Field, the Department of the Navy writes 
that parts of the wildlife refuge would be disturbed because of surface danger zones and 
development of land. Constructing this live fire range training complex at Northwest Field would 
have the following effects: significant impact to vegetation due to the conversion of 219 acres of 
limestone forest to developed area, conversion of 298 acres of Overlay Refuge lands to developed 
area, impacts to 215 acres of Mariana fruit bat recovery habitat, 215 acres of Mariana crow 
recovery habitat, and lastly, 215 acres of Guam Micronesian kingfisher recovery habitat.  
The military plans outlined in the SEIS here show the truth behind Harris’ argument. This 
land was taken and touted as a refuge for endangered species, limestone forests, and particular 
species of tree. However, as soon as the military prepares for missions to “protect” national 
security, the conservation objective gets subjugated to the periphery demonstrating that the long-
term goal of genuine security and conservation will never come first. So, when scholars such as 
anthropologist Lisa Meierotto write, “Militarization and conservation may have different motives, 
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but they both aim to protect the nation and its resources,” places like Guåhan dig the grave of her 
argument and throw it six feet deep. She is half right in that the military does aim to protect the 
nation’s resources, but in our case we have two complications: first, our place within the American 
nation-state and second, the securitization of protection of the “nation’s” resources usually means 
the destruction of Guåhan’s environment to secure U.S. national resources. Former Guåhan 
Senator, Fernando Esteves, describes the scenario in Guåhan well regarding “military 
environmentalism,” saying 
The military has come off as environmentally friendly but consider green ammo. It was 
supposed to be environmentally friendly, but it was carcinogenic. They knew for years, 
for like four years, but they only stopped using it when they ran out of stock. It’s going to 
come out that you are being anti-patriotic; anti-military, but it’s not that. Justice is justice. 
Justice sought against our own should be fought just as hard because there is something 
bigger at stake.101 
Mitigation and False Stewardship: The More Subtle Performance of Death 
And to here we return. The subtle performance of death, the horseman of the apocalypse 
in slow violence’s name: mitigation. In this subsection, I analyze the mitigation efforts included 
in the SEIS by the Department of the Defense to “mitigate” the effects to their conservation effort. 
Put differently, I analyze the ways they have tried to justify their disregard for their military 
environmentalism. I also examine the discourse of “partnership” utilized by the military to keep 
up the appearance of environmentalism. I argue that the military invokes a “partnership” in order 
to mask the serious power hierarchy exercised in these military activity decisions.  
In the SEIS, to mitigate the conversion of 780 acres of limestone forest, they outline their 
plan to enhance another 780 acres located elsewhere. Regarding the conservation of the animals 
in the wildlife refuge, the Navy agreed to designate approximately 5,234 acres under the custody 
and control of the DoD to a “status that will provide durable habitat protection needed to support 
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native habitat restoration and land management for the survival and recovery of the kingfisher.”102 
A critical analysis of this potential mitigation leads one to be skeptical. Placing the habitat under 
the custody and control of the DoD is handing control to an entity whose primary objective in 
Guåhan is to maintain military preparedness. As is evident in this dissertation thus far, national 
security becomes the epistemological baseline for all military activities, and the conservation of 
an endangered species is not the highest on a national security priority list, unless the species’ 
decimation would incite public outrage causing a potential threat to the smooth functioning of 
national security. However, even at that, protest does not stop the war machine. As Guåhan senator 
Sabina Perez said in an interview, “Mitigation is a farce. It is not an equal and fair process. If you 
are not allowed in the decision making. A lot of these environmental laws privilege the federal 
projects because it says they will consider, not necessarily avoid the impacts. They can still go 
forward with the project. The federal government has an upper hand.”103 Continuing, she says, 
“The whole cumulative mitigations have led us to this point where our environment is damaged. 
It is a constant degradation of our land because they aren’t really protecting, they’re destroying 
and then compensating us for something less than what they destroyed.”104 
To get a glimpse of the biodiversity argument, the same section of the SEIS argues that, 
“The Department of the Navy (DON) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) 
recognize the designation of the 5,234 acres may also provide a conservation benefit to other ESA-
listed species with similar habitat requirements (e.g. Mariana Crow, Mariana Fruit Bat).”105 In 
building cantonment facilities for the new troops, “there would be a loss of 765 acres of occupied 
moth skink and Pacific slender-toed gecko habitat.”106 To lessen this, the military argues that the 
mitigation they are planning for vegetation will also benefit the moth skink and Pacific slender-
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toed gecko, and that no additional mitigation is needed beyond this. To alleviate the effects of 
family housing activities on terrestrial conservation areas, the only potential mitigation is fencing 
the area, educational signage, monitoring of visitor use, and educational materials regarding 
sensitive biological resources.  
I now turn to a presentation given by Lisa Fiedler named “DoD Environmental Stewardship 
in the Marianas: Now and in the Future,” in which DoD representatives display their history and 
plans for military environmentalism to its fullest extent. To begin the presentation, Fiedler argues 
that DoD is a sound steward of the environment and that the Navy has an impressive track record 
of stewardship, thus the military buildup will produce the same benefits. The first project described 
was the Cycad collaboration with the University of Guam (UOG), in which DoD and UOG helped 
eliminate some of the pests harming the cycad trees in the island. The presentation then goes on to 
show the military’s investment in helping to fight erosion of lands on their federal footprint as well 
as the planting of acacia trees to produce a shade to stop wildfires. At the end of this presentation, 
Fiedler proclaims that the results of their environmental work will benefit everyone, not just DoD. 
This leads to the following discussion on the military’s attempt at displaying themselves as being 
in partnership with Guåhan in the protection of the environment.107 
Despite the SEIS showing the contradictions between military activities and contradictions, 
the military has tried to maintain the appearance of environmental stewards. They have done this 
primarily through the invocation of a “partnership” discourse relationship and the “One Guam” 
approach. The “One Guam” and the subsequent “Green Guam” approach was first proclaimed by 
Under Secretary of the Navy Robert Work during a visit to Guam on January 20, 2011. In his 
statement, Work fully describes the “mitigation” mission at the heart of the Department of 
Defense-Guåhan colonial and hierarchical relationship. He writes on the “One Guam” approach, 
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DoD recognized the added strain that additional Marines and their family members will 
place on Guam’s infrastructure. We are committed to improving the quality of life for 
both the proud people who call Guam their home and the military personnel based on the 
island. Improvements in the quality of life will result from direct investments in projects 
to improve and upgrade Guam infrastructure. These projects will reflect a combination of 
requests by the government of Guam and those identified by the environmental impact 
study, performed by DoD to study the effects of the build-up.108 
Similarly, his “Green Guam” approach is described as, 
DoD understands and supports the great emphasis the people of Guam place on 
protecting the island’s environmental resources. We have projects underway with the 
Guam Power Authority, Guam Waterworks Authority, University of Guam, Department 
of Energy and other federal agencies to bring public and private funds to Guam for 
sustainable projects…In addition, DoD is committed to developing the most energy 
efficient infrastructure possible, with a goal of converting all DoD bases on Guam into 
“net zero” energy users over time.109 
Lastly, Work calls for the creation of a Civilian-Military Coordination Council which will help 
ensure that the buildup moves forward based on mutual agreement. However, I argue that this 
simply cannot be the case due to Guåhan’s status as an unincorporated territory under the “plenary 
power” of Congress. The most that can be achieved here is a cushioning of the blow, a band-aid 
to the possible environmental infection. This is yet another manifestation of the hierarchical 
Federal-Territorial relationship Guåhan experiences with the United States.  
 After this “One Guam” and “Green Guam” approach, the military has continuously 
invoked this mutual partnership approach in how it proceeds with the military buildup of the island. 
For example, in her letter to the Pacific Daily News, former Commander of Joint Region Marianas 
Bette Bolivar writes, “The strong partnership between the military and local communities in Guam 
is an indicator of the many great things to come in the next few years. As we move forward, I am 
confident that we will continue to foster our relationships.”110 Supplementing this, in her outgoing 
speech to the people of Guåhan, Bolivar passionately addressed the crowd, exclaiming, “Put 
                                               
108 “Under SECNAV Releases Statement Following Visit to Guam,” Department of the Navy, Accessed October 
2018, https://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=58119 
109 “Under SECNAV Releases Statement Following Visit to Guam,” Department of the Navy. 
110 Bette Bolivar, “Navy committed to One Guam,” Pacific Daily News, January 1, 2016, 
https://www.guampdn.com/story/opinion/2015/12/31/navy-committed-one-guam/78116194/ 
 235 
simply, that means while some of us wear a military uniform to work every day and some of us 
don’t, we are similar people with similar life goals and I truly believe that we can all work 
together.”111 Lastly, the new Commander, Shoshanna Chatfield, said, “We are grateful to our 
partners from the government of Guam for their continued partnership.”112 Unfortunately, some in 
the community have bought into this belief of the military as a green and excellent environmental 
steward. In a hearing regarding the military buildup, a columnist of the Pacific Daily News, Paul 
Zerzan, testified before the legislature, saying that the military does a better job of taking care of 
the land than the people of the community. Furthermore, he says, “I have every doubt that the 
people here would be good stewards of the land.”113 
 This emphasis on partnership is a ruse, meant to induce complacency in the population of 
the island. Michael Lujan Bevacqua analyzes the problematics of partnership in Guåhan, writing,  
The military routinely promotes the idea of its actions being taken though a partnership 
with Guam’s community. Local leaders invoke the same ideas, when they want to put a 
positive spin on things that are actually out of their control…On Monday, they may pay 
to play the partnership game. But this may not be the case from Tuesday to Sunday. The 
rest of the week, their interests are their own.114  
So, truly analyzing the power held over the island by the United States, one can see how they have 
the ability to call the shots day-by-day, without any consistency except that they exercise an 
immense amount of power over the island. Overall, we can see the connections between this 
chapter and the last. The destruction of the environment leads to the military forming a “One 
Guam” approach that provides infrastructure improvement to an island that faces economic 
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shortfalls. Economic dependency is also fueled by a history of stolen land and environmental 
contamination. The pieces of the colonial and militarized puzzle all fit well with one another.  
VI. I FINAKPO’ (CONCLUSION) 
In a conversation, Robert Underwood discussed the idea of keeping a balance sheet that 
would keep track of all the mitigation efforts and initiatives taken on by the military contrasted 
against the extent of contamination their activities in the island have caused. Throughout the 
chapter, I have made clear that the environmental issue is not an isolated one, but rather a 
metastasized manifestation of our status as a militarized unincorporated territory. Economy, land 
dispossession, and environmental contamination are not separate issues, but rather highly 
entangled realities of life in everyday Guåhan. When taken together as a collective, the balance 
sheet becomes quite complicated with various twists and turns as well as secondary and tertiary 
effects. However, what this chapter has made clear in conjunction with the previous chapters is 
that the military has clearly had a more negative impact on the environment, than they have a 
positive impact here. This chapter also shows that Paul Zerzan’s notion that the military is a better 
environmental steward of the land than the local people here is not empirically supportable, as they 
have been one of the largest contaminators of the environment here. Demonstrating the falsity of 
Zerzan’s notion for academic purposes is not the goal of this chapter. The stakes are much higher 
than this. What I hope this chapter can do is help show the rest of Guåhan the danger of buying 
into notions as Zerzan’s. When people believe that the military is a good environmental steward 
or that their mitigation efforts are enough, the livelihoods of our children are at stake. The literal 
land and water source they will depend on is threatened as long as ideas such as his are prevalent 
in the discursive sphere of the island.  
From PCBs to TCE to a permanent state of environmental mitigation, the DoD’s treatment 
of Guåhan’s environment, I argue, constitutes environmental violence and insecurity. Through an 
examination of the politics of doubt regarding the Agent Orange issue, I argued that political power 
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manifests itself not only in visible oppression, but also in the clouds of doubt in a state of 
epistemological violence. Power, along with the passing of time, is what prolongs resolution of 
these controversial issues. Power is also what constitutes the delay in cleanup as the power of 
technicality and bureaucracy plays a large role. Another important concluding point is that in this 
chapter, I only scratched the surface of Guåhan’s contaminated sites and the clean-up actions taken 
to mitigate the impact. However, what I hope the reader has gained is at least a rudimentary 
understanding of the variety and simultaneous commonality of contamination in Guåhan due to 
military activities and operations, as well as the methods by which this insecurity is made 
sustainable via purported mitigation efforts. 
With geopolitics, land dispossession, economy, and now environmental contamination 
examined as part of the form-of-life of a militarized, unincorporated territory, the next chapter 
deals specifically with the question, “Why are there not 10,000 people protesting in the streets?” 
This chapter and the previous chapter have helped to show the material manifestation of power in 
producing a state of sustainable insecurity in the island and amongst its people. The next chapter 
outlines World War II and the “liberation” framework as it is important to understanding the lack 
of widespread resistance in the island. Without an understanding of World War II, one simply 
cannot understand the contemporary picture of life in Guåhan. The next chapter examines the 





Chapter 5: Frosted Boundaries: The Crisis of Imaginative Insecurity 
“It's all real in Outside, everything there is, because I saw an airplane in the blue between the 




In Emma Donaghue’s national bestselling novel and academy-award nominated motion 
picture, Room, 7-year old Jack and his “Ma” live their entire lives in an eleven by eleven-foot 
enclosed space. Ma was kidnapped as a teenager and imprisoned within this room where she was 
raped and impregnated with Jack, giving birth to him in Room. Room is Jack’s entire world. It is 
the limit of his experiences and understanding of the world. Jack has never played with other 
children, never ran through a field with the wind in his face or swam in the deep blue of the ocean. 
Outside of his eleven by eleven existence, his only exposure to the Outside is through what he can 
see out of the narrow window of Room or through the television provided to him and Ma by the 
mysterious “Old Nick,” Ma’s kidnapper and Jack’s biological father. For Jack, “Old Nick” is the 
one that provides for them. He buys them their food, clothes, and other necessary items for their 
livelihood.  
Up until the middle of the book, Jack is not cognizant of the violence Old Nick inflicts on 
his mother, his health, and his ability to experience the world. Only later in the book does Jack 
realize that he and Ma have the potential to escape Room and drastically expand their horizons 
and quality of life. For many living in Guåhan, they wake only to see Jack as their reflection in the 
mirror hoping Old Nick (the U.S. military in Guåhan’s case) gives us something better with each 
passing week.2 As the quote opening this chapter describes, CHamorus see the metaphorical 
airplane of a life not dependent on the U.S. military, but they truly believe that they do not know 
the secret code of existing on our own. From statements like Guåhan businessman Carl Petersen’s, 
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“If the U.S. left, it wouldn’t be long before China would run everything in Guam,”3 to Guam 
resident Virgie Matson, responding to the North Korea threat saying, “I feel that the presence of 
the military on Guam will help us a lot, they are here to protect the islands, just in case something 
happens,”4 we seem to be psychologically trapped in the eleven-by-eleven colonial cage of a 
militarized, unincorporated territory.  
In the beginning of the book, Jack and Ma use recycled cereal boxes to make a ruler. After 
measuring Ma’s nose and feet, Jack asks Ma to measure the dimensions of Room. They begin by 
measuring the various dimensions of Room such as “Door Wall, Roof, and Bed Wall.” This small 
portion of the book makes it known to the reader that Jack is starting to become curious about the 
composition of Room and its dimensions. What makes Room, Room? With equal curiosity, this 
chapter acts as a measuring tape exploring and analyzing the crevices of our form-of-life here in 
Guåhan as a militarized, unincorporated territory. The prior chapters aimed, through evidence and 
analysis, to shatter the illusion that the U.S. military makes Guåhan “secure” either in a traditional 
sense or in broader definitions of security such as environmental and economic security and has 
demonstrated how these insecurities have been made sustainable through mitigations or 
dependency. I reiterate Robert Underwood’s burning question, “Why are there not 10,000 people 
protesting in the streets?”5 This chapter is in no shape or form a perfect answer to Underwood’s 
question, but is rather an attempt to examine the discursive, cultural, and psychological forms of 
control used to legitimate military presence in the island and to sustain insecurity. With the shards 
of security hanging, this chapter explores the crevices and aims to find the glue holding the 
military’s structure of insecurity together. 
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The decision to dedicate an entire chapter to look at the discursive, cultural, and 
psychological factors of Guåhan’s dependence, embrace, acceptance, or even acquiescence to the 
current militarized circumstance is an attempt to provide a stronger foundation in my excavation 
of  sustainable insecurity. Why do CHamorus hold on to the myths that either a) the military keeps 
Guåhan secure (or, is this a byproduct of their presence or the reason for their presence?) or b) we 
could not provide this security for ourselves as an autonomous political entity. It is insufficient to 
provide an analysis of the material factors of (in)security without engaging in the immaterial, as 
they are intimately intertwined. In his groundbreaking book, Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz 
Fanon analyzes and excavates these psychological components of colonialism. In chapter four, 
“The So-Called Dependency Complex Of The Colonized,” Fanon argues that the problem of 
colonization does not only consist of looking at the historical and objective conditions of a people 
and place, but also includes a person’s attitude toward these conditions.6 Glen Coulthard further 
describes Fanon’s argument, writing,  
In actual contexts of domination (such as colonialism), not only are the terms of 
recognition usually determined by and in the interests of the master, but also over time 
slave populations (the colonized) tend to develop what he called “psycho-affective” 
attachments to these master-sanctioned forms of recognition, and that this attachment is 
essential in maintaining the economic and political structure.7   
Thus, colonialism is perpetuated and sustained through both the subjective and objective factors, 
and not one of these alone or by itself. Building on this, Fanon writes, “the black man must wage 
the struggle on two levels, whereas historically these levels are mutually dependent, any unilateral 
liberation is flawed, and the worst mistake would be to believe their mutual dependence 
automatic.”8 Thus, while the subjective, psychological factors of colonialism and the colonial, 
objective infrastructure together make up the foundation for colonial exploitation, they also can 
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operate outside of each other. This is important in looking at Guåhan’s present. Despite the 
material conditions telling a different story of security, the subjective factors and perceptions of 
militarization continue to help legitimize this sustainable insecurity. 
This chapter is divided into two sections, each dedicated to examining a piece of the 
discursive puzzle in invisibilizing or diminishing the violences wrought onto the people of Guåhan. 
The first section takes a deeper look at World War II and, in particular, how the “cultures of 
commemoration”9 surrounding the war were used to instill a “liberation” framework into the 
Guåhan collective psyche. From this, I argue, the United States created the conditions of possibility 
to ensure hegemony and continued military access to CHamoru land. I highlight World War II and 
its aftermath as the discursive fulcrum for Guåhan’s present militarization. Building on this history 
of war’s creative transformation, the second section analyzes the normalization of militarization 
in Guåhan via military service and the use of the CHamoru family structure as a method of 
sustainable enlistment. In this analysis, I examine the ways that patriotism and support of the troops 
gets utilized in the name of empire. Through these collective analyses, I hope to offer a better 
understanding of the various psychological and discursive forces that keep the masses off the 
streets despite evidence that the military does not make the island “secure.”  
I. UNCLE SAM, MY DEAR UNCLE SAM, WON’T YOU PLEASE COME BACK TO GUAM? 
Early Monday morning the action came to Guam 
Eighth of December, 1941 
Oh Uncle Sam, Sam, My Dear Uncle Sam 
Won’t You Please Come Back to Guam?10 
The lyrics above are the chorus of a popular song sung by the CHamoru people during the 
Japanese occupation of the island from 1941-1944 where CHamorus, near the end of the war, 
pleaded for the U.S. military to return and defeat the Japanese occupiers of the island. This period 
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of Guåhan history is particularly brutal with beheadings, rapes, and massacres occurring in 
multiplicity. In the southern village of Malesso’, the Japanese gathered those they believed to be 
the most intimidating or pro-American. Teachers, parents with sons in the military, and those who 
showed a semblance of resistance to the Japanese were led to a cave in Tinta where they were 
bayoneted and killed, with only a few survivors.11 Not long after, they gathered thirty of the 
strongest men in the same village and massacred them once again in a cave near Fåha.  
Unfortunately, there were no survivors of this atrocity. One of the saddest events of this Japanese 
period were the Fena Cave Massacres, where multiple young women were raped by Japanese 
soldiers and subsequently killed. Many CHamorus remember the war as being the most difficult 
part of their lives. My grandmother, Estella Meno Gofigan, was six years old when the war started 
and nine years old when the war ended. During this time, her older sisters were beaten, she was 
forced to march to a concentration camp in Manenggon, lost her father due to a heat stroke, and 
had a bullet graze her arm just a few inches from her chest. Although young during the war, it 
stays with her today; a dark passenger accompanying her every journey. She still flinches at any 
unexpected sound whether it be a car backfiring or a plastic cup dropping on our kitchen floor. 
On July 21, 1944, the U.S. military returned to the island to fight the Japanese and reoccupy 
this strategically located piece of real estate that would help ensure hegemony in the region. 
Through a bombing campaign that flattened much of the island and a subsequent ground invasion, 
the Americans were able to reoccupy the island and push the Japanese out. They would then use 
the island as a basing station to finish the war in the Pacific. While a purely military analysis of 
this retaking and reoccupation may be labeled as simply that: a retaking, the survivors of World 
War II remember it quite differently. My grandma remembers how the Marines who came to the 
island gave her food and candy. She remembers the joy of the other people in the camp at seeing 
the Americans, who were tall and white, and looked like giants who freed them from the camp and 
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provided for them. Most importantly, my grandmother remembers this event as one of liberation. 
She views the U.S. military as heroes and liberators. She thanks them for saving her life and her 
family’s life and is very grateful for their deeds. In this section, I argue that the dominant 
commemoration of World War II and its aftermath served as the condition of possibility for the 
transformation of the island into a giant military base that is hegemonically viewed as beneficial 
to the island. As Michael Lujan Bevacqua writes, “World War II thus becomes ‘the war’ and can 
be invoked as a single word reply to answering any number of Guam history questions related to 
land, military service, military bases, the Chamorro social calendar, Chamorro identity and the 
identity of Guam itself.”12 
I identify World War II as this fulcrum point of transformation because only after the war 
do CHamorus start truly assimilating and identifying as Americans. During the naval 
administration of the island beginning in 1898, CHamorus did not have strong desires to assimilate 
to American culture or to learn English, despite them using the rhetoric of patriotism to achieve 
political rights, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Before the war, there was an organized 
attempt by the navy to assimilate and discipline CHamorus. From hygiene to recreation to 
education, the social realm of the CHamoru became a zone of contestation and infiltration for the 
American navy to exploit. As Anne Perez Hattori argues, “The Navy saw it their duty to transform 
the Chamorro populace into a modern American society, into a people who would be … 
productive, disciplined, and educated.”13 Yet, this American project failed. As Robert Underwood 
writes of CHamoru subjectivity before the war, “The Chamorro people were not Americans, did 
not see themselves as American-in-waiting, and probably did not care much about being 
American.”14 Yet, this all changes after the war, and to demonstrate this, I turn to language. One 
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can analyze the difference in CHamoru acceptance of the United States of America through the 
change in intergenerational transmission of the indigenous CHamoru language, Fino’ CHamoru. I 
qualify that studying language shift before and after the war is telling of a larger psychological 
transformation because languages act as a memory bank and storage place of a worldview. 
Language is epistemology and a zone of sovereignty. The language one speaks reflects a wider 
cultural picture, and in a colonial context, demonstrates the effectiveness of hierarchical power 
relations. Ngũgĩ Wa Thiong’o, writes in Decolonising The Mind: The Politics of Language in 
African Literature, “The choice of language and the use to which language is put is central to a 
people’s definition of themselves in relation to their natural and social environment, indeed in 
relation to the entire universe.”15 Language was a powerful tool of colonization because language 
does not simply include words, but rather has a suggestive power beyond the surface meaning of 
words. When one learns a language, one learns to view the world in that language’s cultural lens, 
and thus is a good indicator of cultural change. 
As soon as the first naval governor of the island, Richard Leary, assumed his position, 
acculturating CHamorus became integral to the transition from Spanish control to American 
control. Some of the first general orders of the governor included banning the large village parties 
called fiestas (since they each had a patron saint and reinforced Catholic beliefs), prohibiting 
religious processions, and most pertinent, ensuring that CHamorus were instructed in the English 
language via General Order No. 12.16 As stated in the order, it was expected that “the present force 
of native teachers will cheerfully and harmoniously cooperate with the teachers of English that the 
greatest benefits may be derived by both scholars and preceptors.”17 Seventeen years later, General 
Order No. 243 banned the speaking of Fino’ CHamoru by “designating English as the only official 
language of Guam and ordered that Chamorro must not be spoken except for official 
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interpreting.”18 To encourage the public use of English, the naval government also forbade the 
speaking of Fino’ CHamoru on baseball fields, so that any child who wanted to play this new and 
exciting sport introduced to the island had to learn this new language. In the school system, 
corporal punishment and monetary fines were implemented if a child spoke CHamoru during class 
time. My grandmother, who grew up in a poor family, only had a nickel a day to buy her lunch, 
and often had this nickel taken away from her because she spoke CHamoru in school. She vividly 
remembers the hunger pangs she experienced while watching her classmates eat lunch in the 
cafeteria.19  
Yet, despite all of this, CHamorus were still not using English as their primary language in 
their homes, and this greatly frustrated the Americans. In 1916, Governor Smith wrote, “They do 
not learn English as rapidly as they should … Appointments and promotions under the island and 
Federal governments are now subject to requirements in English.”20 Yet, even the enticements of 
jobs and promotions did not cause language shift. In a 1921 report, naval governor Wettengel, 
wrote of the stagnation of English, “The defects of the schools are emphasized by the small number 
of school children who can speak English with any degree of efficiency.”21 This concern was 
repeated years later by naval governor Adelbert Althouse. During his time in Guåhan, he was 
equally as frustrated at the lack of progress of English fluency. He argued that the problem was 
that schoolchildren had “no background of home assistance either in the matter of English or 
knowledge of the parent,”22 thus demonstrating that English had not yet become the language of 
the CHamoru home. In his frustration, Althouse ordered the burning of CHamoru dictionaries, 
which is quite comedic, considering that it was the navy that commissioned the creation of that 
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dictionary in the first place.23 Even after this event, CHamorus still did not switch to English. In 
1934, Governor Alexander wrote, “After 36 years of American occupation it is discouraging that 
the language of the United States is not in more general use among the native people.”24 This 
analysis of the language situation before the war is meant to show that many CHamorus before the 
war did not have a strong desire to acculturate into the American culture and English language, 
and thus did not have a strong American identity or subjectivity.25 
Fast forward to the present, and the language is in a dire state. In the 2010 census, only 
16% of the population reported to have spoken Fino’ CHamoru, roughly 25,827 speakers.26 It was 
also reported that 44% of households in Guåhan use English as the only language of 
communication.27 The language’s reach has also quite diminished. In teaching CHamoru language 
classes in the past at the University of Guam, there is one question I asked my students on the first 
day of class. I asked them to tell me where we can find the CHamoru language here in Guåhan. 
Their answers thus far have been the same throughout; one can find it the southern part of the 
island, in the rosaries said after someone dies, and most especially, amongst the elders. This is the 
truth as 70% of the total CHamoru speakers are over the age of 55 with only 4% of speakers being 
30 years of age or younger.28 Mathematically, this means that those who are 55 and younger were 
born in 1963, making them the children of those who survived the war. The linguistic demography 
provided here helps to show that something changes after the war. In the life of a roughly 3,000-
year old language, the only glaring trend of language decline and intergenerational transmission 
of English over the CHamoru language occurs after World War II, not before the war despite 
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attempts at elevating English at the expense of Fino’ CHamoru. This helps to show that it was only 
after the war, that giving up one’s language, as a sign of Americanization and assimilation becomes 
effective. Through this, CHamorus accept their new political subjectivities as aspiring Americans. 
This telling sign of a sociocultural shift in identity and political subjectivity does not come 
in a vacuum.  Something happened during and after the war that set the stage for this shift, and we 
can forensically catch this colonial culprit in the form of the dominant narratives of the 
commemorations of World War II. Camacho argues that CHamoru survivors of the war 
internalized the “liberation” of Guåhan into their ways of thinking, receiving, and sharing. If one 
were forced to choose one word to describe the CHamoru relationship with the United States, 
“liberation” may be the most pertinent.  
Michael Lujan Bevacqua illustrates this in his article, “The Scene of Liberation.” He argues 
that in the scene of Manenggon, which is the camp where my grandmother was forced by the 
Japanese to stay near the end of the war, we see a physical performance of the current hierarchical 
relationship between the CHamoru and the U.S. military. All the elements of the relationship can 
be found in this one scene: the brutal Japanese soldier, the starving and weak CHamoru, and the 
brave American soldier.29 The brave American soldier kills the Japanese soldier and saves the 
CHamorus who are emaciated, sick, and starving. The soldiers then provide for the weak CHamoru 
through candy, cigarettes, and canned goods like Spam. CHamorus are the perpetual damsel in 
distress, in need of saving, and the military is the knight in camouflaged armor. After World War 
II, it seems as if this archetype has remained the same, with only the villain (the Japanese soldier) 
shape-shifting30 to other characters such as China, North Korea, poverty, economic stagnation, and 
many others. Bevacqua describes World War II as a scene, explaining “A scene is not a literal 
moment, but rather the way in which a certain particular historical moment achieves a certain 
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valorized character and can end up feeling more real than the reality of the history it is meant to 
represent.”31 Guåhan seems to be hierarchically frozen in time, and this dominant narrative of 
liberation is the freezer keeping us loyal to the United States, despite the passage of 72 years since 
the war. 
This creation of a pacified population is not only done through material means, but requires 
a discursive and psychological medium as well. In Guåhan, this commemoration of World War II 
proved to be a strong medium which the U.S. military helped craft and subsequently capitalized 
on. Camacho writes that, “The rhetoric of loyalty has been invented as a form of social control.”32 
A loyal, colonized society implies an obedient, pacified population. The politics of war and 
memory are entangled with one another, and in regions such as the Pacific Islands, which have 
been stuck in the middle of geopolitical conflicts, understanding this entanglement is of paramount 
importance. The mixture of trauma, adrenaline, and historiography all converge to muddy the 
waters of clarity surrounding the war.  
In their anthology, Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s), T Fujitani, Geoffrey 
White, and Lisa Yoneyama write,  
Memory production concerning imagined collectivities is never simply about the 
politically disinterested recovery of a pure and undiluted past…There is no one-to-one 
correspondence between a discrete experience and a particular memory, for even 
experience itself might come to us through mediation. Experience and memory, in other 
words, are already mediated and this mediation in turn is always shaped by relations of 
power.33 
The words of George Orwell never get old in this regard, especially when presented as a rap lyric 
in the popular Rage Against The Machine song ‘Bulls on Parade’: “He who controls the past, 
controls the future. He who controls the present now, controls the past.”34 Power is essential in 
                                               
31 Michael Lujan Bevacqua, “The Scene of Liberation.” 
32 Michael Lujan Bevacqua, “The Scene of Liberation,” 20.  
33 T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama, Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s) 
(Durham/London: Duke University Press, 2000), 1.  
34 George Orwell, 1984 (New York: Random House, 1992). 
 249 
understanding which narratives get passed down to future generations. Writing on the role of 
power, Yoneyama argues that, “the production of knowledge about the past is always enmeshed 
in the exercise of power and is always accompanied by elements of repression.”35 Narratives of 
the past consistently compete with one another to claim the status of truth, and power is the method 
in which one narrative can bury another. Native scholar Thomas King writes, “The truth about 
stories is that that’s all we are.”36 This is an incredibly powerful technique of control. Controlling 
stories is controlling what people believe about themselves, their potential, and their imaginations. 
Power is a discursive shovel digging the graves of alternative narratives of the war. 
 I argue that World War II made it possible for the creation of power necessary to hammer 
the head of the nail of colonialism and its subsequent ramifications on memory and 
commemoration. This scene of liberation culminating after the war is obviously rooted in the war, 
and a better understanding of the psychological effects of war in itself is useful in understanding 
the creation of the discursive power of loyalty. Michael Waller and Andrew Linklater write, “new 
loyalties lack strong emotional attachment until they survive real tests and have been hallowed by 
time—or have been sealed by a compact, formal or informal.”37 World War II served as the 
compact cementing CHamoru loyalty to the United States of America. Camacho discusses the 
similarities between the Japanese and American colonial governments, writing, “They separately 
concurred that the processes involving the colonization of Chamorros could not be fully 
implemented without first securing and guaranteeing their loyalty to the nation in power.”38 Our 
perpetual scene of liberation is loyalty, patriotism, and dependence all rolled into one, and all 
solidified through war. War has a phenomenological and psychologically unique niche in the realm 
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of human experience, and tends to haunt those it visits. As William James writes, war is the “gory 
nurse that trained societies to cohesiveness…martial values are the enduring cement.”39 
Middle East war reporter Chris Hedges spent most of his life in war zones such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan and has experienced everything from being kidnapped to almost being killed. In his 
semi-memoir, War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, Hedges describes the range of emotions 
and transformational experience of war. In describing his experience, he argues that war forms its 
own culture. He writes that war “dominates culture, distorts memory, corrupts language, and 
infects everything, even humor, which becomes preoccupied with the perversities of smut and 
death.”40 Even more brutally honest, Hedges argues that war “can give us purpose, meaning, a 
reason for living. Only when we are in the midst of conflict does the shallowness and vapidness 
of much of our lives become apparent.”41 Although calling war a rational instrument for state 
interests, even war theorist Clausewitz understood how emotions are closely entangled with war. 
Emotions and passion compose one of the three components of the Clausewitzian trinity of war 
along with reason and chance/probability.42 Wars are not just violent, they are pavers of roads. 
Hedges begins his book by describing his time in Sarajevo in 1995, which was part of the 
now-dissolved Yugoslavia. He remembers literally slipping in the blood and entrails of the dead 
and hearing the bloodcurdling screams of the maimed and disfigured. When the war ended, he 
recollects sitting with a group of friends who survived the Yugoslavian Civil War. As they sat, 
they recalled fearing for their lives, being emaciated, having no water and no electricity, yet they 
also distinctly remembered what the war had given them. It gave them meaning. In a seemingly 
illogical spin, the brutality of war gave them a reason to live. He writes,  
Peace had again exposed the void that the rush of war, of battle, had filled. Once again 
they were, as perhaps as we all are, alone, no longer bound by that common sense of 
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struggle, no longer given the opportunity to be noble, heroic, no longer sure what life was 
about or what it meant.43 
War leaves a psychological void. I am not arguing that CHamorus missed the war or felt as if the 
war became their reason to live, but rather I aim to show how war can be a metaphorical paver of 
roads. War is not only a destroyer of worlds, but also a creator of worlds, both inside our heads 
and outside. The conclusion of the Revolutionary War was a condition of possibility for the 
creation of the United States just as some argue the War on Terror led to the creation of the 
powerful terrorist group, ISIS or that World War I led to the creation of the modern Middle East 
with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. War has the ability to make possible what was not 
possible before.  
In her book, The Shock Doctrine, The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, Naomi Klein describes 
the effects that large natural disasters, wars, and other large-scale events can have on political 
landscapes and controversial legislation. The example she opens her book with is Hurricane 
Katrina, which pummeled Louisiana in 2005, killing around 1,245 people. Richard Baker, a 
congressman from Louisiana, seemed to be thankful for the hurricane, writing, “We finally cleaned 
up public housing in New Orleans. We couldn’t do it, but God did.”44 Sharing his sentiment, New 
Orleans developer, Joseph Canizaro, said, “I think we have a clean sheet to start again. And with 
that clean sheet, we have some very big opportunities.”45 The idea behind these statements is that 
these large-scale events can shock a population and allow for a clean slate for those in power to 
pave their preferred realities. One waits for a crisis and then when the population is still distracted, 
one can make permanent reforms. Milton Friedman, one of the fathers of neoliberal capitalism, 
observed,  
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Only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the 
actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our 
basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and 
available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.46 
Crises, such as war, produce the condition of possibility for forms of social, political, and economic 
engineering. The previous chapters showed the material manifestations of Guåhan’s militarization, 
and a significant portion of sustainable insecurity lies in the CHamoru relationship to the U.S. 
military after the war. This loyalty, I argue, is a form of social engineering crafting the colonial 
hierarchy and sense of American superiority in the CHamoru psyche. 
Through the creation of this new frame of commemoration, “liberation,” American 
acculturation and CHamoru feelings of loyalty to the United States, spawned as a response to the 
war, served as the lubricant to Guåhan’s transformation as an important military base. As Albert 
Memmi writes in The Colonizer and The Colonized, “The manner in which the colonialist wants 
to see himself plays a considerable role in the emergence of his final portrait.”47 Liberation or 
reoccupation? What portrait is painted? On the power of loyalty and liberation in Guåhan, Vicente 
Diaz writes, “I have memories of a war that took place before I was born. They come from stories 
told by my parents, who survived the war in the Philippines, and by CHamoru survivors of the 
Japanese occupation of Guam, where I was born. These stories inhabit my mind and body.”48 We 
are taught that we are American citizens and should be grateful to the military for saving us. I have 
witnessed loyalty’s power in my life growing up in Guåhan. I was taught this in the stories of my 
grandparents. I was taught this through the daily flag-raising and Pledge of Allegiance of my 
school’s morning assembly. I was taught this through the ubiquitous American flags around the 
island. Vicente Diaz describes this as “everyday rituals” of liberation. In addition to these everyday 
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rituals, there was also one event per year that would force one to remember the liberation 
framework: The Liberation Day Parade. 
Liberation Day is celebrated every year on July 21st and consists of a giant parade, with 
road closures, amazing barbeque, and family tents. Growing up, I remember camping out on the 
side of the road the night before the event. I played my Gameboy all night, chatted with my cousins, 
and all around had a blast. As a kid, experiencing the parade was extremely exciting. Every village 
had its float, businesses advertised and passed out candy, and the island’s dignitaries and local 
organizations all marched down the main road, Marine Corps Drive. Perhaps one of my fondest 
and most vivid memories of these parades is the marching of the various military units and ROTC 
troops. With their rifles, drums, and unitary cadence, it was a sight to see as a child. Even with the 
village and business floats, the patriotic message of these parades was to not be forgotten. Whether 
it be through banners, the parade emcees and announcers, or plethora of American flags, the day 
was a celebration of CHamorus, the United States, and the beautiful relationship the island has 
with the greatest country on earth.  
Now, it may be tempting to misconstrue the sentence above as my attempt to victimize 
CHamorus and make it appear as if CHamorus were simply duped and that the aftermath of the 
war led to a massive brainwashing. This is not the case. Guåhan history is filled with many 
examples of CHamorus resisting colonialism, land-takings, and political mistreatment. From the 
petitions for American citizenship (which also may seem as acquiescence to power, a position I 
disagree with) to the group Nasion Chamoru who fought for CHamoru landowners who had their 
land stolen by the military, the CHamoru people are not lazy and passive. Robert Underwood helps 
to demonstrate this in his article, “Red, Whitewash, and Blue,” writing, 
On Liberation Day, when the Chamorros wave the flag and thank the Marines (and 
appear to be patriotic beyond belief), they are in reality celebrating themselves and their 
own experiences. As a group, the Chamorros were heroic during the Japanese occupation 
 254 
and, if they expressed it through Reoccupation (excuse me, Liberation) Day, it is because 
these are the symbols which are made available to them.49 
It is too easy to call “victim” and seep agency away from the CHamoru people, and I hope this 
argument does not get construed in that manner. However, Underwood wrote this news article in 
1977, and 41 years later, we have seen the evolution of just how often “liberation” as a sacred 
frame of reference is invoked to justify continuing U.S. colonialism. If the CHamorus were 
celebrating themselves through these American symbols after the war, has this aspect of 
commemoration become lost today in 2018? Do a majority of our young adults and the middle-
aged demographic still view the celebration of “Liberation Day” primarily as a way to celebrate 
ourselves as CHamoru people? What I am trying to clarify here is that the nuances of CHamoru 
identity are complex and any attempt to elide the interactions of CHamoru agency, dispossession, 
and narrativization, is simplifying a complex issue. 
 While the answer to the questions above deserve a chapter on its own, but in a rather 
different dissertation, Underwood’s point that there have historically been multiple methods at 
attaching American patriotism as the defining characteristic of the post-war CHamoru to our 
commemorations is extremely relevant. Wars produce loyalties and commemoration is used to 
cement loyalty as can be captured in the words of Felix Torres Pangelinan, a CHamoru man from 
Guåhan. In a press release, he wrote, “Chamorros owe an everlasting debt to these gallant 
American men; a debt that we can never repay, but that we can show, in our humble gratitude, by 
being loyal, faithful, and patriotic to the United States of America.”50 Invoking the values of 
loyalty, patriotism, and faithfulness is used as a method of social control. It is much easier to turn 
an island with indigenous inhabitants into a giant military base if you get the acceptance of the 
people; a classic Gramscian concept of hegemony. When Gramsci writes, “If the ruling class has 
lost its consensus, i.e. is no longer ‘leading’, but only ‘dominant,’ exercising coercive force alone, 
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this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional ideologies, 
and no longer believe what they used to believe,”51 one can only think of how powerful the 
archetype of savior being attributed to a colonizer can be. In the next section, I look at the 
ramifications of this loyalty and liberation framework in the present through the various forms of 
military normalization. 
II. A MILITARY METAPHYSICS: THE OTHER FACES OF LIBERATION 
For the past three semesters, I have been teaching the class, “State and Territorial 
Government.” My focus in this class is to help students understand Guåhan’s status as an 
unincorporated territory. I begin every semester with a discussion of colonialism and its various 
modalities. To demonstrate this, I take a piece of paper, hold it up in the air and ask them what I 
have in my hands. Obviously, the students say paper. I then fold the paper in half and ask the same 
question, “What do I have in my hands?” At this point, they look at me with a funny look on their 
faces and respond “paper.” I move on to crumble the paper and ask the same question. Once again, 
with an even more confused look, they respond “paper.” Through this visual exercise, I teach them 
that colonialism comes in various forms, but at its core, it is still colonialism, reflecting Glen 
Coulthard’s idea of shape-shifting colonialism. 
Coulthard argues that colonialism is adaptive and changes shape to fit the current 
circumstances. He argues that in order to maintain its dominance temporally and spatially, colonial 
power has shape-shifted from primarily being exclusive and assimilationist in structure to 
becoming accommodating and engaging, but ultimately still hierarchical and violent.52 Mohawk 
scholar, Taiaiake Alfred, puts it best when he likens this shape-shifting as moving from being 
trapped in a rusty cage to being restrained by a brand-new chain. “The chain may offer more room 
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for us to move, but the colonial system is still the one in control.”53 We have seen this throughout 
history. Slavery becomes institutionalized racism. Institutionalized racism becomes color-blind 
views of society. Banning languages becomes celebrating cultural diversity as long as access to 
indigenous land is not impeded.  
In this section, I traverse the discursive jungles, caves, and crevices of the military’s 
legitimizing factors here in Guåhan to find the shapes of military legitimation today. The previous 
section argued that World War II and the subsequent liberation narrative attached to the war 
created the condition of possibility for the sustenance of the island into a giant military base today. 
In traversing the discursive moves in Guåhan, I am primarily analyzing the various manifestations 
of normalized militarization in Guåhan. For this, I borrow heavily from authors such as Cynthia 
Enloe, Catherine Lutz, and Chris Cuomo, who write on the seeping of militarization into the 
everyday lives of a community. Ann Laura Stoler argues that the vestiges of colonialism seem 
obvious, but rather manifest in the most unusual and inconspicuous of societal crevices. She writes,  
Colonial pasts, the narratives recounted about them, the unspoken distinctions they 
continue to ‘cue,’ the affective charges they reactivate, and the implicit ‘lessons’ they are 
mobilized to impart are so ineffably threaded through the fabric of contemporary life 
forms they seem indiscernible as distinct effects, as if everywhere and nowhere at all.54 
In a similar fashion, I look for the progeny of liberation and militarization here in Guåhan today. 
The seen and unseen, the heard and unheard, the felt and unfelt, are all important in this analysis 
of militarized normalization. 
 To begin, it is important to look at Cynthia Enloe’s notion of normalization found in 
Bananas, Beaches, and Bases. In chapter three of the book, Enloe tells the story of Okinawan 
children playing baseball in a field, when all of a sudden U.S. military planes boom across the 
skyline nearly scaring her to death. Yet, she said the kids remained calm and it seemed like they 
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did not even notice the giant aircraft above them. There is nothing alarming about the normal, it is 
the deviation from the normal that causes the concern. The normal may be inconvenient, but 
inconveniences are not equivalent to extraordinary events worthy of our attention. One person’s 
crisis may be another person’s normal, which is essentially the main argument of this dissertation 
and my focus on forced powerlessness, continuum of violences, and sustainable insecurity. Many 
of us in Guåhan took our first breath of militarization upon exiting the nurturing wombs of our 
mothers. Enloe writes,  
 
Most bases have managed to slip into the daily lives of the nearby community. A military 
base, even one controlled by soldiers of another country, can become politically invisible 
if its ways of doing business and seeing the world insinuate themselves into a community’s 
schools, consumer tastes, housing patterns, children’s games, adults’ friendship, jobs, and 
gossip. On any given day, therefore, only a handful of these scores of bases scattered 
around the world are the objects of dispute. Most have draped themselves with the 
camouflage of normalcy.55 
In analytical harmony with this book, Kathy Ferguson and Phyllis Turnbull, in their book, Oh, Say, 
Can You See?: The Semiotics of the Military in Hawai’i, write, “The narratives of naturalization 
imbricate military institutions and discourses into daily life so that they become just the way things 
are. The narratives of reassurance kick in with a more prescriptive tone, marking the military 
presence in Hawaiʻi as necessary, productive, heroic, desirable, good.”56 This is the core of 
sustainable insecurity: the normalization of insecurity where others may view it as crises. This 
normalization of militarization and insecurity helps determine our form-of-life here in Guåhan, 
limiting the scope of our imaginations, the water we dare to drink, and the economic dreams we 
want to have. One of the core methods of normalization of militarization in Guåhan’s history is 
the soldiering of the CHamoru.  
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Manmetgot Siha: The Soldiering of the CHamoru 
 Guåhan has one of the highest enlistment rates per capita, which is common amongst 
Pacific Island territories. It is rare for a CHamoru family to not have multiple members who are 
either serving or are veterans of the U.S. military. One of every 8 people from Guåhan has served 
in the American Armed Forces.57 While the previous chapter on economic insecurity discussed the 
economic incentives one has to join the military and receive benefits, I look at the discursive 
ramifications of soldiering, particularly in reinforcing the liberation framework and helping to 
produce new subjectivities. Even if one argues that soldiering is purely because of the economic 
benefits of recruitment and that CHamorus are not necessarily joining because they are patriotic, 
this does not mean that the U.S. agenda of continued control of the island is not reinforced through 
this soldiering. Although the material factor of poverty is key here, the soldiering of the CHamoru 
becomes narrativized differently here in Guåhan.  
 To demonstrate his pride in the success of recruitment here in Guåhan, General Joseph 
Lengyel, the chief of the National Guard Bureau, told the Guam National Guard, “Guam is 
unbelievably successful. Whatever it is they’re drinking, I need to pass it around to the rest.”58 I 
wish I was there when he said this because I would have said the secret ingredients to make this 
magical drink of soldiering is “economic limiting, political inferiority, contaminated land, and 
heavy dependency.” Of course, at that point, he probably would have just asked me for a cup of 
coffee instead! Yet, that is our reality. Guåhan: the recruiter’s dream. Guåhan: not only where 
America’s day begins, but where CHamoru land and brown CHamoru bodies fuse together to form 
the tip of the spear. What is most telling is the narrative Lengyel gives in explaining such sucessful 
recruitment. Instead of saying that the economic benefits of joining the military with relatively few 
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other options is almost too good to pass up, as many other poor communities have turned towards 
the military as a meal ticket, Lengyel says, “It speaks to that sense of service. The high morale of 
the organization is something that people want to be a part of–to serve the nation, serve the 
territory, and be here for the people of Guam. They’ve been very sucessful at doing it.”59 
 This narrative is rather ubiquitous. In the chapter, “Uncomfortable Fatigues: Chamorro 
Soldiers, Gendered Identities, and the Question of Decolonization in Guam,” Keith Camacho 
provides a quote from U.S. Army recruiter Olympio Magofña regarding the superior status of the 
CHamoru soldier. Magofña says, 
Let me tell you something about Chamorros ... they are one of the most decorated, 
motivated, sophisticated soldiers in the world, man. When they join any of the armed 
forces, they are there to prove themselves...so when we go into the military we tend to be 
the best of the best. And I hear this from everybody else...from generals, sergeant 
majors.60 
The bottom line seems to be that CHamorus are superior soldiers who prove themselves and who 
are eager to serve their territory and country. Upon the deployment of Guåhan troops, then Guåhan 
governor Eddie Baza Calvo said, “it’s a tragic irony that so many from Guam laid down their lives 
and thousands more fought and bled on foreign shores in the service of America’s most cherished 
ideal of defending democracy, yet they cannot vote for their commander-in-chief.”61 While 
definitely using the fact of CHamoru military service to push the political cause of voting 
representation in the Electoral College for the territories, the narrative of the CHamoru as a great 
defender of democracy is the discursive capital needed to prove the case. Robert Underwood has 
pointed out the irony of this narrative. He discusses how in situations in districts where African-
Americans make up a majority of recruits, the narrativization of African-Americans as “more” 
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patriotic does not occur. Underwood says, “Nobody calls African-Americans more patriotic, we 
only see this in the case of Chamorros.”62 This is evident in Governor Calvo’s interview in the 
documentary Island of Warriors, saying, “We are the most patriotic Americans you will find 
anywhere.”63 In Guåhan, the hyper-patriot and super-soldier narrativization of CHamorus is 
something that many CHamorus have bought into.  
 In Guåhan, the military seems to offer so much more than just military protection. For 
many CHamorus, the opportunity to become a soldier allows them to also become the provider, 
and is an opportunity for not only economic, but also social mobility. As Michael Lujan Bevacqua 
writes, “It is in the uniform that so much that is otherwise difficult or unattainable can be easily 
grasped or attained.”64 While CHamorus historically could only join the U.S. military as mess 
attendants in the Navy, there are now CHamorus who have occupied the high ranks of the military 
such as Marine Corps Brigadier General Ben Blaz and Major General Benny Meno Paulino. 
Military service is held in the highest regard and is often seen as a status elevator. There is a 
ubiquitous joke amongst women in Guåhan, “I.D., I Do,” meaning that if a man is in the military 
and has base access, they will definitely say yes to marrying him. CHamoru men have used military 
service for many purposes, but this all gets enmeshed into a narrative of the hyperpatriot CHamoru.  
 CHamoru service in the military did not begin after the war, but in the late 1930s, years 
before the Japanese occupation and World War II. Joining as mess attendants in the Navy, many 
CHamorus enlisted in the military out of a sense of adventure and travel. In his dissertation, James 
Viernes interviewed many of these men who joined before the war. One of his interviewees, 
Manuel Cruz Diaz, said he joined the navy because of opportunity. “I wanted to travel and see the 
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world. I see Hawaii. I see the west coast. All over the east coast. I really enjoy myself.”65 In another 
instance, Viernes interviews Antonio Borja Perez, who recalls his military enlistment as expanding 
his horizons. He says, “You join the Navy and see the world! That was the main thing. Get out of 
Guam and really explore what’s out there.”66 Up until the start of World War II, 625 CHamoru 
men were in the Navy as mess attendants.67 As shown in the previous chapter, the military created 
the economic conditions that pushed CHamoru men, and later, women towards enlisting in the 
armed services. However, after the war, we begin to see service narrativized to fit the “liberation” 
framework.  
 After World War II and the cementing of CHamoru loyalty to the United States, military 
service took on a nuanced face. Even if being pushed towards joining the military due to socio-
economic factors, CHamoru military service itself becomes supplemented to fit nicely into the 
“scene of liberation.” This is also the point of emergence of military service being intertwined with 
CHamoru cultural values, and most importantly, as a proud family tradition. No longer do we see 
the intergenerational transmission of the CHamoru language, but rather we see the honor of 
military service being portrayed as an admirable life decision. After the war, CHamorus continued 
to join the military in larger numbers, and by 1971, around 3,270 men from the island were enlisted 
in the U.S. military.68 I argue that the post-WWII soldiering of the CHamoru, despite economic 
factors, were ways that CHamorus could express gratitude for the liberation of the island and 
provide a way for them to prove their “Americanness.”  
For many soldiers, hyperpatriotism and military service as a method of proving 
“Americanness,” required assimilating to the dominant ideals and attitudes of the American 
military man. This ultimately resulted in the hypermasculinization of the CHamoru male. Proving 
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“Americanness” in this manner meant proving masculinity. In Guåhan, this can be seen not only 
in military service, but also in the concept of the modern CHamoru warrior. The American military 
as an institution invokes the tropes of strength and valor as hypermasculine to ensure soldiers’ 
willingness to give their lives for the cause. As John Hopton writes, military leaders “have used 
ideologies of idealized masculinity that valorize the notion of strong active males collectively 
risking their personal safety for the greater good of the wider community.”69 Furthermore, he 
writes, “states have a vested interest in maintaining strong ideological links between militarism 
and masculinity.”70 The military as a hypermasculine space aims to reinforce tropes of what it 
means to be a man, thus defining masculinity for those who serve. Keith Camacho argues that the 
military was one of the few institutions after the war where CHamoru men could “achieve a 
masculinity based on notions of family, leadership, providing, and strength.”71 The military helps 
CHamoru men to prove masculinity, thus reinforcing the “warrior” image valorized in many 
communities, including indigenous communities. This is not the only sense in which military 
service has intertwined with or utilized CHamoru culture and norms to its advantage.  
The Perversion of Kustumbren CHamoru 
 A core concept of CHamoru culture is chenchule’. CHenchule’ refers to a system of 
reciprocity, which in a small island, helps to maintain societal ties and relationships. One primary 
example of chenchule’ can be found in the gifting custom amongst CHamorus. After parties, 
CHamoru families usually sit together and write down who gave presents or money, and how much 
people gave. For example, if Juan Castro went to your child’s birthday party and gave your child 
$30, you would record this information for future use. A year later, Juan Castro’s child is having 
a birthday party and invites you. This is when you would look at how much Juan gave you and 
                                               
69 John Hopton, “The State and Military Masculinity,” in Military Masculinities: Identity and the State, ed. Paul R. 
Higate (Westport: Praeger, 2003), 113. 
70 Hopton, “The State and Masculinity,” 115. 
71 Camacho, “Uncomfortable Fatigues,” 161. 
 263 
either match that amount or increase it. So, you would give Juan Castro’s child either $30 or more 
for their party. In a CHamoru worldview, one remembers what another has done for them, so that 
they may return the favor in the future. “Chamorros gain a sense of social esteem through fulfilling 
such obligations...Part of one’s Chamorro identity rests on the particular system of which one’s 
family is a part.”72 Despite cultural shifts amongst the CHamoru culture, chenchule’ has remained 
strong, and I argue that it is now invoked in the name of military service. When asked why he 
joined the military, a major in the Reserve Officers Training Corps program at the University of 
Guam, said, “My service is a payment for a debt. I was taught since I was young about how we 
were liberated, and this is the least I can do.”73 Gonzalo Fernandez, a CHamoru recruiter for the 
Guam National Guard who won the National Guard’s Recruiter of the Year award three years in a 
row said regarding his success rate, “The success I have here, I probably couldn’t duplicate 
anywhere else because I’m not sure the people of those places are as patriotic.”74 For many 
CHamorus, this military service is a form of repayment and an expression of gratitude for the role 
the U.S. military had in “liberating” the island.  
 Surely, the ancestors did not intend chenchule’ to be used as a method of forever chaining 
CHamorus to the bottom of a hierarchical power relationship. How far does chenchule’ and 
gratitude have to go? For the sake of argument, I invite the reader to put themselves into a 
hypothetical situation. It is a dark, rainy night, and you hear your doorbell ringing. You open the 
door and a masked robber crashes into your door and physically restrains you with rope to your 
recliner, completely inhibiting you from moving. A man happens to be walking by and sees this 
masked person robbing your house. He runs into your house, puts this person into a chokehold, 
and waits for the police to arrive to take them away. As the police leave, you express gratitude and 
thanks to the man for coming in to help you. At the end of your speech of gratitude, he argues that 
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since he saved you, he should be able to use one of the rooms and one of the bathrooms in your 
three-bed, two-bath house (so roughly 1/3 of your home). Naturally, you would find this to be an 
irrational request. A more rational response would be for the two of you to become life-long friends 
and help each other out in times of need, not for him to claim ownership of parts of your house.  
 This distorted form of chenchule’ is clearly a perversion. CHamoru scholar Laura Souder 
writes, “These memories have become inscribed within the Chamorro tradition: obligations being 
a sacred duty, the Chamorros have since been caught in a never-ending cycle of paying back...and 
so our people gave precious land and continue to offer their sons and daughters to show their 
appreciation to Uncle Sam.”75 CHenchule’ is not meant to be this way. CHenchule’ is meant to 
maintain and give life to communities, not to dispossess them. The entire system of chenchule’ 
breaks down if it is abused for hierarchical purposes, as it has been invoked in the name of 
liberation, a debt to forever remain unpaid. To restate my argument thus far, I am not arguing that 
a sense of chenchule’ completely explains military legitimation in Guåhan, but rather that 
chenchule’ as narrativized has been perverted and used to maintain control. This form of control 
of utilizing cultural values to obtain one’s interests is a powerful method because from a Gramscian 
perspective, it helps to quell resistance and provides legitimacy to that control. The U.S. military’s 
sheer might allows them, if they desire, to destroy all CHamorus and completely dominate us in 
the most visible, violent manner. However, one can argue, in order to keep their image as the 
model nation and defender of democracy, the U.S. resorted to other means of control such as this 
cultural appropriation of values and the forging of CHamoru culture with soldiering. 
CHamerican Soldiers: An Identity Merged and Proven To Death 
After years and generations of military service, CHamoru identities as soldiers, while 
ultimately complex, seem to be comfortable. Veteran Maggie Aguon, who suffers from PTSD and 
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has expressed her psychological battles from her memories of war, said that she would re-enlist 
tomorrow if called upon. When asked why she should re-enlist, she said she wanted to represent 
her island and “put it on the map...For my country, for my island. I’m not trying to prove anything. 
It’s called pride.”76 Ronni Alexander, in her article on identity and militarism in Guåhan, asks, 
“Can American concepts of the self as an independent individual co-exist with Chamoru 
understandings of the self as part of an interconnected and interdependent web of extended 
family?”77 In this section, I argue that there is little tension between being an American soldier and 
a proud CHamoru from Guam, and that modern military service has acted as an amalgam at 
proving CHamoru identity, Guåhan pride, and American political subjectivity all at the same time. 
Keith Camacho and Laurel Monnig interviewed former American military members whose 
military service opened their eyes to the contradictions of democracy and colonialism in their 
homeland in Guåhan. Some veterans like Angel Santos, for example, became leaders of significant 
CHamoru activist organizations. In their chapter, they conclude, “What many of these male 
Chamorro soldiers had disclosed was the fact that their fatigues never fit so snugly in the first 
place–a discomfort that has helped some of them to think about the contradictions and the problems 
of militarism.”78 While I fully acknowledge that there have been veterans whose military service 
opened the pathways to their critical attitude towards military occupation in Guåhan, this section 
investigates the narratives of those other CHamoru members and veterans of the military: those 
who argue their fatigues fit quite comfortably today.  
Laurel Monnig’s dissertation, “Proving Chamorro,” investigates the various venues of 
“identity proving” done by CHamoru activists who have to interact with multiple forces such as 
race and colonialism in order to verify their rights as a people. She argues that the United States 
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has moved CHamoru identity within “the realm of the provable.”79 Identity is a tricky concept to 
ever pin down and is always in flux. Stuart Hall argues that identity is a “moveable feast: formed 
and transformed continuously in relation to the ways we are represented or addressed in the cultural 
systems which surround us.”80 Identity is historically defined and individuals are capable of having 
different identities at different times, according to Hall. He argues that the notion of a stable 
identity is a mere illusion held up through a “narrative of the self.”81 The post-war transformation 
of the island and the dominance of the liberation narrative created a cultural system which the 
CHamoru ultimately found themselves in, and soldiering became a way to exist within this new 
cultural system in order to prove both their American and CHamoru identities.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, CHamorus had a long struggle to become American citizens in 
order to obtain more rights and resist the dictatorship of the naval government. Using the cultural 
system of American patriotism made available to them prior to the war, CHamoru leaders and 
politicians argued they should be granted citizenship because of their assimilation and respect for 
American culture and political values. In the first petition to the U.S. Congress for citizenship in 
1901 signed by 32 community leaders and members, the authors wrote,  
The change of sovereignty was welcomed by the inhabitants of Guam, and the American 
government has never been hampered by disaffection or opposition on their part, but, on 
the contrary, they have been loyal, law-abiding, and patient, supporting the government 
morally and materially, as opportunity offered, frequently at considerable personal 
sacrifice.82  
The language of loyalty and acceptance was utilized in the attempt for political rights. Penelope 
Bordallo Hofschneider argues, “the Chamorro leaders understood that as long as they were 
subjected to military rule, they would never have the guarantees of civil liberty and property rights 
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which they associated with civil government.”83 CHamorus were displaying obedience and loyalty 
as a tool of empowerment and civil rights, and not necessarily as a duped populace. This framing 
of the CHamoru civil rights movement would continue for decades.  
In September 1926, the Congress of the Philippines, which was on its way to becoming an 
independent country, heard a resolution which petitioned the U.S. president to cede Guåhan to the 
Philippines government. When the Guam Congress was made aware of this resolution, there was 
absolute outrage and on September 25th, they held a special session to craft a response to this 
resolution. Finally, on October 12th, the Guam Congress adopted a resolution, which illuminates 
how the Guam Congress used “proving” Americanness to obtain their civil rights.  
Whereas, the people of Guam have been peaceful and law-abiding citizens since the 
American occupation in 1899, and have not given the slightest sign of rebellion, 
insurrection, or trouble to the United States government; and 
Whereas, for twenty-seven years the Chamorros as people of Guam, alone, have 
continued, to be peaceful and law-abiding and have given, at all times, their fidelity, 
loyalty, and affection to the United States of America; and 
Whereas, they have formed the strongest ties of love to the American flag and have 
developed a whole-hearted and deep-seated desire to have no other flag than Old Glory 
wave over their heads.84 
Proving that they were Americans at heart and deeply loyal to the American flag was not just 
meant to convince the United States to not cede Guåhan to the Phillippines, but was a method of 
legitimation. Despite these attempts at proving their loyalty or proving their Americanness, 
CHamorus were still not granted citizenship before the war. They would not become American 
citizens until 1950, nine years after the outbreak of the war. The push for citizenship after the war 
was heavily motivated by the immense land-takings, as outlined in Chapter 2, and CHamoru 
leadership used their survival during the war as another tool to obtain political rights and just 
treatment. For the CHamoru push for citizenship after the war, liberation became the new cultural 
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system of symbols to prove their worthiness. As Vince Diaz writes, this became “the only political 
language available to the CHamorus that could be heard and understood by the Americans.”85  
 This leads us back to CHamoru military service and enlistment, where CHamorus found 
another tool for proving their worth, a language that strongly resonated with the heavily militarized 
and national security state America maintained, especially after World War II. When American 
recollections of the war argue that “Agana was liberated by the blood of young Americans,”86 
CHamorus were shown the potential of becoming soldiers economically, socially, and most 
importantly, nationally. For 52 years, CHamorus were governed by a country that treated them as 
orphans, neither citizen nor alien. For 52 years, CHamorus did not know their place within a nation 
whose geopolitical conflicts destroyed their home. There was nothing more American, especially 
in the Cold War militarism prevalent after the war, than to be a soldier who puts their life on the 
line for their nation.  
 Military service as a method of proving Americanness or fighting for political rights and 
inclusion is not unique to CHamorus or Guåhan and can be seen with minority and other 
indigenous peoples. Political thinkers throughout history have seen the military as an institution 
capable of producing national identity as well as to transmit a country’s social values.87 Max Weber 
understood the importance of military service in an individual’s transformation, commenting that 
the discipline in military service changes someone from an ordinary citizen to having a more heroic 
status more in line with the wants and desires of the nation-state to which one belongs.88 Ronald 
R. Krebs argues, “Groups seeking first-class citizenship may deploy their military record as a 
rhetorical device, framing their demands as the just reward for their people’s sacrifice. This effort 
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to exploit a widely recognized norm has at times cornered state leaders, leaving them without room 
for rhetorical maneuver.”89 This is reminiscent of CHamorus appealing to American ideals and 
governmental values in their fight for citizenship. They were rhetorical maneuvers meant to trap 
the United States to either give CHamorus citizenship or be viewed as hypocrites. Unfortunately, 
the race and development card of CHamorus not being ready overtook these attempts at cornering 
the United States government. 
 Krebs aims to explore the relationship between the military service and the way that 
citizenship is renegotiated. Military service has been viewed as the ultimate form of citizenship 
and belonging to a nation or supplementing this, proving that one is worthy of being made a citizen. 
Krebs writes, “The leaders of communal groups relegated to second-class citizenship have time 
and again contrasted the reality of entrenched political and social inequity to their people’s 
unassailable record of loyalty and sacrifice.”90 As CHamorus did, African-Americans have used 
their history of military service as a rhetorical tool for rights. During the Civil War, many Blacks 
served in the military fighting for the Union, making up 10% of their total army. As a result of the 
war, roughly 40,000 blacks died.91 Just like CHamorus who in the Iraq War suffered the most 
deaths per capita in the nation, blacks after the war appealed to their bloodshed and death as proof 
once again that they are worthy of being treated as equal. Frederick Douglass exclaimed, “If the 
black man knows enough to shoulder a musket and to fight for the flag, fight for the government, 
he knows enough to vote…Shall we be citizens in war and aliens in peace.”92 A black member of 
the 1868 Arkansas Constitutional Convention argues similarly to Douglass, “Has not the man who 
conquers upon the field of battle, gained any rights? Have we gained none by the sacrifice of our 
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brethren?”93 Through service and through death, both CHamorus and African-Americans proved 
they were worthy of full inclusion into the American nation-state and body politic. From an 
intergenerational perspective, we can see the interplay between the CHamoru push for citizenship, 
family tradition of military service, and hyperpatriotism. If the push for citizenship was facilitated 
through service and a hyperpatriotic attitude, it is easy to see how these sentiments of generational 
discourse gets passed down. Returning to Underwood’s and Diaz’s arguments that CHamorus used 
the language and political symbols available to them, I reiterate that hyperpatriotism for a cause 
has become hyperpatriotism as a learned behavior. 
 The other core point to be made in this section is how military service for CHamorus were 
not just ways to prove their Americanness as discussed, but also, CHamorus have indigenized their 
military service and have used it to prove their CHamoru and Guåhan roots as well. In a proud 
story on the Air National Guard website, Staff Sgt. Alexander W. Riedel, labels CHamoru soldiers 
as Island Defenders. He praises their ability to patrol and guard the fencelines and facilities of the 
407th Air Expeditionary Group. In the story, Riedel interviews soldiers from Guåhan, Ricky Meno 
and Melquiadez Racho. Racho speaks to this indigenization of service, saying,  
We bring our pride out because a lot of people don’t know where Guam is. It’s a small 
island right in the middle of the Pacific. People look at it on a map and there is nothing 
but a speck. But that is home. I believe people from Guam have a very strong sense of 
honor. Especially being from a small island, we always want to try to be with the best and 
represent that pride. That’s the driving force we have.94 
Further on in the interview, Racho says, “We want to represent, so when we come home our 
families can have that pride saying one of ours represented and did well. Our families are our 
inspiration. We can’t fail them.”95 Not once in this interview did Racho mention “America” or 
“patriotism.” His reasons were to represent his island, make his family proud, and demonstrate 
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Guåhan pride. For a people who were dispossessed of their land, made politically ambiguous 
within the American nation-state, swiftly transitioned to a cash economy, and stripped of many 
traditional roles and practices, being a good soldier was a method of demonstrating one’s pride in 
their island and of being a modern CHamoru and Guåhan warrior. 
 Meno explained how watching the gate guards in Guåhan at Andersen Air Force Base and 
the Naval Base inspired him to join the military. “I used to see them out there at the gate. I wanted 
to be a part of that. I joined the military to defend my country as well as my island. And I kind of 
fell in love with it. And here I am now.”96 Racho’s and Meno’s answers together help to show that 
military service for many CHamorus and Guåhan soldiers has become a multipurpose Swiss Army 
knife of proving. On one hand, becoming a soldier helps prove one is a true American, and on the 
other hand, becoming a soldier helps to represent Guåhan and prove one’s worth as a contributing 
member to Guåhan’s security and safety. This comfortability and amalgamation of the identities 
of soldier, American, and CHamoru, I argue, helps to bring militarization and militarism within 
the realm of the natural for the CHamoru, and even scarier, into the realm of the desirable. When 
military service, which helps to solidify the liberation narrative and subsequent positive orientation 
towards the military in general, becomes a family tradition or a way of representing one’s home 
or proving one’s identity, it becomes difficult to argue against. Thus, hyperpatriotism and military 
service becomes an amalgam of island pride, love for nation, remnants of past rhetorical 
discourses, and proving self-worth.  
III. I Finakpo’: Conclusion 
 This leads to the culminating key question: “What is the end goal?” CHamorus fought for 
citizenship using the rhetoric of patriotism only to be given second-class statutory citizenship via 
a unilateral act of Congress in 1950. CHamorus joined the military as a way of proving themselves, 
climbing the social ladder, expanding the realms of their opportunities, and economically securing 
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themselves. The contradiction of these two struggles is that CHamorus in Guåhan are not allowed 
to be represented in the Electoral College which elects the Commander-in-Chief of the military 
they overwhelmingly serve in or voting representation in the legislative body which could send 
them to war. The post-war transformation and the liberation narrative helped to create the dominant 
and hegemonic cultural systems of CHamoru expression. I am not arguing that all CHamorus 
discursively bought into this dominant cultural system which strengthens the legitimation of 
military activity and presence in Guåhan. However, I am arguing that as long as this remains the 
dominant cultural system for us to operate within, we will never truly be liberated. As Julian Aguon 
writes regarding CHamorus, “We are kept under lock and key. Cleverly invisible in the 
international community so that no one sees as we slip quietly into the sea. Not marching, but 
being marched, to the drums of our own disempowerment.”97  
 For CHamorus to truly be liberated, they must not continue marching to someone else’s 
drumbeat, especially when the end of the march leads further and further into the cages of our 
oppression. Taiaiake Alfred writes in Peace, Power, Righteousness: An Indigenous Manifesto,  
The final steps to decolonization can be truly frightening as Native people are jarred from 
that familiar reality and forced into a new one–even if it is of their own making. The 
post–colonial reality is fearsome in its demands, responsibilities, and burdens. There is no 
one to turn to except ourselves. There is no else to blame.98   
The material conditions of insecurity and dependence discussed in the prior chapters have heavily 
restricted not only the economic, environmental, or political spheres in which CHamorus live, but 
has also restricted the cultural systems available to the CHamoru to express their pride in 
themselves and represent their island. Service in the American military and the never-ending cycle 
of gratitude of the liberation framework has become the small 11 by 11 room, we are stuck inside 
of. This discursive and psychological room valorizes military service and legitimizes military 
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presence, which I argue ultimately leaves us in a perpetual state of insecurity. May we one day 
open the windows of our small room and realize that the smell of militarization which we have 
lived with for more than century, is truly a stench. The scent of demilitarization is surely a breath 






                                  I Finakpo’: Conclusion 
 
(NON?)FICTION, The Journals of a Shape-Shifter Hunter Entry #666: For a while, I 
had no idea if we were going to make it. We were going on years of endless shivering, intense fear 
acting as harsh frost in this tropical weather. Some nights, it would get so bad, I genuflected on 
the torn flesh of my weak knees to a god I knew wasn’t real, just for the comfort of false hope. 
Today, however, false hope is dead. We have defeated the giant. Perseverance and effective 
intelligence became the blood running through the veins of our once-defeated bodies. A slow 
process, indeed, but we began to train our people to notice the different faces and appearances of 
the giant. We learned the language of its oscillation, and became fluent in his disguise. The giant 
no longer confuses us, we are intimate with its violence, no longer disillusioned with the shifting 
of its poisonous modes. The battle against the giant is surely not won. There are still many of our 
people who have not learned to decipher its shapes. Yet, we have a shot. There is real hope, not 
the fake hope of times past. And for this, and this alone, we must not give up. We will continue to 
hold off the giant’s encroachmen t into our homes. He will step on no more of our children. He is 
no longer welcome in our house.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
In this dissertation, I have argued against the hegemonic belief that the U.S. military keeps 
the island of Guåhan secure. To make this argument, I examined political, land, economic, 
environmental, and discursive acts in a continuum of violences that led to various states of current 
insecurity. Furthermore, I have shown how the military need for the island in the name of U.S. 
national security has marginalized genuine examples of thriving and growth in Guåhan, and that 
it is this forced powerlessness of a militarized, unincorporated territory status that is the condition 
of possibility for our current form-of-life here in the island. Lastly, I demonstrated through the 
history that mitigation, dependency, and discursive formations formed the blob of sustainable 
insecurity, a situation in which despite empirically shown violences and insecurities, these events 
and quasi-events have been able to remain from becoming crises.  
I use this conclusion to articulate a patchwork of thoughts and ideas regarding futures for 
the island of Guåhan and its people, which may read like an overview of future research projects. 
Each section introduces an idea for future books and articles, or ideas about the future in general 
for the island. I am comfortable with this conclusion as seeming incomplete, as each of these 
sections requires their own respective research projects dedicated to them. However, I find it 
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helpful, and I could argue, even necessary, to have these intellectual discussions about possible 
futures in this section. To do any less would be to leave the reader in a state of despair, numbness, 
or defeat. This dissertation, admittedly, may read as a dismal description of powerlessness. 
However, I don’t want to leave it on this melancholy note, despite how gloomy the future may 
appear. So, before outlining the parameters of the conclusion, I find it necessary to discuss the 
lurking issue for this dissertation: Hope. 
Last semester, I taught a class entitled “The Future of Global Violence.” In the class, I had 
my students read a range of texts from Timothy Mitchell’s Carbon Democracy to David 
Kilcullen’s, Out of the Mountains, as well as Ian Shaw’s Predator Empire. Halfway through the 
semester, I entered the classroom to begin our seminar and noticed this defeated look on one of 
my students’ faces. I began the class by asking him what was wrong. His response was that the 
books we have been reading are so real and make the future look bleak and hopeless. He said the 
books made him question why he was even continuing to get his degree. It was such an intimately 
honest moment, and one that I knew I had to address. So, in the following weeks, I had them read 
Hope In The Dark: Untold Histories, Wild Possibilities, by Rebecca Solnit, and it really changed 
the tone of the course. 
Solnit powerfully and lyrically dismantles the pretentiousness in which hope may stand, 
that unusual feeling in which hope is just an ameliorative term for eminent death. Rather than 
sticking to this falsity, Solnit writes, “It’s important to say what hope is not: it is not the belief that 
everything was, is, or will be fine.”
1 The hope that I invoke through this dissertation is in uncertainty, not in a belief that all is 
well and will remain that way. Solnit continues, “Hope locates itself in the premises that we don’t 
know what will happen and that in the spaciousness of uncertainty is room to act. When you 
recognize uncertainty, you recognize that you may be able to influence the outcomes.”2 
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Uncertainty is certainly not traditionally thought of as comforting, but this dissertation shows a 
different picture. Through this analysis of forced powerlessness and the continuum of violence, it 
should be abundantly clear that actions were taken to get Guåhan to this point. What exists now is 
not a permanent, inherent form-of-life, or to put it differently, what exists now is not the way it 
has or had to be. This structure of sustainable insecurity in Guåhan has a genealogy and this 
dissertation has aimed at illuminating this dark genealogy, which for many, has been hiding 
beneath our feet this entire time. The chapters of this dissertation, while thematically different, all 
come together to show the picture of how Guåhan came to be, but most importantly, this 
dissertation acts as affirmative uncertainty. Through examining the processes that created a 
situation of sustainable insecurity, maybe the reader can look around them with a more critical eye 
and help identify the beginnings or operations of insecurities in their respective homelands. What 
was made evident throughout this dissertation is that the genealogy of violence, forced 
powerlessness, and sustainable insecurity in Guåhån did not make itself known at every corner, 
but often grew where the eye isn’t likely to look. May the reader’s eye have a more critical lens 
after reading this. This dissertation does not claim to know the future, but rather affirmatively 
embraces the uncertainty ahead. The uncertainty of it all makes fighting, resisting, and creating 
new structures and forms of life worth it, and it is in this spirit that I write this dissertation.  
Resurging to Power: Independence for Guåhan (The Best Solution For Now) 
 This dissertation has shown how power is the name of the game when it comes to Guåhan’s 
current political situation. It is the exercise of U.S. power and the mechanistic forced 
powerlessness of Guåhan that enables this. In this section, I articulate my argument against efforts 
to depict Guåhan as inherently powerless, through a rethinking of Guåhan’s ability to be powerful 
in a traditional International Relations sense and in an indigenous resurgence of the word. This 
dissertation has shown that violence, sustainable insecurity, and an imposed political status have 
produced this state of powerlessness.  I argue that the island becoming its own independent nation-
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state would be the best path for the island (for now) to eliminate further violences and the 
conditions of insecurity, even if it will not solve all problems, and even if it may be problematic 
in itself. 
 CHamoru rights activist Carlos Taitano, one of the key figures in the push for American 
citizenship for the CHamoru people, once analogized his push for citizenship to a desert scenario. 
Taitano said, “If one is dead thirsty in the desert and is offered water, surely they are bound to take 
it.”3 As explained by Taitano’s son, Tyrone Taitano, his father knew that citizenship bestowed 
upon the CHamoru people would not give us the best political future, but it was a step forward. I 
argue that the next step is Guåhan fully becoming its own independent nation-state. Per Guam Law 
23-147, the following question would be asked on a self-determination plebiscite, “In recognition 
of your right to self-determination, which of the following political status options do you favor? 
1. Independence, 2. Free Association with the United States of America, 3. Statehood.”4   
 I argue that a shift of the island’s status to an independent nation-state will help solve some 
of the problems of violence and insecurity. This dissertation has shown that Guåhan’s 
unincorporated territory status is a key condition of possibility for this violence, thus transitioning 
to an independent country gives the island a chance at changing the circumstances of our lives 
here. Becoming an independent country could usher Guåhan into the family of nations and at the 
very least, provide the sovereignty (even if one argues it a ruse) granted to current nation-states. 
With independence on a nation-state level, the United States would have a much more difficult 
time getting their way here in the island because we would no longer be part of their political 
family, nor be under the Territorial Clause of their Constitution, nor be considered American soil 
to freely and unilaterally put their military bases. Rather, Guåhan would have the right to establish 
its own defense, handle its own economy, and choose its own interdependencies.   
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In Chapter 1, I demonstrated how Guåhan’s unique location along with its unincorporated 
territory status produced the conditions of possibility for Guåhan to become the militarized “tip of 
the spear” for U.S. presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The reality is that geography doesn’t 
change and returning to Robert Roger’s nickname of Guåhan as “Destiny’s Landfall,” the question 
being asked is “Does our geography need to remain our curse?” The unchanging nature of 
geography should not make one fear that our militarization will simply continue no matter what 
the circumstances of the future hold. Rather, it should stand out as a giant opportunity for the 
people of the island to take advantage of. When looking at the possibilities of independence for 
the island, our geography will act as one of the core components of our power. We have a long 
history of being told of the sheer importance of our geography, and as a country, we can use this 
for an advantageous defense position, stop on a trade route, and in crafting regional relationships 
in this vast ocean. In Chapters 2 and 3, I argued that our political status and use as a military base 
has led to rampant land, economic, and environmental violences and insecurities. As an 
independent nation-state, Guåhan will craft its own land, economic, and environmental policies, 
choose its trade partners, establish who can own land and how it can be used, and apply CHamoru 
values and epistemology in our thinking about the environment. All this fits into the typology of 
power presented in the introduction of this dissertation.  
Drawing from the main educational resource of the group Independent Guåhan, an 
advocacy group for independence for the island, in which I co-chair the Educational Development 
and Research Committee, I provide an analysis of the power of independence. 
Independence is the political status which will allow us to exercise self-governance over 
our territory and population, have sovereignty, participate on the world stage as equals, 
and engage in foreign relations on our terms. We will be internationally recognized and 
respected as an independent country with the right and power to regulate our internal and 
external affairs without foreign dictation. Being an independent country means taking 
responsibility for both our failures and successes, and ultimately having democratic 
control over both our political system and our social, cultural, and economic lives. This is 
why Hita La’mon is one of Independent Guåhan’s foundational CHamoru phrases. It 
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means, “it is up to us.” Independence will allow our island to be the place we (and 
nobody else) decide it is going to be.5 
I argue that this turn towards an independent nation-state and the power that may come with it, 
will not only help Guåhan to craft its own destiny, but is also a form of resurgence, a theory that 
has been circulating in Indigenous Politics literature. Within Indigenous Politics, there is a 
substantial body of criticism of the state, particularly efforts to revitalize indigenous cultures, 
languages, and livelihoods via state-centric frameworks. Identified as recognition, rights, and 
responsibilities, many indigenous scholars describe pursuing these ends alone as a “politics of 
distraction.” According to Graham Smith, the politics of distraction are efforts that divert “energies 
away from decolonizing and regenerating communities and [frame] community relationships in 
state-centric terms.”6 The core of the argument is that state-centric frameworks for revitalization 
or sustenance of indigenous nations will ultimately fail due to the systemic violence and forgotten 
histories of dispossession upon which the state is built. Rather, indigenous scholars argue for 
indigenous nations to focus on resurgence.  
Cherokee scholar Jeff Corntassel describes resurgence as “taking the emphasis away from 
state frameworks of forgive and forget back to re-localized community-centered actions premised 
on reconnecting with land, culture and community.”7 Taiaiake Alfred comes up with these 
components for resurgence efforts: restoration of indigenous presence on the land, increased 
reliance on traditional diets among Indigenous people, the transmission of indigenous teachings 
between Elders and the youth, along with the strengthening of familial activities and sustainable 
land-based economies.8 It is through these everyday acts of resurgence and decolonization, as 
dubbed by Corntassel, that indigenous communities and nations can thrive once again. In summing 
up their stance on resurgence, Alfred and Corntassel write, “We do not need to wait for the 
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colonizer to provide us with money or to validate our vision of a free future; we only need to start 
to use our Indigenous languages to frame our thoughts, the ethical framework of our philosophies 
to make decisions and to use our laws and institutions to govern ourselves.”9 
It may read as quite odd then, especially to readers versed in Indigenous Politics, for this 
conclusion to invest so heavily in advocating for Guåhan to become its own nation-state. For many, 
the nation-state model of political governance itself is the problem and the deficiencies within 
International Relations stem from this form or organization. For example, Glen Coulthard argues, 
“In our efforts to interpolate the legal and political discourses of the state to secure recognition of 
our rights to land and self-determination we have too often found ourselves interpellated as 
subjects of settler-colonial rule.”10 Alfred argues regarding the values of harmony, balance, and 
peaceful co-existence, “It is not possible to reach these goals in the context of Western institutions 
at all, because those institutions were designed within the framework of a very different belief 
system, to achieve very different objectives.11 My advocacy of wanting our own nation-state may 
thus seem quite antithetical to the resurgence agenda. However, just as indigenous peoples are 
intimately concerned with genealogy, I argue that one needs to look at the genealogy of resurgence 
to understand its particular historical and geographical positioning. Resurgence as a theory was 
bred amongst a political landscape of Native American nations, First Nations, and aboriginal 
peoples petitioning the settler governments of the United States, Canada, and Australia for redress 
for past wrongs, federal recognition of tribes which would provide them with access to certain 
rights, or more federal funding for indigenous issues. Blanketly applying resurgence to the 
indigenous situation in the Pacific Islands is an intellectual error, and resurgence needs to be 
rethought for our unique circumstances in the region.  
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Primarily, I argue that the ease of state critique dominant in Indigenous Politics literature, 
while important and in many ways relevant to the Pacific Islands, is not as straightforward in the 
region. Many indigenous peoples in the Pacific Islands have existing nation-states, many of which 
are newer and were formed at the peak of decolonization after World War II, including the 
Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Vanuatu, and Nauru. None of the tribes or First Nations, from 
who many of the authors in Indigenous Politics are peoples who have their own existing nation-
state today, but rather live within settler occupied lands with little to no chance of attaining a 
nation-state of their own. This ontological difference is fundamentally important in picking and 
choosing our theoretical tools. Rather than simply sticking to the literature already existing on 
indigenous resurgence, a Pacific Islands version of resurgence is needed; one that treats the nation-
state differently.  
To begin this reformulation, it is important to look at works such as Terence Wesley-
Smith’s “The Limits of Self-Determination in Oceania.” In his article, Wesley-Smith argues that 
the optimism of decolonization and self-determination in Oceania has now morphed into 
discourses of state failure, crisis, and collapse. He argues regarding self-determination, 
“Significant as it was, that initiative could not represent a definitive break from the colonial past, 
since the traces of that past were too deeply etched into the economic, political, cultural, and even 
physical landscapes of Oceania. Indeed, the process was not designed to achieve such a rupture.”12 
For Wesley-Smith, decolonization’s result in nation-state status did not vanquish colonialism, and 
arguments that decolonization was a clean break from the past are inherently flawed. Wesley-
Smith calls on the reader to have a more realistic understanding of the limits of self-determination 
and the problems associated with the formation of nation-states in Oceania. Summing it up 
perfectly, he writes of his argument, 
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This is not necessarily to deride the intrinsic value of sovereign independence, and 
certainly not to provide support for those in the region who express nostalgia for the 
colonial era. It is simply to suggest that the problems associated with making states and 
nations capable of reconciling local and global needs and expectations, and with the 
development project generally, can easily serve to frustrate expectations of hope and a 
new future.13 
Works such as Wesley-Smith’s provide a more sobering analysis of the problems and limits of 
nation-states in Oceania today. It is from works like these that a Pacific Islands resurgence can 
derive its questions such as “What can indigenous peoples who already have their nation-state, 
with the multiple examples in this region, do to further push the notion of resurgence in eliminating 
some of the limits of self-determination?” In Guåhan’s example, “How do we fight to become our 
own nation-state (which is a feasibility for the island), while at the same time acknowledging the 
critiques of the state present in the resurgence literature?” These are questions that a Pacific-Island 
indigenous theory of resurgence needs to address. Questions not rooted in pure critique, but also 
not rooted in revolutionary fervor and romanticized views of becoming an independent nation-
state. 
 This dissertation fits perfectly into the Indigenous Politics literature. What I hoped to have 
shown is how political status, particularly as used in Guåhan with a militarized essence, 
fundamentally thwarts the livelihoods of the CHamoru people of the island. The macabre duet of 
unincorporated territory and strategic location for militarization use is a very difficult framework 
to exist within and successfully engage in a resurgence campaign. I am not arguing that this means 
that resurgence projects should be avoided, however, that we, in this region, need to critically 
engage with the nation-state in a different way. It is incredibly difficult for CHamoru resurgence 
projects and true CHamoru thriving to occur in our current political status. Thus, if the CHamoru 
people have the opportunity to create a new condition of possibility for thriving, they must take 
that step, even with the potentialities for problems. I argue that by becoming our own nation-state, 
CHamorus can better thrive and resurge to power.  
                                               
13 Wesley-Smith, “The Limits of Self-Determination in Oceania”, 203. 
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In the dissertation, I demonstrated the multiple harms of U.S. military presence in Guåhan, 
from economic dependency to ontological threats to our existence because of established military 
bases to environmental contamination. It is important to understand that in an independent Guåhan, 
these problems may or may not linger. There is definitely a chance, but as the beginning of this 
conclusion mentions, the future is uncertain, and I refuse to submit to defeat. At the same time, 
however, I do not romanticize independence and acknowledge that we, as a people, will have an 
immense amount of work to do even if independence is achieved. In an American militarized, 
independent Guåhan, our international image will still be that of a giant target. Our economy will 
begin to once again revolve around the military and environmental contamination may be further 
exacerbated. This is the trap of sovereignty. There is no doubt that our lack of sovereignty is a 
gigantic problem and this consequent lack of power brings much harm to the island. However, in 
a self-help anarchic international system, if we make decisions on our supposedly own accord, we 
are responsible for those decisions. This is not to say that the situation is unchangeable, as 
demilitarization activists in South Korea and Okinawa have shown. There is honorable work being 
done there. However, an independent Guåhan, at the end of the day is responsible for its policies 
per the granting of sovereignty.  
Furthermore, independence should not be demonized as a pure reversion to the past of grass 
skirts and no electricity nor should it be saturated with romanticized ideas of harmony, 
inafa’maolek, and utopia. An independent Guåhan is not a cure for all our problems, but is the path 
of self-determination to the largest extent. Independence does not automatically equate to being 
freed from the problems of colonialism, militarization, patriarchy, or environmental 
contamination. It is a tool that can be utilized towards these goals, providing they become 
collective. As my good Kanaka Maoli friend and staunch Hawaiian independence activist ‘Ilima 
Long always says, “Give me back my government so I can fight against it.”14 I whole-heartedly 
                                               
14 ‘Ilima Long, personal communication to author, March 6, 2017.  
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accept that there will be challenges, birth pains, and failure along the way in this pursuit of 
independence. However, I still hold onto this goal as the best path forward, for now, in eliminating 
the continuum of violences and sustainable insecurity Guåhan experiences today.  
Islands and Hau’ofian Realism 
I now want to turn to an idea of defense for an independent Guåhan that is predicated upon 
alliances with other countries in Oceania, which I call stonefish geopolitics. The nufo’ (stonefish 
in CHamoru) is considered one of the most venomous fish in the entire world. The PADI 
(Professional Association of Diving Instructors) website warns, “In the underwater world, you 
don’t have to be the largest creature to be the biggest threat. The stonefish, which reaches an 
average length of 30 to 40 centimeters and up to 2 kg/5 lbs in weight, is the most venomous fish in 
the world having venomous sacs on each one of its 13 spines.”15 According to the medical website, 
Medline Plus, the effects of a stonefish sting include intense pain, difficulty breathing, bleeding, 
low blood pressure, vomiting, delirium, headache, seizure, diarrhea, paralysis, and in some 
instances, death if one is punctured in their chest or abdomen.16  
My fascination with the nufo’ here is not purely biochemical nor autobiographical. I have 
a geopolitical curiosity with the fish and its behavior, physiology, and environment. Particularly, 
I argue that the most secure, beneficial defense arrangement for an independent Guåhan would 
require an alliance with other Oceanic countries counterbalancing the great powers that threaten 
the Pacific and the development of small-state, maritime, and cyber defense capabilities. This idea 
is the genealogical descendant of Epeli Hau’ofa’s pivotal essay, “Our Sea of Islands.” In 
challenging the colonial, geographical determinism that represents the islands as small and 
scattered throughout the ocean, Hau’ofa argues for a paradigmatic shift to a “sea of islands” 
                                               
15 Andrew Jenkins, “Stonefish: The Most Venomous Fish in the World,” Professional Association of Diving 
Instructors, October 7, 2014, accessed February 16, 2018, http://www2.padi.com/blog/2014/10/07/stonefish-the-
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16 “Stonefish Sting,” Medline Plus, last updated February 7, 2018, accessed February 16, 2018, https://medline 
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connected via the ocean. He calls for a resurgence of Oceania and a reliance on ourselves.17 
Hau’ofa ends his essay, 
Oceania is vast, Oceania is expanding, Oceania is hospitable and generous, Oceania is 
humanity rising from the depths of brine and regions of fire deeper still, Oceania is us. 
We are the sea, we are the ocean, we must wake up to this ancient truth and together use 
it to overturn all hegemonic views that aim ultimately to confine us again, physically and 
psychologically, in the tiny spaces that we have resisted accepting as our sole appointed 
places and from which we have recently liberated ourselves. We must not allow anyone 
to belittle us again, and take away our freedom.18 
After reading this, one starts to ponder how to utilize Hau’ofa’s words. It is incredibly insufficient 
for us here in the region to just develop an Oceanian identity, and leave it at that. We can just hold 
the Festival of Pacific Arts every four years, write songs about the greatness of our ocean, and 
chant to our shared Austronesian ancestors. I am not calling this useless, but rather insufficient in 
the development of meaningful implementation of Hau’ofa’s words.  
 This is where the nufo’ defense model can be a possible utilization of this Oceania 
paradigm shift. I advocate for a Hau’ofian alliance approach rooted in defensive realism. In 
international relations terms, I agree with realists that power is the currency of the international 
system. While I critique the realist state-centrism and do wish to expand the epistemological scope 
of international relations, I argue that the liberal emphasis on cooperation through international 
organizations and institutions is a mask for hegemonic agendas and that while the constructivist 
critique of IR is useful, there is still a dynamic of power in who gets to change the norms that shape 
the game. Being on the receiving end of the stick of great power politics, I recognize the role that 
power has in shaping the world and have demonstrated so in this dissertation. I also realize that in 
this anarchic (or rather hierarchical) international system, states (and others) need to do what they 
can to survive, and that many times what states view as necessary for survival, is simply 
imperialism and colonialism.  
                                               
17 Epeli Hau’ofa, We Are the Ocean: Selected Works (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2008). 
18 Hau’ofa, We Are the Ocean, 39. 
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 In a non-imperial, defensive realist approach using the metaphor of the nufo’, I envision 
an alliance system of neutrality. Like the nufo’, we wait in our waters with 13 spines ready to 
poison those who attempt to step on or bite us. To understand this better, it is important to go 
through some of the core concepts of defensive realism. Defensive realism finds its roots in 
Kenneth Waltz’s 1979 book, Theory of International Politics. At its core, defensive realists argue 
that the primary purpose of a military is to maintain security (I diverge slightly from this 
perspective because of my epistemological broadening of what security means) by having the 
capacity for defending against aggressors. Defensive capabilities are emphasized over offensive 
capabilities. Thus, defensive realists are security-maximizers.19 Another key component of the 
nufo’ model I am proposing is the defensive realist perspective of mistrust. Offensive realists argue 
that “mistrust in the international system is constant, but defensive realists argue that mistrust is 
variable and amenable to change through international cooperation, primarily through mutual 
security agreements.”20  
 These two components of a defensive realist perspective fit perfectly into what Oceania 
can become from a Hau’ofian perspective. First, most of Oceania, especially the islands in 
Micronesia, have been used for military purposes and have experienced the harmful effects of 
rampant militarization. I argue that an Oceanian defensive realist approach has the potential to not 
simply reproduce an imperial-tinged military presence that disregards indigenous peoples, places 
“national security” ahead of protecting the land, water, and sea, and is built on a cyclical military-
industrial complex. This is where I envision the fusing of a decolonial politics in this Hau’ofian 
defensive realism. For this, I turn to Sankaran Krishna’s description of steps needed to decolonize 
international relations. Krishna begins with asking a few self-reflective questions IR scholars need 
to ask themselves. He writes, 
                                               
19 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press, Inc., 1979). 
20 Haroun Alfarsi, “Comparison: Defensive realism vs. Offensive realism,” Profolus, October 23, 2017, accessed 
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What is the relationship between our techniques of abstraction (the fetish for placeless 
and context-less theory) and the disappearance of issues of race, genocide and 
colonialism from our field of study? Must international relations always reduce to 
international relations, that is, relations between sovereign entities called nation-states? 
Can we not counter IR’s statist discourse, the prose of counter-insurgency, with the 
poetry of non-national ways of being?21 
He then goes on to propose some methods of “doing” decolonial IR which include: (1) Emplacing 
every contemporary context and issue in IR in a genealogical context, (2) Listening to the voices, 
stories, and narratives of people from outside the mainstream, (3) Teaching IR in ways that do not 
revere a canon but rather present that canon for contestation and deconstruction, (4) Choosing 
topics to research and work that are truly global in their purview, and (5) Recognizing the world 
becomes legible to us through a variety of modes of understanding.22  
 In my attempt to “do” decolonial IR, I also begin to envision a CHamoru conception of 
security and argue that bringing in CHamoru values for a renewed vision of security is extremely 
important not only as a nation-building endeavor, but also for the formulation of an IR that speaks 
back to the mainstream. If the defensive realist approach argues that a military is meant to provide 
security and ward off aggressors, then including a broadened CHamoru concept of security is also 
very important. While a more detailed CHamoru concept of security is the focus of my future 
work, I do want to articulate some aspects of my vision of genuine CHamoru security. First, 
methodologically, this dissertation did not engage in deep ethnographic research and community 
participation, which I argue is the most proper method for developing a CHamoru concept of 
security. For my future work on theorizing CHamoru security, I plan on engaging in this more 
community-based research as opposed to unilaterally laying out my vision of security. In the 
meantime, here is a glimpse of this vision. 
 In an independent Guåhan, I envision the CHamoru values of na’lå’la’ and inafa’matatnga 
as being the core of security policy development. Lina’la’ in CHamoru means “life” and lå’la’ 
                                               
21 Sankaran Krishna, “Decolonizing International Relations,” E-International Relations, October 8, 2012, accessed 
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means “living.” The na’ in na’lå’la’ is a causative prefix meaning “to make one or to cause one 
to,” so collectively “na’lå’la” translates to “to give life” which is embodied in the CHamoru 
language revitalization quote, “Na’lå’la’ i Fino’-ta!,” meaning “Give Life To Our Language!” As 
argued in this dissertation, slow death, violence, and purposeful limitation have been the effects of 
U.S. national security interests and power projection in Guåhan. A genuine CHamoru security will 
be rooted in the understanding that security has been a scary word for our lives in the past and that 
future security policy should not take part in this agenda of slow death. I envision the main 
questions of future security policy being, “Does this give life or take it away? If it does take life 
away, how so?” For example, if future lawmakers in an independent Guåhan ever proposed 
building a wharf for naval vessels, and subsequently proposed dredging a reef for military 
purposes, a CHamoru-rooted approach to security would consider this dredging a security threat 
to the island and its people. Another example is that in an independent Guåhan, military and 
technological innovation research would not overpower the ability of the government’s budget to 
provide food for its school children via budget allocations, as this would also be a security threat 
to our national self-interest of na’lå’la’.  
 Na’lå’la’ as a guiding principle of security policy will not just be used as a litmus test for 
proposals, but will also be utilized for the development of new policies, programs, and initiatives. 
To put it differently, na’lå’la’ will not just be invoked as a gatekeeper for the passing of policies, 
but also as an inspiration for creation. This fits well with the genuine security definition provided 
in the introduction from the group, Women For Genuine Security. To reiterate, they describe 
genuine security, “We work toward the creation of a society free of militarism, violence, and all 
forms of sexual exploitation, and for the safety, well-being, and long-term sustainability of our 
communities.”23 Na’lå’la’ can help to truly develop a security policy rooted in a sustainable self-
determination. For example, I envision na’lå’la’ being invoked to create coding classes for 
                                               
23 Women For Genuine Security, http://www.genuinesecurity.org/index.html 
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Guåhan’s youth as a way to prepare them for the cyberfuture, to help get them into higher education 
programs, and to help develop cyberdefense strategies for protecting Guåhan’s assets. 
Furthermore, na’lå’la’ could also be invoked to support the creation of community gardens in the 
name of food security or the creation of arts programs for mental health purposes.  
 The second core concept of genuine CHamoru security that I envision is inafa’matatnga. 
There is a core value in CHamoru, inafa’maolek. The etymology of the word is as follows: maolek 
means “good,” fa’maolek includes the addition of the fa’ prefix which can be translated to “to 
make it appear as,” or “to make it so,” thus fa’maolek meaning “to make it good.” Afa’maolek is 
the next step, the “a” prefix acts as a reciprocal marker in the CHamoru language, thus afa’maolek 
translates to “making good for one another.” Lastly, inafa’maolek includes the -in- infix which 
nominalizes a word, thus inafa’maolek translates to “the process of making good for one another.” 
Taking from this core value, I advocate for a modification of this value: inafa’matatnga. Matatnga 
translates to “brave, fearless, and valiant,” with inafa’matatnga meaning “the process of making 
one another brave and valiant.” This modification comes from my disillusionment with the 
commodification and abuse of inafa’maolek. Inafa’maolek in Guåhan has been utilized as an 
interchangeable word for hospitality and open-armed natives ready to embrace what comes their 
way. Haunani-Kay Trask puts this perfectly in the context of Hawaiʻi and the word Aloha, writing,  
The point, of course, is that everything in Hawaiʻi can be yours, that is, you the tourists, 
the non-Natives, the visitors. The place, the people, the culture, even our identity as a 
“Native” people is for sale. Thus the word “Aloha” is employed as an aid in the constant 
hawking of everything Hawaiian. In truth, this use of aloha is so far removed from any 
Hawaiian cultural context that is, literally, meangingless.24 
In a similar fashion, inafa’maolek has been stripped by the mainstream of its deep cultural meaning 
and has instead been used to represent CHamorus as generous, friendly, and welcoming. Thus, the 
invocation of inafa’matatnga is rather important in establishing another core value that is more 
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difficult to co-opt and that can help CHamorus move forward in challenging colonialism and 
imperialism.  
 I envision inafa’matatnga being used as a criterion for security policy with the two primary 
questions being, “Does this policy replicate the colonialism and insecurity of the past?” and “Does 
this policy or plan help to protect from outside colonialism and imperialism?” For example, the 
development of a cyberdefense program will fit the inafa’matatnga criterion of helping to prevent 
outside imperialism and take over by a foreign international actor. The development of naval 
vessels and technology could fit the inafa’matatnga criterion, but this is why the invocation of 
na’lå’la’ as the other core guiding principle of security policy in an independent Guåhan is so 
important. Passing one critetion alone does not qualify something as sound security policy as it 
will need to pass both criteria of na’lå’la’ and inafa’matatnga. Returning to the naval vessel 
example, if it was determined that building naval vessels and technology capacity can help defend 
against outside interference and imperialism, an independent Guåhan would then ask whether the 
development of those naval vessels would take too much of the fiscal budget away from schools 
and social programs or whether the port where they would be stationed would require a substantive 
amount of environmental degradation. Overall, these two values can act as guiding principles of a 
CHamoru-rooted and centered conception of security.  
It is important to point out that this CHamoru-centered, Hau’ofian vision of security is not 
antithetical to defensive realism, but in many ways, can fit into the model. In his article, “Security 
Seeking under Anarchy,” Jeffrey Taliaferro writes that, “The defensive variant of neoclassical 
realism posits a role for domestic politics in shaping states’ foreign policies. Furthermore, 
defensive neoclassical realism specifies the conditions under which domestic politics matters in 
foreign policy.”25 This helps to show the complete compatibility of creating CHamoru-centered 
domestic policies that can spill over to an independent Guåhan’s foreign policy as well.   
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The next question one could ask is “What models of defense would be good to take after?” 
To begin, I look at the small state of Estonia. Estonia is a Baltic state bordered by Latvia, and of 
primary importance to Estonia, Russia. A former part of the USSR, when Estonia achieved 
independence in 1991, they ordered the withdrawal of Russian troops from their territory and 
turned to NATO for security guarantees rather than Russia. This, along with many other factors 
and history, has made the Russia-Estonia relationship tense with Estonians wondering how they 
would defend themselves against immediate Russian attack or invasion. The Estonians take this 
potential threat seriously and have engaged in various activities aimed at defending their territory, 
sovereignty, and ensuring the survival of their people. I argue that an independent Guåhan, in 
conjunction with other countries of Oceania, can adapt these tactics. 
“Her face puffy from lack of sleep, Vivika Barnabas peered down at the springs, rods and 
other parts of a disassembled assault rifle spread before her. Already, she and her three teammates 
had put out a fire, ridden a horse, identified medicinal herbs from the forest and played hide-and-
seek with gun-wielding ‘enemies’ in the woods at night.”26 This news story is referring to the 
activities of the Estonian Defense League (EDL), an organization of more than 25,000 Estonian 
volunteers dedicated to training themselves to be prepared for a possible Russian invasion. The 
EDL teaches their members insurgency tactics such as making improvised explosive devices and 
keeping firearms in their homes as well as survival skills like identifying edible and medicinal 
herbs and moving wounded people by horseback.27 They hold “military games” almost every 
weekend and take their role very seriously, with members saying they are engaging in their 
“everyday contribution to security.”28 Estonian Brigadier General Meelis Killi, who is the head of 
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the Estonian Defense League, believes that “the best deterrent is not only armed soldiers, but armed 
citizens, too.”29   
The military doctrine behind this strategy can be summed up in the words of Madis Milling, 
MP and Lieutenant of the Estonian Defence League who said in an interview with VICE News, “If 
Russia knows that Estonia is not a walk in the park, maybe they will think twice.”30 In military 
doctrine terminology, this strategy is referred to as porcupining. As Bernard FW Loo writes 
regarding porcupining and the island nation of Singapore: “The idea was that, like the porcupine 
rustling its quills and preventing hostile actors from causing harm to its body, the Singapore Armed 
Forces could defeat a hostile opponent even before this hostile opponent got close enough to direct 
deadly forces against the island.”31 To put it another way, the idea behind porcupining is becoming 
a pill too hard to swallow and thus providing a deterrence factor and making more powerful 
countries second guess possible aggression towards your country. 
However powerful Estonia’s example may be for a nufo’ defense model, they are located 
in a completely different part of the world and are not an island. To supplement this model, it 
would be helpful to look at how this porcupine strategy works in island nations located in the 
Pacific Ocean. First, we will examine the defense strategy and military philosophy of Singapore. 
On January 9, 1982, Brigadier General Lee Hsien Loong at the National University of Singapore 
outlined his vision of porcupining. In this speech, he said,  
If someone threatens to step on us, and our only alternatives are suicide or surrender, then 
there will be a very strong argument for surrender. So, we need a policy which says: If 
you come I’ll whack you, and I’ll survive. This is a workable strategy. I may not 
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completely destroy you, but you will have to pay a high price for trying to subdue me, 
and you may still not succeed.32 
This evolved from Singapore’s previous defense analogy of a poisonous shrimp. In the poisonous 
shrimp strategy, Singapore would be “easy to swallow, but impossible to digest.”33 In other words, 
“while Singapore could not resist a determined invader, the cost of any victory to an invader would 
be so high as to be an effective deterrent.”34 In explaining the reason for shifting from the 
“Poisonous Shrimp” strategy to the “Porcupine” strategy, Bernard Loo writes that the “Poisonous 
Shrimp” strategy was not satisfactory because it was “essentially defeatist; it envisaged the 
eventual defeat of Singapore and its disappearance. Its deterrent value was in the promise of great 
pain that the potential aggressor would suffer in the process of defeating the SAF, but that defeat 
was virtually guaranteed.”35 
 In switching their defense strategy to porcupining, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) have 
developed some new tactics for national defense and have increased their material capabilities. 
Advocates of the porcupining strategy argue for “hardening key facilities and using mobile short-
range defensive weapons to deny airspace, repel an invasion, and defy a blockade.”36 One of the 
first moves that Singapore made was adopting the system of national conscription where every 18-
year old male who was able bodied was eligible for military service. Now, the Singapore Armed 
Forces has roughly 60,500 active military members and 213,800 reservists.37 In addition to the 
building of their military, Singapore has also engaged in security cooperation initiatives with other 
countries to enhance their national interests. For example, they engage in border cooperation with 
Malaysia and Indonesia, intelligence sharing with other Association of Southeast Asian Nation 
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(ASEAN) states, sharing training facilities with other countries due to their lack of physical space 
available in Singapore, multiple joint military exercises, and bilateral defense agreements with 
countries such as Australia and Israel.38 
 The reason for studying Singapore’s hard power and defense arrangements is that, like 
Guåhan, they are also potential victims of geography. Singapore is located near the southern end 
of the Straits of Malacca, which are by one of the busiest sea-lanes of the world. Because of this 
geography, they are the world’s leading telecommunications hub and gateway to the region for air 
travelers.39 Singapore is also located at the juncture of the Indian and the Pacific oceans, and this 
was a primary reason that Britain made Singapore its chief naval port in the region to safeguard its 
interests. It is also the only place in Southeast Asia that can service aircraft carriers and where 
these same aircraft carriers can dock onshore.40 Yet, they have developed a deterrence capability 
and philosophy that does not just accept typical geographical determinism that characterizes them 
as small and important only as strategically exploitable by larger countries.  
 Like Estonia or Singapore, I argue that an independent Guåhan in the nufo’ model can 
follow similar steps of small-state defense strategies and military doctrine. Some guiding 
principles of small-state defense can be found in a report entitled, “Vulnerability: Small States in 
the Globalised Society.” In this report, the authors describe a number of measures to reduce the 
vulnerabilities of small states, including: “a. strengthening national defense capability, b. entering 
into defense arrangements with other states either on a bilateral, special multilateral or regional 
basis, c. underpinning security through economic growth by adopting sound national policies as 
well as advancing regional cooperation, d. promoting internal cohesion, and e. adopting a sound 
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diplomacy at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.”41 In my vision, an independent Guåhan, in 
adopting a Hau’ofian, defensive realist approach towards security can work with other Oceanic 
countries in collective military technology development, create large multilateral defense and 
security alliances with these same countries, utilize our strategic, geographical location for our 
benefit rather than the benefit of larger powers, create sound domestic policies that reflect a 
widened view of security inclusive of respect for i guinaha-ta (what we have), and lastly, be a 
primarily neutral country that does not fall into the liberal trap of invading countries to promote 
democracy or human rights. Instead of being the “tip of the spear,” I envision us being the “spines 
of the stonefish.” If the facts of geography are never-changing, then we need to use them to our 
advantage.  
 In envisioning this concept of the nufo’, I took a step back and wondered whether or not 
all I was doing was replacing one form of militarization with another. This is a very tempting 
argument, especially by certain peace activists who disdain any martial characteristics. In a 
conversation with Jairus Grove, I told him about this dilemna and he provided me with some wise 
words. He told me, “a martial life is not necessarily a militarized life and that the problem is that 
we think that everything that looks like a military acts like the American military.”42 Military 
capability does not have to equate to invading others or forcing our moral views on other states or 
peoples. Demilitarization should not be equated with helplessness or being defenseless. In 
choosing to model Guåhan foreign policy after defensive realism, it is the defensive capability that 
is emphasized. Defensive realism and stonefish geopolitics inspires us to understand that not every 
defense capability is offensive. Warriors or militaries of the West do not have the monopoly on 
protection. It would be naïve to believe that Guåhan should remain completely defenseless because 
weapons, martial characters, and national defense are the exclusive characteristics of the West.  
                                               
41 Commonwealth Consultative Group, Vulnerability: Small States in the Global Society (London: Commonwealth 
Secretariat: 1985).  
42 Jairus Grove, interview, April 16, 2017.  
 296 
There will be some who argue that we should not have our own military or prioritize 
security alliances or military technology. They will look at the world and point out states like Costa 
Rica or Tuvalu and argue that a country without a military is not new, experimental, or unique, 
and that it is the route we should take. I heavily caution against such an idealist view of the world, 
particularly in the northern, western Pacific. Being situated in the region that is purported to be the 
region of the future, great power politics, neocolonialism, and imperialism will all be factors of 
the future. Having our own alliances and military capabilities does not mean that we will simply 
reinvent the wheel of oppressive militarization, but rather create a protected Oceania. There is still 
a lot of research to be done such as the promises and perils of alliances, the particulars of maritime 
and cyber defense technologies, the history of movements like the Nuclear Free and Independent 
Pacific and the Non-Aligned Movement, and even how to move other countries to engage with 
this idea of the nufo’, as they may be resistant to such a seemingly large shift from the 
bandwagoning with larger countries that this region is sorely used to.  
I also want to point out that one of the most realistic options for defense could be a 
“Bilateral agreement with the United States.” I could have written how the gaining of our 
sovereignty means we will be able to control their presence in Guåhan much more easily. I could 
have argued that we can just be like the FSM with the United States or like Papua New Guinea 
with Australia. Yet, I do not find this to be a satisfactory answer, and truly believe it is the epitome 
of putting a band-aid on an infected wound. I wanted to explore an answer that can be achievable 
one day even if that day is not today. I completely understand that neither I or my daughter may 
be alive when this vision comes into fruition. I also understand that this writing may end up in a 
published book that sits on dusty bookshelves for years. Yet, maybe one day, someone will pick it 
up and bring it to life.  
This conclusion has not tackled every single issue presented in the dissertation nor has it 
provided solutions to every problem. I, quite honestly, do not know all the answers and do not 
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pretend to know. What I have presented in this conclusion is a patchwork of ideas, theories, hopes, 
and concerns about Guåhan’s future paths. May you, the reader, pick up where I left off, correct 
me where I am wrong, or at least, just be inspired to keep fighting the good fight for a better 
Guåhan! Through this conclusion, what I hope to inspire in you, the reader, is that we need more 
of us at the forefront of the fight over how we know who we are. In this dissertation, I have 
provided countless examples of quotes justifying violence and the use of power due to indigenous 
inferiority, island isolation and diminutive size, or our complete erasure. These quotes reflect a 
dominant frame of mind that legitimizes violence, colonialism, and militarization of our lands, 
waters, ways of life, and cultures. In providing a genealogy of sustainable insecurity in Guåhan, I 
challenge the reader to take up the mantle of excavating insecurity in their communities and to 
create new knowledges, narratives, and forms-of-life for our peoples. Our grandchildren may thank 
us one day for it.  
I Ettimo Na Finiho’ Siha: A Final Story, A Final Plea, A New Letter 
One warm Guåhan weekend, my daughter Inina and I were playing outside in my backyard. 
It was around 5:00 p.m. and it was a beautiful day with the wind blowing and the hot sun preparing 
for its rest. Then, as I pushed my daughter on the swing we bought her, a loud noise came overhead, 
and we saw a large, black plane breaking the sound barrier and flying above us. My daughter 
immediately got scared and wanted me to carry her. Seeping past the piercing decibels of B-52s 
taking off with the weight of 15 million pounds of munitions lies the CHamoru voice waiting to 
be heard. Beneath the curse of our lack of sovereignty and the manipulation of our geographical 
size and location, true genuine security for the CHamoru people is waiting. Truly, Guåhan deserves 
a future in which geography is our blessing and not our curse. Guåhan deserves a future where we 
take the cartographic pens away from the Pentagon and map our own policies and paths. My 
daughter deserves a future where all she can hear is the sweet wind blowing in her face as she 
swings in her childhood backyard. To that end, we cannot stop fighting for our right to self-
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determination, even in the face of the increasing strategic importance of the island in American 
strategic thought regarding the Asia-Pacific region. To do any less, feels too much like giving into 
the self-fulfilling prophecy that we are just “Destiny’s Landfall.” Let us not forget that the “tip of 
the spear” is always the bloodiest.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
I lahi-hu as Matatnga Gregorio, 
Annai hu cho’gue iyo-ku thesis gi 2012, hu na’funhåyan ayu taiguini lokkue’. Hu tuge’i i 
che’lu-mu as Inina ya hu sangåni gui’ na put guiya na hu tutuge’ ayu na tinige’. Para este na 
dissertation, hu tutuge’ este para hamyo na dos i patgon-hu siha. Gi minagåhet, annai hu sodda’ 
na mapotge si nanå–mu, magof yu’ yan triste yu’ gi mismo tiempo. Magof yu’ sa’ kumekeilek-ña 
na u guaha otro patgon-hu yan gof na’magof enao, lao triste yu’ lokkue’ sa’ chathinanasso yu’ 
put håfa na klåssen mundo para un hålumi. Hu hasso un diha annai sumåsaga ham yan si nanå-
hu giya Hawai‘i, tumåtanges yu’ annai hu hassuyi i tiempon mo’na para i tano’-ta yan i mundo 
lokkue’. Hu faisen maisa yu’ kao maolek na para u guaha otro påtgon-hu pat kao båba este para 
i patgon-hu? Håfa na klåsen tåno’ para un hålumi? Håfa i chinatsaga ni para un fåna’ gi lina’lå’-
mu ni tåya’ na hu hasso pat hu tungo’ gi lina’lå’-hu. Gi finakpo’ i diha, ti siña hu tulaika todu i 
malago’ hu tulaika, lao ginen este na tinige’-hu, hu fa’nunu’i hao na hu chachagi tumulaika håfa 
siña hu cho’gue nu i todu i nina’siña-hu. Un diha, siempre para un taitai este, yan yanggen låla’la’ 
yu’ guihi na tiempo, puedi mohon na un sangåni yu’ na guaha adilåntu yan gof magof hao na in 
na’i hao lina’la’. Yanggen un taitai este, yan båbaba ha’ i tano’ ni un sagågayi, pues dispensa’ 
yu’ låhi-hu, put fåbot, asi’i yu’ ya tungo’ na hu gof guaiya hamyo yan i che’lu-mu. Sungon ha’ sa’ 
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